
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A MANUAL

OF THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

TENNEMANN,

59583
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BY

THE REV. ARTHUR JOHNSON, M.A.

REVISED, ENLARGED, AND CONTINUED,

BY

J. R. MORELL.

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PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

The basis of the present edition of Tennemann's Manual of the History of Philosophy will be found in the Rev. Arthur Johnson's translation, printed at Oxford in 1832. Since that time a revised edition of the original work has been published at Leipzic, and M. Cousin has issued a new and improved edition of his French version. Both these have been carefully consulted and compared.

Mr. Johnson, though entitled to commendation on the score of elegance and perspicuity, is open to the charge of inaccuracy. This might be expected: few men were competent to such a task at that period. Now, however, the case is different. England has become familiar with the German mind, through the many valuable philosophical works and translations which have appeared or become accessible during the last twenty years; and most of the recondite terms have received conventional renderings. Notwithstanding these advantages, however, it is still no easy task to give at once a readable and accurate English rendering of German Metaphysics. The translator's office is at no time a sinecure. He has to retain the author's thoughts, and at the same time to clothe them in appropriate diction, in a sometimes widely diverging dialect. These remarks apply with two-fold force to scientific works. The subtlety of the German tongue and thought renders it nearly impossible to do justice to every shade of expression. Indeed, the only chance of correctly interpreting many of their peculiar phrases is by coining new words or enlisting them from foreign languages.

Tennemann, being himself a Kantian, naturally views the History of Philosophy with a Kantian bias. Hence, the reader would do well to acquire some previous acquaintance with Kant's principles and terminology, by consulting the sections on his Philosophy at page 400 and seq. (§ 388-395.) With the view of further elucidation, an explanatory vocabulary of some of the principal Kantian expressions is subjoined at page vii.

The revision of Johnson's text, was, however, only a portion of the editor's task. Besides having to incorporate the additions given by Professor Wendt in the last edition of the original work, he has continued the development of German philosophy to its latest manifestation,—'the Will's Phases' of Schopenhauer and Planeke. He has also given a view of the latest divarications of the New Hegelian School, as exemplified in Strauss and Feuerbach. Many valuable additions have been furnished by Carrière's *Buch der Weltweisheit*, and some, particularly the sections on Italian, Russian, and Swedo-Danish philosophy, by Blakey's History of the Philosophy of Mind.

It remained also for the editor to introduce several systems which have recently obtained currency in the empire of thought. Emanuel Swedenborg was a man of too remarkable a mould, and his system too original, to be overlooked in a work professing to develope the psychological manifestations of human nature. The science of Animal Magnetism too, is now so well authenticated, and has already disclosed such remarkable phenomena in the spiritual constitution of man, that it was incumbent on the editor to give some account of it.

The French School of Mystical Socialism which has arisen within the last twenty or thirty years, claimed especial notice from the important influence it has exerted on the political condition of modern Europe. Charles Fourier was a genius of too rare a flight, and too penetrating a cast, to be altogether passed over. A short section has been added, insufficient to do justice to his merits, and perhaps defects. The works of Pierre Leroux and Comte have also received some little of the notice which their merits and influence deserve.

Some original matter has been added on the Idealistic and Inductive or Empirical Schools, which have lately stood forth and measured their strength in England; also chapters on the American contributions to Philosophy, and on the disputed science of Phrenology.

It has long been the distinction of England to take the lead in the invention, improvement, and application of whatever is practical and useful; but she has, at the same time, laboured under the reproach that, through a spirit of stolid finality, she has been dragging in the rear of Continental Europe in the sublimer walks of science. We trust it will be so no more; and that, theoretically as well as practically, she will vindicate her proper place among the nations.

J. R. M.

A Vocabulary of some principal Kantian and other Metaphysical Terms.

The most remarkable division of the human mind, in Kant's system is, that into:

Vernunft. The Intuitional Faculty, or Reason, which he divides into theoretical and practical, and which gives birth to Ideas, (*Ideen*) the highest perceptions of the mind, which are innate, but stimulated into action by Experience.

Verstand. Understanding or Intellect; also divided into theoretical and practical; the parent of Conceptions or Notions (*Begriffe*), which are the generalizations of Thought, and mediate representations of things. They are divided into conceptions derived from Experience, and conceptions derived from the Understanding itself.

Under the operations of the mind we find the following terms:

Anschauung, rendered, in this edition, by Intuitional and Sensational Perception, gives immediate representations of things.

Vorstellung. Representation (the Greek *φαντασία*), applies to Intuitional and Sensational Perceptions, and also to conceptions which are their generalizations.

Erkenntniss. Cognition, representing the active co-operation of the Intellect bearing on the object presented by Sensational and Intuitional Perception.

Gefühl has been translated Emotion and Feeling.

Wissen. Science; sometimes Knowledge, but never Cognition.

A marked feature of Kant's, and indeed of all modern German philosophy, is the division of the universe of things into *Subjective* and *Objective*.

The *Subjective* implies the internal individual element, in perception, feeling, and knowledge. It must be referred to its centre and source;—*Das Ich*, translated the *Ego*, I or Me, implying the Percipient Self-hood.

The *Objective* is the externally-caused element in our perception and knowledge, derivable from the *Nicht-Ich—Non-Ego;* or in plain English, from without.

Another broad distinction in the Transcendental School i that between

Das Seyn, translated *Esse*, or Being, and signifying bare, empt Existence, admitting of no predicates; and

Das Wesen. Real concrete Existence, or Essence manifested i Qualified or Conditional Nature.

Das Werden. The *Esse* in a state of action, *i. e.* active Exist ence; differing from it as dynamical from static electricity.

Das Absolute, the Absolute, explains itself as the contrast to th *Relative*, and implies the Ground and Real Principal an Basis of all things.

The editor has also been reduced to the necessity of coin ing a few words, in order to give an adequate rendering o the author's thoughts. Thus he has translated—

Denkbarkeit. Thinkableness; Capacity of being thought.

Erkennt. Cognized; (a word for which we have the sanction o Sir William Hamilton.)

Teleologisch = Teleological. The science of the adaptation of means to ends. Final Causes.

Apodiktik = Apodiktik. Demonstration.

Pädagogik = Pædagogik. The Science of Education.

Æsthetik = Æsthetics. Theory of the Fine Arts.

Propädeutik = Propædeutik. Introductory Preparation.

Moment = Momentum. This term was borrowed from Mechanics by Hegel (See his Wissenschaft der Logik, vol 3, p. 104, ed. 1841). He employs it to denote the two contending forces which are mutually dependent, and whose contradiction forms an equation. Hence his formula *Esse* = Nothing. Here *Esse* and Nothing are momentums, giving birth to *Werden*, i.e. Existence. Thus the momentum contributes to the same oneness of operation in contradictory forces that we see in Mechanics, amidst contrast and diversity, in weight and distance, in the case of the balance.

Potenz. Potency or degree. (Schelling's term for the Serial Order).

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A MANUAL

OF THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

THE history of philosophy, if treated conformably with the end in view, implies an enquiry regarding the conception of the science, coupling with it a view of its contents, form, and end; and also of its scope, method, value, and the various modes in which it may be handled. These objects, together with the history and literature of the history of philosophy, combined with some preliminary remarks on the progress of the philosophizing reason, afford the contents of a general introduction to the history of philosophy.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

CHARACTER, EXTENT, METHOD, IMPORTANCE, DIVISION, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY* OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

I. *Character of the History of Philosophy.*

† CH. LEONH. REINHOLD, On the Character of the History of Philosophy, in the Collection of Fülleborn; Fasc. I. (12 fasc. *Jena*, 1791–9).

† GEO. FRED. DAN. GOESS, Essay on the Character of the History of Philosophy, and on the System of Thales, *Erlangen*, 1794, 8vo., with a sketch of the proper limits of the History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1798, 8vo.

* The titles of the German and French works are in most instances given in English, although no translation may have been published. The reader will be governed as to whether the works are English or Foreign by the places where they are printed.

† CHRIST. AUG. GROHMANN, On the Character of the History of Philosophy, *Wittenberg*, 1797, 8vo.

† W. G. TENNEMANN, History of Philosophy, vol. i, *Leips.* 1798, 8vo.

DAN. BOETHIUS, De ideâ Historiæ Philosophiæ rite formandâ, *Upsal*, 1800, 4to.

† FRED. AUG. CARUS, Observations towards a History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1809.

† CH. FRED. BACHMANN, On Philosophy and its History; three Academic lectures; *Jena*, 1811, 8vo. On the History of Philosophy, second edition, remodelled, with a dedication to Reinhold, *Jena*, 1820, 8vo.

† CHRIST. AUG. BRANDIS, On the Character of the History of Philosophy, *Copenhagen*, 1815, 8vo.

† H. RITTER, Introduction to his History of Philosophy (contained in vol. i. of Ritter's History of Philosophy, translated by A. J. W. MORRISON, 4 vols. 8vo. *Oxford* and *London*, BOHN, 1838–1846.)

2. Man, from the constitution of his reason, strives after systematic completeness in his knowledge, and consequently seeks to attain to a *science of the ultimate principles and laws of nature and freedom, as also of their mutual relations*. In the first instance he is impelled in this course by a blind instinct, without duly appreciating the problem and office of reason; and knows not in what way, by what means, or to what extent the end is to be attained. Gradually his efforts become more enlightened, and are determined in accordance with the progressive development of self-knowledge through the reason. This effort of reflection is named the act of *philosophizing*.

3. Various attempts of thinkers result from this endeavour to approximate to this Idea of reason, or to realize it in thought. These attempts differ more or less from each other as regards their principles, method, logical consequence, their result, and the scope and general character of their objects. The thinking reason developes itself in conformity to its own law in these attempts, which, when they present themselves in a perfectly scientific form, are entitled *Philosophical Systems*. The value of these systems naturally varies according to the degree of intellectual culture, and to the point of view of the several speculators, and of the age in which they lived.

[1] WEILLER, Kajet. über das Verhältniss der Philos. Versuche zur Philos. (Schulschrift, 1812) in dem zweit. Bd. der akad. Reden und Abhandlungen, 1822, 8vo.

4. But the development of human reason is not called forth without external excitement; it is consequently dependent on external causes, since its activity is either favoured or impeded by the various impulses it receives from without.

5. The history of philosophy consists, in fact, in the chronicling of the multifarious efforts to realize this Idea of reason as regards substance and form. It shews how these efforts sprang from the development of reason, and how they were promoted or checked by external causes in endeavouring to give a footing to philosophy as a science.

6. The material with which the history of philosophy has to deal is *internal* and *external*. The *internal* or immediate material comprises, in the first place, the continued *application* of *reason* to the investigation of the ultimate principles and laws of Nature and Liberty; for the act of philosophizing consists in this. And here great distinctions are to be traced in regard to subject and object,[1] to the extensive application and intensive force of the philosophizing energy,—to internal aims and motives (noble or interested) as also to external causes and occasions. This material comprises, secondly; *the products of the act of philosophizing*, or the *philosophical Opinions, Methods, and Systems*, which are quite as manifold as the efforts from which they proceed. The reason obtains, through these means, continually, more genuine materials for philosophy as a science, as well as rules and principles for the welding of the same into a scientific whole, besides Maxims to direct our search for Philosophy. Thirdly, it comprehends *the development of the Reason*, as the organ of philosophy, or, in other words, the impulse of reason to spontaneous research according to fixed laws, by means of an internal instinct and external occasions. In this development will be traced the gradual progress manifested by individuals, by nations, and the thinking

[1] The philosophical signification of *subject* and *object*, in German Metaphysics, may be popularly defined as identical with spirit or mind, i.e. the percipient, and nature, or the thing perceived. In a strict sense the subject is the *Ego*, or percipient, which may become its own object, as the *Me*, as well as other things. *Schelling* and *Hegel* identify the subject and object (*Identitätslehre*), but Kant drew a marked line of separation between them.—See Preface.

portion of mankind; thus constituting an important anthropological phase of the history of philosophy.

The history of *philosophical systems* does not amount to a *history of philosophy.*

7. The external material consists in those causes, events, and circumstances, which have exerted an influence on the development of philosophic reason, and the character of its produce. Amongst these we may enumerate: first, the individuality of the philosopher; i. e. the degree, the relation, and the tendency of their intellectual powers, the sphere of their thoughts and lives, the interests that governed them, and even their moral character. Secondly may be noticed, the influence of external circumstances on this individuality, such as the character and the degree of mental cultivation of their respective countries, the prevailing spirit of the age, and, more remotely perhaps, the climate and constitution of the country,[1] education, political government, religion,[2] and language.[3] In the third place we may enumerate the influence of individuals (through the medium of admiration and imitation of their example) on the interests, the tendency, the peculiar objects, the shape, and method of succeeding researches. This influence is variously modified according to the intellectual character, to the consideration and celebrity of the schools that were established, and according to writings, their form and contents. (Bacon, Locke, Leibnitz.)

8. The *form* of the history of philosophy consists in the suitable arrangement of these two classes of materials, so as to make one scientific whole. Nevertheless, the result is modified, partly by the end of history in general, and partly by the special end of the history of philosophy.

9. History, in its most limited sense, is distinguished, as respects *form*, from mere annals and memoirs, &c., by the concatenation of events and their scientific exposition; i. e. the laws that govern their development.

[1] On the influence of climate and country on thought, see HERDER'S Philosophy of the History of Man. An English translation, 2 vols. 8vo., appeared in 1803.

[2] For the influence of religion on philosophy, see FR. V. SCHLEGEL'S Philosophy of History. A translation by ROBERTSON, Bohn, 1850. PABST'S Der Mensch und seine Geschichte, 8vo. *Wien*, 1847.

[3] For the influence of Language on philosophy, see W. V. HUMBOLDT'S Sprachwissenschaft, 1 vol. 4to. *Berlin*, 1848.

10. To enable the history of philosophy to satisfy an enlightened curiosity, not merely a vain and idle one, its object ought to be thoroughly to explore, through its continual alternations of improvement and declension, the progress of a philosophic spirit, and the gradual development of philosophy as a science. This end cannot be attained by a mere acquaintance with historic facts, but rather by contemplating their mutual dependence, and connecting their causes and effects.

11. The efforts of philosophic reason are internal to the mind; but by their publication, and the influence they exert on the world without, they assume the character and enter into the combinations of *external* facts. The facts, therefore, which form a groundwork for the history of philosophy may be regarded as both external and internal; because, 1st. They stand in connection with chronology, as successive or contemporaneous events. 2dly. They have their external effects and causes. 3dly. They have their origin in the constitution of the human mind, developing themselves in a variety of combinations and mutual relations. 4thly. They have reference to an object of the reason.

12. The *formal* character, therefore, of a history of philosophy will be modified according to the above four-fold relation, and by its proper end, which is to demonstrate at once circumstantially and with a scientific view, the causes of every revolution, and its consequences.

Observation. The circumstantial account does not consist merely in a chronological statement of a series of facts, but assumes such a series as its text and groundwork. It is very compatible with a scientific character in the history of philosophy; at the same time that it must be borne in mind, that a history of philosophy is not philosophy itself. See the work of Grohmann cited above, at the head of § 2.

13. Consequently, the history of philosophy is the science which details the efforts of the human reason to realise the idea of philosophy, by exhibiting them in their mutual dependency: it is a scientific exposition of facts illustrating the gradual development of philosophy, as a science.

Observation. There is a difference to be observed between the history of philosophy, and the history of mankind, the history of the cultivatisn of the human understanding, and the history of the sciences. The biography of philosophers, the examination of their writings, the state-

ment of their opinions, and the bibliographical history of philosophy in general, are either preliminary lights and aids, or constituent parts, of the history of philosophy.

II. *Comprehensiveness and Commencement of the History of Philosophy.*

See, in addition to the works cited above, at the head of § 2, † BÖRGE RISBRIGH, on the Antiquity of Philosophy, and the character of this Science, translated from the Danish into German by J. AMB. MARKUSSEN, *Copenh.* 1803, 8vo.

14. The history of philosophy does not affect to comprehend all the ideas, hypotheses, and caprices which have found a place in minds addicted to philosophic researches; such an attempt would be equally impracticable and unprofitable. The only philosophic opinions which deserve to be recorded are those which may claim to be so for their originality, their intrinsic worth, or their influence in their own and subsequent epochs.

15. It must be granted that philosophy has had a *beginning*, because it is nothing else than a superior degree of energy and activity in the reason, which must have been preceded by an inferior. But it is not necessary that the history of philosophy should embrace all its first efforts, or ascend up to the very cradle of our species. This is, in fact, its point of contact with the history of humanity and of the human understanding. See the so-called *Philosophia antediluviana.*

16. No sufficient reason has been alleged to induce a belief in the existence of a Primitive Philosophic People, with whom philosophy might be supposed to have commenced, and from whom all philosophic knowledge might have emanated; for an aptness to philosophise is natural to the human mind, and has not been reserved exclusively for any one people. The very hypothesis of such a people would remove only one step farther the question of the origin of philosophy. Nor must we dignify with the name of science the symbolical notions of some of the earlier races, which did not as yet clearly apprehend and grasp their objects with a full consciousness.

Observation. The idea of a Primitive Philosophic People is founded: 1st. On the hypothesis that all instruction came by revelation. 2ndly. In the tendency of the understanding to refer correspondent facts to the

same origin. 3rdly. In the attempt to render certain doctrines more venerable by their high antiquity. The general cause is to be sought in the indolence natural to human nature, and the habit of confounding opinions which have a semblance of philosophy with philosophy itself. The writers who have devoted themselves to the critical examination of history with a theological view, have declared the Hebrews to be the primitive race; others (like Plessing) the Egyptians; and these last have recently (since the writings of Fred. Schlegel), been displaced by the Hindoos.

17. Although we discover in every people the traces of philosophic thinking, nevertheless this general disposition does not appear to have developed itself in all in an equal degree: nor has philosophy among all attained to the character of a science. In general, it seems as if nature employed the mental cultivation of one nation as the means of cultivating others, and accorded only to a *few* the distinction of originality in philosophizing. Consequently, all nations have not an equal claim to a place in the history of this science. The first belongs to those among whom the spirit of philosophy, originally aided by a slight external impulse, has felt itself sufficiently strong to advance to independent researches, and to gain ground in the paths of science; the second belongs to such as, without possessing so much originality and spontaneous exertion, have adopted philosophic ideas from others,—have made them their own, and thereby exerted an influence over the destinies of philosophy.

18. The Greeks are the nation whose originality of genius has created an era in the history of this science. In fact, although they were dependent for part of their first civilization on other nations, and have received from foreigners certain materials and incitements to the study of philosophy, we can perceive that they evinced themselves a lively and sincere interest in the investigations of reason, and among them this curiosity assumed a scientific character, and imparted the same to the language itself. It is among the Greeks, then, that we find for the first time a truly philosophic spirit united to literature and good taste, and a a scientific spirit of investigation which centered in the contemplation of the Nature of Man; which direction also was easily able to lead back the spirit of research from its wanderings to the true source of philosophic inquiry—γνῶθι σεαυτόν. To this succeeded the desire of investigating to

the end and consolidating these first bases of study (the origin this of *scepticism*); and at length ensued the formation of a philosophic language and method. We have moreover positive and certain testimonies to enable us to follow, on grounds altogether historical, the origin and development of the philosophic literature of this nation. We may add that the philosophy, and in general, the science of the Greeks, naturally combine and form a whole with those of more recent nations.

19. The Orientals, prior to the Greeks in point of antiquity and the date of their civilization, never attained to the same eminence, at least as far as we are enabled to judge. Their doctrines were constantly invested with the character of *Revelation*, diversified by the imagination under a thousand different aspects. Even among the Hindoos they wear a form altogether mystical and symbolical. It was the genius of these nations to clothe in the colours of the fancy the convictions of the reason, and a certain number of speculative notions, more or less capriciously conceived, in order to render them perceptible; without troubling themselves to examine the operations of reason and its principles; with its movements progressive and retrograde. The notions respecting the Deity, the world, and mankind, which these nations incontestably entertained, were not, with them, the causes nor the consequences of any true philosophy. Their climate, their political constitution, and despotic governments, with the institution of castes, were often obstacles to the free development of the mind. Besides, the history of these nations continues still to be involved in obscurity; there is a want of positive and certain information; and the relation their intellectual progress bears to the history of philosophy cannot as yet be sufficiently ascertained.

Observation. There are some interesting remarks on the Greek and Oriental characters, and on the causes of their diversity, in the work of † J. AUG. EBERHARD, entitled the Spirit of Primitive Christianity, vol. i, p. 63, sqq. What is generally understood by the Barbaric philosophy? See Diog. Laert. I, 1, sqq.

20. The true commencement, therefore, of the history of philosophy must be sought among the Greeks, and particularly at that epoch when, by the progress of imagination

and understanding, the activity of the reason had attained a high degree of development: an epoch when the minds of men, become more independent of religion, poetry, and politics, applied themselves to the investigation of truth, and devoted themselves to rational knowledge. This state of things may be referred to the epoch of Thales. The different directions and forms which, in the course of ages, this spirit of philosophic research assumed, and the effects of every kind which it produced, derived, through different channels, from the Greeks to the moderns, constitute the province of the history of philosophy.

Observation. The definition of the true limits of the history of philosophy has only of late become an object of inquiry; (the system of ethnography, or partial histories of particular nations opposing itself to anything like a precise limitation,) and even yet there is nothing satisfactorily determined on this point; only Tiedemann would exclude the Orientals. The reasons assigned on the other hand by † CARUS, Thoughts on the History of Philosophy, p. 143, and † BACHMANN, On Philosophy and its History, and the same author, Dissert. Philos. de peccatis Tennemanni in historiâ Philosophiæ, *Jenæ*, 1814, 4to., fail to prove that they necessarily belong to philosophy. It is true that a great interest attaches to the investigation of their doctrines, but we must distinguish well between this and the proper interest of the history of philosophy. On the whole, it may not be useless to preface the statement of Greek philosophy by a brief review of the philosophic and religious opinions of the principal nations who, in a greater or less degree, have had relations with the Greeks.

III. *Method.*

Consult, besides the works cited before (§ 2), † CHRIST. GARVE, De ratione scribendi historiam Philosophiæ, *Lips.* 1768, 4to. and Legendorum veterum præcepta nonnulla et exemplum, *Lips.* 1770, 4to. both contained in FULLEBORN'S Collection, etc. Fasiculi xi, xii.

† GEO. GUST. FULLEBORN, Plan of a History of Philosophy, in the iv. Fasc. of his Collection; and, † What is meant by a representation of the Spirit of Philosophy? Fasc. v.

† CHRIST. WEISS, On the Method of treating the History of Philosophy in the Universities, *Leips*, 1800.

21. The *Method*, determined by the end of the science (§ 10), consists in the rules agreeably to which the materials ought to be investigated, collected, prepared, and combined to form a whole.

22. The materials for the history of philosophy may be either accidentally met with, or methodically investigated.

In the latter case we ought to inquire especially what are the authorities, and what should be the procedure of a well-directed research. The sources to which we may have recourse are of two sorts; the works themselves of philosophers which have descended to us; and the notices afforded by other writers concerning the lives and the doctrines of these philosophers; testimonies, the authenticity and probability of which should be critically examined. The less that any philosopher has written, or the less his writings have been preserved, the more we should seek to collect information from other authors; but, at the same time, the more necessary it becomes to be cautious in our adoption of such information.[1] When only fragments remain, it is well to consider them not only philosophically but philologically.

23. Besides collecting the propositions of philosophers, it becomes necessary to study their true sense, their extent, their origin, and their mutual connection,[2] in order to be enabled to assume the true point of view in which the philosopher himself stood, and to appreciate the merit of his labours, without exaggeration, and without injustice. The means to this end are a perfect acquaintance with his contemporaries, with the idioms of the language, and the course of men's ideas at that time; as well as a comparison of different authorities and testimonies with a view to ascertaining their credibility. In order to attain to a faithful and true representation of the meaning and the merit of different philosophical systems, it is indispensably necessary that we should compare one philosophical doctrine with analogous ones, whether contemporary or posterior; that we should determine with care its points of approximation and divergency; that we should investigate its place in the general system of its author, and the manner in which he appears to have been led to this doctrine; in which particular, care must be taken to distinguish between internal principles and external causes.

24. The management of the materials thus critically

[1] See H. KUHNHARDT, De fide historicorum recte æstimandâ in Hist. Philosophiæ. *Helmst.* 1796, 4to.

[2] Apply this, for example, to the *naturæ convenienter vivere* of the Stoics, and their *ακαταληψια*.

analyzed, demands a particular care in the choice of expression; particularly in the case of technical terms, which it is necessary to render with perspicuity; without, however, giving them too foreign an air and character, e. g. the ἕξις, *habitus*, of Chrysippus. From the *connection* of these materials, it will result from that chronological and systematic dependency of which we have spoken (§ 2), and especially from their joint relation to the final object and end of the understanding (§ 3).

Observation. The particular ends contemplated in such a work may justify a certain diversity in the manner and method of it; and may help to resolve the question (according to circumstances) whether it should be accompanied or not by criticism.

25. In combining these materials into a whole it is necessary to direct an earnest and constant attention to the development of reason, and to the progressive advancement of the science of reason. With this view we should establish points of repose, consisting in divisions and subdivisions, which ought not merely to enable the reader the better to glance over the work, but should offer a clearer view of the whole, and of the mutual relation of its parts.

Observation. The ethnographical method, which prevailed up to the time of Tiedemann, is useful for a collection of the materials proper for a general or special history of philosophy; but will not form such a history itself.

26. Assuming the above principle, it is required, to constitute distinct epochs: 1st. That a sensible progress should have taken place in the improvement of reason, and that new lights and new principles should have been introduced into philosophy itself, influencing the scientific combination of acquired knowledge. 2dly. That great external events should have had a powerful and lasting influence over philosophy.[1]

27. Three principal periods may be defined in the history of philosophy. First period: Comprising an account of the free efforts of the Reason to acquire a knowledge of first principles, and the laws of nature, and freedom of will and action; without a clear consciousness of the method most conducive to such knowledge:—*Greek and Roman philoso-*

[1] DAN. BOETHIUS, De præcipuis Philosophiæ epochis. *Lond.* 1800, 4to.

phy. Second period: Efforts of the Reason towards the same end, but under the influence of a principle superior to itself, derived from Revelation: subsequently, an impulse to free itself from any imposed restraint; followed by a fresh subjugation to another arbitrary formulary; a spirit exclusively dialectic, to which the freer Mysticism opposed itself: — *Philosophy of the Middle Ages.* Third period: Fresh and independent exertions towards the discovery of first principles; and combination of all human knowledge in a more complete and systematic form; an epoch remarkable for the manner in which it has contributed to investigate, found, and define the principles of philosophy as a science.—*Modern Philosophy.*

KRUG, in his history of Ancient Philosophy, p. 28, admits only two divisions, those of ancient and modern philosophy. He assumes as the line of demarcation, the decline of government, manners, arts, and sciences, during the first five or six centuries of the Christian era.

IV. *Importance of this History.*

† FR. ANT. ZIMMERMANN, Dissertation on the Utility of the History of Philosophy, *Heidelb.* 1785, 4to.

† GEO. GUST. FULLEBORN, Some general Deductions from the Hist. of Philosophy, in his collection, Fasc iv. and, On certain Advantages resulting from the History of Ancient Philosophy, Fasc. xi.

† H. RITTER, On the advancement of Philosophy through the History of Philosophy (a supplement to his work, On the Influence of Descartes), *Leips.* 1816, 8vo.

28. If philosophy may claim the highest interest, as the most elevated of human sciences, its history, for the same reason, ought to possess a great importance. Whoever is interested in philosophy ought not to be ignorant of its history and progress.

29. The history of philosophy, besides, possesses a scientific merit peculiar to itself; it disposes the mind to a free and independent thought, furnishes it with useful results respecting the proper method to be followed, renders it more sensible to its aberrations, with their causes and consequences, and thereby furnishes a valuable assistance towards establishing rules for a right conduct of the understanding, in order to the attainment of new lights, and discovery of fresh paths: sources of information indispensable

to philosophy, so long as it must be considered as in a progressive state, and not yet fully matured.

30. The history of philosophy has a connection with all the other sciences and their history; more especially with the history of Religion and of Mankind, because Reason is the basis of all knowledge, and embraces the ultimate end of all theoretical and practical employment of our faculties.

31. As a department of study, such history may materially tend to improve the mind, all the powers of which it exercises in the research and exposition of the different systems. Nor is it less calculated to influence the *habits* of the mind, inasmuch as it teaches the renunciation of prejudices, modesty in forming an opinion, and tolerance of the opinions of others; its tendency is to secure the mind from exaggerated admiration, and to moderate attachment to opinions received on the faith of authority.

Observation. On the other hand, has not the study of the history of philosophy its disadvantages? What are they, and how do they present themselves? Indecision and hesitation of judgment, indifference to the truth and the value of every rational research, can only be effects of a light and superficial study, where the diversity of opinions is the only thing contemplated, without regard had to their principles; where the difference of doctrines is the only thing attended to, without ascending to the points of union which they have in common. Here may be applied what Bacon says of philosophy.

V. *Different ways in which the History of Philosophy may be treated.*

32. The history of philosophy divides itself into universal and particular, according to the extent of the objects which it may be the author's design to embrace. The first is the statement, by facts, of the progress of philosophy, considered as Science in general, in the principal directions, and the most conspicuous results of the investigations of reason. This sort of history embraces a consideration of the principles of all philosophy; the most distinguished systems of philosophers; and the progress which they have enabled the philosophical sciences to make in their several departments. The second is employed about instances of the progress of the philosophizing reason confined within certain limits of time and place; and limited to certain particular directions, or certain special objects of philosophy.

Observation. † CARUS, Thoughts on the History of Philosophy, p. 106, defines the universal history of philosophy as, "the natural history of human reason, its pursuits and productions." But he takes this definition in so loose a sense, that he gives us, instead of historic facts, nothing but a meagre and barren abstract of general conclusions. This way of viewing the matter does not answer the true notion of a history of philosophy; the second chapter of this general introduction contains the substance of it.

33. The universal history of philosophy may be presented in an abridged or a detailed form. The principle of a good abridgment is to present a review, as complete as possible, of all the essential subjects of discussion, with a due regard to perspicuity and brevity. Truth, impartiality, and conciseness are of course requisite.

34. Agreeably to what has been laid down (§ 32), we may define many kinds of *particular histories* of philosophy; such as, 1st. (From a relation to certain times or places;) histories of the philosophy of particular epochs; e. g. of the ancients, of the middle ages, or of the moderns; with numerous subdivisions, embracing histories of the philosophy of this or that particular nation. 2dly. (From a relation to certain particular pursuits or special objects of philosophy;) histories of systems or schools, or literary questions, taken separately; of different philosophical *methods;* of the technical language of philosophy; histories of certain branches of philosophy; histories of certain philosophical notions, principles, or theories. If a particular philosophical history be limited to one single object, we have then a special history—a monography.

35. There is an intimate relation between particular and universal history. The first supplies the other with useful and various materials; but the latter, in its turn, developes general views, and affords lights for the examination and exposition of the particular details. Consequently, they can only become perfect when united.

VI. *Various Histories of Philosophy.*

36. The history of philosophy has not been separately treated, as a distinct science, by the ancient philosophers. They have touched upon the subject only while occupied

with the statement of their own doctrines, and only so far as the points they adverted to bore a relation to what they taught themselves, in which respect the critical judgment of Aristotle threw a light upon the opinions of his predecessors. A collection of historic documents illustrative of the gradual development of philosophy, was the first step towards a history of the science. Even in modern times the earliest attempt at this sort of history was made in the form of a compilation, and the model assumed was the work of Diogenes Laertius. The prevailing notion of the time was that of a primitive philosophic race (§ 16), and that all philosophy was derived from revelation; the *ethnographical* method being adopted in the execution. (cf. § 25, *obs.*) First period. *Bayle* awakened a spirit of investigation in this kind of undertaking; *Jac. Thomasius* extended the circle of study necessary to the same; and *Leibnitz* indicated what the history of philosophy ought to be. Second period. From *Brucker* to *Tennemann:* philology and criticism improved the materials collected; some imperfections in the works of the preceding age were corrected, and the science assumed more elevated pretensions. *Brucker* published the most complete work yet known, which, by a laborious assemblage of documents, by the judiciousness of his remarks, and particularly by what it contains on the biography of the philosophers, continues to be useful: but is deficient in a philosophic spirit. *Gurlett* and *Tiedemann* pursued a better method, and rendered great services to its special history. From *Kant* to our own time, a zealous industry has been applied to its improvement in respect of *theory* and *method;* and, in consequence of the inquiries which this new sort of study has suggested, examination has been made of its proper sources and principles; documents have been revised, and their contents more ably stated; under the influence, more or less sensible, of a philosophical spirit and system.[1] The German nation has done the most for

[1] See a review of the principal services rendered to the history of philosophy since 1780, in the Philosophical Journal of NIETHAMMER, 1795, Nos. viii and ix. TENNEMANN'S Review of the Labours of the History of Philosophy in the last fifteen years of the eighteenth Century, in the *Ergänzbl. der Allg. Lit. Z.* 1801, s. 81—147, and CARUS, Hints on the History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1809, s. 21—90.

this description of history, as regards both its manner and its matter; but there is still occasion for much labour in this extensive field. We still want an exposition, which should display the development of philosophy among men, in its totality, according to its organic connection; and that should fundamentally pourtray each special original system as a member of this structure.

VII. *Bibliography of the History of Philosophy.*

37. Under this head are comprehended the works relative to the history of philosophy in general and in particular. We shall particularize the writings on individual subjects, as they shall come under consideration. The works on the universal history of philosophy may be arranged under five heads: *(a)* Treatises on its Literature and Method, *(b)* Collections. *(c)* Miscellanies. *(d)* Detailed histories. *(e)* Outlines.

(a) Bibliographical Treatises.

J. JONSIUS, De scriptoribus Hist. Philosophicæ, libri iv, *Francof.* 1659.—Recogniti et ad præsentem ætatem usque perducti, cura J. CHR. DORN, *Jen.* 1716, 8vo.

† J. ANDR. ORTLOFF, Bibliographical Manual of the History of Philosophy, *Erlangen*, 1798, 8vo. part i (never completed).

N.B. The *Treatises on Method* have been cited under the preceding sections.

(b) Collections.

JAC. THOMASII Schediasma historicum, quo varia discutiuntur ad historiam tum philosophicam tum ecclesiasticam pertinentia. *Lips.* 1665, 4to. The same work, under this title: Origines historiæ philos. et ecclesiast., cura CHR. THOMASII, *Hal.* 1609, 8vo.

J. FRANC. BUDDEI Analecta Historiæ Philosophiæ, *Hal.* 1706, 8vo. second edition, 1724, 8vo.

† Acta Philosophorum: by C. A. HEUMANN, 3 v. 8vo. *Hal.* 1715-23.

JAC. BRUCKERI Otium Vindelicum, sive meletematum Historico-philosophicorum triga, *Aug. Vind.* 1729, 8vo. Miscellanea Historiæ philosophicæ, litterariæ, criticæ, olim sparsim edita, etc. *Aug. Vind.* 1748, 8vo.

CHR. ERN. LE WINDHEIM, Fragmenta historiæ philosophicæ, etc. *Erl.* 1753, 8vo. With essays of various other authors.

† MICH. MISMANN, Magazine of Philosophy and History, *Götting. et Leips.* 1778-83, 6 vols. 8vo. In this work are many essays translated from the Académie Royale des Inscriptions, etc.

† GEO. GUST. FUELLEBORN, Collection of Pieces toward a History of Philosophy, *Züllichau*, 1791–99. Fasc. xii, 8vo.

KRUG, Symbolæ ad Histor. Philosophiæ, *Leips.* 1813, 4to. Part i.

† J. F. FRIES, Pieces towards a history of Philosophy, *Heidel.* Fasc. i.

(*c*) *Miscellanies*, containing researches and remarks on the History of Philosophy.

The true Intellectual System of the Universe, by RALPH CUDWORTH, etc. *Lond.* 1678, folio, second edit., by BIRCH, 1743, 2 vols. 4to. reprinted in 4 vols. 8vo. *Lond.* 1820; again at *Oxford*, 1829, and with MOSHEIM's additions, in 2 vols. 8vo. *Lond.* 1845.

CUDWORTHI Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, seu de veris naturæ rerum originibus commentarii, quibus omnis eorum philosophia qui Deum esse negant, funditus evertitur, *Jen.* 1733, folio: 2nd edition, *Leyd.* 1773, 3 vols. 4to. translated by Mosheim [with the addition of many learned notes and dissertations by the translator.]

HUETII Demonstratio Evangelica, *Par.* 1679, fol., often republished.

Dictionnaire historique et critique, par J. BAYLE, *Rotterd.* 1697. The best editions are the second, revised and enlarged by MARCHAND, 4 vols. folio, *Rotterdam*, 1720; the third and fifth, with life of the author, and some additions, by DES MAIZEAUX, *Amst.* 1730, and *ib.* 1740, 4 vols. folio; the fourth, edited by LE CLERC, in 5 vols. folio, *Trevoux*, 1734, (printed in a large letter); and the sixth and last, edited by BEUCHOT, in 16 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1820. An English translation was published, *London*, 1710, in 4 vols. folio, and again in 1734, in 5 vols. folio. [A continuation was published by J. G. CHAUFFIE, *Amst.* 1750, likewise in 4 vols. folio.]

† ERN. PLATNER, Philosophical Aphorisms, with some Principles for a History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1782, 2 vols. 8vo.; a second edition, 1788–1800. 8vo.

(*d*) *Detailed Histories.*

The History of Philosophy, by THOMAS STANLEY, *Lond.* 1659, 1687, and 1701, all in folio, and 1743, 4to. with portrait. Latin translation, with corrections by GODEFR. OLEARIUS, Historia Philos. *Lipsiæ*, 1711, 4to. et *Ven.* 1733, 4to.

Histoire critique de la Philosophie, où l'on traite de son Origine, de ses Progrès, et des diverses Revolutions qui lui sont arrivées jusqu'à notre temps, par M. D*** (ANDR. FR. BOUREAU DESLANDES), *Paris*, 1731–36, 3 vols. Another Edition, *Amsterd.* 3 vols. 8vo.

† J. J. BRUCKER, Questions on the History of Philosophy, *Ulm*, 1731–36. 7 vols. 12mo. with a Supplement, 1737, 12mo.

J. BRUCKERI Historica critica Philosophiæ, *Lips.* 1742-44, 5 vols. 4to. (to which is usually added the supplementary volume published in 1767,) a new edition without alterations, but augmented by a Supplement. 1766–67, 6 vols. 4to. An English Abridgment by W. ENFIELD, History of Philosophy from the earliest times, etc. *Lond.* 1791, 2 vols. 4to., again in 8vo. 2 vols.

AGATOPISTO CROMAZIANO (APPIANO BUONAFEDE), Della Istoria e della

indole di ogni Filosofia, *Lucca*, 1766–71, 5 vols. 8vo. Again *Venice*, 1782–83, 6 vols. 8vo. For the continuation of this work, see § 38 *(a)*.

† History of Philosophy for Amateurs, by J. CHRIST. ADELUNG, *Leips.* 1786–87, second edition, 1809, 3 vols. 8vo.

† J. G. BUHLE, History of Philosophical Reason, *Lemgo*, 1793, 8vo. vol. I. Instead of this work which he did not continue, Buhle published † A Compendium of the History of Philosophy, and a critical Bibliography of this Science, *Götting.* 1796–1804, 8 vols. 8vo. We may here add the work cited in § 38, on Modern Philosophy, which is preceded by a Review of the Ancient Systems of Philosophy up to the fifteenth century.

† G. GOTTLIEB TENNEMANN, History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1798–1819, 11 vols. 8vo. One vol. of second edition published by A. WENDT, 1828.

DEGERANDO, Histoire comparée des Systèmes de la Philosophie, 1804, 3 vols. 8vo., seconde édition, augmentée, 4 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1822. A German translation by TENNEMANN, *Marburg*, 1806–7, 2 vols. 8vo.

† J. HENR. MART. ERNESTI, An Encyclopedic Manual of General Hist. of Philos. and its Bibliography, *Lemgo*, 1807, 8vo.

† FRED. AUG. CARUS, Hints for a Hist. of Philos. *Leips.* 1809, 2 vols. 8vo. (in the fourth volume of his posthumous works).

† E. G. STECK, the History of Philosophy, vol. I, *Riga*, 1805, 8vo.

† C. J. H. WINDISCHMANN, Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte, *Bonn*, 1827, 8vo.

CARRIERE, Das Buch der Weltweisheit, 2 Th., *Leipzig*, 1851.

H. RITTER'S Geschichte der Philosophie, 9 v. *Hamburgh*, 1838–50.

MARBACH, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, 1838.

(c) Outlines.

Omitting the sketches of the History of Philosophy, which, since the time of Buddeus, may be found at the head of many Manuals of Philosophy, we shall merely notice the following abstracts:

GEO. HORNII Historia Philosophica, *Lugd. Bat.* 1655, 4to.

LAUR. REINHARTI Compend. Hist. Philosoph. *Lips.* 1724, 8vo.

Jo. GOTT. HEINECCII Element. Hist. Philosophicæ, *Berol.* 1743, 8vo.

† J. BRUCKER, Abridgment of his Questions on the History of Philosophy, *Ulm*, 1736, 12mo. with additions, 1737; under the title of Elements of the Hist. of Philosophy, *Ulm*, 1751, 8vo.

† J. BRUCKERI Institutiones Hist. Philosophicæ, *Lips.* 1747, 8vo. second edit. 1756, third edit. by FR. GOTTL. BORN, *Leips.* 1790, 8vo.

† C. G. W. LODTMANN, Brief Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Helmst.* 1754, 8vo.

FORMEY, Abrégé de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, *Amstd.* 1760, 8vo.

† Fr. Ant. Buesching, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Berlin*, 1772–74, 2 vols. 8vo.

† Christ. Meiners, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Lemgo*, 1786, 8vo. second edition, 1789.

† Jo. Gurlitt, Sketch of the Hist. of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1786, 8vo.

† Fr. Xav. Gmeiner, Literary History of the Origin and Progress of Philosophy, and of its Sects and Systems, *Greiz*, 1788–89, 11 vols. 8vo.

† J. Aug. Eberhard, General History of Philosophy, *Halle*, 1788, second edit. 1796, 8vo. Abstract of a general History, *Halle*, 1794, 8vo.

† Geo. Socher, Historical Sketch of the Systems of Philosophy from the Greeks to Kant, *Munich*, 1802, 8vo.

† Fred. Ast, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Landshut*, 1807, 8vo.

† Ch. Aug. Schaller, Manual of the History of Philosophical Discoveries, etc. forming the second part of the Magaz. für Verstandesübungen, *Halle*, 1809, 8vo.

† Ph. L. Snell, Brief Sketch of the History of Philosophy: Part first, History of Ancient Philosophy, *Geissen*, 1813, 8vo. Part second, History of the Philosophy of the Middle Ages, *Ibid.* 1819, 8vo.

† Weiller, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Munich*, 1813, 8vo.

† Jos. Hillebrand, History and Methodical Systems of Philosophy, forming the second part of his Introduction to Philosophy, *Heidelberg*, 1819, 8vo.

G. H. Lewis, Biographical History of Philosophy, *London*, 1845.

An Epitome of the History of Philosophy, translated from the French by C. S. Henry, *New York*, 1843, 2 vols.

† A. T. Rixner, Manual of the History of Philosophy, 3 vols. *Salz.* 1822–23, 8vo.

† L. Hamerskold, Outlines of the History of Philosophy from the earliest times to the present, *Stockholm*, 1822, 8vo.

Reinhold, Manual of the History of Philosophy, Ancient and Modern, 3 vols. 8vo. *Gotha*, 1828–30.

Reinhold, Geschichte der Philosophie, nach den Hauptmomenten ihrer Entwickelung, 2 vols. 1845.

Reinhold, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, 1836.

Schwegler, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1847.

Bayrhoffer, Idee und Geschichte der Philosophie, 1838.

Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 3 vols. herausgegeben von Michelet (1838), 1840, ff.

Sigwart, Die Propedeutik der Geschichte der Philosophie, oder über den Begriff, die Methode und den Anfang der Geschichte der Philosophie, 1840.

38. Works on the history of philosophy in detail: classed according to the distinctions given in § 34.

I. (*a*) *Histories of particular epochs.*

† W. Traug. Krug, History of Ancient Philosophy, particularly among the Greeks and Romans, *Leips.* 1827, 8vo. second edition.

† CHRISTOPH. MEINERS, Memoirs towards a History of the Opinions prevalent during the first centuries after the birth of Jesus Christ, *Leips.* 1782, 8vo.

AGATOPISTO CROMAZIANO (APPIANO BUONAFEDE), Della ristaurazione di ogni Filosofia nei secoli xv, xvi, xvii. This work may be considered as a sequel of one by the same author, mentioned in the preceding §. *Venice,* 1789, 8vo. † A German translation, with corrections and additions, by CH. HEYDENREICH, *Leips.* 1791–92, 2 vols. 8vo.

† J. GOTTL. BUHLE, History of Modern Philosophy from the revival of Letters, *Götting.* 1800–5, 6 vols. 8vo. Cf. § 37 (*d*).

† A. KAYSSLER, Memoirs towards a Critical History of Modern Philosophy, *Halle,* 1804, large 8vo.

† CH. FRED. BACHMANN, On the Philosophy of our own Times, *Jena,* 1816, 8vo.

† K. J. H. WINDISCHMANN, Critical Reflections upon the fate of Philosophy in modern times, and the commencement of a new era, *Francof.* 1825, 8vo.

BRANDIS, Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie, 2 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1835–44.

BRANDIS, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie.

(*b*) *Histories of the Philosophy of particular nations.*

(For writings on the philosophy of the most ancient nations, see below § 68, and following.)

CICERONIS Historia Philosophiæ antiquæ; ex omnibus illius scriptis collegit, etc. FRID. GEDIKE, *Berl.* 1782; second edition, 1801, 8vo.

† FR. VICT. LEBRECHT PLESSING, Historical and Philosophical Researches on the Opinions, the Theology, and Philosophy of the most Ancient Nations, and particularly of the Greeks up to the time of Aristotle, *Elbing.* 1785, part the first, 8vo.

† FR. VICT. LEBRECHT PLESSING, Memnonium, or Researches to elucidate the Mysteries of Antiquity, *Leips.* 1787, 2 vols. 8vo.

† FR. VICT. LEBRECHT PLESSING, Researches to illustrate the Philosophy of the most remote Antiquity, *Leips.* 1788, 2 vols. 8vo.

BERCHETTI, Filosofia degli antichi popoli, *Perugia,* 1812, 8vo.

† CHR. MEINERS, History of the Origin, the Progress, and the Decline of the Sciences in Greece and Rome, *Lemgo,* 1781–82, 2 vols. 8vo. (incomplete.)

The Philosophy of Ancient Greece investigated, by W. ANDERSON, *Lond.* 1791, 4to.

(FR. DE SALIGNAC DE LA MOTHE FENELON,) Abrégé des Vies des Anciens Philosophes, etc. *Paris,* 1795, 8vo. 1796, 12mo.

DEFFENDENTE SACCHI, Storia della Filosofia Greca, *Pavia,* 1818–20, 4 vols. 8vo. (Brought down to the times of the Sophists.)

† G. FRED. DAN. GOESS, The Science of education on the Principles of the Greeks and Romans, *Anspach,* 1801, 8vo.

PAGANINUS GAUDENTIUS, De Philosophiæ apud Romanos origine et

progressu, *Pisa*, 1643, 4to. Reprinted in the Nova rariorum Collectio, Fasc. ii, iii, *Halæ*, 1717.

J. L. BLESSIG, Diss. de Origine Philosophiæ apud Romanos, *Strasburg*, 1770, 4to.

II. *(a) Histories of different Philosophical Methods, Systems, and Schools.*

J. GERH. VOSSII De Philosophiæ et Philosophorum sectis lib. ii, *Hag. Com.* 1658, 4to.; contin. atque supplementa adjecit Jo. JAC. A RYSSEL, *Lips.* 1690, 4to., again *Jenæ*, 1705, 4to.

† C. FR. STÆUDLIN, History and Spirit of Scepticism, principally in relation to Morals and Religion, *Lips.* 1794–95, 2 vols. 8vo.

IMMAN. ZEENDER, De notione et generibus Scepticismi et hodierna præsertim ejus ratione, *Bern.* 1795, 8vo.

(For writings relative to particular schools of philosophy, see the places wherein these schools are mentioned.)

(b) History of the Philosophical Sciences in detail.

B. T. (BAS. TERZI) Storia critica delle Opinioni Filosofiche, etc. intorno all' anima. *Padova*, 1776–78, 8vo.

† FR. AUG. CARUS, History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1808 (third vol. of his posthumous works).

* * *

PET. GASSENDI, De Origine et varietate Logicæ, opp. tom. I.

GER. JO. VOSSII De Natura et Constitutione Logicæ, etc. *Hag. Com.* 1658.

JO. ALB. FABRICII Specimen elenchticum Historiæ Logicæ, *Hamb.* 1699, 4to.

JOH. GE. WALCH, Historia Logicæ, in his Parerga Academica, p. 453, sqq. *Leips.* 1721, 8vo.

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CHAPTER II.

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHIC REASON.

39. The human mind is the inmost basis of the acts and of the changes which constitute the inner life of man, and these phenomena are subject to the laws of the human mind. It is from without that the first impressions of the human mind are derived; on these it speculates at first instinctively and blindly, till having attained to a consciousness of itself, it becomes capable of developing itself freely and with reflection. The act of philosophizing (§ 2) is the offspring of reason directed by its natural thirst for knowledge, and this reason is united to the other faculties of the human mind by the most intimate relation.

40. To know, is to have a representation of a determinate object, or the consciousness of a perception and of its relation

to something determinate, and distinct from the representation itself. Cognition implies two terms, the subjective and the objective, the thing that can be perceived immediately, and the subject to which the apperception is referable. Sensational Perception, Intuition, and Thought, also form a part of knowing; in sensational perception, we represent to ourselves the object such as it is furnished to us by our feelings; in thought, this object of sensation becomes complicated by the addition of notions and judgments, and this complexity becomes connected with a superior unity by means of ideas and principles.

41. The faculty of thinking is manifested as Understanding and as Reason. The understanding prompts and enables us to learn and discover the reasons, causes, and conditions of our conceptions, of our sensations, of our wishes or desires, and of the objects to which they refer. It is the reason that enables us to attend to primary axioms, causes, and conditions; this faculty has the tendency of attracting all knowledge to its highest principle which is independent of every other principle. The understanding chalks out the rules for the conduct of our will; the reason submits all those rules to a supreme rule which prescribes the absolute form, and the highest aim of the free action. Finally, it is thought that establishes unity, connection, and harmony in all our knowledges, whether speculative or practical.

Remark. A great schism exists among philosophers as regards the idea of reason, and its connexion with the understanding. According to some, it is a purely formal faculty; and according to others it is at once a material and formal, a speculative and practical mode of knowing. See the Programme of *Bachmann* on the confusion of words and of ideas among the German philosophers, in relation with the Understanding and the Reason. *Jena*, 1814, in 4to; and several works occasioned by the discussion between Jacobi and Schelling. The distinction between the Reason and Understanding has been clearly shown to the English student in the writings of Coleridge, and more recently in the philosophical works of Mr. J. D. Morell. It will suffice here to give a popular definition of the Reason as the *Intuitional Faculty*, the fountain of first truths, axioms, and self-evident propositions. The Understanding may be defined as the logical faculty which compares, classifies, and draws conclusions from the objects presented to it by the Reason, the Senses, and the Imagination. (See Coleridge's Table-Talk, J. D. Morell's Philosophy of Religion, and the Preface, by the Editor).

42. By reflection and abstraction we are able to distin-

guish between what is originally existing in our cognition, feeling, and desire, from the material upon which these energies exert their influence; and it is only in the former that a satisfactory answer can be obtained to all the problems presented to philosophy for solution by reason. For the material presented to us is accidental, variable, and indefinable; whereas philosophy is *rational* cognition, which has for its object the highest and first principles of knowledge, and the universal and necessary principles, laws, and aims of things, as they are determined by the original conformation of the mind.

43. Every cognition is a subjective state contained within the consciousness; and as such, a subjective reality belongs to it. The conviction that it also has an *objective* reality reposes, in all cognition acquired from experience, on a feeling by which we perceive a something as immediately and outwardly existing, to which this cognition must be referred. The objects of philosophy are not to be found in the sphere of immediate perceptions, they are only matters of thought. But since a knowledge of these is derived from the essential constitution of the human mind (§ 42), in their universality and necessity may be found the evidence and certainty of their having not only subjective but also objective reality. We are forced as rational beings to admit *that* as objective and true which combines with what is real in our consciousness as a fundamental principle.

Observation. These remarks of Tenneman, though probably conclusive in the eyes of the disciple of Kant, will be regarded as obsolete and inconclusive by those who are familiar with the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Identity Philosophy (*Identitäts lehre*) of Schelling and Hegel's Pantheistic Idealism, by identifying the Subject and Object, have directed thought into new channels, and trespassed beyond the landmarks of the Kantian critique. (See Stallo's General Principles of the Philosophy of Nature, *New York*, 1841).

44. Philosophy, as a science, aims at a systematic knowledge of the conditions, reasons, and primary laws of all knowledge. Such a system ought to present a complete development of the principles of the human mind, and a perfect deduction of all that results from them, without *lacuna* or omission. Without this, it must be impossible to establish a theory of human knowledge which may be complete, solid, and connected through all its parts.

45. All knowledge ought to be placed on a firm foundation, and cemented into a harmonious structure by philosophy. It follows that philosophy itself must lay a well-founded claim to truth and certainty. Consequently, all true cognitions demand a proof, i.e., a deduction from a higher source of knowledge, saving the highest of all, which cannot be proved, but can only be indicated (by a dissection of the faculty of cognition) as that which is originally and immediately true in its necessary connection with what is conditional and derived. Philosophy then, as a science, is founded on something directly true or certain, and the complete oneness and agreement of what is derived with that which is true *per se*. In the reason lies the ultimate source of all certainty, and a system of principles and derived knowledges which is true in itself and through its internal harmony.[1]

46. But before the Reason can arrive at such a comprehension of itself, it must pass through many intermediate degrees of development and improvement; and in this transition-state, being as yet ignorant of the ultimate principle of knowledge, and not seeking it in that direction in which alone it can be found (viz. in the *mind* instead of *external objects*, in the *subject* instead of the *object*,) ends in mistaking for it something inferior and subordinate; pursues certainty beyond the limits of reason; commits innumerable errors in the demonstration of philosophical knowledge; pretends to investigate matters beyond its range; and thus ends in conflict with itself.

47. The development of Reason (§ 46 et § 4), implies that of the other faculties of the mind (§ 49). There can be no doubt that the reason begins to dawn as soon as the development of the other faculties commences. But it is requisite for the other powers of our mind to be in full play, in order for the action of the reason to be complete, and accompanied by consciousness and liberty; and it is only at length that the reason determines its own sphere, its direction, and its proper constitution.

48. This last development, which takes place according to a similar process in small as well as great matters, implies

[1] The reader must bear in mind that Tenneman was a Rationalist of Kant's school—hence this assumption.

a principle of activity, and moreover certain particular causes. There is an instinct in man that inclines him to exert his reason; at the same time, this reason is under the influence of various internal causes that occasion its passage through an infinite number of modifications and of degrees, which at one extremity proceed to the ultimate limits of activity, and at the other terminate in inaction.

49. The reflective activity which, when properly cultivated, we call Philosophy (§ 2), presupposes in its turn attention, reflection, and abstraction. These are faculties which manifest themselves in various degrees, proportioned to the diversity of intellectual powers.

50. The causes which influence the development of reason are: the constitution of the human mind; certain desires, doubts, sentiments, and representations of the mind; acquired knowledge; curiosity; emulation, resulting from the number and the diversity of persons engaged in the same pursuit; the influence of genius; example; encouragement; and the free communication of thought.

51. Previously to the scientific investigation of the principles, the laws, and the ends of phenomena presented to it, the human mind in some sort imagines, or, as it were, divines them; and this imagination conforms itself to the laws of the fancy; assimilating and personifying. It is thus that man, in a state of nature, conceives of all things as living and resembling himself. There is vaguely presented to his thoughts a world of spirits, at first without laws; afterwards, under the empire of a law foreign and external (Fate.) He conceives an idea of unity and harmony, less at first in the internal world than the external; less in the whole than the parts; less by strict thought than by a poetic creation (his fancy externalizing the divinations of his reason); and thus advances from a capricious indulgence of the imagination to the exercise of legitimate thought.

52. The development of the Reason begins with the religious feeling. The more that man by reflection extends and enlarges the sphere of his consciousness, the more he elevates himself, with regard to the object of his veneration, from feeling to perception and intuition, and from notions to general ideas. The human mind seeks the evidence of its religious belief, first of all *without*, in the *object;* subsequently *within*, in the rational *subject*.

53. It is thus that man advances, from a state of consciousness, obscure and imperfect, to an enlightened knowledge; from poetry to thinking; from faith to science; from individual to universal. It it thus that, guided by an obscure sentiment of truth, of harmony, of analogy, he prosecutes the pursuit of something *certain* and *necessary;* to which may be referred all the points of belief which have attracted his attention; and which may establish the certainty of them. It is thus that he attempts philosophy, at first to satisfy his own mind; afterwards, with a more general view, for the advancement of Reason itself. In the natural order of her progress, Philosophy apprehends at first the *complex* objects of the world without, which are of a nature to excite in a lively manner its attention; subsequently, it advances by degrees to objects more difficult of apprehension, more obscure, more internal, and more simple.

Observation. This progress may be observed to obtain in a greater or less degree, and with different modifications, among all nations. There is, however, this difference, that only a few have elevated the subjective thinking of the human mind to the rank of a scientific philosophy;—whence proceeds this difference?

54. Philosophy, when it has assumed a scientific character, has a tendency, by the investigation of causes, of the laws, and the ultimate ends of things, to constitute human knowledge as an integral system, independent, and fundamentally established (§ 2 and 44). Such is the task of reason in philosophy; but we must also distinguish the differences which exist in its *aim*, *method*, and *results*.

55. As to its *aim*, philosophy may be influenced by a solitary and partial curiosity, confined to one point of view, or stimulated by a more liberal and scientific interest, at once practical and theoretical. As to *method*, it proceeds, on general topics, either from principles to consequences (the *synthetic* order); or from consequences to principles (the *analytic* order); and, in special matter, as far as relates to the starting point of its researches, it advances, either from a complete and profound inquiry into the nature of our faculties of cognition to the knowledge itself of things; or from the assumed knowledge of things to the theory of knowledge. This last method of proceeding is called, since the time of Kant, the *Dogmatic* method, or *Dogmatism;* the other, the *Critical* method.

56. The *non-critical* philosophy has for its aim to establish certain points of doctrine (*dogmata*) from a blind trust in the reason, or to destroy the *dogmatic* opinions of others from a blind mistrust of the reason; in which latter case it has the tendency, as it does not substitute other principles for those which it removes, to establish uncertainty and doubt as most consistent with reason. The first of these two schools ends in dogmatism *positive;* the second in scepticism, or dogmatism *negative.*

Remark. Dogmatism follows a true idea of reason by a false path. The sceptic attacks the faith of the dogmatist, and endeavours to establish a methodical ignorance, by means of which he destroys that idea of reason. Thus there is truth and error in both doctrines.

See CHRIST. WEISS, De Scepticismi causis atque natura. *Lips.* 1801, 4to.; ADOLPH SIEDLER, De Scepticismo commentatio, *Halle,* 1827; and the works above indicated, § 38, II.

57. Dogmatism pretends, either that human reason is, of itself, capable of attaining to a knowledge of the laws and the nature of things; or that it cannot attain thereto without a superior instruction and guidance. The first of these doctrines is *Naturalism*, or *Rationalism*, in its most extended signification; the other is *Supernaturalism.*

58. Rationalism, in the most extended signification of the word, proceeds sometimes upon knowledge, sometimes (like that of *Jacobi*) upon belief; and either demonstrates the *esse* (*das Seyn*) of our representations and knowledge, by the reality of the objects; or, contrariwise, the *esse* of the objects, by the certainty of the impressions. In the first of these cases we have *Realism*, which takes for its principle the reality of things; in the second case we have *Idealism*, which takes our representations as the original things. Several philosophical systems, on the other hand, maintain an original oneness of knowing and being, a view which they sometimes present chiefly in a speculative form) such as the system of Absolute Identity), whilst at other times they represent or assume it as a psychological fact, like the system of Critical Synthetism, and other dualistic views.

59. Dogmatism, with reference to the *means* of acquiring knowledge, is either *Sensationalism* or *Rationalism* in a more restricted sense; or compounded of both (either by blending them,—intellectual perception,—or without any

mixture). As far as relates to the *origin* of knowledge, dogmatism becomes either *Empirism*, or *Nöologism;* or compounded of both. Lastly, with reference to the *number* of fundamental principles, it becomes *Dualism* or *Monism;* and to this last description belong both *Materialism* and *Spiritualism*, as well as the system of Absolute Identity.

60. Supernaturalism not only asserts that the Deity is the real basis of all that exists, but also the source of all truth by revelation; thus referring all knowledge to a supernatural source, unattainable by the steps of science. There are diversities in this system, according to the manner in which revelation is considered relatively to its subject or its object; as universal or particular; and as superior or subordinate to reason; or co-ordinate with it.

Observation. Supernaturalism has this in common with Scepticism, that it lays great stress on the false pretensions and the inefficiency of the reason. But by having recourse to a supernaturalist medium, it easily falls into a dogmatism of another kind.

61. Scepticism is opposed to Dogmatism, inasmuch as it seeks to diminish the confidence of reason in the success of its efforts. It uses as arguments the errors which are often with justice imputed to dogmatism, or alleges certain formal propositions of its own, relative to the end and the principles of knowledge. It is, therefore, the perpetual antagonist of dogmatism; but in disputing the pretensions to which knowledge lays claim, it proceeds even to deny its existence and destroy it altogether. Scepticism is sometimes universal, sometimes particular, and has been the precursor of the critical method, which leads to the true science of reason.

62. The *result* of philosophizing research is philosophy; and there can be only one philosophy, which is that *ideal* of the science reason perpetually aims at (§ 2). But the various attempts of individual thinkers to attain thereto have given occasion to a number of systems, which approximate this *ideal object* and each other in proportion to the degree of the development in the knowledge they evince of the reason,—the true end and principles of philosophy,—to the extent of information they convey,—the validity of the reasoning they contain, and the accuracy of their technical language (cf. § 3).

Observation. Until a more complete examination of the powers of the reason shall have been instituted, and a more extensive analysis of the faculty of knowledge, systems of philosophy must inevitably contain a mixture of *universal* and *particular*, of *true* and *false*, of *determinate* and *indeterminate*, of *objective* and *subjective*. All these qualities suffer increments, blendings, and divisions, in various degrees, during the process of their propagation and diffusion. (*e. g.*, Plato's Innate Ideas).

63. These different systems are opposed to each other and to scepticism. The consequence has been a contest which we see carried on with a greater or less degree of ardour, maintained by the love of truth, and too frequently also by private interests and passions; until at last either *indifference*, or a revolution in the direction of reason, or the acuteness of logicians and critics, put an end to it for the time, and introduced a more liberal system of inquiry.

64. More than one system has figured upon the stage in various dresses, and certain philosophical questions have frequently been repeated under different forms. These apparent reiterations do not, however, prove that philosophy has been retarded in its progress; the repetition of old ideas does not render its advance towards new ones more tardy, but only more sure. By this very circumstance analysis is rendered more exact and more complete; and the search after unity, consistency, and perfection, more accurate and profound. The ideal of the science is more completely grasped, and better appreciated; errors and unfounded theories are more cautiously avoided.

65. But, with all these retrogradations and moments of apparent relaxation, advancement is impossible except by the aid of a sustained zeal for philosophical investigation. This science demands a perpetual agitation of doubts and discussions; of controversy between dogmatism and scepticism, between the partizans of ancient systems and of modern ideas.

PARTICULAR INTRODUCTION.

RAPID REVIEW OF THE RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS OF THE ORIENTAL NATIONS, AND OF THE FIRST PERIODS OF GRECIAN CIVILIZATION.

To this head belong the works on the religions and the discoveries of the East at large; some of which, for example those of *Plessing*, have been noticed above, § 38; see, besides, the mythological treatises, such as:

† Fr. Creuzer, Symbolical and Mythological System of the Ancients, etc. 4 vols. *Leips.* and *Darmstadt*, 1810-12, second edition, 1820 (and following years), 5 vols. 8vo. 4 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1843.

† J. Görres, History of the Fables of the Asiatic World, 2 vols. *Heidelb.* 1810, 8vo.

† J. J. Wagner, Ideas towards an Universal Mythology of the Ancient World, *Frankfort on the M.* 1808, 8vo.

† J. G. Rhode, On the Age and Merit of certain Records of Oriental Antiquity, *Berlin*, 1817-18. And Memoirs towards illustrating the science of Antiquities, No. I, *Berlin*, 1819, No. II, 1820, 8vo.

Particularly a dissertation in No. I, on the most Ancient Religious Systems of the East.

L. C. Baur, Symbolical and Mythological Systems, 2 parts, *Stuttg.* 1825, 8vo.

66. Instruction was in part conveyed by the nations of Asia to the Greeks; and the latter had gone through many gradations of intellectual improvement before the epoch when a philosophical spirit was awakened among them. Accordingly, it may not be foreign to our purpose to give a rapid sketch of the religious and philosophical opinions of the oriental nations, as well as of the first advances of intellectual improvement among the Greeks, in order to be enabled to estimate, at least *generally*, the influence which the former may have had over Grecian genius in its infancy; and consequently over *philosophy* itself, in its *manner* as well as its *matter*. The Hindoos, the Persians, the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Phœnicians, are the principal nations with whom the Greeks have had any intercourse.[1]

[1] On the general character of thought in the East, see above, § 19.

Hindostan.

Authorities: The sacred books of the Hindoos, the *Schasters*, and particularly the *Vedams*, whereto belong the *Upanishadas* (fragments of the *Oupnek'hat*), and the *Puranams*, to which belong the ancient national poems: *Ramayana* (*Serampore*, 1806–10, 3 vols. 4to. a new edition by A. W. SCHLEGEL),—*Mahabharata*—and the *Dersanas*.

The EZOUR-VEDAM, or Ancient Commentary on the Vedam, containing the digest of the religious and philosophical opinions of the Indians, translated from the Sanscrit by a Brahmin; revised and published, with preliminary observations, notes, and illustrations, *Yverdun*, 1778, 2 vols. 12mo. (The introduction On the wisdom of the Hindoos is by SAINTE-CROIX.) See SCHLEGEL, Biblio. ind. t. II, p. 50.

BHAGUAT-GEETA, or Dialogues of Chrishna and Ardjoon, in eighteen lectures, with notes, translated from the original Sanscrit by CH. WILKINS, *Lond.* 1785, 4to. AUG. WILL. VON SCHLEGEL has given a new edition of this work: BHAGAVAD-GITA, *i.e.* Θεσπέσιον μέλος, sive Almi Crishnæ et Arjunæ colloquium de rebus divinis, Bharatiæ episodium; text. rec., adnotat. crit. et interpret. lat. adjecit. *Bonnæ*, 1846, royal 8vo.

BAGAVADAM, ou Doctrine Divine; ouvrage Indien Canonique sur l'Etre Suprême, les Dieux, les Géans, les Hommes, les diverses parties de l'Univers (par OPSONVILLE), *Paris*, 1788, 8vo.

OUPNECK'HAT, seu theologia et philosophia indica; edid. ANQUETIL DU PERRON, *Argentov.* 1801–2, 2 vols. 4to.

WILL. VON HUMBOLDT, On the Episode of the Mahabharata, known by the name of Bhagavad-Gita. *Berlin*, 1826. And the article of HEGEL in the Journal of Berlin for scientific criticism, 1827.

MUNAVA DHARMASASTRA, or Laws of Menu, translated by Sir W. JONES, *London*, 1796.

AMBERTKEND, a work on the Nature of the Soul; an account of it by DE GUIGNES, in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXVI.

The Moon of Intelligence and the Knowledge of the Spirit, translated into English by TAYLOR, 1812, 8vo.

† REMMOHON-ROY, *Jena*, 1817.

CTESIÆ Indicorum fragmenta; STRABO; ARRIANUS De Exped. Alexandri; PALLADIUS De gentibus Indiæ et Brachmanibus; AMBROSIUS De moribus Brachmanum, et alius anonymus de iisdem, junctim editi curâ ED. BISSÆI, *Lond.* 1668, 4to.

Specimen sapientiæ Indorum veterum, Græcè ex cod. Holst. cum vers. Lat. ed. SEB. GFR. STARK, *Berol.* 1697, 8vo.

ALEX. DOW, History of Hindostan, from the earliest account of time to the death of Akbar, translated from the Persian of MUHAMMED CASIM FERISHTA, *Lond.* 1768, 3 vols. 4to. (With a learned Dissertation prefixed, concerning the Language, Manners, and Customs of the Hindoos).

J. JAC. HOLWELL, Interesting historical Events relative to the

Provinces of Bengal and the Empire of Hindostan, *Lond.* 1766, 3 vols. 8vo.

SINNER, Essai sur les dogmes de la Métempsychose et du Purgatoire, enseignés par les Brahmins de l'Indostan, *Berne*, 1771, 8vo.

Asiatic Researches, *Calcutta;* from 1788; 20 vols. 4to. (in 1851).

The Dissertations and Miscellanies relative to the History of the Antiquities, Arts, Sciences, and Literature of Asia, by Sir W. JONES and others, have been extracted from the last volumes of the foregoing collection, *Lond.* 1792–8, 4 vols. 8vo.

Systema Brachmanicum liturgicum, mythologicum, civile, ex monumentis Indicis musæi Borgiani Velitris dissertationibus historico-criticis illustravit FR. PAULINUS a S. BARTHOLOMÆO, *Romæ*, 1791, 4to.

† Various Dissertations in the Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscript. by THOM. MAURICE, and MIGNOT (Memoirs on the ancient Philosophers of India, in vol. XXXI.), and DE GUIGNES (Inquiry respecting the Philosophers called Samaneans), vol. XXVI.

† J. ITH, Moral Doctrine of the Brahmins, or The Religion of the Hindoos, *Berl.* and *Leips.* 1794, 8vo.

† FR. SCHLEGEL, On the Language and Wisdom of the Hindoos, *Heidelb.* 1808, 8vo.

POLIER, Mythologie des Hindous, tom. I et II, *Paris*, 1809, 8vo.

† FR. MAYER, Universal Dictionary of Mythology. The first vol. only has appeared. By the same author: Brahma, or the Religion of the Hindoos, *Leips.* 1818, 8vo.

W. WARD, A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos, *Lond.* 1817–20, 4 vols. Particularly vol. IV.

BOHLEN, Das alte Indien.

COLEBROOKE, *Trans. R. As. Soc.* 1. 2. 7. etc.

† A. H. L. HEEREN, On the Indians: (Suppl. to the third edition of his work, *Ideen über die Politik*, etc. s. 444), *Götting.* 1815–27, 8vo. (In Bohn's translation of Heeren's *Asia*, vol. 2).

† NIC. MULLER, Opinions, Arts, and Sciences of the ancient Hindoos, *Mentz*, 1822, 8vo.

LAUNJUINAIS, La Religion des Indous selon les Vedah, ou Analyse de l'Oupnek'hat publié par ANQ. DU PERRON, *Paris*, 1823, 8vo. See also his Memoirs on the Literature, Philosophy, etc. of the Hindoos.

† OTHM. FRANKS, On the Hindoos, and their Literature, etc. *Leips.* 1826, 8vo.

† J. G. RHODE, on the same subject, *Leips.* 1827, 2 vols. 8vo.

67. The Hindoos early distinguished themselves for arts, industry, civilization, and science; but the commencement of their history is, even yet, involved in great obscurity, and lost in the wildest traditions and chronological pretensions. Nothing has, even yet, been positively decided on the question whether their civilization and sciences be indigenous or derived from others; nor yet, whether they may not have

blended certain ideas and representations either directly or indirectly borrowed from foreign nations, with others which were properly their own. The same uncertainty prevails with respect to the age attributable to their sacred books.

Of the four *castes* into which the nation is divided, the first consists of the priests (Brahmins); subdivided into a great number of sects, and modified by various revolutions. The compulsory emigration of many Brahminical tribes has carried their religious opinions into the adjacent countries of Siam, China, and Tartary.

The highest object of the Hindoo religion is the Deity, regarded as an absolute Unity escaping the grasp of the human understanding. Originally, he reposed in the contemplation of himself; subsequently, his creative word has caused all things to proceed from him, by a succession of continual emanations. As creator, he is named *Brahma*; as the preserving power, *Vishnou;* as the destroyer and renovator of the forms of matter, *Siva.* These three relations of the divine being constitute the Trinity (*Timourti*) of the Hindoos. The innumerable transformations of Vishnou, or incarnations of the divine being, form the principal subject of their sacred books. All things return to unity or to Brahma, and the highest good consists in the union with Brahma, a union that is compassed by means of a contemplation of unity, without action and without movement. Connected with this doctrine of *emanation* is that of the pre-existence of souls; their derivation from the divine nature; their immortality; their fall; and the purification of fallen spirits by successive migrations through the corporeal world.—(Doctrine of the migration of souls, or Metempsychosis).

Subsequently, the religion and philosophy of the Hindoos was split into two sects—of Brahmism and Buddhism. In consequence of this we find, both in their sacred books and among the Brahmins, the greatest discrepancy of opinion to prevail respecting God, the world, and the soul: that is to say, we find both *realism* and *idealism; theism* and *atheism; materialism* and *spiritualism:* they contain, moreover, a development of the system of absolute identity. These doctrines are for the most part propounded in the form of instruction, delivered by men professing to be enlightened

from above.[1] They are shrouded by a veil of poetical tales and inventions, displaying an acute and profound intellect, but having rather the tendency to go forth than to retire into itself. After all, the true systematic and scientific genius of philosophy must not be expected in these works. Their books of moral precepts have a character of nobleness and gentleness which belongs to the race; and are, in a great measure, framed in accordance with the doctrine of the migration of souls. In the religion of Buddha, to which belong the Schamans, the Talapoins, and the Bonzes, the supreme felicity of God, and of the human soul, is made to consist in a state of absolute indifference and inaction.

The most important modern authorities on Indian philosophy are:—

COLEBROOKE. Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. I, p. 19–43, 92–118, 439–466, 542–579; vol. II, p. 1–39, &c.

WINDISCHMANN, Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte.

KENNEDY. Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, v. 3, p. 412, &c.

Thibet.

Besides some works enumerated § 66, consult Alphabetum Tibetanum, auct. AUG. ANT. GEORGIO, *Romæ*, 1762, 8vo. MAYER has given an extract from it in his Lexicon.

† P. S. PALLAS, Collection of Historical details respecting the Mogul nations, *Petersburgh*, 1776–1803, 4to.

† KLAPROTH, Travels in the neighbourhood of Caucasus in 1807–8, 2 vols. 8vo, *Halle*, 1812–14. Translated into French, 2 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1823. An English translation, 4to. 1814.

† HULLMANN, Critical Researches respecting the Lamaic Religion, *Berlin*, 1796, 8vo.

68. Like the Hindoos, the Thibetians believe in a God who reveals himself in a threefold relation and form; and suppose a great number of transformations of this deity, principally in his *second* character. They have, besides, various traditions respecting the origin of all things; respecting spirits, and their descent into the visible world; also with regard to the different epochs of the world, and the migration of souls.

Chinese.

Sinensis imperii Libri Classici Sex e Sinico idiomate in Lat. trad. a P. FRANC. NOEL, *Prag.* 1711, 4to.

[1] See, concerning the Gymnosophists, CIC. Tusc. V, 27; concerning Menou-Capila, Buddha, Calanus, CIC. de Div. I, 23; Tusc. II, 22.

† The Chou-King, one of the sacred books of the Chinese, translated by FATHER GAUBIL, revised and compared with the Chinese by M. DE GUIGNES; with a notice concerning Y-King, another sacred book of the Chinese, *Paris*, 1770, 4to.

† A Treatise on some points of the Chinese Religion, by FATHER LONGOBARD. Furthermore, A Treatise on some important points relative to the Mission to China, by FATHER SAINTE-MARIE; with Letters of M. DE LEIBNITZ on the Chinese Philosophy. These three works are contained in Leibnitznii Epist., ed. KORTHOLT, 2 vols.

The works of Confucius and of his disciples, by SCHOTT, 1st. p., *Halle*, 8vo. 1826.

Historia Philosophiæ Sinensis. *Brunswick*, 1727, 4to.

MENG-TSEU, vel Mincium, inter sinenses philosophos, Confucio proximum, edidit P. STANISLAS JULIEN, pt. 1, *Lutet. Parisior.* 8vo. 1824.

ABEL REMUSAT, On Laotseu, (Asiatic Journal, July 1823, *Paris.*)

KLAPROTH'S Memoirs relating to Asia, in the Asiatisches Magazin, from 1810.

SCHOTT'S Article on Chinese Literature, in the Encyclopædia of Grüber and Ersch, 16th. vol.

WINDISCHMANN, 1st. part of the 1st. vol. of his work: On philosophy in the development of Universal History.

CONFUCIUS, Sinarum Philosophus, sive scientia Sinensis Lat. exposita studio et op. PROSPERI JUONETTA, CHRIST. HERDTRICH, FRANC. ROUGEMONT, PHIL. COUPLET, P. P. Soc. Jesu, *Paris.* 1687, folio.

GEO. BERN. BILFINGERI, Specimen doctrinæ veterum Sinarum moralis et practicæ, *Francof.* 1724, 8vo.

CHR. WOLFII, Oratio de Sinarum philosophiâ practicâ, *Francof.* 1726. Third edition, with notes of LANGIUS, *Hal.* 1736, 4to.

J. DE BENED. CARPZOVII, Memcius seu Mentius Sinensium post Confucium Philosophus, *Lips.* 1725, 8vo.

DE PAUW, Recherches philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois, *Berlin*, 1775, 2 vols.

STUHR, Religions of China and Systems of Indian Philosophy, *Berlin*, 1835.

Mémoires concernant l'Histoire, les Sciences, les Arts, les Mœurs, les Usages des Chinois, par les Missionnaires de Pékin (AMYOT et d'autres), *Paris*, 1776-61, 4 vols.

Cf. the Dissertations of DE GUIGNES and others, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. vol. XXV, XXVII, XXXVI, XXXVIII.

The works of CONFUCIUS, containing the original text, with a translation by MARSHMAN, *Serampore*, 1809, 4to.

KLAPROTH, Mémoires Relatifs à l'Asie (Asiat. Mag. from 1810).

MORRISON, On Chinese Literature (in the Asiatic Journal).

69. The most ancient religion of the Chinese was simple and patriarchal. *Fo* is considered as the founder of their religious worship. They adored, originally, Heaven (Lian;) and the Supreme Master (Schang-Di), with inferior spirits

or geni. Superstitious imaginations connected with astrology, demons, and magic, were introduced at the fall of the Empire under the Dscheu dynasty. *Lao-Kiun* or Lao-Tsee, founded a religious sect, which calls the essence of all things Dao or Reason,[1] and whose members follow an epicurean life. *Kong-fu-tzee* (Confucius), whose father was a mandarin of the kingdom of Lo, collected, about the year 550 B.C., the traditions of Fo and of Lao-Dsee, perfected their religion and laws, and good maxims of morality founded on the social and domestic life of the nation. He so entirely confined himself to practical things, that not a single doctrine respecting the deity and immortality, is to be traced in his writings. His style is extremely laconic. His school was very numerous. The most eminent of his disciples was Dsu-tze. *Meng-dsu* (Mencius) gave a greater extension to the doctrines of Confucius. A great number of ideas passed from India and Thibet into China; hence arose the Chinese Buddhism, which became mingled with the old popular religion. Scientific culture has remained stationary in China for ages. Why?—(The Japanese follow analogous doctrines).

Persians:

Authorities: The Sacred Scriptures, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Xenophon Cyrop., Strabo, Plutarch, Λόγια τοῦ Ζωροάστρου, or Chaldean Oracles; the same, with additions, by Fr. Patricius, Nova de Universis Philosophia, *Venet.* 1595. fol.; and also published by Stanley, in his Philosophia Orientalis (cum notis Clerici).

Thomæ Hyde, Historia Religionis veterum Persarum eorumque Magorum, *Oxonii*, 1700–4; new edition, 1760.

Zend-Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre, contenant les Idées théologiques, physiques, et morales, de ce Législateur, les Cérémonies du culte Religieux qu'il a établi, etc., traduit en Français sur l'original Zend, avec des remarques, et accompagné de plusieurs traités propres à éclaircir les matières qui en sont l'objet; par M. Anquetil Du Perron, *Paris*, 1711, 4to.

† Anquetil and Foucher, Memoirs on the Person, the Writings, and the Philosophical System of Zoroaster; in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. XXVII, p. 257 and sqq.; XXX, XXXI, XXXIV, XXXVII, XXXIX, XL; and in the Mémoires de Littérature, vol. XXX and XXXV.

[1] According to some, this last is the Buddha of the Hindoos, and the same with the Sommona-Codom of the Siamese Cf. Bayle, art. "Sommona Codom."

[JONES], A Letter to M. A—— du P——, containing a Critique on his translation of the works attributed to Zoroaster, *Lond.* 1771, 8vo.

C. P. MEINERS, De Zoroastris Vitâ, Institutis, Doctrinâ, et Libris; In the Nov. Comment. Soc. Scient. Götting. vol. VIII, IX: and Comm. de variis religionum Persarum conversionibus; in the Comment. Soc. Götting, 1780, cl. phil. I, 45, et. sqq.; II, 19, sqq.; and, concerning Zoroaster, in the Biblioth. Philos. tom. IV, p. 2.

T. CH. TYSCHEN, Commentat. de Religionem Zoroastricarum apud exteras gentes vestigiis; In the Nov. Comm. Soc. Scient. Gött. tom. XI, XII.

THE DESSATIR, or Sacred writings of the ancient Persian prophets, *Bombay*, 1808, 8vo.

Heidelberg Jahrbuch, 1823: Febr. article, by *Hammer*. Leips. Liter. 1822, p. 156. THOLUCK, Journal des Savants, 1823; Art. "De Sacy."

The Schah-nameh of Firdûsi, in the work of GÖRRES; The Book of the heroes of Irân, 2 vol. *Berlin*, 1819; 8vo.

HAMMER, Journal of Vienna, vols. 8, 9, 10, 1820; RASK, On the antiquity and authenticity of the Zend-Avesta; the German translation by HAGEN, *Berlin*, 1826.

† J. G. RHODE, The Sacred Tradition; or, A complete System of the Religion of the ancient Bactrians, Medes, and Persians, or the people of Zend, *Francf. on the Maine*, 1820, 8vo. Particularly p. 453 and sqq.; and the works of the same author enumerated § 66.

Asiatic Researches, vol. VIII and IX.

On the Authenticity of the books of Zend consult also, † BUHLE, Manual of the History of Philosophy; † ZOEGA, Dissertations published by WELCKER; VALENTIA, Travels; and ERSKINE, Dissertation on the Parsees, in the second vol. of the Literary Society of Bombay.

70. The religion of the ancient Persians (Parsees) was the worship of fire or of the elements, in which fire was symbolical of the Deity. At a later period, in the time of the Greeks, the ancient worship was changed into the adoration of the stars (Sabeism), especially of the sun and of the morning-star. This religion was distinguished by a simple and majestic character; its priests were called Magi. Zoroaster (*Serduscht*), a Mede by birth, reformed the religion of the Medes, which, originally confined to the worship of fire, had been modified to the worship of the sun and the planets. This worship survives to the present day in India among the Parsees, who were driven out of Persia by the Mahometans; and who pretend to be still in possession of the sacred books of Zoroaster. This philosopher lived in the time of Guschtasb (*Darius Hystaspes*). He asserts the existence of a supreme being, all-powerful and eternal (*Zeruane Akerene*, i. e. *infinite time*,) from whom have

eternally proceeded, by his creative word (*Honofer*), two principles, *Ormuzd* and *Ahriman;* Ormuzd (*Oromasdes*), being pure and infinite Light, Wisdom, and Perfection, the Creator of every good thing; Ahriman the principle of darkness and evil, opposed to Ormuzd, either originally, or in consequence of his fall. To this belief are attached fables respecting the conflicting efforts and creations of these two powers; on the universal dominion ultimately reserved for the good principle, and the return of Ahriman during four periods, each of which is to last three thousand years;—on the good and the evil spirits (*Amshaspands, Izeds, Ferfers,*[1] and *Dives*), and their differences of sex and rank;—on the souls of men (*Ferfers*), which, created by Ormuzd before their union with the body, have their habitation in the heavens; and which ultimately, according as in this world they have served Ormuzd or Ahriman, pass after death into the dwellings of the blessed, or are precipitated into obscurity:—finally, respecting the future resurrection of the bodies of the wicked after the victory of Ormuzd and the restoration of all things. Such, with some ascetic precepts, are the leading subjects of their sacred books. The doctrines of Zoroaster had an extensive influence, owing to the principles of demonology and magic.

Chaldeans.

Authorities: The Scriptures, Diodorus Siculus, II, 29; Strabo, XVI, p. 739, ed. CASAUB.; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. lib. V; Cic. de Div. I, 1, 41; II, 46, sqq.

BEROSI Chaldaica, in the work of SCALIGER, De Emendatione temporum; and in FABRIC. Bibl. gr. t. XIV, p. 175; and the work itself (probably not authentic), entitled, Antiquitates totius Orbis; published in FR. JO. ANNII Antiquitat. Varr. vol. XVII, *Romæ,* 1798 (and subsequently).

† AUG. L. SCHLÖZER, On the Chaldeans, in the Repertory of Biblical Literature, published by EICHHORN, vol. VIII and X.

STANLEII Philosophia Orientalis in Clerici opp. Philos.

† FR. MUNTER, Religion of the Babylonians, *Copenh.* 1827, 4to.

JO. JAC. WAGNER'S Works before referred to.

71. The Chaldeans were devoted to the worship of the stars and to astrology: the nature of their climate and their country disposing them to it. The worship of the stars was

[1] These have been compared to the *Ideas* of the Platonists.

revived by them and widely disseminated, even subsequently to the Christian era, under the name of *Sabeism*. The learned caste, which appropriated to itself the appellation of Chaldeans, had collected a certain number of astrological facts, and carried to a great length the delusive science of astrology. Under the empire of the Persians, this caste lost much of its credit, through the influence of the Magi, and ceased to attempt anything but common-place tricks of divination. The cosmogony of Berosus,[1] and the pretended Chaldean oracles (allowed to be apocryphal), are evidently the productions of another age and country. The principal divinity of this nation was called *Bel*. The fables related of him by the pretended Berosus do not deserve recital.

Ægyptians.

Authorities: Books of Moses, Herodotus, lib. II, Manethonis Ægyptiaca et Apotelesmatica (fragments of dubious authority), Diodorus Siculus (with Heyne's Observations in the Comm. Soc. Gött. V, VI, VII), Plutarchi Isis et Osiris, Porphyrius De Abstinentiâ, Jamblichus De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, cum ep. Porphyrii ed. Th. Gale, *Oxon.* 1678, fol., Horapollinis Hieroglyphica, Gr. et Lat. ed. De Pauw, *Traj.* 1727, 4to., Hermes Trismegistus in Franc. Patrich nova de Universis Philosophia, etc. *Ferrar.* 1591.

Fr. And. Stroth, Ægyptiaca, seu Veterum Scriptorum de reb. Ægypti commentarii et fragmenta, *Gothæ*, 1782–88, 2 vols. 8vo.

Athan. Kircheri, Œdipus Ægyptiacus, *Romæ*, 1652–54, folio, et Obeliscus Pamphilius, *Ibid.* 1656, folio.

Jablonski, Pantheon Ægyptiacum, *Francf. ad Viadrim*, 1750–52, 3 vols. 8vo.

Conrad. Adami Comm. de sapientia, eruditione, atque inventis Ægyptiorum.' (In his Exercitatt. Exegett. p. 95, sqq).

† C. A. Heumann, On the Philosophy of the Ancient Egyptians; in his Acta Philosophorum, II, 659, sqq.

De Pauw, Recherches Philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois, *Berlin*, 1773, 2 vols. 8vo. (An English translation, 2 vols. 8vo. 1795.

† J. C. Meiners, Essay on the History of the Religion of the Ancients, particularly the Egyptians, *Götting.* 1775, 8vo. On the Worship of Animals, in his Philosophical Miscellanies, part I, p. 180; and several treatises by the same in the Comm. Soc. Götting. 1780–89–90.

† F. V. Lebrecht Plessing, Osiris and Socrates, *Berl.* and *Strals.* 1783, 8vo. cf. above § 38.

† C. P. Moritz, Symbolical Wisdom of the Egyptians, etc. *Berlin*, 1793, 8vo.

[1] A contemporary of Alexander the Great.

† P. J. S. VOGEL, Essay on the Religion of the Ancient Egyptians and Greeks, *Nürnberg*, 1793, 4to.

JOS. CHRISTOPH. GATTERER, De Theogoniâ Ægyptiorum ad Herodotum, in Comm. Soc. Götting. vol. V et VII. De Metempsychosi, immortalitatis animorum symbolo Ægyptiaco, vol. IX.

† CREUZER, Religions of Antiquity (cited above, at the head of § 66), et Commentatt. Herodoteæ, c. II.

HEEREN, Ideen, etc. second part, second edition. (In Bohn's translation of Heeren's *Asia*, pp. 249, and seq.)

SEYFFARTH, Rudimenta Hieroglyphices, 1826, etc.

Sir GARDINER WILKINSON, History of the Ancient Egyptians, 5 vols. 8vo. 1847.

BUNSEN, Ægyptens Lage in der Weltgeschichte, 1844. (Egypt's place in History, translated by Cottrell, vol. 1, 8vo. 1850.)

The Rev. JOHN KENRICK, Ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs, 2 vols. 8vo; and Herodotus, books ii and iii (the Egypt), with notes and dissertations, 8vo. 1841.

SHARPE'S Early History of Egypt, 8vo. 1848.

See also the following works on Egypt; DENON'S Egypt; BELZONI; GAU; MINUTOLI, etc.; PFAFF'S Hieroglyphica, *Nürnb.* 1824, 8vo.; the great work of the French Commission, by order of Napoleon; the work of ROSELLINI, and various recent works on Egypt.

72. The Egyptians were a nation highly remarkable for the antiquity of their civilization, and the originality of all their social system. Their priests, who formed a separate caste, were the sole depositaries of the secrets of certain sacred books written in hieroglyphics.[1] It is very difficult to determine with certainty, owing to the want of existing records, in what consisted their mysterious knowledge (*Esoteric* doctrine). It probably had a reference to the popular religion (*Exoteric* doctrine), which authorised the worship of the constellations (*Sabeism*); and that of certain animals (*Fetischism*), as symbolical of the former; of certain deified heroes (Thaut or Thot, Hermes, Horus); and lastly, maintained the doctrine of the Metempsychosis.[2] Their divinities Isis and Osiris, represented two principles, male and female. The peculiar character of the country seems to have given rise to, and encouraged, as the principal sciences of the Egyptians, geometry and astronomy; to which were united astrology and other superstitions, highly popular with the

[1] See † HEEREN, Thoughts on the Policy, Commerce, etc. of the Ancients (in Heeren's Works, Bohn's translation, 6 vols. 8vo.); and the articles of the New Literary Journal of Leipsic, 1816, Nos. I and II, on the recent attempts to explain the hieroglyphics.

[2] HEROD. II, c. 123.

people at large. It is impossible to define with accuracy the progress which the priests may have made in the above sciences; but, previous to their intercourse with the Greeks, we cannot conclude them to have been possessed of any high degree of mental cultivation.

After the foundation of the Græco-Egyptian kingdom, the civilization of the two races was combined; and this circumstance renders yet more difficult any explanation of the mysteries of the ancient esoteric doctrines, and the former habits of the original inhabitants.

The Hebrews.

See the books of the Old Testament: the Introductions to the Old Testament by EICHHORN, DE WELTE, and others; and the Commentaries on each book, as for instance those on Job, Proverbs, and the Prophets in general.

FLAVII JOSEPHI Opera, ed. HAVERKAMP. *Amstel.* 1726, 2 vols. folio.

PHILONIS JUDÆI Opera, ed. MANGEY, 2 vols. fol. *Lond.* 1742.

Jos. FR. BUDDÆI, Introd. ad Histor. Philos. Hebræor. *Halœ*, 1702, 8vo. Edit. emendata, 1721.

† FRIED. ANDR. WALTHER, History of the Philosophy of the Ancient Hebrews, *Gött.* 1750, 4to.

W. WARBURTON'S Divine Legation of Moses, new edition, *Lond.* 1756, 5 vols. 8vo. Supplement, 1788, 8vo.

† Jos. FR. JERUSALEM, Letters on the Books and the Philosophy of Moses, *Brunswick*, 1762, 8vo. and 1783.

† Jos. DAV. MICHAELIS, The Mosaic Law, *Francf. on the M.* 1770–1775, 6 vols. 8vo. New edition, 1775 and 1803.

J. F. KLENKER, Writings of Solomon, 3 vols. 8vo., *Riga*, 1778–86.

Doctrine of Jesus the son of Sirach, expounded by LINDE, with a treatise of H. NIEMEYER, *Leipz.* 1782; second edition, 1795.

† W. A. TELLER, Theodicé of the first Ages, etc. *Jena*, 1802, 8vo.

† C. A. LINDEMANN, On the Book of Job, *Wittenb.* 1811, 8vo.

JUL. FRID. WINZER, De Philos. Morali in libro Sapientiæ, quæ vocatur Salomonis, expositâ, *Viteb.* 1811, 4to.

C. FRID. STAUDLIN, Comment. de Prophetar. Hebræor. Doctrinâ Morali, *Gött.* 1798, 4to.

† J. JAHN'S Bibl. Archæology, *Vienna*, 1796; second edition, 1817-18.

† LAZ. BEN DAVID, On the Religion of the Hebrews before Moses, *Berlin*, 1812, 8vo.

† PHIL. BUTTMANN, Dissertation on the two first Mythi of the Mosaic History, etc. in the *Berliner Monatsschrift*, 1804, Nos. III and IV; and 1811, No. III.

† PHIL. BUTTMANN, On the Mythos of the Deluge, *Berlin*, 1812, 8vo.

UMBREIT. Koheleth scepticus De Summo Bono, *Götting.* 1820, 8vo.

JOST'S Geschichte der Israeliten.

73. The Hebrews or Israelites have transmitted to us, in their sacred writings, which belong to different periods, the most ancient philosophical dogmas on the creation of the world, on the providence that governs it, and on the origin of sin by the fall of the first man: lastly, they have traced out a very distinct system of monotheism. The writings of Moses contain ideas and maxims of wisdom, but no system. The book of Job is a didactic poem. Their kings, *David* and *Solomon*, were men of great experience and of great practical wisdom. They, as well as the prophets, have treated chiefly of morality under gnomical and sententious forms. But it was only at a later period that the Jews attended to philosophy properly so called. (See § 195.)

The Phœnicians.

SANCHONIATHO, and the authors who wrote upon him. Fragments of Books attributed to him in EUSEB. Præparat. Evangel. I, 10.

SANCHONIATHO, Phœnician History, translated from the first book of Eusebius, etc. with a continuation, etc. by ERATOSTHENES Cyrenæus; with historical and chronological remarks by R. CUMBERLAND, *Lond.* 1720, 8vo.

H. DODWELL'S Appendix concerning Sanchoniathon's Phœnician History, *Lond.* 1691, 8vo.

D. J. BAIER, De Phœnicibus eorumque studiis et inventis, *Jena*, 1709, 4to.

J. MICH. WEINRICH, De Phœnicum Litteraturâ, *Meiningæ*, 1744, 4to.

See also † HEEREN (Ideen, etc. I, 2), and † MUNTER, Religion of the Carthaginians, *Copenh.* 1821, with † BELLERMANN, On the Phœnician and Punic Coinage, *Berlin*, 1812–16.

74. The Phœnicians, a commercial people, served, through their continual intercourse with other nations, to disseminate widely a knowledge of the discoveries effected in the arts and sciences. Nevertheless, their mercantile habits restricted[1] their own knowledge to the maritime art and the mathematics. The history and the doctrines of Sanchoniatho[2] and of Ochus (Mochus, Moschus), are, at the present time, matters of much dispute. The cosmogonies attributed to them, as well as the popular religion of the Phœnicians, are eminently *material*. Posidonius, the Stoic, cites Moschus as the first inventor of the doctrine of atoms. See SEXT. EMPIR. adv. Mathem. IX, 363; and STRABO, Geog. XVI, p. 757.

[1] PLATO, De Repub. IV, p. 359. [2] About 1200 B.C (?).

75. *First Civilization of the Greeks, their Mythical and Poetical Traditions.*

See, above, § 38, 1, *b*.

De Pauw, Recherches Philosophiques sur les Grecs, *Berlin*, 1787, 4 vols. 8vo. (An English translation, 2 vols. 8vo. 1793).

† Barthelemy, Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis en Grèce.

Muller's History and Antiquities of the Doric Race, 2 vols. 8vo. *Oxford*, 1830.

† J. D. Hartmann, Essay towards a History of the Civilization of the principal Nations of Greece, *Lemgo*, 1796, 1800, 2 vols. 8vo.

Christ. Gottlob Heyne, De causis Mythorum veterum Physicis, in Opusc. Acad. tom. I.

† C. Fr. Creuzer, Symbolik (above § 66).

† F. W. J. Schelling, On the Mythi, Traditions, and Philosophical Maxims of the first epochs of the World; in the Memorabilien of Paulus, No. V.

† H. E. G. Paulus, Chaos a Poetic Fable, and not an Era of physical cosmology. In his Memorabilien, No. V.

† Fr. Ast, On the Chaos of the Greeks, in the Journal of Arts and Science, 1808, vol. I, part 2.

Greece was gradually rescued from barbarism, and advanced to a state of civilization, by the means of foreigners. Colonies from Egypt, Phœnicia, and Phrygia, introduced inventions and arts, such as agriculture, music, religious hymns, fabulous poems, and mysteries. It cannot be doubted that, in like manner, a great number of religious opinions and ideas must have migrated from Egypt to Greece. The only question is the degree of influence we should allow to these adventitious materials, the manner in which they became naturalized in their new country, and how far they were lost, or not, in the civilization and mental culture which they contributed to form. It is true that the Greeks possessed not only a rare aptitude for civilisation, but also a high degree of mental originality, the consequence of which necessarily was, that whatever inventions and ideas they acquired from foreign nations speedily assumed among them a new and original character; the more so, because there was no sacerdotal race, no division into castes, no despotic authority to obstruct the advances of society, the development of the mental powers, and the perfectibility of the mind's products.

The religion of the Greeks, notwithstanding the *sensible* forms which it assumed in most of its mythi (the meaning of which was indeterminate), presented a substance to

engage and exercise the curiosity of the human mind. The poets laid hold on these materials, and employed them with genial Art. By these latter a sort of æsthetic-spiritual culture was established, which served as an introduction to scientific culture. Among those who in this respect exerted the greatest influence, was *Orpheus*;[1] by his religious hymns, his imaginations respecting cosmogony; by the introduction of mysteries, and by certain moral precepts.[2] *Musæus*, by his poetic description of the region of the dead,—Homer,[3] by his national epic poems, which present us with a lively and faithful picture of the manners of ancient Greece, and contain besides a multitude of mythological recitals,[4]

[1] About 1250 B.C (?).

[2] Editions of Orpheus; those of ESCHENBACH, *Traj. ad Rhen.* 1689; GESNER, *Lips.* 1764; SCHNEIDER, *Jena*, 1803; HERMANN, *Lips.* 1805.

De Orpheo atque de Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, auctore K. LYCKE, *Hafniæ*, 1786, 8vo. Cf. JOS. GOTTLOB SCHNEIDER, Analecta Critica, *Trajecti ad Viadrim*, 1777, 8vo. (Fasc. I, sec. 4.) WAGNER, Mythol. sec. 344, sqq.

C. A. LOBECK, De Carminibus Orphicis, Diss. I, *Regiomont.* 1824.

G. H. BOTHE, Orpheus Poetarum Græcorum antiquissimus, *Götting.* 1825.

On the Mysteries, see EUSEB. Præpar. Evan. II, 3, p. 61; MEINER'S Verm. Phil. Schriften, Th. III, § 164, ff; S. CROIX, Recherches Hist. et Critiques sur les Mystères, 2nd edition, ed. DE SACY, 2 vols, *Paris*, 1817; OUVAROF, Essay on the Mysteries of Eleusis, *Strasbourg*, 1816; and LOBECK, De Mysteriorum Græcorum Argumentis, Diss. I, III, *Regiomont.* 1820, 4to; with the Mythological works of CREUZER, BAUR, and VOSS, mentioned above.

[3] About 1000 B.C (?).

[4] CHR. GLOB. HEYNE, De Origine et Causis Fabularum Homericarum. Nov. Comment. Soc. Scient. Gött. vol. VII.

† J. F. ROTHE, On Homer's Idea of a Supreme Deity, *Görlitz*, 1768, 4to.

C. BÖTTIGER, Quam vim ad religionis cultum habuerit Homeri lectio apud Græcos? *Guben.* 1790.

C. GUIL. HALBKART, Psychologia Homerica, *Züllichau*, 1796, 8vo.

K. H. W. VÖLCKER, On the ψυχή and εἴδωλον of the Iliad and Odyssey, etc. *Giessen*, 1825, 4to.

FR. GUIL. STURZ, De Vestigiis Doctrinæ de Animi Immortalitate in Homeri Carminibus, Prolusiones I—III, *Geræ*, 1794—1797, 4to.

J. FRED. DELBRUCK, Homeri religionis quæ ad bene beateque vivendum fuerit vis? *Magdeb.* 1797, 8vo.

J. D. SCHULZE, Deus Mosis et Homeri comparatus, *Lips.* 1799, 4to.

† FRAGUIER, On the Gods of Homer; in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr. tom. IV.

GUST. GADOLIN. De Fato Homerico. *Aboæ*, 1800, 8vo.

Hesiod,[1] by the collection he made of the sacred mythi (forming a system of theogony and cosmogony,) and by originating a great number of new ideas on morals,[2]—Epimenides of Crete,[3] and Simonides[4] of Ceos, with the lyric and gnomic poets, and the authors of fables (Æsop), belong to the same class, as having rendered to their country the like services.[5]

Practical and Gnomical Wisdom.

C. G. HEYNE, De Zaleuci et Charondæ Legibus atque Institutis. In his Opusc. Academ. tom. II.

† On the Legislation of Solon and Lycurgus, in the Thalia of SCHILLER, 1790, No. XI.

Jo. FR. BUDDEI Sapientia Veterum, h. e. Dicta illustriora Septem Græciæ Sapientum explicata, *Halæ*, 1699, 4to.

† G. AUG. HEUMANN, On the Seven Sages; in the Acta Philosoph. No. X.

† IS. DE LARREY, History of the Seven Sages, 2 vols. *Rotterdam*, 1713–16, 8vo. augmented by the remarks of DELABARRE DE BEAUMARCHAIS, *The Hague*, 1734, 2 vols. 8vo. (French).

JO. FR. WAGNER, De fontibus Honesti apud Homerum, *Luneb.* 1795, 4to.

[1] About 800 B.C.

[2] HEINSII Introductio in Hesiodi Opera et Dies, in qua Hesiodi philosophia exponitur; (in his edition of Hesiod, *Lugd. Bat.* 1613).

† L. WACHLER, On the Notions of Hesiod respecting the Gods, the World, Man, and his Duties, *Rinteln*, 1789, 4to.

† WAGNER, Homer and Hesiod, *Sulzb.* 8vo.

CH. GLOB. HEYNE, De Theogonia ab Hesiodo condita; in the Nov Comment. Soc. Gött. vol. VIII.

CHPH. ARZBERGER, Adumbratio doctrinæ Hesiodi de origine Rerum, Deorumque Natura, *Erlang.* 1794, 8vo.

† Letters on Hesiod, by CREUZER and G. HERMANN, *Leips.* 1818, 8vo.

C. G. EISSNER, The Theogony of Hesiod, *Leips.* 1823, 8vo.

[3] † C. F. HEINRICH, Epimenides of Crete, *Leips.* 1805, 8vo.

PET. GERH. DUKERI, Diss. de Simonide Ceo, poetâ et philosopho, *Ultrajecti*, 1768, 4to.

[4] See the article SIMONIDES in BAYLE's Dictionary.

[5] ULR. ANDR. RHODE, De Veterum Poetarum Sapientiâ Gnomicâ, Hebræorum imprimis et Græcorum, *Hafniæ*, 1800, 8vo.

J. CONR. DURII Diss. de reconditâ Veterum Sapientiâ in Poetis, *Altdorf.* 1655, 4to.

EL. WEIHENMAIERI Diss. de Poetarum Fabulis Philosophiæ involucris, *Ulmæ*, 1749, 4to.

CHR. GLOB. HEYNE, Prog. quo disputantur nonnulla de Efficaci ad Disciplinam publicam privatamque vetustissimorum Poetarum doctrina morali, *Götting.* 1764, 4to.

76. In the legislative systems of the Greeks, particularly those of Lycurgus, Zaleucus, Charondas, and Solon, we observe a high sense of liberty, a profound observation of the human heart, and great political prudence and experience. The sentences of the Seven Wise Men,[1] and the ancient Gnomic poets, contain, it is true, nothing more than rules of practical wisdom, expressed with energy and conciseness; but they evince, even at this early period, an advancement in civilization, and a maturity of reason for the pursuits of science, whenever an occasion should present itself to facilitate their prosecution.

[1] From the XLth to the LVIIth Olympiad.

PART THE FIRST.

FIRST PERIOD.

GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

FROM THALES TO JOHN OF DAMASCUS; i. e. FROM 600 YEARS B.C. TO THE END OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY.

Progress of the understanding towards knowledge, but without a clear perception of the principles which should direct it.

BRANDIS, Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie.
CREUZER'S Symbolik. (Above § 66).
SCHLOSSER'S Universal-historische Uebersicht, Part 1.
OTTFRIED MULLER, Prolegomena zu einer wissenchaftlicher Mythologie.

77. The Greeks, who had derived from foreigners the first seeds of civilization, distinguished themselves above all the other nations of antiquity, by their taste for poetry, for the arts, and sciences. The position of their country, their religion, their political constitution, and their love of liberty, contributed to develope, in all its originality and grandeur, the native genius of their country. They thus were betimes matured for philosophy, and engaged in the pursuit of it, even from the earliest date of their political liberty (§ 75).

78. A philosophical spirit having been once awakened among the Greeks, continued to extend its dominion. They devoted their attention to the most important objects of science (theoretically and practically); introduced method into their researches, forming a system of scepticism in opposition to dogmatism, and rarely failing to apply these speculative inquiries to purposes of real life. The Greek thinkers have justly been regarded by succeeding ages as models, as well for their spirit of research and investigation, as for the results to which these have led, both in the

manner and the *matter* of their philosophical inquiries; but above all, for a certain character of elegance and urbanity, and a command of philosophical language, which satisfies at once the judgment and the taste.

79. Their philosophy did not arrive at this perfection at once; it began by disjointed speculations on the external world. The habit of reflection which grew out of these first essays, the diversity of the results at which they arrived, and the continually increasing sense of a want of unity and harmony in their conclusions, recalled wandering speculation to the contemplation of the human mind as the ultimate source of all certain knowledge; and philosophizing became more enlarged, more methodical, and more systematic. In after times, the discord of different systems, the prevalence of a subtile scepticism, the oppression of the scientific spirit under a load of historical erudition, eventually diverted the mind from the investigation of its own properties; till the philosophers of Greece, having borrowed from those of the East some of their opinions, in the hope of attaining to something like *positive* knowledge, fell, instead, into *syncretism* and *mysticism*.[1] It is true that the passionate enthusiasm which mixed itself up with this latter philosophy, belonged in part to the natural character of the Greeks.

80. The history of Grecian philosophy may, therefore, be divided into three periods analagous to the ages of man; his youth—his maturity—and his decrepitude. Period the first: an ardent spirit of speculation, but with limited views and deficient in system; from *Thales* to *Socrates*, i. e. from 600 to 400 B.C. Period the second: a spirit of inquiry more universal, more systematic; both *dogmatical* and *sceptical;* from *Socrates* to the union of the Porch and the Academy, i. e. from 400 to 60 B.C. Period the third: cultivation of Greek philosophy by the Jews and the Romans, and its declension; philosophical learning, without a philosophical spirit; sceptical speculations under a more learned aspect, but speedily lost in mystical and enthusiastical fancies, and destroyed by the union of Grecian literature with that of the Orientals: prevalence of Christi-

[1] *Syncretism* denotes *eclecticism* without digesting the compound into a system. *Mysticism* admits the emotions and sensations as well as the Reason as a source of authority.—ED.

anity; from *Ænesidemus* to John of Damascus; i. e. from the year 60 B.C. to the eighth century.[1]

Authorities for the history of Grecian philosophy.

81. These are twofold; direct and indirect. The first are the works of the philosophers themselves, of which only a portion have come down to us entire, and for the most part consist of unconnected fragments, which have inflicted on the learned a prodigious deal of labour to arrange and illustrate them. The *indirect* sources consist in notices and information respecting the lives, the doctrines, and labours of the philosophers, which are to be found in subsequent writers of whatever description; whether presented to us in detached and unconnected pieces, or in a more complete form, and with a systematic arrangement. To this class belong: 1st. The writings of philosophers which contain accounts of the theories of their predecessors; among others, the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero (§ 180), Seneca, Plutarch (§ 185), Sextus Empiricus (§ 189, sqq.), Simplicius (§ 220). 2dly. The collection of Diogenes Laertius,[2] Philostratus,[3] Eunapius;[4] the history of philosophy ascribed to Galen,[5] and that of Origen;[6] with the collections of the Pseudo-Plutarch,[7] and of Stobæus.[8] 3dly.

[1] Consult also † AST, Epochs of Greek Philosophy, in the Europa of FR. SCHLEGEL, vol. ii, No II.

[2] DIOGENES LAERTIUS, De vitis, dogmatibus, et apophthegmatibus clarorum Philosophorum, curâ MARC. MEIBOMII, *Amst.* 1692, 2 vols. 4to. Curâ P. DAN. LONGOLII, 2 vols. 1739, 8vo. *Lips.* 1759, 8vo. Cum Notis Variorum, cura HUBNERI et JACOBETZ, 4 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1828–33.

[3] FLAV. PHILOSTRATI Vitæ Sophistarum in Philostratorum Operibus, Gr. et Lat. c. not. OLEARII, *Lips.* 1709, fol.

[4] EUNAPII Vitæ Philosophorum et Sophistarum, ed. JUNIUS, *Antwerp.* 1568, 8vo. Ed. COMMELIN, *Heidelb.* 1596, 8vo. Ed. SCHOTT, *Genevæ*, 1616, 8vo. Cum Notis WYTTENBACH et BOISSONADE, 2 vols. 8vo. *Amst.* 1822.

[5] CLAUDII GALENI Liber περὶ φιλοσοφου ἱστορίας, in Hippocratis et Galeni Operibus ex edit. CARTERII, tom. II, p. 21, seq.

[6] ORIGENIS φιλοσοφούμενα in JAC. GRONOVII Thes. Antiq. Græc., tom. X. (Also published by)

Jo. CHPH. WOLFF, Compendium Historiæ Philosophicæ antiquæ, sive Philosophumena quæ sub Origenis nomine circumferuntur, *Hamb.* 1706—1716, 8vo.

[7] PLUTARCHUS, De placitis Philosophorum, sive de Physicis Philosophorum decretis, ed. CHR. DAN. BECK, *Lips.* 1787, 8vo.

[8] JOH. STOBÆI Eclogæ Physicæ et Ethicæ, ed A. H. L. HEEREN, *Gött.*

The works of other Greek and Latin authors, such as Athenæus,[1] Aulus Gellius,[2] Macrobius,[3] Suidas.[4] 4thly. The writings of the ecclesiastical Fathers; Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Eusebius, Lactantius, Augustine (§ 232), Nemesius, Photius (§ 235).

CHAPTER FIRST.

FROM THALES TO SOCRATES (FIRST PERIOD OF GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY.)

Partial and Unsystematic Speculation.

HENR. STEPHANI Poesis Philosophica, *Paris*, 1573, 8vo. Ἠθικὴ ποίησις, seu Gnomici Poetæ Græci, ed. BRUNCK. *Argent.* 1784. 4to. And the Works on the Seven Sages and the Legislators of the Greeks.

SCIPIO AQUILIANUS, De placitis Philosophorum ante Aristotelem, *Milan*, 1615, 4to. Op. GE. MONALIS, *Venet.* 1620, 4to. Ed. CAR. PHIL. BRUCKER, *Lips.* 1756, 4to.

† D. TIEDEMANN, First Philosophers of Greece, *Leips.* 1780, 8vo.

† G. GUST. FULLEBORN, On the History of the first ages of Grecian Philosophy. In his Collection, Fasc. I.

J. GOTTL. BUHLE, Comment. de Veterum Philosophorum Græcorum ante Aristotelem conaminibus in arte Logicâ inveniendâ et perficiendâ. Comment. Soc. Scient. Gött. tom. X.

FRIED. BOUTERWEK, De primis Philosophorum Græcorum decretis physicis. Comment. Soc. Gött. tom. II, 1811.

KIEFHABER, Sprüche der Sieben Weisen Griechenlands, 1830.

DILTHEY, Griechische Fragmente in Prosa and Poesie. Gesammelt, übersetzt und erläutert. Erstes Heft. Fragmente der Sieben Weisen &c. 1836.

WAGNER, De Periandro septem sapientibus annumerato, 1823.

See also the works enumerated above, § 75, on the Greek Mythology, particularly on ORPHEUS, HOMER, and HESIOD, and the Gnomic poets.

1792—1801, 2 parts in 4 vols. Sermones, *Francf.* 1781, fol. Ed. NIC. SCHOW, *Lips.* 1797, 8vo.

[1] ATHENÆI Deipnosophistarum, libri XV, ed. CASAUBON, *Lugd.* 1657—64, 2 vols. fol. Jo. SCHWEIGHÆUSER, *Argent.* 1801—7, 14 vols. 8vo. Cura DINDORFII, 3 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1827.

[2] † Fragments of the History of Ancient Philosophy, drawn from the Nights of AULUS GELLIUS, *Lemgo*, 1785, 8vo.

Noctes Atticæ, *Henr. Steph.* 1585. GRONOV. *Lugd. Batav.* 1706. 4to. etc. Cura CONRADI, 2 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1762. Cura LEON, 2 vols. 8vo. *Götting.* 1824.

[3] MACROBII Saturnal. ed. JAC. GRONOVIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1670, 8vo. Ed. ZEUNE, *Lips.* 1774, 8vo.

[4] The modern works on the history of philosophy among the Greeks, have been mentioned, § 38, I, *a* and *b*.

82. A spirit of philosophical research first manifested itself in some rude attempts in Ionia, made at the period when this country, colonized from Greece, enjoyed the utmost prosperity. Thence it extended to some of the neighbouring colonies; subsequently into Magna Græcia, until the conquests of the Persians and the troubles of southern Italy compelled it to take refuge in Athens; from which, as a centre, intellectual civilization was disseminated, and, as it were, radiated over the whole of Greece.

83. The starting-point of philosophy was the question concerning the origin and the elementary principle of the world: the resolution of which was attempted by experience and reflection in the Matter (Ionic school); and Form of perception (Pythagoreans.) The *Eleatic* school opposed to each other the *experimental* and *intellectual* systems; which were combined by the *Atomistic* philosophers. Last of all came a *Sophistical* school, which threatened to destroy all belief, religious and moral.

84. But this progress of investigation was a sort of prelude to a more scientific philosophy, which by-and-by turned from the external *object* to the internal *subject:* from the world without to the mind within. Philosophical reflection, discarding poetical myths, applied itself to practical purposes, by the discovery of moral and political apophthegms, for a long time delivered in verse (*Gnomæ*, whence *philosophia gnomica* sive *sententiaria;* cf. § 75-76). In theory, men wandered, went from one hypothesis to another, until, in the end, they endeavoured to substitute for these a system of metaphysical knowledge. The earliest philosophers were solitary, and without a school (Pythagoras nevertheless being an exception). Their notions were disseminated at first by oral tradition; subsequently by writings; which gradually disengaged themselves from poetic fictions.

I. *Speculations of the Ancient Ionians.*

† H. RITTER, History of the Ionian Philosophy, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo.
BOUTERWEK, Dissertation referred to above, at the head of § 82.

Thales.

† THE ABBE DE CANAYE, Inquiry respecting the Philosophy of Thales, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. X.

CHR. ALB. DOEDERLINI Animadversiones historico-criticæ de Thaletis et Pythagoræ historicâ ratione, 1750, 8vo.

GODOFR. PLOUCQUET, Dissert. de Dogmatibus Thaletis Milesii et Anaxagoræ Clazomenii, etc. *Tubing.* 1763; and in his Comment. Philos. Select.

GLIEB. CHPH. HARLES, Tria Programmata de Thaletis Doctrinâ, de Principio Rerum, imprimis de Deo, ad illustrandum Ciceronis de Nat. Deor. locum, lib. I, 10, *Erlang.* 1780-84, folio.

J. FRID. FLATT, Diss. de Theismo Thaleti Milesio abjudicando, *Tub.* 1785, 4to.

J. H. MULLER, De Aqua, principio Thaletis, *Altd.* 1719, in 4to.

FISCHER, De Hellenicæ philosophiæ principiis, atque de cursu a Thalete usque ad Platonem, 1836.

† GOESS, On the System of Thales. See above, at the head of § 2.

85. *Thales* (603 B. C.), of Miletus, the most flourishing commercial city in Ionia, improved himself by travel, was possessed of some mathematical and astronomical knowledge, and was ranked by his fellow-citizens among the Seven Sages. He was the first Grecian who discussed, on principles of reason, the origin of the world. *Water* (ὕδωρ), or humidity,[1] was in his opinion (formed in consequence of some empirical observations very partial in their nature) the original element (ἀρχή), whence all things proceeded;[2] and spirit (νοῦς) the impulsive principle. He observed the attractive power of the magnet, and consistently with his theory, supposed the stone to have a soul. Everything is full of the divinity.[3] It is not exactly known in what manner Thales associated the spiritual parts of his system with his material principle. Accordingly, the discussions which his theism has occasioned commenced at a very early epoch. Among other sentences, they attribute to him that of γνῶθι σεαυτόν.

Anaximander and Pherecydes.

† THE ABBE DE CANAYE, Inquiry concerning Anaximander, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. X.

† FR. SCHLEIERMACHER, Dissertation on the Philosophy of Anaximander, in the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin, 1804-11, *Berlin*, 1815, 4to.

[1] ARISTOT. Metaph. I, 3. De Cœlo, II, 13.

[2] ARISTOT. De Animâ, I, 2, 5. Cf. De Mundo, VI.

[3] CICERO, De Nat. Deor. I, 10.

† H. RITTER, in the work already referred to, and the article Anaximander, IVth part of the Encyclopædia published by ERSCH and GRUBER.

PHERECYDIS fragmenta e variis scriptoribus collegit, etc. commentationem de Pherecyde utroque philos. et historico præmisit FR. GUIL. STURZ, *Gera*, 1789, 8vo. second edition, 1824.

† HEINIUS, Dissertation on Pherecydes, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences, Berlin, V. 1747.

† See also the work of TIEDEMANN, mentioned above, at the head of § 82, p. 172, sqq.

86. *Anaximander*,[1] a Milesian like Thales, and a friend of that philosopher, chose, as the basis of his argument on the same subject, not analogy, but an assumed philosophical principle. The primary essence he asserted to be *infinite* (ἄπειρον), comprehending all things, and *divine* (τὸ θεῖον), without, however, more exactly defining it.[2] According to some he attributed to this divine nature an essence altogether distinct from the elements; according to others, he made it something intermediate between water and air. It is only in infinity that the perpetual changes of things can take place; from infinity, opposites detach themselves by a perpetual movement, and in like manner continually return to the same. By this principle the heavens and the earth subsist: with respect to which Anaximander did not content himself with astronomical speculations only. Every thing which is contained in infinitude (τὸ ἄπειρον), is subject to change, itself being unchangeable.[3] Such also was the doctrine, with some slight differences, of his contemporary (but younger than himself) Pherecydes of Syros; who recognised as the eternal principles of all things Jupiter (Ζεὺς or αἰθήρ), Time, and the Earth. It appears also that he attempted an account of the origin of the celestial bodies and of the human race, and that he believed the soul to be immortal.[4] Anaximander and Pherecydes were the first philosophers who committed their thoughts and opinions to writing.

[1] About 610 B.C. [2] DIOG. LAERT. II, 1.

[3] ARISTOT. Physic. I, 4, 5; III, 4—7; and SIMPLIC. Comment. in Phys. p. 6; and De Cœlo, p. 151.

[4] ARISTOT. Metaph. XIV, 4. DIOG. LAERT. I, 119. CIC. Tusc. Qu. I, 16.

Anaximenes.

DAN. GROTHII (præs. J. ANDR. SCHMIDT), Diss. de Anaximensis Psychologiâ, *Jen.* 1689, 4to.

87. *Anaximenes*, of Miletus,[1] followed the doctrine of his friend and teacher Anaximander; but instead of the indeterminate ἄπειρον of the latter, certain observations, though partial and limited, on the origin of things and the nature of the soul, led him to regard the air (ἀήρ) as the primitive element.[2] In after-time, *Diogenes* of *Apollonia* revived and improved upon this system; in which we may already observe a more enlarged view of nature, and a higher exercise of thought.

II. *Speculations of the Pythagorean.*

Authorities: besides Plato and Aristotle, and the Pythagorean Fragments, particularly those of Philolaus:

Pythagoræ Aurea Carmina. Timæus Locris. Occllus Lucanus. Porphyrius de Vita Pythagoræ, ed. CONR. RITTERSHUSIUS, *Altd.* 1610, 8vo. See also χρύσεα ἔπη, in the Sententiosa vetustissimorum Gnomicorum opera, tom. I, ed. GLANDORF, *Lips.* 1776, 8vo.; and in BRUNCK'S Gnomici Poetæ Græci, 8vo. *Argent.* 1784.

JAMBLICHI de Vita Pythagorica liber, Gr. cum vers. Lat. Ulr. Obrechti notisque suis edid. LUDOLF. KUESTERUS, acced. MALCHUS sive PORPHYRIUS De Vita Pythagoræ cum not. L. HOLSTENII et CONRAD. RITTERSHUSII, *Amstelod.* 1707, 4to. ed. THEOPH. KIESLING, *Lips.* 1815, 2 vols. 8vo.

Pythagoræ Sphæra Divinatoria de decubitu ægrotorum; and the Epistolæ Pythagoræ, in the Opusc. Myth. Phys. of GALE, p. 735, sqq.

Socratis et Socraticorum, Pythagoræ et Pythagoricorum, quæ feruntur Epistolæ, ed. ORELLIUS, 1816, 8vo.

RICH. BENTLEY'S Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris, &c. 8vo. best edition, *Lond.* 1777; new edition, by DYCE, 2 vols. 8vo. 1836. Dissert. de Phalaridis, Themistoclis, Socratis, Euripidis, aliorumque Epistolis, in Latin. sermonem convertit J. D. A. LENNEP, *Gröning.* 1777, 4to. Et, BENTLEII Opuscula Philologica, Dissertationem in Phalaridis Epistolas et Epistolam ad J. MILLIUM complectentia, *Lips.* 1781, 8vo.

† MEINERS, History of the Sciences in Greece and Rome, tom. I, p. 187.

† MEINERS, Dissertation on the Authenticity of some works of the Pythagorean School, in the Bibliotheca Philol. tom. I, No. V.

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[1] Flourished about 257 B.C.

[2] ARISTOT. Metaph. I, 3. SIMPLIC. in Phys. Arist. p. 6 et 9. CIC. Acad. Quæst. II, 37. PLUTARCH, De plac. Philos. I, 3. STOB. Ecl. I, p. 296. SEXT. EMP. Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 30; Adv. Mathem. VII, 5; IX, 360, DIOG. LAERT. II, 3.

* TIEDEMANN, Early Philosophers of Greece, p. 188, sqq.

W. LLOYD, A Chronological Account of the Life of Pythagoras, and of other Famous Men, his Contemporaries, with an Epistle to Dr. Bentley, etc. *Lond.* 1699–1704, 8vo.

HENR. DODWELLI Exercitationes duæ, prima de ætate Phalaridis, altera de ætate Pythagoræ, *Lond.* 1699–1704, 8vo.

Dissertations sur l'Époque de Pythagore, par DE LANAUZE et FREBET, dans les Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XIV.

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GE. LUD. HAMBERGER, Exerc. de Vitâ et Symbolis Pythagoræ. *Vitemb.* 1676, 4to.

DACIER, La Vie de Pythagore, ses symboles, ses vers dorés, etc. *Par.* 1706, 2 vols. 12mo.

CHPH. SCHRADER, Diss. de Pythagorâ, in quâ de ejus Ortu, Præceptoribus et Peregrinationibus agitur, *Lips.* 1708, 4to.

JE. JAC. LEHMANN, Observatt. ad Histor. Pythagoræ, *Frcft.* et *Leips.* 1731, 4to.

M....; Vies d'Epicure, de Platon, et de Pythagore, *Amst.* 1752, 12mo.

† FRED. CHRIST. EILSCHOV, History and Critical Life of Pythagoras, translated from the Danish of PHILANDER VON DER WELSTRITZ, *Kopenhagen*, 1756, 8vo.

† AUG. E. ZINSERLING, Pythagoras-Apollon, *Lips.* 1808, 8vo.

JOH. SCHEFFER, De Naturâ et Constitutione Philosophiæ Italicæ, *Ups.* 1664. Edit. II, cum carminibus, *Vitemb.* 1701, 8vo.

† J. LE CLERC, in his Bibliotheca, tom. X, art. II, p. 79.

RITTER, Geschichte der Pythagoräischen Philosophie, 1826; (in his History of Philosophy, vol. I, pp, 326 and seq. Bohn's translation).

WENDT, De rerum principiis secundum Pythagoreos, 1827.

REINHOLD, Beitrag zur Erläuterung der Pythagoräischen Metaphysik, 1827.

For the ancient works relative to Pythagoras and his Philosophy, see the † Acta Philos. of HEUMANN, part II, p. 370, part IV, p. 752.

88. The difficulties which embarrass this part of history and demand the exercise of much critical discernment are, —The want of authentic writings, the abundance of those which are apocryphal, the mystery which appears to involve everything belonging to the person, the character, and views of Pythagoras and his society; the difficulty of discriminating between what was his own, and what was borrowed from the Egyptians, or may have proceeded from others of his school, and, finally, the re-establishment of the same school at a later period, under different masters, and with somewhat different views.

89. Pythagoras was born at Samos;[1] and improved him-

[1] In 584, according to Meiners.

self by his travels in Greece and Egypt,[1] and probably also by the lessons of Thales and Pherecydes (whose disciple he is said to have been),[2] as well as by those of Anaximander. After having previously attempted to establish a school and a species of philosophical congregation at Samos, he founded one (about 527) at Croto, in Italy, whence his school came to be called the *Italic*. Besides the improvement of the intellectual, moral, and religious capacities of man, this society had also considerable political influence; which circumstance occasioned its ruin, and the death of its founder,[3] about the year 500. Pythagoras may justly be esteemed a man remarkable for his talents, his discoveries, his plans, and the authority he possessed over others; but the ancient Greeks and Romans invested him with something more than this, amounting to a sort of superstitious reverence. He was the first who assumed the name of *philosopher*. See Cic. Tusc. Quæst. V. 3, 4. Diog. Laert. VIII. 8, and I, 12.

90. He investigated the principles of the mathematical sciences; particularly of Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy; his discoveries in which are of themselves sufficient to immortalize his name. He ascribed an occult power to words and numbers;[4] and the science of arithmetic, which he considered as the key to mathematics, he looked upon as containing also the essence of all philosophical knowledge.[5] From this principle he was led to adopt a sort of Mathematical Philosophy, which gave to his school also the name of *Mathematical*. We possess only fragments of the speculations of his school on these subjects, in which we are not enabled to distinguish the hand of the master from that of his disciples.

§ 91.

On the subject of the Pythagorean numbers, see Jac. Brucker, Con-

[1] Fr. Buddei Diss. de Peregrinationib. Pythagoræ, *Jena*, 1692, 4to.; and in his Analect. Hist. Philos.

[2] Diog. Laert. I, 118, sqq. Cic. De Div. I, 13.

[3] About 504, according to Meiners; according to others, 489 B.C.

[4] Ælian. Var. Hist. IV, 17. Jamblich. c. 10.

[5] Aristot. Metaph. I, 5.

venientia Numerorum Pythagoræ cum Ideis Platonis, Miscell. Hist. Philos.

De Numerorum, quos Arabicos vocant, vera origine Pythagoricâ commentatur CONR. MANNERT, *Norimb.* 1801, 8vo.

† C. A. BRANDIS, On the Doctrine of Numbers of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (in the Rhen. Mus. of Hist. Philos. etc. 1828, No. II, s. 208).

AMAD. WENDT, De rerum principiis secundum Pythagoreos Comment. *Lips.* 1827, 8vo.

Numbers were defined by the Pythagoreans to be the principles (*αἰτίαι*) of all things;[1] this school being disposed by their mathematical studies to make the system of external things subordinate to that of numbers, agreeably to their axiom, *μίμησιν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα τῶν ἀριθμῶν*.[2] Numbers are equal and unequal, *ἀρτίοι* and *περιττοί*; the elementary principle of the latter being unity (*μονάς*), that of the former duality (*δυάς*). Unequal numbers are limited and complete; equal ones unlimited and incomplete. The abstract principle then of all perfection is unity and limitation (*τὸ πεπερασμένον*); that of imperfection, duality and indeterminateness (*τὸ ἄπειρον*). The ten elementary numbers which are represented in the *tetractys*,[3] and which embrace a complete system of numeration, contain also the elements of a perfect system of nature. (See Arist. Met. I, 5). In this instance they applied the theory of numbers to explain the natures and substances of things, as, in others, to illustrate their formation and origin. But on this subject we are acquainted only with subsequent essays, belonging to a later school.[4]

92. *On the World and the Deity.* The Pythagoreans, like their predecessors, considered the world to be a harmonious whole (*κόσμος*); consisting, according to a system of Decades, of ten great bodies revolving around a common centre, agreeably to harmonious laws; whence the music of the spheres,[5] and their explanation of the symbolical

[1] ARIST. Metaph. I, 3. JAMBLICH. Vit. Pythag. c. xii, p. 120, ex Heraclide Pontic.

[2] ARIST. Metaph. I, 5, 6; XII, 6, 8.

[3] SEXT. EMPIR. Adv. Math. IV, 3.

J. GEO. MICHAELIS. Diss. de Tetracty Pythagoricâ, *Francof. ad Viad.* 1735. ERH. WEIGEL, Tetractys Pythagorica.

[4] SEXTUS, Adv. Mathem. X, 249, sqq.

[5] AUG. BOECKH, Disputatio de Platonico Systemate Cœlestium

lyre of Apollo. The centre, or central fire (the sun), in other words, the seat of Jupiter, Διὸς οἶκος φυλάκη, is the most perfect object in nature, the principle of heat, and consequently of life; penetrating and vivifying all things. According to the same system, the stars also are divinities; and even men, nay, the inferior animals, have a sort of consanguinity with the Divine Being. They considered the *dæmones* as a race intermediate between gods and men, and attributed to them a considerable agency in dreams and divination: always, however, assigning as ultimate causes of all things, destiny and the deity. They ennobled their notion of the deity by the attribution of certain moral qualities, such as truth and beneficence.[1]

93. *Doctrine of the Soul.* The soul also is a number, and an emanation from the central fire,[2] resembling the constellations to which it is allied by its immortality and its constant activity; capable of combining with any body, and compelled by destiny to pass successively through several. This theory of the *metempsychosis*, borrowed (it is probable) from the Egyptians,[3] Pythagoras appears to have combined with the doctrine of moral Retribution. It is to the Pythagoreans we are indebted for the first attempt, however rude, at an analysis of the operations and faculties of the mind. The Reason and Understanding (νοῦς and φρένες), they placed in the brain; the appetites and the will (θυμός) in the heart.[4]

94. The doctrine of Pythagoras embraced also the ques-

Globorum, et de verâ indole Astronomiæ Philolaicæ, *Heidelberg.* 1810, 4to.

[1] Plato Phædon. p. 139, et Heindorf, ad h. l. Plutarch. De Plac. Philos. I, 3, 7; II, 4. Diog. VIII, 27, 21. Jamblich. LXXXVI, 137, sqq. Porphyr. Vitâ Pythag. § 41. Ælian. Var. H. XII, 59. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 206.

Conr. Dietr. Koch, Diss. Unum Theol. Pythagor. Compendium, *Helmst.* 1710. Mich. Mourgues, Plan Théologique du Pythagorisme et des autres Sectes, *Toulouse*, 1712, 2 vols. 8vo.

[2] Diog. Laert. VIII, 28.

[3] Herodot. II, 123. Arist. De An. I, 3.? Plut. De Plac. Philos. IV, 7. Jamblich. Vit. Pyth., c. 24. Diog. Laert. VIII, 14, 28. 30, 31. Stob. Ecl. I, 1044, sqq.

[4] Cic. Tusc. Quæst. I, 17. Diog. VIII, 30. Stob. Ecl. Phys., p. 878.

tion of *Ethics*;[1] and the fragments of his which we possess on this subject contain (in symbolical language) many admirable ideas, but of which *the principles* are not sufficiently developed.[2] Moral good they identified with *unity* —evil with *multiplicity*. Virtue is *the harmony and unison of the Soul* (Aristot. Eth. Nicom. II, 5; cf. I, 4. Diog. Laert. VIII, 33. Clem. Alex. Strom. IV, c. 23), or, in other words, *similitude to God*, ὁμολογία πρὸς τὸ θεῖον. Justice they defined to be ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος;[3] and Right they made to consist in τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός: Friendship was made to consist in community of interests and equality; self-murder was condemned by Pythagoras as a crime against the gods, and the virtue which he especially commended was self-command (κατάρτυσις). But the attention of this school was greatly engaged, and its disciples exer-

AMBROS. RHODII, Dial. de Transmigratione Animarum Pythagoricâ. *Hafn.* 1638, 8vo.

PAGANINI GAUDENTII De Pythagorica Animarum Transmigratione, *Pis.* 1641, 4to.

Essay of Transmigration, in defence of Pythagoras, *Lond.* 1692.

GUIL. IRHOVII De Palengenesiâ veterum, s. Metempsychosi sic dicta Pythagoricâ, Lib. III, *Amst.* 1733, 4to.

[1] MARC. MAPPI Diss. (Præs. JAC. SCHALLER) de Ethica Pythagoricâ, *Argent.* 1653; and in the Fragmen. Hist. Philos. of WINDHEIM.

KRISCHE, De societate a Pythagora in urbe Crotoniatanâ conditæ scopo politico. 1830.

CRAMER, De Pythagora, quomodo educaverit atque instituerit. 1833.

MAGN. DAN. OMEISII Ethica Pythagorica, *Altd.* 1693, 8vo.

FRID. GUIL. EHRENFR. ROST, Super Pythagora Virtutem ad Numeros referente non revocante, *Lips.* 1803.

FR. BERNH Arcana Moralitatis ex Pythagoræ symbolis collecta, *Ferrar.* 1669; ed. quartus PAUL Pater. *Francf. ad M.* 1687.

Jo. MICH. SONNTAG, Diss. de similitudine nostri cum Deo Pythagorico-Platonico, *Jen.* 1699, 4to.

FR. BUDDEI, Diss. De καθάρσει Pythagorico-Platonica, *Hal.* 1701, 4to; cf. Analect. Hist. Philos. ejusdem.

CH. AUG. ROTH, De Examine conscientiæ Pythagorico vespertino, *Lips.* 1708, 4to.

Jo. FRIEDEM. SCHNEIDER, Diss. De ἀνοδῳ seu ascensu hominis in Deum Pythagorico, *Hal.* 1710.

Jo. SCHILTERI, Diss. De Disciplinâ Pythagoricâ, in his Manuductio Philos. Moralis, *Jen.* 1676, 8vo.

[2] ARIST. Eth. Magn. I, 2.

[3] ARIST. Eth. Nicom. I, 1; cf. II, 6; V, 5. DIOG. LAERT. VIII, 33.

cised in an anthropological morality, or asceticism, which pervaded all their system.[1]

95. We are acquainted with but a small portion of the writings of the old Pythagorean sect, and these are merely commentaries on the opinions of their master. The philosophers belonging to it were *Aristæus* of Croto, the successor and son-in-law of Pythagoras, according to Jamblichus;[2] *Teleauges* and *Mnesarchus*, sons of Pythagoras; *Alcmæon* of Croto, particularly distinguished as a naturalist and physician; *Hippo* of Rhegium, and *Hippasus* of Metapontum; (these two last were allied to the Ionic school by their doctrine of a fundamental and elementary principle of nature); *Ecphantus* of Syracuse, who inclined to the Atomic school; *Clinias*, the contemporary of Philolaus, and *Epicharmus* of Cos, the comedian, called also the Megarean and Sicilian, on account of his residence at those places. Nothing can be advanced with certainty concerning *Ocellus* the Lucanian,[3] and *Timæus* of Locri Epizephyrii, and on that account called Timæus the Locrian.[4] The work attributed to the latter[5] is nothing but an abstract of the Timæus of Plato, and the authenticity of the treatise on the Universe[6] attributed to Ocellus, is even more unquestionably apocryphal. Among the most distinguished Pythagoreans of a later

[1] Several symbolical precepts are to be found apud PLUTARCH. De Pueror. Educ. fin.; and DIOG. LAERT. VIII, 17.

[2] Vita Pythag. [3] Flourished about 496 B.C.

[4] Respecting both, consult † MEINERS, Hist. Doctr. de Vero Deo, P. II. p. 312, sqq. The same, in his † History of the Sciences among the Greeks and Romans, vol. I, p. 584. The same, in the † Bibl. Philol. of Gött., vol. I, No. I, p. 204; and † TIEDEMANN, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, vol. I, p. 89.

[5] Περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς, printed in the Opusc. Myth. Phys. et Eth. of THOM. GALE, p. 539, sqq., and published by D'ARGENS, *Berlin*, 1763, 8vo. translated by BARDILI, in the collection of FULLEBORN, No. IX, § 9. On this work, consult † TENNEMANN, System of the Philosophy of Plato, vol. I. p. 93.

[6] Περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, first published in the Opusc. of TH. GALE, p. 99, sqq. The same, by BATTEUX, with the work of TIMÆUS, *Par.* 1768, 3 vols. 8vo; and also separately, by D'ARGENS, *Berlin*, 1792, 8vo; by ROTERMUND, *Leips.* 1784, 8vo; and lastly, by RUDOLPHI. Ocellus Lucanus de Rer. Naturâ, Græcè; rec., comment. perpet. auxit et vindicare studuit AUG. FRID. WILH. RUDOLPHI, *Leips.* 1801, 8vo., translated with a Dissertation on the Genius of Ocellus, by BARDILI, ap. FULLEBORN, Fasc. X, § 1—3.

period should be mentioned, *Archytas* of Tarentum,[1] a contemporary of Plato, and *Philolaus* of Croto, or Tarentum,[2] who became celebrated for his system of astronomy, and composed the first treatise of his school which was committed to writing,[3] entitled "The Bacchæ, or Inspired Women."[4]

96. The doctrine of Pythagoras had great influence with the most eminent philosophers of Greece (and, in particular, with Plato) from the excitement, direction, and method it communicated to their speculations. Subsequently, however, it became the fashion to call Pythagorean all that Plato, Aristotle, and others after them, had added to the doctrines of Pythagoras, even opinions which they themselves had started; and to this medley of doctrines of various origin was superadded a mass of superstitions (§ 184).

III. *Speculations of the Eleatic School.*

Liber de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgiâ, Aristoteli vulgo tributus, partim illustratus Commentario a GE. GUST. FÜLLEBORN, *Hal.* 1789, 4to.

GE. LUD. SPALDINGII Vindiciæ Philosophorum Megaricorum; subjicitur Commentarius in priorem partem libelli de Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ, *Hal.* 1792, 8vo.

† J. GOTTFR. WALTHER, The Tombs of the Eleatic Philosopher unclosed, second edition, *Magd.* et *Leips.* 1724.

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[1] See C. G. BARDILI, Epochen, etc., supplement to the first part. The same, Disquisitio de Archyta Tarentino, Nov. Act. Soc. Lat. Jen. vol. I, p. 1. Tentamen de Archytæ Tarentini vita atque operibus a Jos. Navarra conscriptum, *Hafn.* 1820, 4to. Collection of the pretended Fragments of Archytas, in the † History of the Sciences, by MEINERS, vol. I, p. 598.

GRUPPE, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas und anderen der ältern Pythagoräer, 1840.

[2] The contemporary of Socrates.

[3] Concerning this philosopher, see the work of AUG. BOECKH, mentioned § 92, note; and † The Doctrine of the Pythagorean Philolaus, with the fragment of his work, by the same, *Berl.* 1812, 8vo.

[4] On the Pythagorean Ladies, see IAMBLICHI Vit. Pyth. ed. KUSTER, p. 21. Theano is particularly mentioned as the wife or the daughter of Pythagoras. DIOG. LAERT. VIII, 42, sqq.; IAMBL. l. c.; in the work of GALE. Opusc. Myth. p. 740, sqq.; in the Collect. of J. CHPH. WOLF, Fragmenta Mulierum Græcarum prosaica, p. 224, sqq., we find letters attributed to Theano and other women of this sect. See also FABRICIUS, Bibl. Gr.; † WIELAND, On the Pythagorean Ladies, in his works, vol. XXIV; FRED. SCHLEGEL, Abhandlung über Diotima, fourth vol. of his works, *Vienna*, 1822, 8vo.

JOH. GOTTL. BUHLE, Commentatio de Ortu et Progressu Pantheismi inde a Xenophane primo ejus auctore, usque ad Spinozam, *Götting.* 1790, 4to., et Commentt. Soc. Gött. vol. X, p. 157.

CHR. AUG. BRANDIS, Commentationum Eleaticarum, p. 1. Xenophanis, Parmenidis, et Melissi doctrina e propriis Philosophorum reliquiis repetita, *Alton.* 1813, 8vo.

97. The philosophers whom we have hitherto considered, started from experience; and, conformably with the testimony of the senses, assumed as a substratum the multiplicity of changeable things, of which they endeavoured to trace the origin and connection with the eternal. Now, however, a school arose at Elea, in Italy, that ventured to pronounce experience a mere *appearance*, because they found creation (*das Werden*) incomprehensible, and that endeavoured to determine the nature of things as the one sole substance, merely from notions of the understanding. According to this view, the one immoveable *esse* (seyn) is the only true being. This *idealistic pantheism*[1] was developed by four remarkable thinkers who, as regards their personal history, are but too little known to us.

Xenophanes.

Fragments of the Poem of Xenophanes περὶ φύσεως, in the Collection of FULLEBORN, No. VII, § 1; and in BRANDIS Comment. (above); and in Philosophorum Gr. vet. Operum Reliquiæ. (Xenoph. Parmen. Empcd.) ed. KARSTEN, 3 vols. 8vo. *Brux.* 1830–38.

TOB. ROSCHMANNI Diss. Hist. Philos. (præs. FEUERLIN) de Xenophane, *Altd.* 1729, 4to.

DIET. TIEDEMANN, Xenophanis decreta, Nova Biblioth. Philolog. et Crit. vol. I, fasc. II.

† FULLEBORN, Xenophanes, Collection, fasc. I, § 3. See the works mentioned in the preceding §.

98. *Xenophanes* of Colophon was the contemporary of Pythagoras, and, about the year 536, established himself at Elea or Velia, in Magna Græcia. From the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*, he concluded that nothing could pass from non-existence to existence. According to him, all things

[1] *Idealism* expresses that system of philosophy which, though admitting differences on minor points, agrees in placing the Absolute in abstract ideas and thought, and in regarding the appearances of the world of sense as only relative. *Idealistic Pantheism* denotes that system of philosophy which professes to regard this world of ideas and thought as divine. A close approximation may be traced between the Pantheism of Xenophanes and that of Hegel.—ED.

that really exist are eternal and immutable. On this principle he looked upon all nature as subject to the same law of unity, ἓν τὸ ὂν καὶ πᾶν. God, as being the most perfect essence, τὸ πάντων ἄριστον καὶ κράτιστον, is eternally One; unalterable, and always consistent with himself; He is neither finite nor infinite, neither moveable nor immoveable; he cannot be represented under any human semblance; he is all hearing, all sight, and all thought, and his form is spherical. The same philosopher (on the principle of experience) proposed to explain the multifariousness of variable essences by assuming, as primitive elements, water and earth. He appears to have hesitated between the opposite systems of *empirism*[1] and *rationalism*, and bewailed the incertitude which he regarded as the condition of humanity.[2] Xenophanes was the first to set the example of a philosopher who divested the Deity of the unworthy images under which he had been represented.[3]

Parmenidès.

Fragments of his Poem περὶ φύσεως, collected by H. STEPHENS.

† FULLEBORN, Fragments of Parmenides, collected and illustrated, *Züllichau*, 1795, 8vo. The same in his Collection, fasc. VI and VII. The same Fragments, published with those of Empedocles, by PEYRON; see § 108. (On Parmenides cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 21, sqq.) Parmenidis Carm. Reliquiæ, ed. KARSTEN, 8vo. *Amst.* 1835.

J. BRUCKER, Letter on the Atheism of Parmenides, translated from the Latin into French, in the Bibliothèque Germanique, tom. XXII, p. 90.

† NIC. HIER. GUNDLING, Observations on the Philosophy of Parmenides, in the Gundlingiana, tom. XV, p. 371, sqq.

† J. T. VAN DER KEMP, Parmenides, *Edinæ*, 1731, 8vo.

99. *Parmenides* of Elea, who travelled with Zeno to Athens about 460, enlarged upon the above system. He maintained that the Reason alone was capable of recognizing Truth; that the senses could afford only a deceptive *appearance*

[1] *Empirism*, it is necessary to bear in mind, would derive all our knowledge ultimately from Experience, by the avenues of the senses; *rationalism*, on the contrary, from the Reason.

[2] ARIST. de Xenoph. c. 3; Met. I, 3, 5. SEXTUS, Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 224, sqq.; III, 228; Adv. Math. VII, 49, sqq. Δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται, 52, 110; VIII, 326; X, 313, sqq. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 19, sqq. STOB. Ecl. II, p. 14, sqq. ed. HEEREN.

[3] CLEM. ALEX. ed. POTT, p. 714, sqq.

of it. From this principle he deduced a twofold system of *true* and of *apparent* knowledge; the one resulting from the reason, the other from the senses.[1] His poem on Nature treated of both these systems; but the fragments of it which have come down to us, make us better acquainted with the former than the latter. In the former, Parmenides begins with the idea of *pure existence*, which he identifies with *thought* and *cognition*[2] (never expressly making it the same with the Deity), and concludes that *non-existence*, τὸ μὴ ὄν, cannot be possible; that all things which exist are one and identical; and consequently that existence has no commencement, is invariable, indivisible, pervades all space, and is limited only by itself; and consequently that all movement or change exists only in *appearance*.[3] But appearance itself depends upon an unavoidable Representation (δόξα).[4] To account for this *appearance* conveyed by the senses, Parmenides assumed the existence of two principles, that of heat or light (ethereal fire), and that of cold or darkness (the earth); the first pervading and active, the second dense and heavy; the first he defined to be *positive*, *real*, and the *intellectual* element (δημιουργὸς); the second the *negative* element (μὴ ὄν); or as he preferred to style it—a *limitation* of the former.[5] From this twofold division he derived his doctrine of *changes;* which he applied even to the phenomena of the mind.

Melissus.

ARISTOTELIS liber de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgiâ, c. I, 2; et SPALDING, Comment. ad h. lib. See Bibliogr. § 97; cf. DIOG. LAERT. lib. IX, § 24.

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[1] SEXTUS EMP. Adv. Mathem. VII, 111. ARIST. Metaph. I, 5. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 22.

[2] See Frag. in FULLEBORN, V, 45, 46, 88—91, 93, sqq.

[3] PARMENIDIS Fragmenta, in the Collection of FULLEBORN, V, 39, sqq. ARIST. Physic. I, 2; Metaph. III, 4; Lib. de Xenophane, 4. PLUTARCH. De Plac. Philos. I, 24. SEXT. EMPIR. Adv. Math. X, 46; Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 65. SIMPLIC. in Phys. Arist. p. 19 et 31. STOB. Ecl. I, p. 412, sqq.

[4] SIMPLIC. Comment. in Arist. de Cœlo, p. 38, *b*.

[5] CIC. Acad. Quæst. II, 37. PLUTARCH. De Plac. II, 7—26; III, 1, 15; IV, 5; V, 7. SEXT. EMPIRIC. IX, 7, sqq. STOB. Ecl. I, p. 500. 510. 516, et al.

100. *Melissus* of Samos,[1] adopted (possibly from the teaching of the two last philosophers) the same system of idealism, but characterized by greater boldness in his way of stating it, and, in some respects, by profounder views. What really existed, he maintained, could not either be produced or perish; it exists without having either commencement or end; infinite (differing in this respect from Parmenides), and consequently, one; invariable, not composed of parts, and indivisible: which doctrine implies a denial of the existence of bodies, and of the dimensions of space. All that our senses present to us (that is to say, the greater part of things which exist), is nothing more than an *appearance* relative to our senses (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν), and is altogether beyond the limits of real knowledge.[2] As for the relation between real existence and the Deity, we are ignorant of the sentiments of Melissus on this head; for what is reported by Diog. Laert. IX, 24, can be considered as relating only to the *popular* notions.

Zeno.

See the works mentioned in § 97.

Dieт. Tiedemann, Utrum Scepticus fuerit an Dogmaticus Zeno Eleates; Nova Bibliotheca Philol. et Crit. vol. I, fasc. 2; cf. † Stäudlin, Spirit of Scepticism, vol. I, 264.

101. *Zeno* of Elea, an ardent lover of liberty,[3] travelled, with his friend and teacher Parmenides, to Athens, about the LXXX Olympiad,[4] and appeared in the character of a defender of the idealism of the Eleatic school, which could not but seem to people at large, strange and absurd; endeavouring, with great acuteness, to prove that the system of empiric realism is still more absurd.[5] 1st. Because, if we admit if there is a plurality of real essences, we must admit them to possess qualities which are mutually destructive of

[1] He was distinguished as a statesman and naval commander, and flourished about 444 B.C.

[2] Arist. Phys. I, 2, 3, 4; III, 9; De Cœlo, III, 1; De Sophist. Elench. 28. Simplic. in Physic. Arist. p. 8 et 9. 22. 24, 25; in Arist. de Cœlo, p. 28, *a*. Cic. Acad. Quæst. II, 37. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. III, 65; Adv. Math. X, 46. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 440.

[3] Plutarch, Adv. Colot. ed. Reiske, vol. X, p. 630. Diog. Laert. IX, 25, sqq. Val. Max. III, 3.

[4] 460 B.C. [5] Plato, Parmenides, p. 74, sqq.

each other, similitude, for example, and dissimilitude; unity and plurality; movement and repose.[1] 2ndly. We cannot form an idea of the divisibility of an extended object without a contradiction being involved; for the parts must be either simple or compounded; in the first of which cases the body has no magnitude, and ceases to exist; in the second it has no unity, being at the same time finite and infinite.[2] 3rdly. Innumerable difficulties result (according to Zeno) from the supposition of motion in space: if such motion be allowed to be possible, the consequence is, that infinite space must, in a given time, be traversed. He has acquired great celebrity by his four logical arguments against motion,[3] and particularly by the well-known one named Achilles.[4] 4thly. *We cannot form a notion of space as an object, without conceiving it to be situated in another space*, and so on *ad infinitum*.[5] And in general he denies that the absolute unity which the Reason requires as a character of real existence, is in any sort to be recognized in the objects of the senses.[6] By thus opposing reason to experience, Zeno opened the way to scepticism; at the same time laying the foundations of a system of logic, of which he was the first teacher;[7] and employing dialogue.[8]

102. The speculations of the Eleatæ (to which *Xeniades* of Corinth[9] also attached himself)[10] were subsequently pursued in the school of Megara. They did not fail to meet with opponents, but their real fallacy was not so readily discovered. Plato, by making a due distinction between ideas and their objects, approached the nearest to the truth.

[1] PLATO, Phædr. vol. III, p. 261. SIMPLIC. in Phys. Arist. p. 30.
[2] SIMPLIC. l. c.
[3] ARIST. Physic. VI, 9, 14. Cf. PLATO, Parmenid. l. c.
[4] CAR. HENR. ERDM. LOHSE, Diss. (præside Hoffbauer) de Argumentis quibus Zeno Eleates nullum esse Motum demonstravit, etc. *Hal.* 1794, 8vo.
[5] ARIST. Phys. IV, 3, 5.
[6] ARIST. Metaph. III, 4. SIMPLIC. in Phys. p. 30. SENEC. Ep. 30.
[7] PLUTARCH. Pericles. SEXT. EMP. Adv. Math. VII, 7. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 25, 47.
[8] ARIST. De Sophist. Elench. c. 10.
[9] SEXT. EMP. Adv. Math. VII, 48, 53; VIII, 5.
[10] In the fifth century B.C.

IV. *Heraclitus.*

Joh. Bonitii Diss. de Heraclito Ephesio, P. I—IV, *Schneeberg*, 1605, 4to.

Gottfr. Olearii Diatribe de Principio Rerum Naturalium ex mente Heracliti, *Lips.* 1697, 4to. Ejusdem: Diatribe de rerum naturalium genesi ex mente Heracliti, *ibid.* 1672, 4to.

Jo. Upmark, Diss. de Heraclito Ephesiorum Philosopho, *Upsal*, 1710, 8vo.

Joh. Math. Gesnerr Disp. de Animabus Heracliti et Hippocratis, Comm. Soc. Gött. tom. I.

Chr. Gottlob Heyne, Progr. de Animabus siccis ex Heracliteo placito optime ad sapientiam et virtutem instructis, *Götting.* 1781, fol.; and in his Opusc. Acad. vol. III.

† F. Schleiermacher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, surnamed the Obscure; compiled from the fragments of his work, and the testimonies of ancient writers, in the third fasciculus of vol. I, of the Musæum der Alterthumswissenschaften, *Berl.* 1808, 8vo. Cf. the work of Ritter, p. 60, referred to under the head of § 85; and, in answer to the views of Schleiermacher, Theod. L. Eichoff, Dissertationes Heracliteæ, partic. I, *Mogunt.* 1824, 4to.

103. By his birth *Heraclitus* of Ephesus belonged to the Ionian school.[1] He was a profound thinker, of an inquisitive spirit, and the founder of a sect called after him, which had considerable reputation and influence. His humour was melancholy and sarcastic, which he indulged at the expense of the democracy established in his native town, and with which he was disgusted. The knowledge he had acquired of the systems of preceding philosophers (vying with one another in boldness), of Thales, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes,[2] created in him a habit of scepticism of which he afterwarks cured himself. The result of his meditations was committed to a volume, the obscurity[3] of which procured for him the appellation of σκοτεινὸς.[4] *He* also made it his object to discover an elemental principle; but either because his views were different, or from a desire to oppose himself to the Eleatæ, he assumed it to be *fire*, because the most subtle and active of the elements. *Fire* he asserted to be

[1] He flourished about 500 B.C.

[2] According to some, he was the disciple of this philosopher.

[3] This work is cited under different titles; e. g. Μοῦσαι, Fragments in Henr. Steph. Poes. Philos. Cf. Schleiermacher.

[4] Diog. Laert. IX, 5; et II, 22. Arist. Rhet. III; De Mundo 5. Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 26; III, 14; De Fin. II, 5.

the foundation of all things, and the universal agent. The universe he maintained to be neither the work of gods nor men; but a *fire*, continually kept alive, but with alternations of decay and resuscitation, according to fixed laws.[1] Hence he appears to have deduced among others the following opinions: 1. The variability, or perpetual *flux* of things (ῥοή)[2] wherein also consists the *life* of animals.[3] 2. Their formation and dissolution by fire; the motion from above and from below (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω); the first by evaporation, or ἀναθυμίασις; and the future conflagration of the universe.[4] 3. The explanation of all changes by means of discord (πόλεμος, ἔρις) and universal opposition (ἐναντιότης) according to fixed and immutable laws (εἱμαρμένη)[5]. 4. The principle of force and energy he asserted to be the principle also of thought. The universe he maintained to be full of souls and *dæmones*, endowed with a portion of this all-pervading fire. He maintained the excellence of the soul to consist in its *aridity*, or freedom from aqueous particles—αὐη ψυχὴ ἀρίστη or σοφωτάτη.[6] The soul, he continued, by its relation with the divine reason (κοινὸς καὶ θεῖος λόγος), is capable, when awake, of recognizing the universal and the true; whereas by the exercise of the organs of the senses, it perceives only what is variable and individual.[7] We may remark, that this system, with which we are very imperfectly acquainted, and which furnished a great many hints to Plato, the Stoics, and Ænesidemus, contained many original and acute observa-

[1] Aristot. Metaph. I, c. 3, 7; De Mundo, c. 5. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 6. Clem. Alexand. Strom. lib. V.

[2] Plat. Cratyl. vol. III, ed. *Bipont.* p. 267. Cf. Theætet. *ibid.* p. 69.

[3] Plutarch. De Plac. Phil. I, 23, 27, 28. De εἰ apud Delph. p. 227, 239.

[4] Arist. De Cœlo, I, 10; III, 1. Plutarch. de εἰ apud Delph. Diog. Laert. IX, 8.

[5] Diog. Laert IX, 7, 8, 9. Simplic. in Phys. p. 6. Plat. Sympos. c. 12.

[6] According to Stob., Serm. 17, and Ast, On the Phædrus of Plato, c. III. ed. *Lips.* 1810, Αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη. On this expression compare, besides the works mentioned above, Pet. Wesseling, Obs. de Heracl. αὐη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, in ej. Observatt. Miscell. Amstelod. vol. V, c. III, p. 42.

[7] Aristot. De Animâ, I, 2, 3. Plutarch. De Plac. Phil. IV, 3. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 126, sqq. Cf. 249, VIII, 286; Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 230. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 194, sqq. 906.

tions, which were applied also to moral and political questions.

V. *Speculations of the Atomic School.*

DIOG. LAERT. lib. IX, § 30, sqq.; and BAYLE'S Dict. art. *Leucippe.*

104. *Leucippus*, a contemporary, possibly also a disciple of Parmenides,[1] opposed the system of the Eleatæ; which he unjustly accused of contradicting itself, by advancing the exclusive and narrow doctrine of atoms (the corpuscular system[2]); a doctrine which, agreeably to experience, maintained the existence of *motion* and *plurality*.[3] He asserted also the existence of a matter filling space (τὸ πλῆρες), and constituting the element of *reality*; by the division of which we arrive at something indivisible, τὸ ἄτομον; while at the same time he taught the existence of a *vacuum* (τὸ κενόν); opposed to *material* reality, yet possessing a certain reality of its own;[4] and endeavoured to account for the actual state of the world by the union (περίπλεξις or συμπλοκή) and the separation (διάκρισις) of material reality, within the limits of this void. Accordingly, the *elementary principles* of this system of materialism are the atoms, vacuum, and motion; and we recognize in it none but *corporeal* essences. The atoms, the ultimate elements of what is real, are invariable, indivisible, and imperceptible, owing to their tenuity; they occupy space, and possess forms infinitely diversified; those which are round possessing also the property of motion. It is by their combination or separation (he continues) that all things have their origin, and are brought to their dissolution; their modifications (ἀλλοιώσεις) and properties being determined by the order (διαθιγὴ τάξις) and position (τροπὴ-θέσις) of the atoms; and take place in consequence of a law of absolute necessity. The soul itself he defined to be nothing but a mass of round atoms; whence result heat, motion, and thought.[5]

[1] Flourished about 500 B.C. His birth-place is unknown; probably *Miletus.*

[2] Cf. above, § 74, at the end.

[3] ARIST. De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 8. [4] ARIST. Phys. IV, 3.

[5] ARIST. De Gen. I, 1, 2, 8; De Cœlo I, 7; III, 4; Metaph. I, 4; De Animâ I, c. 2. SIMPLIC. in Phys. Arist. p. 7. STOB. Ecl. I, p. 160, 306, 442, 796.

Democritus.

The fragments of Democritus have been collected by STEPHENS, and are to be found still more complete in ORELLI Opusc. Græc. Sententiosa, I, 91, sqq.

DIOG. LAERT. IX, 34, sqq.; and BAYLE, art. *Démocrite.*

JOH. CHRYSOST. MAGNENI Democritus reviviscens, sive Vita et Philosophia Democriti, *Ludg. Bat.* 1648, *Hag.* 1658, 12mo.

JOH. GEUDERI Democritus Abderita Philosophus accuratissimus, ab injuriis vindicatus et pristinæ famâ restitutus. *Altd.* 1665, 4to.

G. FR. JENICHEN, Progr. de Democrito Philosopho, *Lips.* 1720, 4to.

GODOFR. PLOUCQUET, De placitis Democriti Abderitæ, *Tübing.* 1767, 4to. And in his Commentatt. Philos. sel.

JO. COUR. SCHWARZ, Diss. de Democriti theologia, *Cobl.* 1718, 4to.

See also the work of HILL, mentioned § 151.

105. *Democritus* of Abdera.[1] This ardent inquirer into Nature, ill-understood by his countrymen of Abdera, and to whom has been attributed by subsequent tradition a laughing vein, in opposition to the melancholy of Heraclitus, his contemporary, had been a great traveller for the purpose of amassing instruction, and composed several works; none of which have come down to us entire. He expanded the atomic theory of his master, Leucippus;[2] to support the truth of which he maintained the impossibility of division *ad infinitum;* and from the difficulty of assigning a commencement of time, he argued the eternity of existing nature, of void space, and of motion.[3] He supposed the atoms, originally similar, to be endowed with certain properties, such as impenetrability and a density proportionate to their volume. He referred every active and passive affection to motion, caused by impact; limited by the principle he assumed, that only like can act on like.[4] He drew a distinction between primary motion and secondary; impulse and reaction (*παλμὸς* and *ἀντιτυπία*); from a combination of which he deduced rotatory motion (*δίνη*). Herein consists the law of necessity (*ἀνάγκη*), by which all things in nature are ruled.[5] From the endless multiplicity

[1] Born about 490 or 494; according to others, 460 or 470.

[2] ARIST. De Gen. Anim. 5, 8.

[3] ARIST. De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 2; Physic. VIII, 1; De Generat. Anim. II, 6. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 44.

[4] De Gener. I, 7.

[5] ARIST. De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 7; Physicor. IV, 3. DIOG. IX, 45, 49. SEXTUS, Adv. Math. IX, 113. PLUT. De Decret. Philos. I, 25. Cf. STOB. Ecl. I, 394.

of atoms have resulted the worlds which we behold, with all the properties of immensity, resemblance, and dissimilitude, which belong to them. The soul consists (such is his doctrine) in globular atoms of fire,[1] which impart movement to the body. Maintaining throughout his atomic theory, Democritus introduced the hypothesis of images (εἴδωλα), a species of emanation from external objects, which make an impression on our senses, and from the influence of which he deduced sensation (αἴσθησις), and thought (νόησις). He distinguished between a rude, imperfect, and therefore false perception (σκοτίη), and a true one (γνησιη).[2] In the same manner, consistently with his theory, he accounted for the popular notions of the Deity; partly through our incapacity to understand fully the phenomena of which we are witnesses, and partly from the impressions communicated by certain beings (εἴδωλα) of enormous stature, and resembling the human figure, which inhabit the air.[3] To these he ascribed dreams and the causes of divination.[4] He carried his theory into practical philosophy also, laying down that happiness consisted in an *equability of temperament* (εὐθυμία); whence he deduced his moral principles and prudential maxims.[5] Democritus had many admirers;[6] among others, *Nessus*, or Nessas, of Chios, and the countryman of the latter (and according to some his pupil); *Metrodorus* (by whom were propagated certain sceptical notions);[7] *Diomenes* of Smyrna; *Nausiphanes* of Teios, the master of Epicurus; *Diagoras* of Melos, the freedman and disciple of Democritus, who is also numbered among the Sophists (§ 110), and was obliged to quit

[1] ARIST. De Anim. I, 2. PLUTARCH. De Plac. Philos. IV, 3.

[2] ARIST. de Animâ I, 2, 3. PLUTARCH. De Plac. Philos. IV, 3, 4, 8, 13, 19. ARIST. De Sensu, c. 4; De Divinat. per Somnum, c. 2. SEXTUS Adv. Math. VII, 135, sqq.; VIII, 6, 184; Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 213, sqq. ARIST. Metaph. IV, 5. CIC. De Divin. II, 67.

[3] J. C. SCHWARZ, Diss. de Democriti Theologiâ, *Cobl.* 1718, 4to.

[4] SEXTUS, Adv. Math. IX, 19, 24. PLUTARCH. De defectu Oraculor. IX, p. 326; Vitâ Æmilii Paulli, II, p. 168. CIC. Nat. Deor. I, 12, 43; De Divin. I, 3.

[5] DIOG. LAERT. IX, 45. STOB. Ecl. II, p. 74, sqq. CIC. De Fin. V, 8, 29.

[6] DIOG. LAERT. IX, 58, sqq.

[7] CIC. Acad. Quæst. IV, 23. SEXTUS, Adv. Math. VII, 48, 88.

Athens[1] on account of his reputed atheism;[2] *Anaxarchus* of Abdera, the contemporary and friend of Alexander the Great; and others. It was from Democritus that Epicurus borrowed the principal features of his metaphysics.

VI. *Empedocles.*

Empedocles Agrigentinus, De Vitâ et Philosophiâ ejus exposuit, Carminum Reliquias ex Antiquis Scriptoribus collegit, recensuit, illustravit Fr. Guil. Sturz, *Lips.* 1805, 8vo. Cf. Phil. Buttmanni Observ. in Sturzii Empedoclea, in the Comment. Soc. Phil. Lips. 1804, et Empedoclis et Parmenidis Fragmenta, etc.; restituta et illustrata ab Amadeo Peyron, *Lips.* 1810, 8vo.

J. G. Neumanni Progr. de Empedocle Philosopho, *Viteb.* 1790, fol.

† P. Nic. Bonamy, Researches respecting the Life of Empedocles; in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscript. vol. X.

† Tiedemann, System of Empedocles; in Gött. Mag. tom. IV, No. 3.

† H. Ritter, On the Philosophic Doctrine of Empedocles, in the Litterarische Analekten of Fr. Aug. Wolff, fasc. IV.

Domenico Scina, Memorie sulla Vita e Filosofia di Empedocle Gergentino. *Palermo,* 1813, 2 tomi, 8vo.

106. *Empedocles* of Agrigentum[3] distinguished himself by his knowledge of natural history and medicine;[4] and his talents for philosophical poetry. It is generally believed that he perished in the crater of Ætna.[5] Some suppose him to have been a disciple of Pythagoras or Archytas (Diog. Laert. VIII, 54, sqq.); others, of Parmenides. He cannot have been an immediate scholar of the first, inasmuch as Aristotle (Met. 1, 3) represents him as contemporary with, but younger than Anaxagoras; and because he appears to have been the master of Gorgias. His philosophy, which he described in a didactic poem, of which only

[1] In 415 B.C.

[2] Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. IX, 51, sqq., Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 218. Mariangelus Bonifacius a Reuthen, de Atheismo Diagoræ. J. Jac. Zimmermanni Epist. de Atheismo Evemeri et Diagoræ, in Mus. Brem. vol. I, p. 4. Thienemann, On the Atheism of Diagoras, apud Fulleborn, fasc. XI, No. 2. Cf. p. 57, sqq.; and Bayle's Dictionary, s. h. v.

[3] Flourished about 442, according to others 460 B.C.

[4] Which procured him of old the reputation of working miracles, (probably mesmerism). Diog. Laert. VIII, 51. Cf. Theoph. Gust. Harles, Programmata de Empedocle, num ille meritò possit magiæ accusari, *Erl.* 1788-90, fol.

[5] Ge. Phil. Olearii Progr. de Morte Empedoclis, *Lips.* 1733, fol.

fragments have come down to us, combined the elements of various systems: most nearly approaching that of Pythagoras and Heraclitus, but differing from the latter, principally: 1st. Inasmach as Empedocles more expressly recognises *four* elements,[1] earth, water, air, and fire: these elements (compare his system, in this respect, with that of Anaxagoras) he affirmed not to be *simple* in their nature; and assigned the most important place to fire.[2] 2ndly. Besides the principle of concord (φιλία), opposed to that of discord (νεῖκος), (the one being the source of union and good, the other of their opposites), he admitted into his system *necessity* also, to explain existing phenomena.[3] To the first of these principles he attributed the original composition of the elements. The material world (σφαῖρος μίγμα[4]) he believed, as a whole, to be divine: but in the *sublunar* portion of it he detected a considerable admixture of evil and imperfection.[5] He taught that at some future day all things must again sink into chaos. He advanced a subtle and scarcely intelligible theory of the active and passive affections of things (Cf. Plato Menon. ed. Steph. p. 76, C. D.; Arist. De Gener. et Corr. I, 8; Fragm. ap. Sturz. v. 117), and drew a distinction between the world as presented to our senses (κόσμος αἰσθητός), and that which he presumed to be the type of it, the intellectual world (κόσμος νοητός),[6] He looked for the principle of life in fire; admitting at the same time, the existence of a Divine Being pervading the universe.[7] From this superior intelligence he believed the *Dæmones* to emanate, to whose nature the human soul is allied. Man is a fallen *Dæmon*. There will be a return to unity, a transmigration of souls, and a change of forms. The soul he defined to consist in a combination of the four elements (because cognition depends upon the similarity of the subject and object); and its seat he pronounced to be

[1] D. C. L. Struve, De Elementis Empedoclis, *Dorp.* 1807, 8vo.
[2] Arist. Met. I, 4; De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 1, 8; II, 6.
[3] Arist. Phys. II, 4; De Partib. Animal. I, 1; II, 8.
[4] Simplic. in Phys. Arist.
[5] Arist. Metaph. I, 4; III, 4. Plutarch. De Solertiâ Animal.
[6] Fragm. edit. Peyron, p. 27. Simplic. in Arist. Phys. p. 7. De Cœlo, p. 128.
[7] Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 64 et 127. Cf. Arist. Metaph. III, 4.

principally the blood.[1] He appears to have made a distinction also between good and evil *Dæmones*.[2]

VII. *Others of the Ionian School.*

Hermotimus and Anaxagoras.

For the traditions relating to Hermotimus of Clazomenæ, see a Critical Inquiry by FR. AUG. CARUS, in the Collection of Fülleborn, fasc. IX, p. 58, sqq.

† HEINIUS, Dissertations on Anaxagoras, tom. VIII and IX of the History of the Royal Academy of Sciences and Belles Lettres of Prussia (French); and in the Magazine of HISSMANN, tom. V, § 335, sqq. (German).

DE RAMSAY, Anaxagoras, ou Système qui prouve l'Immortalité de l'âme par la matière du Chaos, qui fait le Magnétisme de la Terre, *La Haye*, 1778, 8vo.

GOD. PLOUCQUET, A work mentioned above, § 85.

† FR. AUG. CARUS, On Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, and the Genius of his Age, in the Collection of FULLEBORN, fascic X. The same. Diss. de Cosmo-Theologiæ Anaxagoræ fontibus, *Lips.* 1797, 4to.

† J VAN VRIES, Two Dissert. on the Life of Anaxagoras (Dutch), *Amsterd.* 1806, 8vo.

J. T. HEMSEN, Anaxagoras Clazomenius, sive de Vitâ ejus atque Philosophiâ Disquis. Philos. Hist. *Götting.* 1821, 8vo.

RITTER, Work mentioned above, at the head of § 85.

ANAXAGORÆ Clazomenii Fragmenta, quæ supersunt, omnia, collecta Commentarioque illustrata ab E. SCHAUBACH, etc. *Lips.* 1827, 8vo.

SCHORN, Anaxagoræ et Diogenes Appoloniatis Fragmenta, 1829.

BREIER, Die philosophie des Anaxagoras von Klazomenä, nach Aristoteles, 1840.

Sketch of the Life, Character, and Philosophy of Anaxagoras, Classical Journal, No. XXXIII, p. 173-177.

107. *Anaxagoras*,[3] animated by an extraordinary love of science, distinguished himself among the most celebrated thinkers by following this principle, that the study of the heavens and of nature is the proper occupation of man.[4] He is looked upon by some as the disciple of Anaximenes (which is inconsistent with chronology), and by others, of Hermotimus, who was also a native of Clazomenæ, and is said to have recognized a Superior Intelligence as the

[1] ARIST. De Anim. I, 2. SEXT. Adv. Math. I, 303; VII, 121. PLUTARCH. De Decr. Philos. IV, 5; V, 25.

[2] PLUTARCH. De Is. et Osir. p. 361.

[3] Born at Clazomenæ, about 500 B.C. The friend of Pericles.

[4] ARIST. Eth. Eudem. I, 5.

Author of nature.[1] In his forty-fifth year Anaxagoras fixed himself at Athens; but in consequence of the machinations of a party, he was accused of being an enemy to religion, without its being possible even for Pericles to protect him; and retired to end his days at Lampsacus.[2] Nothing has so much contributed to his celebrity as his doctrine of a Νοῦς, or intellectual principle, the Author of the universe; a conclusion to which he was led in consequence of the superior attention he paid to the system of nature; the mystical revelations of his countryman Hermotimus[3] possibly contributing to form in him this opinion; as well as the manifest inconsistency and inadequacy of all those systems which had recognised only *material* causes. Adhering to the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, he admitted the existence of a chaotic matter, the constituent elements of which, always united and identical (*τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ*)[4], are incapable of being decomposed; and by the arrangement of which and their dissemination he undertook to account for the phenomena of the natural world;[5] adding, that this chaos, which he conceived surrounded by air and æther, must have been put in movement and animated at the first by the Intelligent Principle. Νοῦς he defined to be the *ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως*. From this first principle he deduces motion, at first circular (*περιχώρησις*); from which resulted the separation (*διάκρισις*) of the discordant parts, the union (*συμμιξις*) of the analogous parts: in fine, proportion and order. *Intelligence* he considers as the forming and regulating cause; it possesses, according to him, omniscience, greatness, power, free energy, and spontaneity (*αὐτοκράτες*); it is simple and pure; distinct

[1] Arist. Met. I, 3. Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 7.

[2] In 428 B.C.

[3] Arist. Metaph. I, 3. Plin. Hist. Nat. VII, 52.

[4] The term Homœomeriæ appears to be of more recent invention. Another of his maxims was, *ἐν πάντι πάντα* that in everything there is a portion of everything.

[5] G. De Vries, Exercitationes de Homoiomeriâ Anaxagoræ, *Ultraject.* 1692, 4to. † Batteux, Conjectures respecting the Homoiomeriæ, or Similar Elements of Anaxagoras. The same, Développement d'un Principe Fondamental de la Physique des Anciens, etc. Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXV; and † Hismann, Magaz. vol. III, sect. 153 and 191. See also G. N. Wiener, On the Homœomeriæ of Anaxagoras, *Wormat.* 1771 (Lat.), and Eilers, Essay on his Principle, *τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον*. *Fcf. ad M.* 1822, 8vo.

from all matter; pervading and determining all things; and consequently the principle of all life (ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου), of all sensation, and of all perception in the world.[1]

Anaxagoras was more inclined to the study of physics than of metaphysics, for which reason he is accused by Plato[2] and by Aristotle[3] of not having conceded enough to final causes, and of having converted God into a machine. Accordingly he explained on physical principles the formation of plants and animals, and even celestial phenomena;[4] which drew upon him the charge of atheism.[5] Nevertheless, he regarded the testimony of the senses as subjectively true; but as insufficient to attain to objective truth,[6] which was the privilege of the reason (λόγος).

Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus.

† F. Schleiermacher, On the Philosophy of Diogenes of Apollonia, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Sc. of Berlin, 1815.

Fr. Panzerbieter, De Diogenis Apolloniatæ Vitâ et Scriptis, *Meining.* 1823, 4to.

108. The theism of Anaxagoras appears to have influenced *Diogenes* of Apollonia in Crete, as well as *Archelaus* of Miletus (or, according to others, of Athens), who were both at Athens at the same period. But the idea of this theism was too new to be understood in a sufficiently clear and profound manner so long as it remained separate from practical notions. Diogenes[7] maintained that air was the fundamental principle of all Nature, and imputed it to an

[1] Diog. Laert. II, 6, sqq. Arist. Phys. I, 4; VIII, 1; Metaph. I, 3; De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 1. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 33, sqq. Arist. De Animâ, I, 1.

[2] Phæd. c. 46, sqq.

[3] Metaph. I, 4. Aristotle accuses him of using the Deity only as a *machine* in his philosophy.

[4] Maintaining that the sun was originally ejected from the earth, and heated till it became a fiery mass, by rapid motion.

[5] Theophrast. Hist. Plantar. III, 2. Diog. Laert. II, 9. Xenoph. Memorab. IV, 7. Plato, Apol. Socr. 14.

[6] Sextus, Hypotyp. I, 33; Adv. Math. VII, 90. Arist. Metaph. IV, 5, 7. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. IV, 23, 31.

[7] Cf. above, § 87. He was sometimes surnamed *Physicus;* and flourished about 472 B.C. In his adoption of *one* elementary principle he resembled the Ionian school: his book was intitled Περὶ φύσεως, of which Simplicius has preserved us several fragments.

intellectual energy:[1] uniting in this respect the system of Anaximenes with that of Anaxagoras. On the other hand, *Archelaus*, a disciple of Anaxagoras,[2] maintained that all things were disengaged from the original chaos by the operation of two discordant principles of heat and cold (or of fire and water); that mankind had insensibly separated themselves from the common herd of the inferior animals; and was inclined to believe that our ideas of what is just, and the contrary, are conventional, and not by nature: τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.[3] With respect to the operations of the mind his system was one of pure materialism. The system of nature of this last is still more obscure than that of the former.[4]

VIII. *Transition to the Second Period of Greek Philosophy. The Sophists.*

Particulars and opinions respecting them to be found in Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Sextus Empir, Diogenes Laertius, and Philostratus.

Lud. Cresollii Theatrum Veterum Rhetorum, Oratorum, Declamatorum, i.e., Sophistarum, de eorum disciplinâ ac discendi docendique ratione, *Paris.* 1620, 8vo. and in Gronovius, Thes. tom. X.

Ge. Nic. Kriegk, Diss. de Sophistarum Eloquentiâ, *Jena*, 1702, 4to.

Jo. Ge. Walchii Diatribe de præmiis Veterum Sophistarum Rhetorum atque Oratorum; in his Parerga Academica, p. 129; and De Enthusiasmo Veterum Sophistarum atque Oratorum, ibid. p. 367, sqq.

† Meiners, History of the Sciences, etc. vol. I, p. 112, sqq. and vol. II.

Geel, Historia critica Sophistarum, qui Socratis ætate Athenis floruerunt. In Nov. Act. liter. Societ. Rheno-Trajectinæ, P. II, 1832.

109. The rapid diffusion of all sorts of knowledge and every variety of speculative system among the Greeks, the uncertainty of the principles assumed and the conclusions deduced in the highest investigations, (consequences of the little stability of the data on which they were grounded), together with the progress of a certain refinement which

[1] Arist. De An. I, 2.; De Generat. et Corrupt. 1, 6. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 6 and 32. Diog. Laert. IX, 57. Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 12. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. XV.

[2] Flourished about 460 B.C.

[3] Diog. Laert. II, 16. Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 135.

[4] Plutarch. De Plac. Philos. I, 3. Cf. Simplic. in Ph. Arist. p. 6 et Stob. Ecl. I.

kept pace with the deterioration of their moral and religious habits, all these causes conspired to give birth to the tribe of Sophists;[1] that is, to a class of persons possessed of a merely superficial and *seeming* knowledge; to the profession of which they were influenced by merely interested motives.[2] The Sophists *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Prodicus*,[3] *Hippias* of Elis, *Polus*, *Thrasymachus*, and *Callicles*, were orators and scholars, very well practised it is true in the art of speaking, of dialectics, criticism, rhetoric, and politics; but being totally devoid of any real love of philosophy, were anxious only so far to follow the current of their time which set that way, as to promote their own advantage by means of their ability as disputants. All they desired was to distinguish themselves by the show of pretended universal knowledge; by solving the most intricate, most fanciful, and most useless questions; and above all, hoped to get money by the pretended possession of the art of persuasion.[4] With this view they had contrived certain logical tricks of a kind to perplex their antagonists; and, without possessing in the least degree a spirit of philosophy, they maintained all sorts of philosophical theories. The end of their system would have been to destroy all difference between truth snd error.

Their conduct reflected much of the general character of their age and country, while it had the advantageous effect of awakening at length, in others, a nobler and more elevated spirit of inquiry.

110. The celebrated orator *Gorgias* of Leontium,[5] a disciple of Empedocles, endeavoured, in his work on Nature,[6]

[1] The term σοφίστης had at first been equivalent to that of σοφός.

[2] For an opposite view of the character of the Sophists, see GROTE'S History of Greece.

[3] WELCKER, Prodikos von Keos, im Rheinischen Museum. Band. I, St. I, Nr. 4, 1833.

[4] PLAT. Tim. ed. *Bipont.* tom. IX, p. 285. XENOPH. Memorab. I, 6. ARIST. Sophist. Elench. c. I. CIC. Acad. Quæst. II, 23.

[5] Flourished about 440. Was ambassador at Athens 424 B.C. FOSS, De Gorgia Leontino commentatio. 1828.

[6] We find, apud Aristot. et Sext. Empir., fragments of this work, under the title: Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως. To Gorgias are also attributed the Speeches which are to be found among the Oratores Græci of REISKE, vol. VIII.

to demonstrate, by certain subtle arguments, *that nothing real exists;* because neither Negative nor Positive, nor both at the same time, can really exist. But even granting that something real did exist, yet 2nd, it would not be cognizable, because, if thoughts are not the real things, the real cannot be thought; and if thoughts were the real things, that which is *not real* could not be thought; consequently everything thought must be real in that case. Finally, even if something were cognizable, still it could not be imparted through the medium of words, because words do not express things, and nobody thinks like his neighbour.[1] The distinction he established between objects, impressions, and words, was important, but led to no immediate result. *Protagoras* of Abdera (said to have been the disciple of Democritus) maintained that human knowledge consists only in the perception of the appearance through the subject, and that whatsoever appeared to any one, in his state at the time, was true;[2] consequently, that man is the standard of all things (*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*):[3] that, as far as truth or falsehood are concerned, there is no difference between our perceptions of external objects;[4] that every way of considering a thing has its opposite, and that there is as much truth on the one side as the other; and that consequently nothing can be supported in argument with certainty;[5] maintaining at the same time the sophistical profession, "to make the worse the better argument." As for the existence of the gods, he appears to have esteemed it doubtful,[6] in consequence of which he was banished from

[1] ARIST. De Xenoph. Zenone, et Gorgiâ, especially c. V, sqq. SEXT. Adv. Math. VII, 65, sqq.

[2] PLAT. Theætet. ed. *Bip.* II, 68. SEXT. Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 217. Cf. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 51.

[3] PLAT. Crat. tom. III, 234, sqq. ARIST. Met. XI, 5. SEXTUS, Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 216, sqq.

[4] PLAT. Theætet. p. 89, 90, 102. SEXT. Adv. Math. VII, 60, sqq. 369, 388. CIC. Ac. II, 46.

[5] DIOG. LAERT. I. l.

[6] CIC. De Nat. Deor. I, 12, 23. SEXT. Adv. Math. IX, 56, sqq. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 51, 53.

On Protagoras, consult, besides the Dialogue which bears his name, in Plato, ed. *Bip.* vol. III, p. 83, sqq.; and Meno, vol. IV, p. 372, sqq., Ælian, A. Gellius, Philostratus, and Suidas. † J. C. BAPT. NURN.

Athens (where he taught), and died in banishment, about the XCIII Olympiad. *Prodicus* of Julis in the isle of Ceos,[1] a disciple of Pythagoras, employed himself in investigating the synonymes of words: deduced the principle of religion from the appearance of a beneficent intention in external nature;[2] and declaimed very plausibly on the subject of virtue.[3] *Hippias* of Elis was a pretender to universal knowledge.[4] *Thrasymachus* of Chalcedon[5] taught that "might made right;" and *Polus* of Agrigentum, *Callicles* of Acharnæ, *Euthydemus* of Chios, and others, that there is no other principle of obligation for man than instinct, caprice, and physical force; and that justice and its opposite are of political invention.[6] *Diagoras* of Melos was notorious for professing atheism (§ 105). *Critias*[7] of Athens, the enemy of Socrates, and reckoned among the partisans of the Sophists, ascribed the origin of religion to political considerations,[8] and appears, like Protagoras, to have asserted that the soul was *material* and resided in the senses; which last he appears to have placed in the blood.[9]

BERGER, Doctrine of the Sophist Protagoras, on existence and non-existence, *Dortm.* 1798, 8vo.

CHR. GOTTLOB HEYNII Prolusio in Narrationem de Protagora Gellii, N. A. V, 10; et Apuleii in Flor. IV, 18, *Götting.* 1806, On his Sophisms and those of his disciple Evathlus.

Jo. LUD. ALEFELD, Mutua Pythagoræ et Evathli Sophismata, quibus olim in judicio certarunt, etc. *Giess.* 1730, 8vo.

[1] About 420 B.C.

[2] SEXT. EMP. Adv. Math. IX, 18. CIC. De Nat. Deor. I, 42.

[3] For example, in his celebrated ἐπίδειξις, *Hercules ad bivium.* See Xenoph. Memorab. II, 1, 21; and Cf. Xenophontis Hercules Prodiceus et Silii Italici Scipio, perpetuâ notâ illustrati a GOTTH. AUG. CUBÆO, *Lips.* 1797, 8vo.

[4] PLAT. In Hipp. Maj. et Min. XENOPH. Memorab. IV, 4. CIC. De Orat. III, 32.

[5] PLAT. De Republ. I; ed. *Bip.* tom. VI, p. 165, sqq.

[6] PLAT. Gorgias, Theætet. de Republ. II, de Leg. X, p. 76.

[7] One of the thirty tyrants, died 404 B.C.

[8] SEXT. Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 218; Adv. Math. IX, 54.

[9] ARIST. De Animâ, I, 2.

CRITIÆ Tyranni Carminum aliorumque ingenii Monumentorum, quæ supersunt, dispos. illustr. et emend. NIC. BACHIUS. Præmissa est Critiæ Vita a Philostrato descripta, *Lips.* 1827, 8vo. GUIL. ERN. WEBER de Critia Tyranno Progr. *Francf. ad M.* 1824, 4to.

CHAPTER SECOND.

FROM SOCRATES TO THE END OF THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE PORCH AND THE ACADEMY (SECOND EPOCH OF GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY.)

111. The Sophists compelled their antagonists to examine narrowly human nature and themselves, in order to be able to discover some solid foundation on which philosophy might take its ground, and defend the principles of truth, religion, and morality. With this period began a better system of Greek philosophy, established by the solid good sense of Socrates. Philosophy was diverted into a new channel, and proceeded from the *subject* to the *object*, from *man* to *external nature*, instead of beginning at the other end of the chain. It became the habit to investigate no longer merely speculative opinions; but likewise, and in a still greater degree, *practical* ones also. Systematic *methods* of proof were now pursued, and the conclusions arrived at diligently compared. The want which all began to feel of positive and established principles, gave birth to different systems; at the same time that the scrupulosity with which all such systems were examined, kept alive the spirit of original inquiry.

112. This alteration was effected under the influence of some *external* changes of circumstances also. Athens had now become, by her constitution and her commerce, by the character of her inhabitants, the renown she had acquired in the Persian war, and other political events, the focus of Grecian arts and sciences. In consequence, she was the scene of the labours of their philosophers: schools were formed in which ideas might be communicated, the intellectual powers of those who frequented them developed by more frequent and more various contact of the opinions of others, and emulation continually excited towards continually higher objects. On the other hand these schools were liable to the defect of fostering, by their very facilities of acquiring knowledge, a certain intellectual indolence; increased by the easy repetition of the doctrines of their teachers, and aided by the *methodical* nature of the instruction itself. It was to the powerful influence of the character

and inquiries of Socrates, that the philosophy of the period owed the new impressions and bias which were given to it.

I. *Socrates.*

The principal authorities are:[1] Xenophon (particularly the Memorabilia and Apology of Socrates), and Plato (Apology?) (Compare these two writers, in this respect). Secondary sources: Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius (II, 18, sqq.), Apuleius.

113. *Socrates* was born at Athens in 470 or 469, and was the son of a poor sculptor named Sophroniscus, and of Phænareta a midwife. He formed himself to a character completely opposed to the frivolity and sophistical habits of the refined and corrupted age to which he belonged, par-

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Works on the Life, Doctrine, and Character of Socrates.

Fr. Charpentier, La Vie de Socrate, 3ème édition. *Amster.* 1699.

J. Gilbert Cooper, The Life of Socrates, collected from the Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato, *Lond.* 1749–50, and 1771.

Jac. Guill. Mich. Wasser, Diss. (Præs. G. Chr. Knorr) de Vitâ, Fatis atque Philos. Socratis, *Œtting.* 1720, 4to.

† W. Fr. Heller, Socrates, 2 parts, *Francf.* 1789–90, 8vo.

† C. W. Brumbey, Socrates, after Diog. Laertius, *Lemgo,* 1800, 8vo.

Dan. Heinsii Socrates, seu Doctrinâ et Moribus Socratis Oratio; in his Orationes, *Lugd. Bat.* 1627, 8vo.

Dan. Boethius, De Philosophiâ Socratis, p. I, *Ups.* 1788, 4to.

† Garnier, The Character and Philosophy of Socrates; in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXXII.

† G. Wiggers, Socrates as a Man, a Citizen, and Philosopher, *Rost.* 1807; second edition, *Neustrel.* 1811, 8vo.

† Ferd. Delbruck, Reflections and Inquiry concerning Socrates, *Cologne,* 1816, 8vo.

J. Andr. Cammii Commentatio (Præs. Jo. Schweighæuser): Mores Socratis ex Xenophontis Memorabilibus delineati, *Argent.* 1785, 4to.

J. Hacker, Diss. (Præs. Fr. Volkm. Reinhard), Imago Vitæ Morumque Socratis è Scriptoribus vetustis, *Viteb.* 1787, 8vo.

J. Lusac, Oratio de Socrate cive, *Lugd. Bat.* 1796, 4to.

Fr. Mentzii Socrates nec officiosus maritus, nec laudandus paterfamilias, *Lips.* 1716, 4to.

Joh. Math. Gesneri Socrates sanctus pæderasta, in Comment. Soc. Reg. Götting. tom. II.

Boeckh, De simultate quam Plato cum Xenoph. exercuisse fertur.

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[1] The pretended Epistles of Socrates, lately published (cf. the bibliography at the head of § 88), are spurious. See Chph. Meiners, Judicium de quorundam Socraticorum reliquiis, in Comment. Soc. Gött. vol. V. p. 45, sqq.

ticularly by living all the while in constant habits of society, even with women of cultivated minds—the Hetairai. By these means, added to personal reflection, he became a venerable sage, whose whole life, in all his relations as man and citizen, presented the pure image of a beautiful humanity ennobled by morality. He became the instructor of his countrymen and of mankind, not for the love of lucre nor of reputation, but in consequence of a sense of duty. He was desirous above all things to repress the flight of speculative theories by the force of an imperturbable good sense; to submit the pretensions of science to the control of a higher authority, that of virtue; and to re-unite religion to morality. Without becoming, properly speaking, the founder of a school or system of philosophy, he drew around him, by the charms of his conversation, a crowd of young men and others, inspiring them with more elevated thoughts and sentiments, and forming several of those most devoted to him into very brilliant characters. He encountered the Sophists with the arms of good sense, irony, and the powerful argument of his personal character. A constant enemy to obscurantism and philosophical charlatanism (even in the circumstances of private life), he drew upon himself the hatred of many; under which he ultimately fell.[1] He was accused of contempt for the household gods, and of corrupting the youth by his doctrine. Being condemned to death, he drank the hemlock goblet, 400 B.C.,[2] Ol. XCV, 1.

[1] † On the Trial of Socrates, etc. by Th. Christ. Tyschen, in the Biblioth. der alten Literatur and Kunst., I and II fasc. 1786.

† W. Süvern, On the Clouds of Aristophanes, *Berl.* 1826. With additions, *ibid.* 1827.

M. Car. Em. Kettner, Socratem criminis majestatis accusatum vindicat. *Lips.* 1738, 4to.

Sig. Fr. Dresigii Epistola de Socrate justè damnato, *Lips.* 1738, 4to.

† J. C. Chph. Nachtigall, On the Condemnation of Socrates, etc, in the Deutsche Monatsschrift, June 1790, p. 127, sqq.

Car. Lud. Richter, Commentatt. I, II, III, de Liberâ quam Cicero vocat Socratis Contumaciâ, *Cassel.* 1788–90, 4to.

[2] Ge. Christ. Ibbecken, Diss. de Socrate mortem minus fortiter subeunte, *Lips.* 1735, 4to.

Jo. Sam. Muller, Ad Actum oratorio-dramaticum de Morte Socratis invitans, præfationis loco, pro Socratis fortitudine in subeundâ morte contra Ibbeckenium pauca disputat. *Hamb.* 1738, fol.

Brandis, Grundlinien der Lehre des Sokrates, im Rheinischen Archiv, 1, 1. St. § 118, f.

114. Although, properly speaking, Socrates was not the founder of a philosophical school, yet by his character, his example, by what he taught, and his manner of communicating it, he rendered, as a wise man and *popular* teacher, immense services to the cause of philosophy: calling the attention of inquirers to those subjects which are of everlasting importance to man, and pointing out the source from which our knowledge (to be complete) must be derived; from an investigation of our own minds (γνῶθι σεαυτόν).

GOD. WILH. PAULI Diss. de Philosophiâ Morali Socratis, *Hal.* 1714, 4to.
EDWARDS, The Socratic System of Morals as delivered in Xenoph. Memorab. *Oxford*, 1773, 8vo.
LUD. DISSEN, Programma de Philosophiâ Morali in Xenophontis de Socrate Commentariis traditâ, *Gött.* 1812, 4to.
SCHLEIERMACHER, in the Abhandlung der Berlinen Akadem. d. w. 1814–15, § 39, f.
ROETSCHER'S Sokrates und sein Zeitalter.

115. The exclusive object of the philosophy of Socrates was the attainment of correct ideas concerning moral and religious obligation; concerning the end of man's being, and the perfection of his nature as a rational being; and lastly his duties; all of which he discussed in an unpretending and *popular* manner; appealing to the testimony of the moral sense within us. 1st. The chief happiness of man consists in knowing the good which it is his duty to do, and acting accordingly: this is the highest exercise of his faculties, and in this consists εὐπραξία (right action).[1] The means to this end are self-knowledge, and the habit of self-control. Wisdom (σοφία), which he often represents as moderation (σωφροσύνη), may be said to embrace all the virtues;[2] and on this account he sometimes called virtue a *science*.[3] The duties of man towards himself embrace also continence (ἐγκράτεια) and courage (ἀνδρεία).[4] Our duties towards others are comprised in justice (δικαιοσύνη); that is, the fulfilment of the laws, human and divine. Socrates appears to have been the first to make allusion to natural right or justice.[5] 2ndly. Virtue and happiness (εὐδαιμονία) he held

[1] XENOPH. Memorab. III, § 14, sqq.; Cf. I, 5; IV, 4, 5, 6.
[2] Ibid. III, 9, § 4 et 5. [3] ARIST. Eth. Nicom. VI, 13.
[4] XENOPH. Memorab. I, 5, § 4; IV, 5, § 6; IV, 6, § 10, sqq.
[5] XENOPH. Memorab. IV, c. 4, c. 6, § 12. Τὸ φύσει δίκαιον.
JAC. GUIL. FUERLIN, Diss. Historico-philosophica, Jus Naturæ Socraticum. *Altdorf.* 1719, 4to.

to be inseparably united.[1] 3rdly. Religion (εὐσέβεια), is the homage rendered to the Divinity by the practice of virtue; and consists in a continual endeavour to effect all the good which our faculties permit us to do.[2] 4thly. The Supreme Being is the first author and the guardian of the laws of morals:[3] his existence is proved by the order and harmony observable in all nature; both in the inward constitution of man, and the world without. (First instance of theology deduced from the order of nature). He is a rational but invisible Being, revealing himself only by his works.[4] Socrates acknowledged, moreover, a Providence; (to which doctrine he superadded a belief in divination, and in a tutelar dæmon of his own);[5] with the other attributes of the Divinity which have a reference to the good government of the world without, and in particular of man.[6] He deemed that beyond this his inquiries ought not to extend. 5thly. The soul he considered to be a divine being, or similar to

[1] Xenoph. Memorab. III, 9; IV, 2, § 34, sqq.; I, 6, § 10. Cic. Offic. III, 3.

[2] Xenoph. Memorab. I, 1, § 2, 3; III. 9, 15.

[3] Ibid. I, 2, 4; IV, 3, 4. Plat. Apol. Socr. c. 15.

[4] M. Lud. Theop. Mylii Diss. de Socratis Theologiâ, *Jen.* 1714, 4to.

J. Fr. Aufschlager, Comment. (Præside J. Schweighæuser): Theologia Socratis ex Xenoph. Memorab. excerpta, *Argent.* 1785, 4to.

[5] God. Olearii Dissert. de Socratis Dæmonio, *Lips.* 1702; and in Stanley, Hist. Philos. p. 130, sqq.

† Chph. Meiners, On the Genius of Socrates, in part III of his Misc. Works.

† On the Genius of Socrates, a Philosophical Inquiry, by Aug. G. Uhle, *Hanov.* 1778, 8vo. The same, previously published in the Deutsches Museum, 1777.

† Parallel between the Genius of Socrates and the Miracles of Jesus Christ, by Doctor Less, *Göttingen*, 1778, 8vo. (an Answer to the preceding.)

See also the Dissert. of Schlosser, *Götting.* 1778, fasc. I, p. 71 and 76.

† On the Genius of Socrates, a new Philosophical Inquiry (by J. Chph. Kœnig), *Francf.* and *Leips.* 1777, 8vo.

B. J. C. Justi, On the Genius of Socrates, *Leips.* 1779, 8vo.

Rob. Nares, An Essay on the Demon or Divination of Socrates, *Lond.* 1782, 8vo.

Matth. Fremling, De Genio Socratis, *Lond.* 1793, 4to.

† J. C. Nachtigall, Did Socrates believe in his Genius? Deutsche Monatsschrift, 1794, fasc. XI, p. 326.

J. Fr. Schaarschmidt, Socratis Dæmonium per tot secula a tot hominibus doctis examinatum quid et quale fuerit, num tandem constat? *Nivemont.* 1812, 8vo.

[6] Xenoph. Memorab. I, 4; IV, 3.

God. He believed it to approximate the Divinity (*μετέχειν τοῦ θεοῦ*) in respect of its reason and invisible energy, and on this account he considered it immortal.[1] 6thly All the other arts and sciences which have no reference to *practice* he looked upon as vain, without object, and unacceptable to God: though he himself was not unacquainted with the mathematics, and the speculations of the Sophists.[2]

116. The method of teaching observed by Socrates[3] was a sort of intellectual obstetricism (*μαιευτική*); agreeable to which he made it his practice to elicit from each, in conversation, the principles of his convictions, employing induction and analogy. His own good natural sense suggested to him this method; which was admirably calculated to refute the Sophists by making them contradict themselves.[4] In such encounters he armed himself with his characteristic *εἰρωνεία*, or affected ignorance, and with his peculiar logic.[5]

117. The services which Socrates has rendered to philosophy are twofold; negative and positive. *Negative*, inasmuch as he avoided all vain discussions; combated mere speculative reasoning on substantial grounds; and had the wisdom to acknowledge ignorance when necessary; but without attempting to determine accurately what is capable, and what is not, of being accurately known. *Positive*, inasmuch as he examined with great ability the ground directly submitted to our understanding, and of which Man

[1] Xenoph. Memorab. I, 4, § 8, 9; IV, 3, § 14; Cyropæd. VIII, 7. Plat. Phædo, c. 8, sqq.

† W. G. Tennemann, Doctrines and Opinions of the Socratic School respecting the Immortality of the Soul, *Jena*, 1791, 8vo.

[2] Xenoph. Memorab. I, 1, § 15; IV, 7. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. V, 3; Acad. I, 4.

[3] Fr. Menzii Diss. de Socratis Methode docendi non omnino præscribendâ, *Lips.* 1740, 4to.

J. Christ. Lossius, De Arte Obstetricâ Socratis, *Erf.* 1785, 4to.

† Fr. M. Vierthaler, Spirit of the Socratic Method, *Salzb.* 1793; 8vo; second ed. *Wurzb.* 1810.

† J. F. Graffe, The Socratic Method in its Primitive Form, *Gött.* 1794, third ed. 1798, 8vo.

G. J. Sievers, De Methodo Socraticâ, *Slesv.* 1810.

[4] † C. Fr. Fraguier, Dissertation on the Irony of Socrates, his pretended Familiar Genius, and his Character; in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. IV.

[5] Xenoph. Memorab. IV, 2. Plat. Theætet., Meno, Sympos. p. 260. Cic. De Fin. II, 1.

is the centre; without, however, any profound investigation of the different ideas and motives which influence practice. He first distinguished that Free-will and Nature were both under the dominion of certain laws; pointed out the proper sources of all knowledge; and finally laid open new subjects for philosophic research.

CHR. FRED. LIEBEGOTT SIMON, Diss. (Præs. W. T. KRUG), de Socratis meritis in Philosophiam rite æstimandis, *Viteb.* 1797, 4to.

† FR. SCHLEIERMACHER, On the Merit of Socrates as a Philosopher; in the Memoirs of the Class of Philosophers of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin, 1818, 4to. p. 50.

118. As Socrates divided his time among men of very different habits and dispositions, some more inclined to active life, some to retired study, a great number of disciples, in very different classes of society, and with very different views, were formed by his conversations, and still more by his method of teaching, so favourable to the development of original thinking.[1] The Athenians *Xenophon*[2] (cf. § 113), *Æschines, Simo*,[3] *Crito*, and the Theban *Cebes*,[4] disseminated the principles of their master and lived agreeably to them. Among those who especially devoted themselves to the pursuits of philosophy, *Antisthenes* the Athenian, founder of the Cynic school, subsequently *Aristippus*, the chief of the Cyrenaic, and afterwards *Pyrrho*, gave their attention exclusively to questions of morals, and their practical application. *Euclid* of Megara, *Phædo* of Elis, *Menedemus* of Eretria, were occupied with theoretical or metaphysical inquiries. The more comprehensive genius of Plato embraced at once both these topics, and united the two principal branches of Socraticism; either of which

[1] CIC. De Oratore, III, 16. DIOG. LAERT. Procem. sect. 10.

[2] Born about 450, died 360 B.C.

On the pretended letters of the Socratic philosophers, see the note on § 113.

A. GOERING, Explicatur cur Socratici Philosophicarum, quæ inter se dissentiebant, Doctrinarum Principes, a Socratis Philosophiâ longius recesserint, *Partenopol.* 1816, 4to.

[3] The authenticity of the two dialogues attributed to him is contested. See BOECKH, Simonis Socratici, ut videtur, Dialogi quatuor. Additi sunt incerti auctoris (vulgo Æschinis) Dialogi Eryxias et Axiochus, ed. AUG. BOECKH, *Heidelb.* 1810, 8vo.

[4] The writing known under the name of Πίναξ (Cebetis Tabula) is also attributed to a Stoic of Cyzicus, of a later age. See also FR. G. KLOPFER, De Cebetis Tabulâ, *Zwick.* 1818, 4to.

separately was found sufficient to employ the generality of the Socratic philosophers. When we examine the spirit of these different schools, the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, the Pyrrhonists, and the Megareans, (as for the schools of Elis and Eretria, we are but imperfectly acquainted with them), and lastly, that of the Platonists, we find that the first four did little more than expand the ideas of Socrates, with partial views of his system; while the latter is distinguished by a boundless activity, allied to the true Socratic spirit; and which explored all the subjects of philosophic investigation.

II. *Partial Systems of the Socratics.*

I. *Cynics.*

Authorities: Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, VI.

GE. GOTTFR. RICHTERI Diss. de Cynicis, *Lips.* 1701, 4to.

J. GE. MEUSCHENII Disp. de Cynicis, *Kilon.* 1703, 4to.

CHRIST. GLIEB. JOECHER, Progr. de Cynicis nullâ re teneri volentibus, *Lips.* 1743, 4to.

FR. MENTZII Progr. de Cynismo nec Philosopho nec homine digno, *Lips.* 1744, 4to.

Antisthenes.

GOTTLOB LUD. RICHTER, Diss. de Vitâ, moribus, ac placitis Antisthenis Cynici, *Jen.* 1724, 4to.

LUD. CHR. CRELLII Progr. de Antisthene Cynico, *Lips.* 1728, 8vo.

119. *Antisthenes*, an Athenian,[1] at first the disciple of Gorgias, afterwards the friend and admirer of Socrates, was virtuous even to excess, and proportionably arrogant. He placed the supreme good of man in virtue; which he defined to consist in abstinence and privations, as the means of assuring to us our independence of external objects: by such a course he maintained that man can reach the highest perfection, the most absolute felicity, and become like to the Deity. Nothing is so beautiful as virtue; nothing so deformed as vice; (*τ' αγαθὰ καλὰ, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ*); all things else are indifferent (*ἀδιάφορα*), and consequently unworthy of our efforts to attain them.[2] On these principles he built a system of practice so excessively simple, as to exclude even the decencies of social life; and for the same reasons

[1] Flourished about 380 B.C.

[2] DIOG. LAERT. VI, 11, sqq., 103, 106.

professed a contempt for speculative science,[1] alleging that the natures of things are undefinable. He maintained also that opinions are all identical, and that no man can refute those of another.[2] We must not omit his idea of one Divinity, superior to those adored by the populace.[3]

120. In spite of the unattractive austerity of his way of life, which procured him the surname of Ἀπλοκύνεν, Antisthenes, by his lofty spirit and the eccentricity of his character and conduct, drew about him a great number of partisans, who were called *Cynics*; either from the *Cynosarges*, where their master taught, or from the rudeness of their manners.[4] Among these we remark *Diogenes* of Sinope,[5] said, on doubtful authority, to have lived in a tub; who gave himself the name of Κύων,[6] and made virtue and wisdom the subjects of his cynical asceticism;[7] and after him, his disciple *Crates* of Thebes,[8] and his wife, *Hipparchia* of Maronea; but these latter are not distinguished for having contributed any thing to the cause of science. *Onesicritus* of Ægina, *Metrocles* the brother of Hipparchia, *Monimus* of Syracuse, *Menedemus*, and *Menippus*, are cited, but less frequently. The Cynic school finally merged in

[1] Notwithstanding, many works of his are quoted (Diog. Laert. VI, 15, sqq.) of which only two speeches remain to us, printed among the Orat. Græc. of Reiske, tom. VIII, p. 52, sqq.

[2] Arist. Metaph. VIII, 3; V, 29. Plat. Sophist. p. 270.

[3] Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 13. [4] Diog. Laert. VI, 13 et 16.

[5] Born 414, died 324 B.C. [6] Diog. Laert. VI, 20—81.

[7] The letters which bear his name (probably suppositious) are found in the Collection published by Ald. Manutius, (reprinted at *Geneva*, 1606); twenty-two more exist, according to the notice of the unedited letters of Diogenes, etc., by M. Boissonade, Notices and Extracts from the MSS. in the King's Library, tom. X, p. ii, p. 122, sqq.

For remarks on this philosopher consult:

† F. A. Grimaldi, Life of Diogenes the Cynic, *Naples*, 1777, 8vo.

Ch. Mar. Wieland, Σωκράτης μαινόμενος, or Dialogues of Diogenes of Sinope, *Leips.* 1770; and among his works.

Fried. Mentzii Diss. de Fastu Philosophico, virtutis colore infucato, in imagine Diogenis Cynici, *Lips.* 1712, 4to.

Jo. Mart. Barkhusii Apologeticum quo Diogenem Cynicum a crimine et stultitiæ et imprudentiæ expeditum sistit, *Regiom.* 1727, 4to.

[8] Diog. Laert. VI, 85, sqq. Cf. Juliani Imperat. Orat. VI, ed. Spangenb. p. 199.

that of the Stoics: it made an ineffectual attempt to rise again in the centuries immediately succeeding the birth of our Lord; but without displaying their spirit, merely by affecting the exterior of the ancient Cynics.[1]

II. *Cyrenaics.*

Authorities: Xenophon, Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII, 11, Diog. Laert. II.

Frid. Menzii Aristippus Philosophus Socraticus, sive de ejus Vitâ, Moribus, et Dogmatibus, Commentarius, *Hal.* 1719, 4to.

† Batteux, Elucidation of the Morals of Aristippus, to explain a passage of Horace; in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. XXVI.

† C. M. Wieland, Aristippus, and some of his Contemporaries, 4 vols. *Leips.* 1800—1802.

H. Kunhardt, Diss. Philos. de Aristippi Philosophiâ Morali, quatenus illa ex ipsius Philosophi dictis secundum Laertium potest derivari, *Helmst.* 1796. 4to.

Wendt, De Philosophia Cyrenaica, 1842.

121. *Aristippus*[2] of Cyrene, a colonial city of Africa, born to easy circumstances, and of a light and sportive character, had, when he first attended the conversations of Socrates, an inclination for self-indulgence, which the latter eventually succeeded in rendering more elevated, without being able to eradicate.[3] He made the *summum bonum* and the τέλος of man to consist in enjoyment, accompanied with good taste and freedom of mind, τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν ἄριστον οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι.[4] Other pursuits and sciences he made very light of, especially the Mathematics.[5] His grandson *Aristippus*, surnamed *Metrodidactus* (because instructed by his mother Arete, daughter of the elder Aristippus)[6] was the first to develope, on these principles, a complete system of the philosophy of self-indulgence (ἡδονισμός.) This sort of philosophy takes for its basis the affections, principally of the body (πάθη); which it divides

[1] Luciani Κυνικός, and other Dialogues.

[2] Flourished 380 B.C.

[3] Diog. Laert. II, 65, sqq. Plutarch. adv. Principem Indoct. II, p. 779 Xenoph. Memorab. II, 1; et III, 8.

[4] Diog. Laert. II, 75.

[5] Diog. Laert. II, 75. Arist. Met. III, 2.

[6] J. Gz. Eck, De Arete Philosophâ, *Lips.* 1775, 8vo.

into pleasurable and the reverse; giving the preference to the pleasures of the senses. Its degraded object is not εὐδαιμονία, but merely present and actual enjoyment, (ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει); allowing something to wisdom and virtue (as they were pleased to term them) as means of attaining thereto.[1] The philosophy of these teachers (neglecting logic and the natural sciences) was confined to what they called a system of morals, built entirely on that of the sensations, as being the only objects of knowledge concerning which we are not liable to err (καταληπτέα καὶ ἀδιάψευστα),[2] and at the same time the only *criteria* of virtue.[3]

122. This species of philosophy, when it came to be compared with our notions of Truth, Justice, and Religion, gave birth to a subdivision of the sect of Cyrenaics, called also *Hedonics* (ἡδονικοί). *Theodorus* (of Cyrene?), surnamed the *Atheist*, a disciple of the second Aristippus,[4] and probably also of the Stoic Zeno, the Sceptic Pyrrho, and others,[5] taking, like his predecessors, Sensation for the basis of his argument, ended by denying the existence of all objects of perception; disallowed the reality of an universal *criterium* of Truth, and thus opened the way for the Sceptic school; framing to himself a system (*Indifferentism*), which excluded all difference of right and wrong, in Morals and in Religion, and assuming pleasure or gaiety (χαρὰ), as the final end of existence. His followers denominated themselves Θεοδώρειοι.[6] His disciple, *Bio* of Borysthenis,[7] and *Euhemerus* (according to some, of Messene),[8] made an

[1] DIOG. LAERT. II, 86, sqq. EUSEB. Præp. Evang. XIV,

[2] Cf. DIOG. LAERT. II, 92. CIC. Acad. Quæst. IV, 46.

[3] DIOG. LAERT. II, 86, sqq. SEXT. EMPIR. Adv. Math. VII, 11, 15, 191—198.

[4] Flourished about 300 B.C.

[5] SUIDAS, s. h. v. DIOG. LAERT. 86 et 97, sqq.

[6] SEXTUS, Adv. Math. VII, 191. sqq. PLUTARCH. Adv. Colot. XIV, p. 177. EUSEB. Præp. Evang. XIV, 18. DIOG. LAERT. II, 93, 97—100.

[7] Bio the Borysthenite, called also the Sophist, lived in the middle of the third century B.C.

See BAYLE'S Dictionary; et MARIUS HOOGVLIET, Specimen Philosophico-criticum continens Diatriben de Bione Borysthenita, etc. *Lugd. Bat.* 1821, 4to.

[8] The fragments of his work, entitled Ἱερὰ ἀναγραφή, in Diod. Sic., Bibl. Hist. ed. VESSELING, tom. II, 633; and among the fragments of ENNIUS, who had translated them into Latin. *Idem.* ed. HESSEL,

application of this doctrine to the religion then prevalent[1] *Hegesias*, who in the time of Ptolemy taught at Alexandria, a native of Cyrene and pupil of the Cyrenaic *Parœbates*, was equally decided in maintaining the *indifference* of right and wrong, but asserted that perfect pleasure is unattainable in our present state (*ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀνυπαρκτόν*), and concluded that death was therefore preferable to life. Hence he was surnamed *Πεισθάνατος*.[2] He became the founder of a sect, the Hegesiacs.

123. *Anniceris* of Cyrene, who appears, like Hegesias, to have been a disciple of Parœbates, and to have taught at Alexandria, endeavoured, without renouncing the principles of his sect, to get rid of their revolting consequences, and to reconcile them with our sentiments in favour of friendship and patriotism, by pleading the refined pleasures of benevolence:[3] thus making the Cyrenaic system approximate that of Epicurus. The success of the latter caused the downfal of the Cyrenaic school.

III. *Pyrrho and Timon.*

Authorities: Cic. De Fin. II, 13; IV, 16. Sextus Empiricus. Diog. Laert. IX, 61, sqq. 105, sqq. Euseb. Præp. Evang. XIV. 18.

Cf. the bibliography § 38, II, *a*.

† G. P. DE CROUZAZ, Examination of Pyrrhonism, Ancient and Modern, folio, *Hague*, 1733 (French). Extracts of the same work in FORMEY, Triumph of Evidence; with a Prelim. Dissert. by M. DE HALLER, *Berlin*, 1756, 2 vols. 8vo.

J. ARRHENII Diss. de Philosophiâ Pyrrhoniâ, *Ups.* 1708, 4to.

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p. 212. See also concerning Euhemerus and Euhemerism: † SEVIN, Researches concerning the Life and Works of Euhemerus; † FOURMONT, Dissertation on the Work of Euhemerus, entitled Ἱερὰ ἀναγραφή, etc.; and † FOUCHER, Memoirs on the System of Euhemerus, in the Mem. of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. VIII, XV, XXXIV (all French).

[1] CIC. De Nat. Deor. I, 42. PLUTARCH. Adv. Stoicos, XIV, p. 77; De Is. et Osir., tom. VII, p. 420, ed. REISKE. SEXTUS, Adv. Math. IX, 17, 51, 55. DIOG. LAERT. II, 97; et IV, 46—58. DIOD. SICUL. V, 11 et 45. LACT. Div. Instit. I, 11.

[2] CIC. Tusc. Quæst. I, 34. DIOG. LAERT. II, 86, 93, sqq. VAL. MAX. XVIII, 9.

J. J RAMBACH, Progr. de Hegesia *πεισθανάτῳ*, *Quedlimb.* 1771, 4to. *Idem.* in his Sylloge Diss. ad rem Litterariam pertinentium, *Hamb.* 1790, 8vo. No. IV.

[3] DIOG. LAERT. II, 96, 97.

God. Ploucquet, Diss. de Epochâ Pyrrhonis, *Tübing.* 1758, 4to.
J. G. Munch. Diss. de Notione ac Indole Scepticismi, nominatim Pyrrhonismi, *Altd.* 1796, 4to.
Jac. Bruckeri Observatio de Pyrrhone à Scepticismi Universalis maculâ absolvendo, Miscell. Hist. Philos. p. 1.
C. Vict. Kindervater, Diss. Adumbratio Questionis, an Pyrrhonis doctrinâ omnis tollatur virtus, *Lips.* 1789, 4to.
Ricard. Brodersen, De Philosophiâ Pyrrhoniâ, *Kil.* 1819, 4to.
Thorbecke. Responsio ad Quest. Philos. etc. numquid in Dogmaticis oppugnandis inter Academicos et Scepticos interfuerit (?). 1820, 4to.
J. Frid. Langheinrich, Diss. I et II de Timonis Vitâ, Doctrinâ, Scriptis, *Lips.* 1729-31.
Zimmerman, Ueber den Ursprung, das Wesen und die historische Bedeutung der Pyrrhonischen Philosophie, 1843.

124. *Pyrrho* of Elis,[1] originally a painter, together with his master Anaxarchus accompanied Alexander in his campaigns, and subsequently became a priest at Elis. In common with Socrates (whom in some particulars he resembled) he maintained that virtue alone is desirable;[2] that every thing else, even science, is useless and unprofitable. To support this last proposition, which was also connected with the Irony of Socrates, he alleged that the contradiction existing between the different principles supported by disputants (ἀντιλογία, ἀντίθεσις τῶν λόγων), demonstrates the *incomprehensibility* of things (ἀκαταληψία). All this he argued, should make a philosopher withhold his assent (ἐπέχειν), and endeavour to maintain an ἀπαθεία, or freedom from all impressions. By this doctrine, Pyrrho and his school attached a special meaning on the word σκέψις (examination), which had already been frequently employed more loosely.[3] His friend and pupil *Timon*, a physician of Phlius, and previously a pupil of Stilpo at Megara,[4] carried still farther this system of scepticism, which had begun on moral principles,[5] and maintained with

[1] Flourished about 340, died about 288 B.C.
[2] Cic. De Orat. III, 17; De Finib. III, 3; Acad. Quæst. II, 42.
[3] Diog. Laert. IX, 70, sqq. Sext. Empir. Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 209, sqq. Aul. Gell. XI, 5.
Hence the Pyrrhonists are also called *Sceptics*, in the proper sense of the word: they have been more properly denominated *Ephectics* (from ἐποχή, suspension of judgment), *Zetetics*, and *Aporetics* (investigators, and doubters).
[4] Flourished about 272 B.C.
[5] Sext. Adv. Math. I, 53.

sarcastic bitterness the following propositions[1] against the Dogmatics:* the doctrines of the Dogmatics are founded not on substantial principles, but mere hypotheses:—the objects of their speculations do not come within the compass of certain knowledge:—all science is to be accounted vain, as not contributing to happiness:—in questions of practice we ought to give ear only to the voice of our own nature, that is, of our emotions; and by withholding the assent in matters of speculation (*ἀφασία*), should endeavour to retain the mind in a state of unalterable repose (*ἀταραξία*).[2] A question has been raised whether the *Ten sources of doubt* (*τόποι* or *τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς*), of the Sceptics,[3] are the work of Pyrrho or Timon. The latter left behind him no disciple of note.

IV. *Megaric School.*

Authorities: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, II.

J. Casp. Guntheri Diss. de Methodo Disputandi Megaricâ, *Jen.* 1707, 4to.

J. Ern. Junn. Walch, Commentatio de Philosophiis Veterum Criticis, *Jen.* 1755, 4to.

G. Lud. Spalding, Vindiciæ Philosophorum Megaricorum, *Berol.* 1793, 8vo.

Ferd. Deycks, De Megaricorum Doctrinâ ejusque apud Platonem et Aristotelem vestigiis, *Bon.* 1827. 8vo.

J. G. Hager, Dissert. de Modo Disputandi Euclidis, *Lips.* 1736, 4to. See also Bayle.

H. Ritter, The Philosophy of the Megaric School. Rhein. Mus. 2nd year, 3rd No.

125. *Euclid* of Megara,[4] had studied the philosophy of the Eleatæ previously to his becoming a disciple of Socrates.

[1] Particularly in his satiric poem Σίλλοι, whence he has been occasionally denominated *Sillographus*. Fragments of the three books of this poem, and of his work Περὶ *αἰσθήσεων*, are to be found partly in the Dissert. quoted above (of Is. Fr. Langheinrich), and partly in Hen. Steph. Poes. Philos. and among the Analecta of Brunck, tom. II and III.

* For an account of what is meant by *Dogmatism*, see §§ 55, 56, 57.—Ed.

[2] Cic. Fin. II, 21, 13; IV, 16; Offic. I, 2; De Orat. III, 17. Diog. Laert. IX, 61, sqq. 103, sqq. Euseb. Præp. XIV, 18. Sextus, Adv. Math. III, 2; XI, § 171; VII, § 30.

[3] See subsequently, under the art. *Ænesidemus*.

[4] Flourished about 400 B.C.

After the death of his master, having, together with the most of his other pupils, taken refuge at Megara, he established there a school; the principal object of which was the cultivation of Dialectics, on the principles of Socrates and the Eleatæ. The subtilties of this sect, which were sufficiently censured of old (witness the appellation of ἐριστικοί), have been still more severely condemned by the moderns; who, it must be allowed, have not been able to collect a sufficiently accurate account of what their practice really was. They appear to have pointed out the difficulties which attend thinking and cognition, Rationalism and Empiricism: and to have pursued certain Dogmatics to their last defences, particularly Aristotle and Zeno. Practical philosophy appears, with the exception of Stilpo, to have engaged the attention of few of this school.

126. *Euclid* gave as it were a new edition of the Eleatic doctrine: Good is one (ἓν τὸ ἀγαθόν); which alone is real and invariable: reasoning by analogy he rejected (διὰ παραβολῆς λόγους); attacking not so much the premises assumed, as the conclusions drawn (ἐπιφοράν).[1] *Eubulides* of Miletus, and his disciple *Alexinus* of Elis (nicknamed Ἐλέγξινος), are only known as the authors of certain captious questions (ἄλυτα) which they levelled at the Empirics, and in particular at Aristotle; such as the σωρείτης, the ψευδόμενος, the κερατινης, etc.[2] *Diodorus* surnamed *Cronus*, of Jasus in Caria, the pupil, according to some, of Eubulides, denied the twofold significations of words,[3] investigated the notions of possibilitiy (περὶ δυνατῶν),[4] and speculated concerning the truth of hypothetical judgments (τὸ συνημμένον);[5] and finally advanced some arguments to disprove the reality of *motion*.[6] His disciple *Philo* the Dialectic,

[1] Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 42. Diog. Laert. II, 106, 107.

[2] Diog. Laert. II, 108, sqq. Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 29. Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. VII, 13; cf. IX, 108. A. Gell. N. A. XVI, 2.

[3] A Gell. Noct. Att. XI, 12.

[4] Arist. De Interpret. c. IX; Metaph. VIII, 3. Cic. De Fato, Frag. VII, IX.

[5] Sext. Empir. Adv. Log. II. 11, 114, sqq.; Adv. Phys. II. 115; Pyrrh. Hyp. II, 110; Adv. Math. VIII, 112, sqq. Cic. Acad. Quæst. II, 47.

[6] Sextus Empir. Adv. Math. X, 85, sqq.; IX, 363; Adv. Phys. II.

(who must not be confounded with the Stoic, or with the Academician of the same name), became his opponent on these subjects. *Stilpo* of Megara, a philosopher venerable for his character,[1] *disallowed the objective validity of generic conceptions* (τὰ εἴδη); *and the truth of those judgments which are not identical.**[2] He made the character of a wise man to consist in *apathy* or impassibility (*animus impatiens*, Senec. Ep. 9.); from which doctrine his disciple Zeno deduced a great number of consequences. We find also mentioned as *Megarics*, *Bryso* or *Dryso*, a son of Stilpo; *Clinomachus*,[3] and *Euphantus*.

V. *Schools of Elis and Eretria.*

127. The schools founded by *Phædo* of Elis and *Menedemus* of Eretria (§ 118), are not, as far as we can learn, more distinguishable from each other than from that of Megara. The first was a true disciple of Socrates:[4] his opinions were set forth in dialogues which have not come down to us. The second, a hearer of Plato and Stilpo, may be said to have continued, at Eretria, the school of Elis.[5] He and his disciples (in this respect resembling Stilpo) limited truth to *identical propositions*.[6] They denied that it could be inferred by negative categorical propositions, or conditional and collective.

85, sqq.; Pyrrh. Hyp. II., 242 et 245. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 310. Euseb. Præp. Evang. XIV, 23.

[1] Diog. Laert. II, 113, sqq.; flourished 300 B.C.

* ——— "läugnete die objective Gültigkeit der Gattungsbegriffe (τὰ εἴδη), und die Wahrheit derjenigen Urtheile, die nicht identisch sind."

[2] Plutarch Adv. Coloten, XIV, p. 174. Diog. Laert. II, 119. Plat. Soph. tom. II, p. 240, 269, 281. Simpl. In Physica, p. 26.

† J. Chph. Schwab, Remarks on Stilpo, in the Philos. Arch. of. Eberhard, tom II, No. I.

J. Frid. Chph. Graffe, Diss. quâ Judiciorum Analyticorum et Synthcticorum Naturam jam longe ante Kantium Antiquitatis Scriptoribus fuisse perspectam contra Schwabium probatur, *Göttingen*, 1794, 8vo.

[3] Diog. Laert. II, 112.

[4] Ibid. II. 105.

[5] Diog. Laert. II, 125, sqq.

[6] Simpl. In Phys. Arist. p. 20. Diog. Laert. II, 135.

III. *More complete Systems, proceeding from the School of Socrates.*

128. A more complete system of dogmatic philosophy was founded at the Academia by Plato, on the principles of the Rationalists, or that of the pure Idea, and another by his disciple Aristotle, on those of the Empirics,[1] or that of Reality. From the Cynic school sprang the Stoics, and from the Cyrenaics the Epicureans. The dogmatism of the Stoics called forth the opposition of the Academician *Arcesilaus*, with whom began the scepticism of the later Academy. In this manner, from the Socratic school arose four dogmatical systems; diverging from one another in theory and practice; and, in addition to these, a school decidedly sceptical.

I. *Plato.*

Authorities: Plato, his works, with the Argumenta Dialogorum Platonis of Tiedemann (in the 12th vol. of the ed. Bipont.), translated by Schleiermacher: Guil. van Heusde, Specimen Criticum in Platon. acc. Wyttenbachii Epist. ad auct. *Lugd. Bat.* 1803, 8vo. Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch (Quæst. Platon.), Sext. Empiricus, Apuleius de Doctrinâ Platonis, Diogenes Laertius, lib. III, Timæus, Suidas.

Modern Works on the Life, Doctrine, and Works of Plato in general.

Mars. Ficini, Vita Platonis: Introductory to his translation of Plato.

Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato, with Answers to the principal Objections against him, and a General View of his Dialogues, *Edinb.* 1760. 8vo.

† W. G. Tennemann, System of the Platonic Philosophy, *Leips.* 1792–5. 4 vols. 8vo.

† Fr. Ast, On the Life and Writings of Plato, intended as introductory to the Study of that Philosopher, *Leips.* 1816, 8vo.

† Ferd. Delbruck, Discourse on Plato, *Bonn*, 1819, 8vo.

† Jos. Socher, On the Works of Plato, *Munich*, 1820. A work principally relating to their authenticity and chronological order.

James Geddes, Essay on the Composition and Manner of Writing of the Ancients, particularly Plato, *Glasg.* 1748, 8vo.

J. Bapt. Bernardi Seminarium Philosophiæ Platonis, *Venet.* 1599–1605, 3 vols. fol.

Rud. Goclenii Idea Philos. Platonicæ, *Marb.* 1612, 8vo.

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[1] The Rationalists maintain that the Intuitional Faculty (the Reason) is the only source of absolute certainty. The Empirics trace all certain knowledge to impressions received from without, through the senses.—Ed.

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LUD. MORAINVILLIERE, Examen Philos. Platonicæ, 1659. 8vo.
SAM. PARKER, A Free and Impartial Censure of Platonic Philosophy, *Lond.* 1666, 4to.
† J. J. WAGNER, A Dictionary of the Platonic Philosophy, *Götting.* 1779, 8vo. with a Sketch of that System.
† J. FR. HERBART, De Platonici Systematis Fundamento, *Gött.* 1805, 8vo. Cf. his Manual to serve for an introduction to Philosophy, second edition, IV sect. ch. 4.
P. G. VON HEUSDE, Initia Philosophiæ Platonicæ, Pars. I, *Ultraj.* 1827, 8vo.
Translations by COUSIN, SYDENHAM, and SCHLEIERMACHER.
† See a Life of Plato by an unknown author, in the Göttinger Bibl. der alt. Litteratur und Kunst. 5 St.
NIEBUHR, Kleine hist. und. philol. Schriften, 1 Samb. p. 470, &c.

129. *Plato*[1] was born at Athens 430 or 429 B.C., in the 3rd or 4th year of the LXXXVII Ol., the son of Aristo and Perictione, of the family of Codrus and Solon, and was endowed with distinguished talents for poetry and philosophy. By the advice of Socrates he attached himself to the latter pursuit. He had originally some inclination for public life, but was disgusted by the perpetual changes which took place in his time in the governments of Greece; by the corruptions of the democracy, and the depravity of the manners of his countrymen.[2] His studies were happily promoted by a diligent cultivation of poetry and the mathematics; by foreign travel, particularly in Italy and Sicily; and by familiar intercourse with the most enlightened men of his time; particularly with Socrates, whose conversations he attended for eight years;*[3] as well as by the correspondences which he entertained with the Pythagoreans of Magna Græcia.[4] In this manner was formed this great philosopher, surpassing, perhaps, all, by the vastness and profoundness of his views, and the correctness and eloquence with which he expressed them; while his moral character entitled him to take his place by the side of Socrates. He

[1] His proper name was Aristocles. [2] PLAT. Epist. VII.
* He had previously become acquainted with the system of Heraclitus.
[3] XENOPH. Memorab. III. 6. APULEIUS.
[4] JO. GUIL. JANI Dissert. de Institutione Platonis, *Vitel.* 1706. De Perigrinatione Platonis. ibid. ejusd.
CHPH. RITTER, De Præceptoribus Platonis, *Gryphisw.* 1707, 4to.
On his intercourse with Xenophon:
AUG. BOECKH, Progr. de Simultate quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur, *Berol.* 1811, 4to.

founded in the *Academia* a school of philosophy, which for a long period was a nursery of virtuous men and profound thinkers. Plato died in the first year of the CVIII Olympiad, 348 B.C.

130. His works, principally in the form of dialogues;[1] (models of excellence for the rare union of a poetic and philosophic spirit);[2] are the only incontestable authorities respecting his opinions; but we must not hope to attain his entire system except by conjecture, as he had certain doctrines (*ἄγραφα δόγματα*) which he did not communicate except to those whom he entrusted with his *esoteric* philosophy.[3]*

131. Plato, by his philosophical education and the superiority of his mind, had placed himself on the higher position of Ideas, which gave him a commanding view of the systems of his contemporaries, without allowing him to be involved in their prejudices.[4] He embraced the highest aim of humanity, together with the theoretical interests of the

[1] J. Jac. Nast, Progr. de Methodo Platonis Philosophiam tradendi Dialogicâ, *Stuttg.* 1787. 4to.

Zeller, Platonische Studien, 1840.

Hermann, Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie, 1839. 1 Th. Die historisch-kritische Grundlegung enthaltend.

J. Aug. Goerenz, Progr. de Dialogisticâ Arte Platonis, *Viteb.* 1794, 4to.

[2] Henr. Phil. Conr.. Henke, De Philosophiâ Mythicâ, Platonis imprimis, Observationes variæ, *Helmst.* 1776, 4to.

J. Aug. Eberhard, Dissert. on the proper end of Philosophy, and the Mythi of Plato, in his *Vermischte Schriften, Hal.* 1788. 8vo.

J. Chr. Hüttner, De Mythis Platonis, *Lips.* 1788, 4to.

† Garnier, Mem. on the use which Plato has made of Fables, in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXXII.

† M. Marx, the Mythi of Plato, a Dissert. in the *Eleutheria*, a Literary Gazette of Fribourg, published by Ehrhardt, tom. 1, fasc. 2 and 3. *Frib.* 1819, 8vo.

[3] Plat. Epist. II, VII, XIII; Phædr. p. 388; Alcib. Pr. de Rep. IV. Arist. Phys. IV, 2; De Gener. et Corrupt. II. 3. Simplic. in Arist. libr. de Animâ, I, p. 76. Suidas.

* This is denied by others.

We must not omit to notice, as sources of information respecting Plato, the passages in Aristotle, where that philosopher criticises the system of his master. See Fr. A. Trendelenburg, Platonis de Ideis et Numeris Doctrinâ ex Aristotele illustrata, *Lips.* 1826, 8vo.

[4] Sophista, vol. II, p. 252, 265. Cratyl., p. 345, 386.

reason, and always considered theoretical and practical philosophy as forming essential parts of the same whole; and conceived that it was only by means of true philosophy that human nature could attain its proper destination.[1]

132. His critical acquaintance with preceding systems, and the appreciation of their ideal aim, enabled Plato to form more adequate notions of the proper end, extent, and character of philosophy.[2] Under this term he comprehended a knowledge of the Universal, the Necessary, the Absolute, as well as of the relations and essential properties of all things.[3] Science he viewed as the form of philosophy. Philosophy he defined to be Science, properly so called. The source of knowledge he pronounced to be not[4] the evidence of our senses, which are occupied with *contingent* matter, nor yet the *understanding*,* but Reason,[5] whose object is that which is Invariable and Absolute (τὸ ὄντως ὄν[6]). He held the doctrine of the existence, in the reason of certain *innate notions* (νοήματα) which form the basis of our conceptions, and precede in the soul the representation of what is individual and peculiar, besides forming the elements of our practical resolutions. These notions have for their object *the Ideas* (ἰδέαι), the eternal archetypes (παραδείγματα), or unities (μονάδες), which are the essence of infinite things, and the principles to which we refer the endless multiplicity of things (τὸ ἄπειρον, τὰ πολλά)[7] by means of thought; and

[1] De Rep. VI, p. 76, 77; Ep. VII.

[2] On the *end* of the philosophy of Plato, see, besides the work of Eberhard quoted in the preceding section:

Aug. Magn. Kraft, De Notione Philosophiæ in Platonis ἐρασταῖς, *Lips.* 1786, 4to.

Gottlob Ern. Schulze, De summo secundum Platonem Philosophiæ fine, *Helmst.* 1789, 4to.

[3] Theætet., p. 141; De Republ. VI, p. 69; V, p. 62; De Leg. III, p. 131.

[4] Jo. Fr. Dammann, Diss. I et II de Humanâ sentiendi et cogitanda facultatis Naturâ ex Mente Platonis. *Helmst.* 1792, 4to.

* See Observation, § 41.

[5] Phædo, p. 225. [6] Phædr., p. 247.

Wienbarg, De primitivo Idearum Platonicorum sensu, 1829.

[7] Besides the general treatises above, see, on the *Ideas* of Plato, the following works:

Scipionis Agnelli Disceptationes de Ideis Platonis, *Ven.* 1615. 4to.

Car. Joach. Sibeth, Diss. (Resp. J. Chr. Fersen) de Ideis Platonicis, *Rostoch.* 1720, 4to.

which consequently cannot have originated from experience, but have been only developed by it. The soul *recollects* the Ideas and principles on perceiving their copies (ὁμοιώματα), with which the world is filled; and this process is in its case like the memory of an anterior state when it lived without being united to a body. This is what constitutes the Platonic ἀναμνήσις.[1] Inasmuch as the manifold objects, whose elements are the great and the little, correspond in part with the eternal Ideas, they must have some principle in common between them and the cognizant soul; that principle is the Divinity, who has formed these external objects after the model of the Ideas.[2] Numbers differ from ideas, and occupy the interval between ideas and objects. Such are the fundamental doctrines of the philosophy of Plato;[3] in accordance with which he drew a distinction between the world of sense and the super-sensuous world (κόσμος αἰσθητὸς and νοητὸς) *Empirical* knowledge and *Rational;* making the latter the only true object of philosophy.

The system of Plato is an instance of *Rationalism*.[4]

133. The division of philosophy into Logic (Dialectics), Metaphysics, (Physiology or Physics), and Morals (the Political science), has been introduced by Plato,[5] who clearly

Jac. Bruckeri Diss. de Convenientiâ Numerorum Pythagoricorum cum Ideis Platonis; Miscellan. Hist. Philos., p. 56.

Glob. Ern. Schulze, Diss. Philosophico-Historica de Ideis Platonis, *Viteb.* 1786, 4to.

† Fr. V. L. Plessing, Dissertation on the Ideas of Plato, as representing at once Immaterial Essences and the Conceptions of the Understanding, in the Collection of *Cæsar*, vol. III, p. 110.

Theoph. Fahse, Diss. de Ideis Platonis, *Lips.* 1795, 4to.

De Schanz (Præs. Matth. Fremling), De Ideis Platonicis. *Lund.* 1795, 4to.

See work of Trendelenburg, mentioned at § 130.

H. Richteri de Ideis Platonis libellus, *Lips.* 1827, 8vo.

J. Andr. Buttstedt, Progr. de Platonicorum Reminiscentiâ, *Erlang.* 1761, 4to.

[1] Phædo, p. 74, 75; Phædr., p. 249.

[2] De Rep. VI, p. 116—124; Tim., p. 348.

[3] Phædr., p. 226, 230; De Rep. VI, 122; VII, 133; De Leg. III, p. 132.

[4] Danzel, Plato, quid de philosophandi methodo senserit, 1841.

[5] Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. VII, 16.

laid down the chief attributes of each of these sciences, and their mutual dependencies; he also attended more than his predecessors to researches into the philosophy of grammar. Διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκέψιν, says Aristotle. He also distinguished between the analytical and synthetical mode of investigation: Philosophy therefore is under great obligations to him, *quoad formam*. She is no less indebted to him for the material enrichment of the above parts considered separately; and though he did not systematically complete the province of research, yet he continually excited the attention of others in order to further discoveries, and fostered free enquiry by adopting the Socratic form of dialogue.

134. Plato distinguished what is corporeal from the Soul. The corporeal is that which only contains an impression of the Ideas in its ever-changing appearance, and which has a share in the Universal. It has Fire and Earth as its fundamental elements, between which Air and Water occupy an intermediate rank. He considered the Soul to be an eternal and self-acting energy (αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν):[1] in it (the Soul) the divine Idea is really united with the manifold into one substance,[2] and hence the Divinity is revealed to it in a more elevated manner than in corporeal things. Viewed as combined with the body, he distinguished in it two parts, the rational (λογιστικὸν νοῦς); and the irrational or animal (ἀλογιστικὸν or ἐπιθυμητικὸν); mutually connected by a sort of middle term (θυμὸς, or τὸ θυμοειδές).[3] The animal part has its origin in the imprisonment of the soul in the body;[4] the rational still retains a consciousness of the *Ideas;* whereby it is capable of returning to the happy condition of Spirits. In Plato we discover also a more complete discrimination of the faculties of cognition, sensation, and volition;[5]

[1] De Leg. X. p. 88. sqq. [2] Timæus. Ed. Steph. p. 35.
[3] De Rep. IV, 349. ed. Steph. [4] Phædo.
[5] On the doctrine of Plato as respecting the soul, consult the following works:

† Chph. Meiners, Dissertation on the Nature of the Soul, a Platonic Allegory (after the Phædrus); in the first vol. of his Miscellany, p. 120, sqq.

† C. L. Reinhold, Dissertation on the Rational Psychology of Plato: in the first vol. of his Letters on the Philosophy of Kant, Letter XI.

Em. Gf. Lilie, Platonis Sententia de Naturâ Animi, *Götting.* 1790, 8vo.

with admirable remarks on their operations,[1] and on the different species of representation, of sensation, of motives determining the will, as well as the relations between Thought and Speech. (See for the last, Theætet. ed. Steph. p. 189, E sqq. Phileb. p. 38, D.)

135. Plato has rendered no less service to philosophy by affording it the first sketch of the laws of thought, (in Phœdr. ed. Bip. p. 226. 230; De Rep. VI. 122; VII. 133: De Leg. p. 132, the law of Identity and Contradiction is laid down as the basis of thought), the rules of propositions, of conclusions, and proofs, and of the analytic method: the distinction drawn between the Universal (κοινὸν) and Substance (οὐσία); and the Particular and the Accidental. He diligently investigated the characteristics of Truth, and detected the signs of appearance:[2] to him we owe the first attempt at the construction of a philosophical language:[3] the first development of the notion of knowledge and science (degrees of cognition δόξα, διάνοια, ἐπίσημη):[4] the first logical development of the conceptions of Matter, Form, Substance, Accident, Cause and Effect, of Natural and Independent Causes, of unchangeable *esse* (τὸ ὄν), and of Appearance (φαινόμενον); a more adequate idea of the Divinity, as a being eminently good; with a more accurate development of the Divine Attributes, especially the moral ones;[5] accompanied by remarks on the popular religion, and an essay towards a demonstration of the existence of God by reasonings drawn from Cosmology.[6] He represented the Divinity as the author of the world, inasmuch as he introduced into rude matter (ὕλη—τὸ ἄμορφον) order and harmony, by moulding it after the *Ideas*, and conferring (together with a rotatory motion) an harmonious body, governed, as in the case of individual animals, by the soul of the world. He also described the Divinity (in respect of his providence) as the

[1] De Rep. IV, p. 367.

[2] For the Logic of Plato, consult † J. J. Engel, Essay on a Method of extracting from the Dialogues of Plato his Doctrines respecting the Understanding, *Berl.* 1780, 8vo.

[3] In the Cratylus.

[4] De Rep. II, p. 250; VII, 133.

[5] De Leg. X, p. 68, XII, p. 229. Cf. X, p. 82, sqq.; Phileb. p. 224; Epinomis, p. 254, sqq.

author and executor, or guardian of the laws of Morals; and to him we owe the first intelligent essay on a Theodice. According to his views, the existence of evil is not attributable to the Deity, inasmuch as it results on the contrary from the principle of what is unformed and variable, and acts in conflict with the Ideas; by means of which conflict life and development are brought to pass in the world; but he maintains that God has adopted all the measures necessary for overcoming evil.[1] Lastly, to him we owe the first

[1] De Rep. IV, 10; Tim., p. 505, sqq.

On the Cosmogony and Theology of Plato, consult, besides the ancients (e.g. PROCLUS), the commentaries on, and translations of, the Timæus: † L. HORSTEL, The Timæus of Plato, the doctrine and the end of this work, with Remarks and Illustrations, *Brunswick*, 1795, 8vo; and † The Timæus of Plato, a Primitive and Veracious Monument of true Physical Knowledge, translated, with illustrations, by K. J. WINDISCHMANN, *Hademar*, 1804.

MARS. FICINI Theologiâ Platonica, *Florent.* 1482, fol.

ES. PUFENDORFII Diss. de Theologiâ Platonis, *Lips.* 1653, 4to.

J. FRIED. WUCHERER, Diss. II. de Defectibus Theologiæ Platonis, *Jen.* 1706, 4to.

OGILVIE, The Theology of Plato compared with the Principles of Oriental and Grecian Philosophers, *Lond.* 1793, 8vo.

† DIET. TIEDEMANN, On the Ideas of Plato respecting the Divinity, in the Mem. of the Antiq. Soc. of Cassel. tom. I. (Fr.) Cf. Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. II, p. 114, sqq.

† W. GL. TENNEMANN, On the Divine Intelligence: in the MEMORABILIEN of Paulus, fasc. 1, p. 2.

BALTH. STOLBERG, De λόγῳ et νῷ Platonis, *Viteb.* 1676, 4to.

J. GE. ARN. OELRICH, Commentatio de Doctrinâ Platonis de Deo a Christianis et recentioribus Platonicis varie explicata et corrupta, *Marb.* 1788, 8vo.

C. FRIED. STAUDLIN, Progr. de Phil. Platonicæ cum Doctrinâ religionis Judaïcâ et Christianâ cognatione, *Gött.* 1819, 4to. (See *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, No. XCV, 1819).

LUD. HORSTEL, Platonis doctrina de Deo e Dialogis ejus, etc. *Lips.* 1814, 8vo.

On the Matter and Formation of the World, and the Soul of the Universe, according to Plato.

DIETR. TIEDEMANN, De Materiâ quid visum sit Platoni; Nov. Biblioth. Philos. et Crit., vol. 1, fascic. 1. *Gött.* 1782.

† CHPH. MEINERS, Considerations on the Greeks, the age of Plato, the Timæus of that Philosopher, and his Hypothesis of a Soul of the World, in vol. I. of his *Vermischte Schriften.*

formal development of the doctrine of the spirituality of the soul, and the first attempt towards demonstrating its immortality.[1]

136. The interesting and profound research which Plato carried so far, respecting the Supreme 'Good,[2] belongs to the subject of *Morals*, which is closely connected with his metaphysical views. Virtue he defined to be the imitation of God, or the free effort of man to attain to a resemblance to his original (*ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*),[3] or in other terms a unison and harmony of all our principles and actions according to reason,[4] whence results the highest degree of happiness. Evil is opposed to this harmony as a disease of the soul. Virtue is *one*, but compounded of four elements: Wisdom (*σοφία—φρόνησις*); Courage, or Con-

Aug. Boeckh, On the Formation of the Soul of the World, according to the Timæus of Plato: in vol. III. of the *Studien*, published by Daub and Creuzer.

Aug. Boeckh, Progr. de Platonicâ Corporis Mundani fabricâ conflati ex Elementis Geometricâ rátione concinnatis, *Heidelb.* 1809, 4to; and De Platonico Systemate Cœlestium Globorum et de veră indole Astronomiæ Philolaicæ, *Ibid.* 1810, 4to.

[1] C. J. Ciph. Gottleberi Animadvers. ad Platonis Phædonem et Alcibiadem II. Adjuncti sunt excursus in Quæstiones Socraticas de Animi Immortalitate, *Lips.* 1771, 8vo; † Fried. Aug. Wolff, On the Phædo, *Berl.* 1814, 4to; and the following:

Sam. Weickmanni Diss. de Platonicâ Animorum Immortalitate, *Viteb.* 1740, 4to.

Chr. Ern. de Windheim, Examen Argumentorum Platonis pro Immortalitate Animæ Humanæ, *Gött.* 1749, 8vo.

Moses Mendelssohn's Phædo, *Berl.* 1767, 8vo.

† W. G. Tennemann, Doctrines and Opinions of the Socratic School respecting the Soul's Immortality, *Jena*, 1791, 8vo.

Gust. Frid. Wiggers, Examen Argumentorum Platonis pro Immortalitate Animi Humani, *Rost.* 1803, 4to.

Franc. Pettavel, De Argumentis quibus apud Platonem Animorum Immortalitas defenditur. Disp. Acad. Berol. 1815, 4to.

† The Phædo of Plato Explained and Examined, more especially inasmuch as it treats of the Immortality of the Soul; by Kuhnhardt, *Lubeck*, 1791, 8vo.

Wehrmann, Platonis de summo bono Doctrina, 1843.

Matthies, Die platonische und aristotelische Staatsidee, 1848.

[2] Especially in the Theætetus, the Philæbus, the Meno, and the Republic.

[3] Tim., p. 338, vol. IX; Theætet. p. 176.

[4] De Rep. IX, p. 48.

stancy (*ἀνδρεία*); Temperance (*σωφροσύνη*); and Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*):[1] which are otherwise termed the four cardinal virtues. Such virtues he describes as arising out of an independence of, and superiority to, the influence of the senses. In his practical philosophy Plato blended a rigid principle of moral obligation with a spirit of gentleness and humanity; and education he described as a liberal cultivation and moral discipline of the mind.[2] Politics he defined to be the application, on a great scale, of the laws of morality (a society being composed of individuals, and therefore under similar obligations): and its end to be liberty and concord. In giving a sketch of his Republic, as governed according to reason, (an Ideal state), Plato had particularly an eye to the character and the political difficulties of the Greeks;[3] and the elements of this organism, in his view, answer to the component parts of the soul.[4] Plato's Republic is the earliest systematic treatise on Socialism, and the philosopher himself the earliest scientific Socialist. Beauty he considered to be the sensible representation of moral and physical perfection:[5] consequently it

[1] De Rep. IV, 443, sqq.

[2] Ibid. III, p. 310; De Leg. I, p. 46, sqq., II, 59. [3] Ibid.

[4] Consult the following works on the philosophy of Plato, as bearing upon practical principles:

CHRYS. JAVELLI Dispositio Moralis Philosophiæ Platonicæ, *Ven.* 1536, 4to. Et, Dispositio Philosophiæ Civilis ad Mentem Platonis *Venet.* 1536, 4to.

MAGN. DAN. OMEISII Ethica Platonica, *Altdorf.* 1696, 8vo.

FR. AUG. LUD. ADOLPH. GROTEFEND, Commentatio in quâ Doctrina Platonis Ethica cum Christiana comparatur, etc., *Götting.* 1720, 4to.

JOH. SLEIDANI Summa Doctrinæ Platonis de Republicâ et de Legibus, *Argentor.* 1548, 8vo.

J. J. LEIBNITII Respublica Platonis, *Leips.* 1776, 4to.

J. ZENTGRAVII Specimen Doctrinæ Juris Naturæ secundum Disciplinam Platonicam, *Argentor.* 1679, 4to.

CAR. MORGENSTERN, De Platonis Republ. Commentt. III., *Halæ*, 1794, 8vo.

J. LUD. GUIL. DE GEER, Diatribe in Politices Platonicæ Principia, *Ultraj.* 1810, 8vo.

† FR. KOPPEN, Polity, according to the Principles of Plato, *Leips.* 1818, 8vo.

G. PINZGER De iis quæ Aristoteles in Platonis Politiâ reprehendit, *Leips.* 1822, 8vo.

[5] De Leg. II, p. 62, sqq., p. 89, sqq.; Sympos. Phædr. Hippias. Maj.

is one with Truth and Goodness, and inspires love (ἔρως), which leads to virtue.[1] (Platonic Love.)

137. Plato borrowed considerably from other philosophers, particularly the Pythagoreans, who suggested to him the leading idea that all the variety of existing objects consist of one changeable substratum and form. but what he borrowed his own genius stamped with a character of originality, and blended the discordant systems of older philosophy in an harmonious whole; the striking advantages of which are the unity it presents in its system of *Ideas;* the combination in one and the same interest of our reason, both speculative and practical; the strictness of the union which he maintains between Virtue, Truth, and Beauty; the multitude of new ideas of which the germs are to be found in his system; and, finally, for the love of science which his meditations inspire.[2] On the other hand his system is not without its weak side; he did not sufficiently distinguish between conceptions originating in the mind itself and those which are acquired by experience; and his origin of the ἰδέαι is mystical; besides which he confounds thought with cognition. There are faults also in his *manner:* the union of much imagination with reasoning, of a poetic with a philosophic spirit, and the total absence of any *systematic* form, have rendered his doctrine difficult to be apprehended; gave occasion for abundance of misinterpretations; and ultimately had great influence over the fortunes of Platonism.

138. Plato drew around him a crowd of disciples and admirers; many of them celebrated statesmen, and even several females:[3] among others *Axiothea* of Phlius, and *Lasthenia* of Mantinea. As the doctrines he had blended came subsequently to be redivided, and as succeeding ages produced a succession of different prevailing spirits of philosophy, his school was subdivided into several sects, and thus gave birth to various *Academies.* To the *first* of these belonged *Speusippus* of Athens (died 339 B.C.), the

[1] Sympos. Phædr., p. 301; Euthyphr. p. 20.
Baur, Das Christliche des Platonismus, 1837.
Diog. Laert. III, 46.

nephew and successor of Plato,[1] and *his* successor *Xenocrates* of Chalcedon (died 314 B.C.);[2] who in his manner of expressing himself resembled Pythagoras: for instance, in defining the soul to be *a self-moving number*. After him *Polemo* of Athens[3] presided at the Academy, who considered the *summum bonum* to consist in a life regulated according to nature;[4] and subsequently *Crates* of Athens.[5] Finally *Crantor* of Soli, the friend and disciple of Xenocrates and Polemo, maintained the original system of the founder of the school, with the exception of a small number of alterations, applied principally to the popular doctrines of practical morality.[6] The *new* Academy (see below, § 166, sqq.) directed its speculations to prove the uncertainty of human judgment: while the Neo-Platonists founded a school of enthusiasts who laid claim to a high degree of internal *illumination*.*

II. *Aristotle.*

Authorities: The works of Aristotle, and his numerous commentators, whose observations must be admitted with caution; (among others, Ammonius, Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Simplicius, and Themistius); Cicero, Plutarch, Sext. Empir., Diog. Laert. lib. V., Suidas.

Modern Works on the Life and Philosophy of Aristotle in general.

Franc. Patricii Discussionum Peripateticarum, tom. IV, quibus Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ Universæ Historia atque Dogmata cum veterum placitis collata eleganter et eruditè declarantur, *Basil.* 1581, fol.

Melch. Weinrichii Oratio Apologetica pro Aristotelis Personâ, adversus Criminationes Patricii, *Lips.* 1644, 4to.

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[1] Diog. Laert. IV, 2, sqq. For some of his opinions, see Arist. Met. VII, 2; XII, 7; Eth. Nic. 1, 4. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 145.

[2] Ibid. IV, 6, sqq. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 16, etc. [3] In 314 B.C.

[4] Diog. Laert. IV, 16, sqq. Cic. De Fin. IV, 6. [5] About 313 B.C.

[6] *Heraclides of Pontus*, the author of some treatises of which we possess certain fragments (ed. Geo. D. Koeler, *Hal.* 1804, 8vo. Cf. Diog. Laert. V, 86, sqq. Cic. Tusc. V, 3; De Div. I, 23, and Suidas, s. h.v.), was the hearer both of Plato and Aristotle; on which account he has by some been called a Peripatetic.

* This internal illumination has been identified, by many modern writers, with the clairvoyance of natural somnambulism and Animal Magnetism. (See Colquhoun's Hist. of Magic, Witchcraft, and Animal Magnetism, vol. I.)—Ed.

Herm. Conringii Aristotelis Laudatio: Orationes duæ, *Helmst.* 1633, 4to.

E. V. L. Plessing, On Aristotle, in *Cæsar's Denkwürdigkeiten, aus der Philös. Welt.* tom. III.

J. Gottl. Buhle, Vita Aristotelis per Annos digesta: in the first vol. of his edition of the Works of Aristotle.

Mich. Piccarti Isagoge in Lectionem Aristotelis cum Epistolâ Conringianâ et præmissâ Dissertatione de Naturâ, Origine et Progressu Philos. Aristotelicæ; ed. J. Conr. Durrius, *Altd.* 1667, 8vo.

Petr. Joh. Nunnesii, Barth. Jos. Paschasii, et Jo. Bapt. Montorii Oratt. tres de Aristotelis Doctrinâ, *Francof.* 1591, 8vo.

Mich. Piccarti Hypotyposis Philos. Aristotelicæ, *Norimb.* 1504, 8vo.

J. Crassoth Institutiones in Universam Arist. Philosophiam, *Par.* 1619, 4to.

J. Conr. Durrii Hypotyposis totius Philos. Aristotelicæ, *Altd.* 1660, 4to.

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Petri Rami Animadversiones Aristotelicæ XX libris comprehensæ, *Par.* 1558, 8vo.; and his other works quoted farther on.

Petri Gassendi Exercitationes Paradoxicæ adversus Aristotel., etc. *Gratianop.* 1624, 8vo.; and in his Works, *Lugd.*

Petri Valeriani Philosophia contra Aristotelem, *Dantisc.* 1653, 4to.

On the other hand see the Works written in defence of Aristotle, by Mart. Dorpius, P. Gallandius, J. Broscius, J. Guilleminat, H. Stabius, Jos. de Munnana against Valla, Ramus, and others.

Pet. Villemandy, Manuductio ad Philosophiæ Aristotelicæ Epicuræ et Cartesianæ parallelismum, *Amst.* 1683, 8vo.

Ge. Paul. Roetenbeccii Disp. de principio Aristotelico et Cartesiano, *Altd.* 1685, 4to.

Sam. Mascovii Exerc. Acad. uter in Scrutinio Veritatis rectius dubitet Aristoteles an Cartesius, *Regiom.* 1704, 4to.

Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, 1 Bd. 1835.

Stahr, Aristotelia, I und II, 1830 und 1832.

Michelet, Examen critique de l'ouvrage d'Aristote, intitulé Metaphysique, 1836.

Michelet, Die Ethik des Aristoteles, 1827.

Harris (James) of Salisbury, Works (passim), published by his son (Lord Malmsbury), *Lond.* 1801, 2 vols. 4to. Again 1805.

Cf. besides, the articles Aristotles, Aristotelische Philosophie (by Buhle), in the great Encyclop. published by Ersch, etc.; part V.

139. Aristotle was born at Stagira, 384 B.C. Ol. XCIX. He inherited from his father Nicomachus, who had been the physician and friend of Amyntas, king of Macedon, a predilection for natural philosophy. From 368 B.C. he continued for twenty years the disciple of Plato, improving under that great master his admirable talents for analysis;

though, subsequently, he separated from him. In 343 he became the preceptor of Alexander, who assisted his scientific pursuits by sending to him collections of objects of natural history, and furnishing him with sums of money for the purchase of books.[1] He founded in 334 a new school in the *walks* of the Lycæum; whence the name of *Peripatetics*;[2] and died in 322,[3] at Chalcis, in Eubœa; probably by poison, which he had taken on being obliged to leave Athens under the suspicion of atheism. Aristotle has bequeathed to us excellent works on all the sciences known to the Greeks, and particularly on Moral Philosophy. These treatises are to be divided into exoteric and esoteric, or acroamatic.[4] The peculiar fortunes to which his works have been exposed,[5] have rendered still more difficult the examination and exposition of his doctrines, already sufficiently obscure, by their brevity and the peculiarity of the language he employed.[6]

140. Aristotle possessed in a high degree the talent of discrimination, and a great mass of knowledge derived from books and the observation of nature. He mastered the whole philosophical and historical science of his age, and started from the exploration of nature. He was consequently not satisfied with Ideas,[7] but sought also to reconcile them with nature. He conceived them to be not

[1] PLIN. Hist. Nat. VIII, 16.

[2] DIOG. LAERT. V, 2. CIC. Acad. Quæst. 1, 4. A. GELL. N. A. XX, 5.

[3] Ol. CXIV.—CXIII.

[4] J. GOTTL. BUHLE, Commentatio de Librorum Aristotelis distributione in Exotericos et Acroamaticos, *Gött.* 1788, 8vo.; and in the first vol. of his edition of Arist.

FRANC. NIC. TITZE, de Aristotelis Operum serie et distinctione liber, *Lips.* 1826, 8vo.

[5] See STRAB. Geo. lib. IX, et PLUT. in Vit. Syllæ, c. 26. HEYNE, Opusc. Acad., vol. I, p. 126, et SCHNEIDER, Epimetrum de Fatis Libror. Aristotelicorum, in his edition of Arist. Hist. of Anim. *Lips.* 1811, p. 76. See also BRANDIS, in the Rhein. Museum, I Jahr, Nos. III and IV, *Lond.* 1827.

[6] PETR. JOH. NUNNESIUS, De Causis Obscuritatis Aristotelis earumque remediis una cum Vita Aristotelis a JOH. PHILOPONO descripta, etc. *Lugd. Bat.* 1621.

† FULLEBORN (Collect. fasc. IX.), On the Manner and Philosophy of Aristotle.

[7] Metaph. I, 7; XII, 9.

only a δύναμις, but at the same time also as an ἐντελέχεια, assuming that all representations, even the highest of the understanding, are developed out of experience,[1] and that the world is, even as regards its *form*, eternal and not formed by an intelligence. He drew a sharp distinction between philosophic thinking and poetry; and he invariably, in all his writings, cast a retrospective and critical glance on the philosophical progress of his predecessors; and differs also from Plato in this respect, that instead of proceeding, like him, from the universal to the particular, he proceeded from the particular to the universal.[2]

141. Philosophy, according to Aristotle, is science arising out of the love of knowledge; and science is knowledge founded on certain principles.[3] There are two sorts of knowledge, mediate and immediate.[4] In order to make the first possible, the existence of the second is necessary. We become sensible *immediately* and by experience of *particulars* (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα): *mediately*, but still by experience, we acquire the *universal* (τὰ καθ' ὅλου), and we thus attain to that which is *real* and *necessary*, and is capable of being expressed in definitions and axioms. From *immediate* certitude we deduce *mediate*, by means of arguments, the theory of which belongs to logic; the object of which is to show how we can ascertain by reasoning the certainty or the probability of things. Logic, therefore, is the instrument (*organum*) of all science or philosophy, but only *quoad*

[1] Analyt. Prior. I, 30.

[2] Here may be noticed the comparisons drawn between the two philosophers, by GEORGE of *Trebizond*, and G. GEMISTHUS PLETHO.

And also: PAGANINUS GAUDENTIUS, De Dogmatum Aristotelis cum phil. Platonis comparatione, *Florent.* 1539, 4to.

JAC. MAZONIUS, De Comparatione Aristot. cum Platone, *Venet.* 1547, fol.

JAC. CARPENTARII Platonis cum Arist. in Universâ Philosophiâ comparatio, *Par.* 1573, 4to.

ANDR. BACHMANN, Aristoteles cum Platone comparatus, *Nordh.* 1629, 4to.

RAPIN, Aristotle and Plato compared, *Paris*, 1671, 8vo.

CHR. HERRMANN WEISSE, De Platonis et Aristotelis in constituendis principiis differentia, Commentat. *Lips.* 1828, 8vo.

[3] Phys. II, 3; Met. I, 2. [4] Anal. Post. I, 2; II, c. 19.

formam; (a distinction which was afterwards very often forgotten); for it is experience which must supply the matter to be worked upon, and wrought into general principles.[1] The first principle is that of contradiction; but, though productive of truth, it is the *test* and not the *constituent element* of truth.[2] By his works comprehended under the title of *Organum*, Aristotle has, next to Plato, rendered the greatest service to logic;[3] as the science which would establish the *formal* part of reasoning, and elucidate its theory: he there considers propositions and conceptions as the elements of reasoning,[4] with admirable remarks on language interspersed; and he ought not to be made responsible for the abuse, which afterwards prevailed, of this art, when it came to be considered as capable of supplying not only the *form* but the *matter* of argumentation.[5]

142. Aristotle, above every other philosopher, enlarged the limits of philosophy. He comprised therein all the sciences (rational, empirical, or mixed), with the single exception of history: and appears to have divided it as a whole into Logic, Physics, and Ethics; or into speculative and practical.[6] *Speculative* philosophy contemplates the *real* order of things, which is not dependent on our caprice: *practical*, the accidental and voluntary: real substances are either invariable (*ἀκίνητα*), or variable (*κίνητα*). The latter

[1] Anal. Post. I, 18.

[2] Anal. Post. Metaph. I, 1; IV, 3; De Animâ, III, 5, 6.

[3] MICH. PSELLI Synopsis Logicæ Aristotelis, Gr. et Lat. edidit EL. EHINGER, *Aug. Vind.* 1597, 8vo.

NICEPH. BLEMMYDÆ Epitome Logicæ Doctrinæ Aristotelis Gr. et Lat. ed. Jo. WEGELIN, *ibid.* 1605, fol.

GEO. ANEPONYMI Compendium Philosophiæ seu Organi Aristotelis, Gr. et Lat. ed. Jo. WEGELIN, *ibid.* 1600, 8vo.

JAC. CARPENTARII Descriptio Universæ Artis disserendi ex Arist. Organo collecta et in III libros distincta, *Par.* 1654, 4to.

CAR. WEINHOLTZ, De Finibus atque pretio Logicæ Aristotelis, *Rost.* 1824.

[4] Sophist. Elench. 34, fin.

[5] TRENDLENBURG, Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, 1842.

HEYDER, Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der aristotelischen und Hegel'schen Dialektik, 1845.

GE. PAUL. ROETENBECK, Diss. Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ divisionem sub examen vocans, *Altd.* 1705, 4to.

[6] DIOG. LAERT. V., 28.

either perishable (φθαρτὰ) or imperishable. Sublunary things are variable and perishable: the heavens are imperishable, but variable: the Deity alone is imperishable and invariable. Consequently, speculative philosophy becomes, in proportion as it advances in abstraction, either Physics or Mathematics, or what came to be afterwards called, Metaphysics: relatively to *its objects*, it is divided into Physics, Cosmology, Psychology, and Theology. Practical Philosophy comprehends Ethics, Politics, and Economy.[1] These subdivisions are not broadly traced, on defined principles, yet it is to Aristotle that we are indebted for the first hint of an encyclopædic system of the sciences; for having subjected to a rigorous examination the notions and principles of his predecessors; for having himself laboured to establish others by induction and reflection: and we are called upon to admire the multitude of hints, inquiries, and observations, which are dispersed up and down his works, without forming integral parts of his system.

§ 143.

Jac. Carpentarii Descriptio Universæ Naturæ ex Aristotele; pars I et II. *Par.* 1562, 4to.

Pet. Rami Scholarum Physicarum, libri VIII. *Par.* 1565, 8vo.

Sebastiani Bassonis Philosophiæ Naturalis adversus Aristotelem libri XII, *Par.* 1621, 8vo.

Speculative Philosophy. 1st. *Physics* or *Natural Philosophy.* Nature (φύσις) is the *sum* of all existing things, whose existence can be known only by means of perception and experience founded thereon. Τὰ νοητὰ, the objects of our mental conception, do not exist *per se*.[2] Nature is also the *internal* principle of change in objects, and this constitutes a distinction between her works and those of art. The knowledge of nature is properly the knowledge of the laws of bodies, so far as they are in movement. In this science are comprised the following subjects of discussion: Nature, Cause, Accident, End, Change (and its subdivisions), Infinitude, Space, and Time: and moreover a general theory of movement. Nature, as a principle of change,

[1] Metaph. I, 2; VI, 1; XI, 3; Ethic. X, 9; Œcon. I, 1.
[2] Metaph. III, 2—4; V, 5.

does nothing without an end or object; which end is *the Form*.[1] When we speak of chance (*τὸ αὐτόματον*), we always in fact mean real causes, unknown to ourselves. All change necessarily presupposes a *substratum* (*ὑκοκείμενον, ὑλη*), and a form (*εἶδος*). A change (*κίνησις, μεταβολὴ*), is the realization of that which is possible *ἐντελεχεία*),[2] so far as it is possible, *ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελεχεία ἢ τοιούτου*.[3] As soon as the Possible (*δυνάμει ὄν*) assumes a certain form and is developed after a particular manner, every other condition and state is excluded (*στέρησις*). Matter, Form, and Privation, are therefore the three principles, or elements of existence and of change. Change is possible in respect of Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Place. This last condition, and *generally* that of space and time, serve as a foundation for the others.[4] Space (*τόπος*) is the first immoveable limit of that which surrounds us: (*τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον*);[5] there is no vacuum (*κενόν*). Time is the measure or numeration (*ἀριθμος*) of movement, with reference to priority and posteriority (*ἀριθμός κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον*).[6] Infinitude is that which continually suggests the idea of still greater extent, in addition to that already ascertained. In reality there is no being which can be called Infinite; only in our conception. Time is infinite, Body and Space are finite, although susceptible of infinite division.[7] Motion, in general, like time, has neither beginning nor end. Nevertheless, it must be supposed to have had a first cause of movement, itself unmoved (*τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*). This source of movement must be eternal and invariable; its essence is eternal and pure, activity and life; such a cause is the Divinity. The first thing put in motion from eternity was the Heavens.[8]

[1] Phys. II, 4—6, 8, sqq.

[2] Cf. SUIDAS, sub hâc v. Cf. also FATHER ANCILLON, Critical and Philosophical Researches respecting the Entelechia of Aristotle, in the Mem. of the Royal Acad. of Prussia (Class of Phil.), for the years 1804—11, *Berl.* 1816, p. 1, sqq. (Fr.).

[3] Phys. III, 1; VIII, 1.

[4] Ibid. III, 1; VII, 7; VIII, 7.

[5] Ibid. IV, 4, sqq.

[6] Ibid. IV, 11.

[7] Phys. III, 1—7; VI, 1—9.

[8] Ibid. VIII, 5, sqq.; De Cœlo, II, 3, sqq.

144. *Cosmology.* The world (κόσμος, οὐρανός) is the sum-total of all things subject to change. Beyond its limits is neither change, nor time, nor space. Itself is eternal and immoveable.[1] The First Being, who is the author of all movement, is not himself a part of the world. The latter is a whole, bounded by the heavens, without beginning or end, and of a spherical form. The earth is the central point, the heavens the circumference. Hence arise three simple movements: towards the centre (the gravitation of bodies towards the earth); from the centre to the circumference (light bodies, for instance, fire); and finally about that centre (the circumambient bodies, the heavens, etc.). The circular motion is the most perfect, and the upper region of the heavens in which it prevails is perfect and divine, indestructible, not subject to suffering or change; and consequently of a nobler nature than sublunary parts. The elementary matter of the constellations is the principle of all life, action, and thought in the inferior region; and all things here are subject to its influence and direction. The constellations are animated beings (ἔμψυχα); their principle of motion is within themselves, although they revolve in the circle to which they are attached. In general, this part of Aristotle's system is obscure and inconsistent, and appears to waver between two opposite doctrines.[2]

145. *Psychology* is indebted to Aristotle for its first though still imperfect elaboration upon the principle of experience, with which, however, he coupled speculative views. The soul is the efficient principle of life (taken in its broadest acceptation) the primitive form of every physical body capable of life, i.e. of one organically framed. (ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελεχεία ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος δυνάμει)[3] The soul is distinct from the body: but considered as its form (εἶδος or ἐντελεχεία), it is inseparable therefrom.[4]

[1] De Cœlo, I, 12.

[2] De Cœlo, I, 6—12; II, 1, 2, 3, 4; De Gener. et Corrupt. 11, 10; De Gener. Animal. II, 3; III, 11; Meteorol. I, 1; Metaph. XII, 8; Phys. VIII, 2, 3, 5.

[3] De An. II, 1.

[4] Ibid. I, 1—4.

To this subject belong the Commentaries on the works of Aristotle which treat of the soul, etc.

The faculties (δυνάμεις) of the soul are: Production, and Nutrition,[1] Sensation,[2] Thought (τὸ διανοητικόν), and Will or Impulse. Notwithstanding, Aristotle maintains the unity of these faculties in one soul, and rejects the notion of a plurality of souls. His remarks are particularly interesting on the manifestations of the cognitive powers,[3] i. e. on the senses; on Common Sense, (κοινὴ αἴσθησις); the first attempt towards a clearer indication of Consciousness,[4] on Imagination, Reminiscence, and Memory.[5] The act of Intuition and Perception is a reception of the forms of objects; and Thought is a reception of the forms pre-supposed by feeling and imagination.[6] Hence a *passive* (παθητικός, intellectus patiens), and an *active Understanding* (ποιητικὸς νοῦς, intellectus agens). The first implies receptivity for those forms, therefore it has the closest relation with the faculty of feeling, and hence, with the body; to the latter, which elaborates those forms into judging (ὑπολαμβάνειν) and inferring (λογίζεσθαι), and which moreover itself thinks, appertains indestructibility (Immortality without Consciousness or Memory.[7] Thought itself is a power separate from the body, coming from without into man,[8] similar to the element of the stars.[9] Further, the understanding is theoretical or practical; it is the latter, inasmuch as it proposes ends and aims. The Will (ὄρεξις,) is an impulse directed towards matters of practice, that is to say, toward Good; which is real or apparent, according as it procures a durable or a transient enjoyment:[10] ὄρεξις is subdivided into βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία; the *Will*, properly so called, and *Desire*. Pleasure is the result of the perfect exertion of a power,—an exertion by which the power again is perfected. The noblest pleasures spring from Reason.[11]

[1] De An. II, 2, 4; De Gener. Anim. II, 3.
[2] Ibid. II, 5, 6, 12; III, 12.
[3] De An. II, 6; III, 12, sqq.; De Sensu et Sensibili.
[4] Ibid. III, 1, sqq.
[5] Ibid. III, 3, et De Memoria.
[6] Ibid. III, 4.
[7] De An. II, 1—6; III, 2, sqq., 5.
[8] De Gen. Animal. II, 3.
[9] Cic. Acad. Quæst. 1, 7.
[10] De An. III, 9—11; Eth. III, VI.
[11] Ethic. X, 4, 5, 8.

§ 146.

† J. G. Buhle, On the Authenticity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, in the Biblioth. of Ancient Arts and Literature, fasc. IV. See also his Compend. of the Hist. of Phil. II, § 331, sqq.

† Fulleborn, On the Metaphysics of Aristotle: in his Collectanea, fascic. V.

Petri Rami Scholarum Metaphysicarum, lib. XIV, *Par.* 1566, 8vo.

Primary philosophy, treating of the nature of Being* in the abstract, was an attempt of Aristotle's, the first which had been made in the science since denominated Metaphysics.[1] It was reasonable to expect that this attempt should be as yet an imperfect one. It contains an analytical statement of the fundamental predicates of the thing (*τὸ κυριως ὄν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν*) or what he denominated the Categories (ten in number),[2] a title under which he comprised and elucidated, without much systematic order, the radical as well as derived notions of the Understanding and of the Senses,[3] as he found them by abstraction, from the objects of experience. The Ten Categories (*prædicamenta*) of Aristotle are—*ἡ οὐσία, τὸ ποσὸν, τὸ ποῖον, πρὸς τί, ποῦ, ποτὲ, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν.* From these he distinguishes the Catagorems (*prædicabilia*, quinque voces)—*ὁρός, γένος, εἶδος, διάφορα, ἴδιον* and *συμβέβηκος*, which are related to the former. (Top. i, 6.) With this arrangement he connected the question of the First Being, and His pro-

* The English work *Being* imperfectly expresses the German *das Seyn*, and the Greek *τὸ ὄν*. The idea intended to be expressed is *esse* in the abstract.—Ed.

[1] Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Grundtext, Uebersetzung und Commentar, nebst erläuternden Ammerkungen, 3 Bände, 1846.

Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, 1 Bd. Logik und Metaphysik, 1835.

[2] See Harris's Philos. Arrangements, *Edin.* and *Lond.* 1775, 8vo.

Cf. the Categories of Aristotle, with illustrations, offered as an introduction to a new theory of Thought, by Sal. Maimon, *Berl.* 1794, 8vo. On the authenticity of the treatise on the Categories; Krug, Observationes Crit. et Exeget. in Aristotelis librum de Categoriis, part I, *Lips.* 1809, 4to.

[3] Metaph. V, 7. Cf. Categor. II, ed. Buhle.

perties (theology).[1] God, the absolute cause of regular movement,[2] is the perfect Intelligence (*νοῦς*), to whom appertains, of his nature, pure and independent Energy, and the most complete Felicity;[3] He is immutable, and the end of all Nature.[4]

147. *Practical Philosophy*, by the profound analysis of Aristotle, became a moral theory of happiness, connected with the Empirical point of view. The enquiry starts from the conception of a sovereign good and final end. The final End (*τέλος*), is happiness (*εὐδαιμονία, εὐπραξία*), which is the result of the energies of the soul, *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*, in a perfect life;[5] to it appertains true dignity as being the highest thing. This perfect exercise of reason is virtue; and virtue is the perfection of speculative and practical reason: hence the subdivision of Intellectual virtue (*διανοητικὴ ἀρετή*), and moral (*ἠθική*).[6] The first belongs in its entire plenitude to God alone, and confers the highest felicity or absolute beatitude; the second, which he also styles the human, is the constant perfecting of the reasonable will (*ἕξις, habitus*), the effect of a deliberate resolve, and consequently of liberty (*προαιρετική*),* of which Aristotle was the first to display its psychological character, and of which the subjective form consists in always taking the mean between two extremes, (*τὸ μέσον, μεσότης*).[7] Ethical

[1] Besides the old treatises on the Theology of Aristotle, by J. Faustius, Hier, Caprædonus, Fortunius Licetus, and the treatises of Valerianus Magnus and Zachar. Grapius on the Atheism of Aristotle, consult:

Joh. G. Walch, Exercitatio Histor. Philosophica de Atheismo Aristotelis. Parerga Academica, *Lips.* 1721, 8vo.

Joh. Sev. Vater, Theologiæ Aristotelicæ Vindiciæ, *Lips.* 1795, 8vo.

† Fulleborn, in his Collections, fasc. III, on the Nat. Theol. of Aristotle.

[2] Cf. § 143—144. [3] Pol. VII, 1.

[4] Metaph. I, 1; XII, 7, sqq.; De Cœlo, II, 3, sqq.; De Gener. et Corrupt. I, 6.

[5] Eth. Nic. I, 1—7; X, 5, 6. [6] Idem, I, 13; II, 1.

* Aristotle may be said to have been the first to analyse *προαίρεσις*, or deliberate free-choice.

Sprengel, Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften. Abhandlungen der Münchener Akademie, III, 2, (1841).

[7] Eth. Nic. II, 6.

virtue presents itself under six principal characters, having reference to the different objects of desire and avoidance (the cardinal virtues), namely, courage (ἀνδρία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), generosity (ἐλευθεριότης) delicacy (μεγαλοπρέπεια), magnanimity and a proper love of glory[1] (μεγαλοψυχία), gentleness and moderation. To these are added the accessory virtues: such as politeness of manners (εὐτραπελία), amiability, the faculty of loving and being beloved (φιλία), and lastly justice (δικαιοσύνη), which comprises and completes all the others, and on that account is called perfect virtue (τελεία). Under the head of Justice Aristotle comprehends Right also. Justice he regards as the special virtue (applied to the notion of equality, τὸ ἴσον) of *giving every man his due;* and its operation may be explained by applying to it the Arithmetical and Geometrical proportions conformably to the two species, the *Distributive* and *Corrective*, into which he subdivided the virtue. To these must be added Equity, which has for its end the rectification of the defects of law.[2] Under the head of Right (δίκαιον), he distinguishes that appertaining to a family (οἰκονομικόν), from that of a city (πολιτικόν); dividing the latter into the natural (φυσικόν), and the positive (νομικόν).

Aristotelis Ethicorum Nicomacheorum adumbratio accommodatè ad nostræ Philosophiæ rationem facta, Disp. Jo. Fr. Gottl. Delbruck, *Hal.* 1790, 8vo.

† The Ethics of Aristotle, translated and illustrated by Chr. Garve, *Bresl.* 1798—1802, 2 vols. 8vo.

Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, comprising his Practical Philosophy, translated from the Greek, illustrated by Introductions and Notes, the Critical History of his Life, and a new Analysis of this Speculative Works, by J. Gillies, *Lond.* 1797, 2 vols. 4to.

† K. L. Michelet, On the Ethics of Aristotle, *Berl.* 1827, 8vo.

148. A perfect unity of plan prevails throughout his Ethics, his Politics, and his Œconomics. Both the latter have for their end to show how the object of man's existence

Michelet, Die Ethik des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältniss zum System der Moral, 1827.

[1] Eth. Nic. V, I, 6, sqq.

[2] C. A. Droste-Huelshoff, De Aristotelis Justitia Universali et Particulari, deque nexu quo Ethica et Jurisprudentia junctæ sunt, *Bonnæ*, 1816, 8vo.

defined in the Ethics, viz. Virtue combined with Happiness, may be attained in the civil and domestic relations, through a good constitution of the state and household.[1] The state (πόλις), is a complete association of a certain number of smaller societies sufficient to satisfy in common all the wants of life.[2] Mental power alone should preponderate. The science of Politics is the investigation of means tending to the final end proposed by the State: its principle is expediency, and its perfection the suitableness of means to the end. By this principle Aristotle would prove the lawfulness of slavery.[3] All education he refers to the ultimate end of political society.

149. Aristotle also rendered great services to philosophy by his investigations with regard to the elements of language; particularly in his treatise περὶ ἑρμηνείας: and by laying the first foundations of a theory of the fine arts;[4] the principle of which, agreeably to his system, he deduced from the imitation of Nature.[5]

150. The first successors of Aristotle were, for the most part, skilful commentators on his doctrines, who endeavoured, in publications under similar titles, to re-state more clearly what he had first advanced: the effect of which was that his system gradually withdrew farther and farther from that of Plato, and proportionably approached the limits of Materialism. The most distinguished of his immediate followers were *Theophrastus* of Eressus;[6] whom Aristotle himself had characterised as the most learned and the ablest of his auditors, and the most proper to be his successor and

[1] Ethic. VIII, 9; X. 9.—See the translations of the Politics and Œconomics, by SCHLOSSER, *Lubeck* and *Leips.* 1798, 2 vols. and that of the Politics by GARVE, with Remarks and Dissertations by FULLEBORN, *Bresl.* 1799, 1802, 2 vols. 8vo. Also: Aristotelis Rerum Public. reliq. coll. illustr. etc. C. FR. NEUMANN, *Heidelb.* et *Spir.* 1827, 8vo.

[2] Pol. I, 2.

[3] W. T. KRUG, De Aristotele Servitutis Defensore, *Lips.* 1813, 4to.

C. G. GOTTLING, Commentatio de Notione Servitutis apud Aristotelem, *Jen.* 1821, 4to.

To this head belong the Rhetoric and Poetics of Aristotle.

† BIESE, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, II Bd. Die besondern Wissenschaften, 1842.

[6] Formerly called Tyrtamos.

heir:[1] *Eudemus* of Rhodes, who, as well as Theophrastus, republished with very few alterations Aristotle's doctrines in Physics, Logic, and Ethics: *Dicæarchus* of Messana,[2] and *Aristoxenus* of Tarentum, the musician; both materialists in their opinions on psychology: the first considering the soul to be a vital energy, inherent in the body:[3] the latter believing it to be a symphony or harmony resulting from the body, analogous to those elicited from the chords of an instrument.[4] *Heraclides Ponticus* has been already mentioned (§ 138). Subsequently, we have occasion to remark, among the disciples of Aristotle, the follower and successor of Theophrastus,[5] *Strato* of Lampsacus; who died about 270 B.C., and published, with more of original character about it, a dynamical system of Physics,[6] in which he referred the existence of all things to the productive energy of nature, acting unconsciously; which caused him to be considered by many an atheist.[7] We have fewer details with regard to *Demetrius Phalereus*,[8] a follower of Theophrastus: as an orator and statesmen he was sufficiently distinguished. As for those who came after, *Lyco* or *Glyco*, of Troas, the successor of Strato[9] (about 270 or 268 B.C.), *Hieronymus* of Rhodes, his

[1] Diog. Laert. V. 36, sqq. A. Gell. Noct. Att. XIII, 5.
Of his numerous works, the only one which has come down to us, besides his treatises on Natural History, is his book of Characters (ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες), and some fragments. Opera Gr. et Lat. ed. Dan. Heinsius, *Lugd. Bat.* 1613, 2 vols. fol. See also the work of Hill, mentioned in the following section.

[2] Flourished about 320 B.C.

[3] Nic. Dodwell, De Dicæarcho ejusque Fragmentis. Cf. Bredow. Epp. *Paris*, p. 4, et alibi; et Bayle, Dict.

[4] G. L. Mahne, Diatr. de Aristoxeno Philos. Peripatetico, *Amstel.* 1793, 8vo.

[5] Cic. Tusc. Quæst. I. 10, 31.

[6] Hence he was surnamed *Physicus*.

[7] Diog. Laert. V, 58. Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 38; De Nat. Deor. I, 13. Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 32, 136, sqq.; Adv. Math. VII, 350; X, 155, 177, 228. Simplic. In Phys. p. 168 et 225. Lactant. De Ira Dei, 10. Plutarch. Adv. Coloten. p. 163; De Plac. IV, 5; De Solert. Anim. p. 141. Stob. Ecl. p. 298—348.
Phil. Frid. Schlosser, De Stratone Lampsaceno et Atheismo vulgo ei tributo, *Viteb.* 1728, 4to.
Brucker, Diss. de Atheismo Stratonis; Amœnitates Literariæ of Schellhorn, tom. XIII.

[8] Flourished 320 B.C.

[9] Diog. Laert. V, 65, sqq.

contemporary,[1] *Aristo* of Ceos, the successor of Lyco,[2] *Critolaus* of Phaselis, who went to Rome as ambassador at the same time time with Carneades,[3] and his pupil and successor *Diodorus* of Tyre—all we know of these Aristotelians is that they devoted their especial attention to the investigation of the supreme good.[4] After them, we are ignorant even of the names of the masters of the Peripatetic school, till the time of Andronicus (see § 183).

The system of Aristotle for a long time maintained its ground as distinct from that of Plato: subsequently, attempts were made to associate them, as identical; or by giving the superiority to one or other. In the Middle ages that of Aristotle, degraded to a system of formularies, became universally prevalent, till in the end it yielded to Platonism: not, however, without continuing to retain great influence, from the general adoption of its Logic.[5]

III. *Epicurus.*

Authorities: Epicuri Physica et Meteorologica duabus Epistolis ejusdem comprehensa, ed J. G. SCHNEIDER, *Lips.* 1813, 8vo.

Epicuri Fragmenta librorum II et XI, De Naturâ, etc., illustrata a Rosinio, ed. ORELLIUS, *Lips.* 1818, 8vo.

DIOGENIS LAERTII De Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmatibus clarorum Philosophorum lib. X, Gr. et Lat. separatim editus, atque Adnotationibus illustratus a CAR. NURNBERGER, *Norimb.* 1791, 8vo.

Cf. also the Didactic Poem of LUCRETIUS De Rerum Naturâ: and likewise CICERO, SENECA, PLUTARCH.

PETRI GASSENDI Animadversiones in Diogenem Laert. de Vitâ et Philosophiâ Epicuri, *Lugd. Bat.* 1646, fol.

Ejusdem De Vitâ, Moribus et Doctrinâ Epicuri, libb. VIII, *Lugd.* 1647, 4to. *Hagæ Comit.* 1656, 4to.

† SAM. DE SORBIERE, Letters on the Life, Character, and Reputation of Epicurus, with Remarks on his Errors (among his Letters and Discourses), *Paris*, 1660, 4to.

† J. RONDEL, Life of Epicurus, *Par.* 1679, 8vo. translated into Lat. *Amst.* 1693, 12mo.

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[1] DIOG. LAERT. IV, 41, sqq. 68.

[2] Idem, V, 70—74. [3] 155 B.C.

[4] CIC. Acad. Quæst. IV, 42; De Fin. II, 3; V, 5.

[5] J. LAUNOY, De Variâ Philosophiæ Aristotelicæ Fortunâ, *Paris*, 1653, third edition, *Hagæ Comit.* 1662, 8vo. Recudi curavit JOH. HERM. ab Elswich, *Viteb.* 1720, 8vo.

G. PAUL ROETENBECK, Oratio de Philosophiæ Aristotelicæ per singulas ætates Fortunâ Variâ, *Altd.* 1668, 4to.

† Essay towards an Apology for Epicurus, by an Opponent of Batteux (J. G. BREMER), *Berl.* 1776, 8vo.

FR. ANT. ZIMMERMANN (Resp. ZEHNER), Vita et Doctrina Epicuri Dissertatione Inaugur. examinata, *Heidelb.* 1785, 4to.

† H. E. WARNEKROS, Apology for, and Life of, Epicurus, *Greifsw.* 1795, 8vo.

NIC. HILL, De Philosophiâ Epicureâ, Democriteâ, et Theophrasteâ, *Genev.* 1669, 8vo.

PETRI GASSENDI Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri, *Hag. Com.* 1665 et 1659, 4to. and in his Opp.

151. *Epicurus*,[1] of the *demos* of Gargettos near Athens, was born of poor parents. His father, who had settled at Samos, gained his livelihood as a schoolmaster, and his mother by divining. The constitution of Epicurus was feeble, and his education imperfect, but his talents were superior. A verse of Hesiod, and the works of Demosthenes, awakened in him, while yet young, a spirit of inquiry. Soon after, he attended at Athens, but in a desultory manner, the lessons of Xenocrates the Academician, Theophrastus, and others. In his thirty-second year he opened a school at Lampsacus, which, five years after, he removed to Athens,[2] where he taught, in his garden, a system of philosophy which readily recommended itself by the indulgence it held out to sensual habits, combined with a taste for the refinements of social life, an abhorrence of superstition, and a tone of elegance and urbanity which blended with all his doctrines. He may be justly reproached with depreciating the works of other philosophers.[3] Of his numerous writings we possess only a few fragments cited by Diogenes Laertius, and the fragments of a book περὶ φύσεως, which by a fortunate chance was discovered among the ruins of Herculaneum.

152. According to him, philosophy directs us to happiness by the means of reason.[4] Consequently, Ethics form a principal part of his system, and Physics, etc. are only accessories. He assigns the same inferior place to what he terms *Canonics*, the Dialectics of his system.[5] There is little originality in this theory of happiness; and the form alone in which it is put belongs to Epicurus. The theory

[1] Born 337, died 270.
[2] DIOG. LAERT. X, 15.
[3] Ibid. X, 17.
[4] SEXTUS EMP. Adv. Mathem. XI, 169.
[5] SENEC. Ep. 89. DIOG. LAERT. X, 24—31.

is in fact nothing more than one of Eudæmonism, interwoven with moral Ideas, built upon an Atomic system by way of Physics; with a theology suitable to such a whole.

153. Epicurus borrowed from Democritus his theory of representations derived from certain subtile emanations of objects (*ἀπόῤῥοιαι, ἀποστάσεις*), which he supposes to detach themselves therefrom, and so disperse themselves through the air (§ 105). The contact of these images with the organs of sense gives birth to perceptions sensational and intuitional, which correspond perfectly to the objects themselves, as well as the representations of imagination, which are distinguished from perceptions by a greater subtlety, by fortuitous combinations, and a slighter connexion with external objects. The knowledge of the object is comprehended in the immediate act of sensuous cognition (*ἐπαίσθησις*). It is from the same act that we derive all our representations, even those which are *universal*, and of which there existed previously what he termed *προλήψεις*;[1] the understanding contributing however to their formation.[2] Every representation of the senses and imagination is true, because necessarily responding to the images impressed upon them; and the results are neither capable of being demonstrated nor refuted (*ἐναργῆς, ἄλογος*). Our opinions (*δόξαι*), on the other hand, are either true or false, according as they respond or not to our sensational perceptions: wherefore these are always to be referred to as their *criteria*. Our sensations (*πάθη*) are our criteria with respect to what we ought to desire or to avoid (*αἱρεσις* and *φυγή*). There is no law of necessity for thought; or a Fatalism would be the consequence. Such are the principles of his Canonics.[3]

[1] JOH. MICH. KERN, Diss. Epicuri Prolepses, seu Anticipationes, Sensibus demum administris haustæ, non vero menti innatæ, in locum CIC. de Nat. Deor. I, 16, *Gött.* 1756, 4to.

TACONIS ROORDA, Disp. de Anticipatione, cum omni tum inprimis Dei, atque Epicureorum et Stoicorum de Anticipationibus Doctrina, *Lugd. Bat.* 1823–4.

[2] DIOG. LAERT. X, 31, sqq. 46, sqq. 52. LUCRET. IV, particularly v. 471—476. 726—753. CIC. Divin. II, 67.

[3] DIOG. LAERT. X, 32. SEXT. Adv. Math. VII, 203, sqq. CIC. Acad. Quæst. IV, 25. 32; Nat. Deor. I, 25; De Fato, 9, 10.

§ 154.

† The Morals of Epicurus, with Remarks, by M. the Baron DES COUTURES, *Par.* 1685. † With additions by RONDEL, *The Hague*, 1686, 12mo.

† The Morals of Epicurus, drawn from his own writings, by the ABBE BATTEUX, *Par.* 1758, 8vo.

MAGNI OMEISII Diss. Epicurus ab Infami Dogmate, quod Summum Bonum consistat in Obscœnâ Corporis Voluptate, Defensus, *Altd.* 1679, 4to.

† Investigation respecting the Partial and Exclusive Opinions of the Stoic School, and that of Epicurus, with respect to the Theory of Happiness (by E. PLATNER); in the *Neue Biblioth. der Schönen Wissenschaften*, XIX, B.

Morals. Pleasure is the sovereign good of man; for all beings from their birth pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure consists in the activity or the repose of the soul; in the enjoyment of agreeable sensations, and the absence of those which are painful (ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει, and ἡδονὴ καταστηματική). Accordingly Epicurus considers as the end and aim of man this well-being, which consists in being exempt from bodily ills and mental afflictions; and he places the *summum bonum* in a state entirely free from suffering (ἀταραξία, ἀπονία, παντὸς τοῦ ἄλγοντος ὑπεξαίρεσις), the results of the satisfaction of our natural and necessary wants, appetites, and desires.[1] All our emotions in themselves are equal in worth and dignity, but differ greatly in intensity, duration, and their consequences. The pleasures and the pains of the mind exceed those of the body. To attain happiness therefore, it is necessary to make a choice (αἵρεσις); and to rule our desires by the help of reason* and free-will, or individual energy independent of nature, which Epicurus explains in a manner not the most philosophical.[2] Consequently Prudence (φρόνεσις), is the first of virtues: next to that Moderation and Justice. Virtue in general has no value or worth but for the consequences which attend her; namely, that she is inseparably allied to enjoyment.[3] *Contracts* are the origin of Right; their end is the

[1] DIOG. LAERT. X, 131. 136, 137. 139. CIC. Fin. I, 9, 11.

* Reason must here be understood in its popular English sense, as denoting the intellectual and intuitional faculties generally.—ED.

[2] Ibid. X, 144. CIC. Nat. Deor. I 25.

[3] Ibid. X 129. 140. 142.

mutual advantage of the contracting parties, and expediency the principle which makes their performance obligatory.[1] Occasionally Epicurus took higher ground;[2] with the same inconsistency which compelled his adversaries to praise the *life* he led, so much at variance with the spirit of his precepts.[3]

Observation.—A difference is to be observed between the system of happiness adopted by the Cyrenaics and that of Epicurus; who appears to have made his more perfect in proportion as he became gradually more alive to the deficiencies of the former. See DIOG. LAERT. X, 6, 131, 137. CIC. Tusc. Quæst. III, 18; Fin. I, 17.

§ 155.

GULT. CHARLETON, Physiologia Epicureo-Gassendo-Charletoniana, etc. *Lond.* 1654, fol.

GOTTFRID. PLOUCQUET, Diss. de Cosmogoniâ Epicuri, *Tub.* 1755, 4to.

†-RESTAURANT, Agreement between the Opinions of Aristotle and Epicurus on Philosophy, *Lugd. Bat.* 1682. 12mo.

Physics. He considered the science of Nature as subordinate, in some sort, to that of Ethics; and that its proper end was to liberate mankind from all superstitious terror derived from their conceptions of the celestial phenomena, the gods, death, and its consequences; i. e. from vain apprehensions affecting the living.[4] With these views, Epicurus found nothing which suited him better than the Atomic theory, which he enlarged by adding a great number of hypotheses, and applied to explain different natural phenomena. If we admit the objects presented to our senses to be compound in their nature, we are led to presume the existence of simple uncompounded bodies, or Atoms. Besides weight, form, and volume, and that which he considered to be the primitive movement common to all, viz. a perpendicular, he assigned to them also an oblique motion,[5] without adding any proof. The various mechanical movements of Atoms *in vacuo* (τὸ κενὸν), or space (τόπος), have produced *aggregates* or bodies, and even the universe itself; which is a body, and which, considered as a whole, is immutable and eternal, though variable and perishable

[1] Ibid. X, 150, 151. [2] Ibid. X, 135. CIC. Tusc. Quæst. II, 7.

[3] CIC. Tusc. Quæst. III, 20. SENEC. De Vitâ Beatâ, 13.

[4] DIOG. LAERT. X, 81, sqq.; 142, sqq. LUCRET. I, 147. PLUTARCH. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 8, 9.

[5] LUCRET. II, 217. CIC. Fin. I, 6.

in respect of the parts or worlds of which it is composed.[1] The world being imperfect, and presenting nothing but scenes of misery, destruction, and death, (imperfections especially observable in Man), cannot be considered the work of an Intelligent Cause. Besides, such an origin is inconceivable, and irreconcileable with the tranquil and happy lot of the Gods.[2] All the appearances of final causes which are observable in the world are purely fortuitous.[3] The soul is of a corporeal nature, as is attested by its sympathy with the body; but at the same time of a nature more refined, involved in one less perfect. Its elemental principles are heat, the æther spirit, and an anonymous matter on which depends its sensibility: this last is situated in the breast, the others dispersed over the body.[4] The soul and the body are united in the most intimate manner: the latter is born with the body, and perishes with it, by the dissolution of its component Atoms.[5] To suppose the soul immortal is to contradict all our notions of the characteristics of an immutable and eternal being.[6] By these and other similar arguments Epicurus would disprove the immateriality of the soul, which Plato had maintained. Death he affirmed to be no evil.[7]

§ 156.

Jo. FAUSTI Diss. de Deo Epicuri, *Argent.* 1685, 4to.

J. CONR. SCHWARZ, Judicium de Recondità Theologiâ Epicuri. Comment, I, II, *Cob.* 1718, 4to.

Jo. HENR. KRONMAYER, Diss. (præs. GOTTL. STOLLE) de Epicuro, Creationis et Providentiæ Divinæ assertore, *Jen.* 1713, 4to.

JOH. ACHAT. FEL. BIELKE, Diss. quâ sistitur Epicurus atheus contra Gassendum, Rondellum, et Bælium, *Jen.* 1741, 4to.

† CHPH. MEINERS, Dissertation on the Character of Epicurus, and the Contradictions in his Theory of the Divine Nature: Vermischte Schriften, II, p. 45, sqq.

Theology. Such a system, as the ancients themselves

[1] DIOG. LAERT. X, 39, 43, sqq., 73, sqq. LUCRET. II, 61, sqq.

[2] Ibid, X, 139. 76, 77. LUCRETIUS, V, 157. 235; III, 855, 984. CIC. De Nat. Deor. I, 9—16.

[3] LUCRET. IV, 821.

[4] DIOG. LAERT. X, 63, sqq.; LUCRET. III. 31, sqq.; 95, sqq.; 138. 188. 204, sqq. SEXTUS EMP. Hyp. Pyrrh. 187, 229.

[5] LUCRET. III, 324, sqq., 396, sqq., 426, sqq. DIOG. LAERT. 64, sqq.

[6] Ibid. III, 807, sqq.

[7] DIOG. LAERT. X, 139. Cf. 124, sqq. LUCRET. III, 670, sqq.

remarked of it, approaches Atheism rather than Theism;[1] and accordingly some Stoics, among others Posidonius, treated Epicurus as a disguised Atheist;[2] but it may be nearer the truth to look upon him as an inconsistent Theist, who asserted the existence of the Gods, and enlarged upon their attributes with all the hardiness of Dogmatism. He concludes that they exist, from the universality of religious representations and conceptions; which according to his system of cognition are the *Effluence* of corresponding real objects. The Gods are compounded of Atoms, and bear the human shape, the most perfect of all figures, their substance being analagous to that of our bodies, without being altogether the same: they are eternal, imperishable, and supremely happy: as such they are worthy of our worship, although they inhabit the space intermediate between the Worlds, in a state of repose and indifference, in which their felicity consists, and without exerting any influence over the affairs of this lower region.

157. Epicurus had a great number of disciples, among whom we remark *Metrodorus*[3] and his brother *Timocrates*, *Colotes* (the same against whom is directed a treatise of Plutarch), *Polyænus*, *Leonteus* and his wife *Themista*, all of Lampsacus; add to these another *Metrodorus* of Stratonicea, who subsequently went over to the Academy:[4] and the friend and confident of Epicurus, *Leontium*, the noted courtesan of Athens; next came *Hermachus* of Mitylene, the successor of Epicurus;[5] and, at a later period, *Polystratus*, *Dionysius*, *Basilides*, *Apollodorus*, *Zeno* of Sidon, *Diogenes* of Tarsus, *Diogenes* of Seleucia, *Phædrus* and *Philodemus* of Gadara, etc. His school subsisted for a long time without undergoing any important modifications:[6] of which the reason probably was, the spirit of the system itself, and the deference entertained by his followers for their master. He had, besides, guarded his doctrines against any considerable innovation by founding them on

[1] PLUTARCH. Non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epicur. c. 8.

[2] CIC. De Nat. I, 30—44.

[3] DIOG. LAERT. X, 22, sqq.

[4] Idem, X, 9.

[5] 270 B.C.

[6] SEN. Ep. 33. Who are the real Epicureans and real Sophists? (See Diog. Laert. X, 26).

formal propositions, or general maxims (κύριαι δόξαι).[1] If on the one hand this system had a tendency to extinguish all that is ideal in the human soul, on the other it fortified it against superstition; with the loss, it is true, of all belief derived from the understanding.[2]

IV. *Zeno and the Stoics.*

Authorities: The Hymn of Cleanthes, and the Fragments of Chrysippus and Posidonius; Cicero; Seneca; Arrian; Antoninus; Stobæus; Diogenes Laertius, VII; Plutarch, in several of his Treatises against the Stoics; Simplicius.

Modern Works.

Hemingii Forelli Zeno Philosophus levitèr adumbratus. Exercitatio Academica, *Ups.* 1700, 8vo.

Justi Lipsii Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam, *Antwerp*, 1604, 4to.; *Ludg. Bat.* 1614, 12mo.

Thom. Gatakeri Diss. de Disciplinâ Stoicâ cum Sectis aliis collatâ. Prefixed to his edition of Antonin., *Cambridge*, 1653, 4to.

Fr. de Quevedo, Doctrina Stoica, in ejus Opp. tom. III, *Bruxell.* 1671, 4to.

Jo. Fr. Buddei Introduct. in Philos. Stoicam. Prefixed to his edition of Antonin. *Lips.* 1729, 8vo.

Dan. Heinsii Oratio de Philos. Stoicâ; in suis Orationib. *Ludg. Bat.* 1627, 4to., p. 326, sqq.

† Dietr. Tiedemann, System of the Stoic Philosophy, *Leips.* 1776, 3 vols. 8vo.; and in his Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, vol. II, § 427, sqq.

Joh. Alb. Fabricii Disputatio de Cavillationibus Stoicorum, *Lips.* 1692, 4to.

Schmidt, Stoicorum grammatica, 1839.

Meyer, Commentatio in qua doctrina Stoicorum ethica cum christiana comparatur, 1823.

158. *Zeno* was born at Cittium, in Cyprus;[3] his father Mnaseas being a rich merchant. Having received a good education, chance, added to his own inclinations, caused him to attend the Socratic schools. He became a hearer of the Cynic Crates, Stilpo and Diodorus Cronus the Megareans, and the Academicians Xenocrates and Polemo, for several years. His object was to found a comprehensive and tenable system of human Cognition which might oppose itself to Scepticism; and, in particular, to establish rigid

[1] Lucret. III, 14. Cic. Fin. I, 5—7; II, 7. Diog. Laert. X, 12, 13.

[2] Lucian. Alexander.

[3] About 340 B.C.

principles of Morality, to which his own conduct was conformable. In the Portico (*στοά*), at Athens, he formed a school,[1] distinguished for a succession of excellent thinkers and lovers of virtue; a school which became memorable for the influence it possessed in the world, and its resistance to vice and tyranny. Zeno died after Epicurus.[2] His system was extended, developed, and completed in the course of a long rivalship with other schools, particularly that of Epicurus and the New Academy. Its principal supporters were *Persæus* or *Dorotheus* of Cittium,[3] *Aristo* of Chios,[4] who founded a separate school approaching that of the Sceptics,[5] *Herillus* of Carthage;[6] and lastly, the pupil and worthy successor of Zeno, *Cleanthes* of Assos.[7] Next came the disciple of the last, *Chrysippus* of Soli or of Tarsus, the pillar of the Portico;[8] then his disciple *Zeno* of Tarsus,[9] and *Diogenes* of Babylon, who with Carneades and Critolaus went as ambassador to Rome about 155 B.C.; still later came *Antipater* of Tarsus or Sidon,[10] *Panætius* of Rhodes, who succeeded him at Athens, but also taught at Rome,

[1] About 300 B.C. [2] Between 264 and 260 B.C.

[3] Suidas, s. v. Persæus and Hermagoras.

[4] Godofr. Buchneri Diss. Hist. Philos. de Aristone Chio, Vita et Doctrina noto, *Lips.* 1725, 4to.

Jo. Ben. Carpzovii Diss. Paradoxon Stoicum Aristonis Chii: Ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ τὸν σοφόν, novis Observationibus illustratum, *Lips.* 1742, 8vo.

[5] We must not confound him with Aristo of Ceos, the Peripatetic, § 150. [6] Persæus, Aristo, and Herillus flourished about 260 B.C.

Guill. Traugott Krug, Herilli de Summo Bono sententia explosa non explodenda, Symbolar. ad Hist. Philos. Partic. III, *Lips.* 1822, 4to. (Cf. Cic. De Offic. I, 2.) [7] Flourished about 264 B.C.

† Hymn of Cleanthes to the Supreme Being, in Greek and German, with a statement of the principal Doctrines of the Stoics, by Herm. Heimart Cludius, *Gött.* 1786, 8vo.

† Gr. C. Fr. Mohnike, Cleanthes the Stoic, *Greifswald*, 1814, 8vo.

J. Fr. Herm. Schwabe, Specimen Theologiæ Comparativæ exhibens Κλεάνθους ὕμνον εἰς Δία, *Jen.* 1819.

[8] Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 24. Diog. Laert. VII, 183. He was born 280, died 212 or 208 B.C.

J. Fr. Richter, Diss. de Chrysippo Stoico Fastuoso, *Lips.* 1738, 4to.

Ge. Albr. Hagedorn, Moralia Chrysippea e Rerum Naturis petita, *Altd.* 1695, 4to.

Joh. Conr. Hagedorn, Ethica Chrysippi, *Norimb.* 1715, 8vo.

[9] About 212 B.C. [10] About 146 B.C.

and accompanied Scipio Africanus to Alexandria;[1] and lastly, *Posidonius* of Apamea in Syria, a pupil of the former, and surnamed the *Rhodian*, from the school which he established at Rhodes.[2] Even after an examination of all the historical authorities relative to the philosophers of this sect, it is no easy matter to assign to each his respective part in the composition of its doctrines. On the present occasion we can only find room for the principles and general characteristics of the system.

159. According to the Stoics, philosophy is the effort after and way to the highest perfection (σοφία, wisdom), or virtue of man, which develops itself in the cognition of the nature of things, in the knowledge and practice of what is good, and in the formation of the understanding. Its three subdivisions are Physiology, Ethics, and Logic, which ought together to shew the way to this perfection. They were not agreed respecting the order in which they presented these. They commonly, however, like Zeno and Chrysippus, placed Logic at the head. The latter (Chrysippus) added Natural Philosophy to it. The Stoics were not able to digest these branches of philosophy into a systematic form, founded on solid principles,* because they were devoted to the theory of Empiricism;[3] their fundamental maxim being, to follow Nature.

160. The Logic of Zeno and his successors was of much more extensive application than that of Aristotle: forming a considerable part of the wisdom he professed to teach,

[1] Flourished about 130 B.C.

† Memoirs of the Life and Works of Panætius, by the ABBE SEVIN, in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscript. tom. X.

CAR. GUNTH. LUDOVICI Progr. Panætii Vitam et Merita in Romanorum tum Philosophiam tum Jurisprud. illustrans, *Lips.* 7333, 4to.

FR. GE. VAN LYNDEN, Diss. Historico-Critica de Panætio Rhodio, Philos. Stoico (præs. Dan. Wyttenbach), *Ludg. Bat.* 1802, 8vo.

[2] He flourished about 103 B.C.

FR. BAKE, Posidonii Rhodii Reliquiæ Doctrinæ, collegit atque illustravit, *Lugd. Bat.* 1810, 8vo.

* This verdict is the offspring of Tennemann's rationalistic principles.—ED.

[3] CIC. Fin. III, 21; IV, 2; Acad. Quæst. I, 10, sqq. SENEC. Ep. 89. PLUTARCH. Decret. Philos. Præm., et De Stoicorum Repugn. p. 342. DIOG. LAERT. VII, 40, sqq. 54.

and being adapted *ad materiam* as well as to the *form* of argumentation; and comprehending in its range as subordinate to itself, something of Psychology, Grammar, and Rhetoric. Such a system of Logic was intended to oppose to the uncertainty and the instability of popular notions a solid and stable science, worthy of a philosopher; and which might serve him as a touchstone of Truth and Falsehood. It starts from a theory of Representations, to which Chrysippus seems to have affixed a doctrine of the nomenclature of representations. Every original representation is the result of impressions produced upon the mind, and hence of sensational perceptions; and is therefore denominated *φαντασία, visum.* Out of these original and sensational impressions, Reason, a superior and directing power (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν), forms our other representations. The *true* are styled by Zeno *φαντάσιαι καταληπτικαὶ*, or *καταλήψεις*, that is, such as are verified by their correspondence with the object to which they refer, are freely assented to, and constitute the foundation of science. The rule of Truth, accordingly, is Right Reason, (ὀρθὸς λόγος), which conceives of an object as it is. On this Dogmatic Empiricism rested the system of Zeno. Chrysippus remarked with still greater exactitude the difference between sensational representaions or conceptions (*αἰσθητικαὶ*) and those which are not derived from the senses. The latter, i. e. *ideas*, result from the mutual comparison of the former, and by combining whatever they contain of *Universal.* This union takes place, sometimes involuntarily, sometimes in consequence of a voluntary application of the thinking faculty; and hence result, on the one hand, natural conceptions (*φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι καὶ προλήψεις*), and, on the other, notions artificially acquired, (*ἔννοιαι*). Of these the former constitute the *Sensus communis* (κοινὸς λόγος), which is the criterium of Truth.[1] The versatility, or as it may be termed, the subtilty of the mind of Chrysippus, displayed itself especially in the manner in which he perfected the Syllogistic system of Logic; and particularly in his theory of Hypothetical and Disjunctive arguments. He assumes the following as the

[1] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 11; 11, 42. Plutarch. Dogm. IV, 11. Diog. Laert. VII, 54. A. Gellius, XIX, 1.

most universal conceptions (*τὰ γενικώτατα*) or categories,[1] 1st. the substratum (*τὸ ὑποκείμενον*), 2nd. the quality (*τὸ ποιόν*), 3rd. the relation of a thing to itself (*τὸ πῶς ἔχον*), 4th. the relation of a thing to others (*τὸ πρός τι ἔχον*).

§ 161.

JUSTI LIPSII Physiologiæ Stoicorum libri III, *Antw.* 1610, 4to.
TH. A. SUABEDISSEN, Programma · cur pauci semper fuerint Physiologiæ Stoicorum Sectatores, *Casel.* 1813, 4to.

Zeno attempted, in his Physiology, to give such an account of the notions commonly received respecting the objects of the natural world, as, without the substitution of any hypothesis, might afford a foundation for practical judgment. Of all preceding systems, that of Heraclitus, which supposed the existence of an all-pervading λόγος, appeared to Zeno to suit his purpose best, and agreed with his doctrine that immaterial beings are nothing more than chimeras.[2] According to the Stoics, all that is real—all that can act or suffer, is corporeal. They make a distinction however between solid bodies (*στερεὰ*), and the contrary. Space, Time, and Representations are incorporeal.[3] Chrysippus also distinguished between Space and Vacuum; and pronounced the latter, like Time, to be infinite. There are two eternal principles (*ἀρχαί*), of all things: the one (*ὕλη*),[4] matter, passive; the other active, namely the Divinity, or creative principle; the source of activity, and author of the forms and arrangement of all things in the world. God is a living fire, unlike however to common fire, he is named also *πνεῦμα* or *spirit*;[5] he fashions, produces, and permeates all things, agreeably to certain laws (*λόγοι σπερματικοί*). *Matter* is thus subject to universal reason, which is the law of all nature.[6]

Various proofs of the existence of a Divinity were alleged by the Stoics, particularly by Cleanthes and Chrysippus.[7]

According to SIMPLICIUS, ad categ. Ar. f. 16.
[2] CIC. Acad. Quæst. I, 11. DIOG. LAERT. VII, 56.
[3] DIOG. LAERT. VII, 135. [4] Idem, VII, 140.
[5] CIC. Nat. Deor. II, 14. DIOG. LAERT. VII, 139. STOB. p. 538.
[6] CIC. Acad. Quæst. I, 11; Nat. Deor. II, 8, 9. 14..22. 32. SEXTUS, Adv. Math. IX, 101. DIOG. LAERT. VII, 134, sqq. 147–156, sqq. STOB. Ecl. Phys. 1, p. 312—538.
[7] GUILL. TRAUG. KRUG, Prog. de Cleanthe Divinitatis assertore ac prædicatore, *Lips.* 1819, 4to.

According to the doctrines we have reviewed, God is *in*, not *without* the world. The world itself is a living being and divine. Hence resulted the close connection maintained by these philosophers between Providence (*προνοία*) and Destiny (*εἱμαρμένη*), founded upon the relations between Cause and Effect observable in the world:[1] this notion led Chrysippus still farther, to *Determinism*, and thence to *Optimism*,[2] to *Divination* (*μαντική*), and an attempt to explain the Mythological Polytheism by the aid of Physiology and Theology.[3] In like manner as the world was produced by the action of fire, when the four elements (*στοιχεῖα*), out of which the Divinity formed all things, were separated from primeval matter;[4] so must it ultimately perish by the same.[5] This combustion or dissolution by fire, by which all things will be resolved into their original state (*ἐκπύρωσις τοῦ κοσμοῦ*) has been rejected by some subsequent Stoics,[6] among others by Zeno of Tarsus, Panætius, and Posidonius.[7]

162. The soul is a fiery air (*πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον*), being a portion of the Soul of the world, but, like every other real individual being, is corporeal and perishable.[8] * Cleanthes and Panætius went so far as to endeavour to establish its

[1] Plutarch. De Stoic. Repugnan. Stob. Ecl. Phys. vol. i, p. 180.

[2] Joh. Mich. Kern, Disp. Stoicorum Dogmata de Deo, *Gött.* 1764, 4to.

Jac. Brucker, De Providentiâ Stoicâ, in Miscell. Hist. Philos. p. 147.

S. E. Schulze, Commentatio de Cohærentia Mundi partium earumque cum Deo conjunctione summa secundum Stoicorum disciplinam. *Viteb.* 1785, 4to.

Mich. Heinr. Reinhard, Prog. de Stoicorum Deo, *Torgav.* 1737, 4to. Et Comment. de Mundo Optimo præsertim ex Stoicorum Sententia, *Torgav.* 1738, 8vo.

[3] Cic. Nat. Deor. I, II, III: De Fato, c. 12, 13, 17. A. Gellius, N. Att. VI, c. 2.

[4] Diog. Laert. VII, 142.

[5] Cic. Nat. Deor. II, 46.

[6] Philo, De Ætern. Mundi.

[7] Jac. Thomasii Exercitatio de Stoicâ Mundi exustione, etc. *Lips.* 1672, 4to.

Mich. Sonntag, Diss. de Palingenesiâ Stoicorum, *Jen.* 1700, 4to.

[8] Cic. De Nat. Deor. III., 14; Tusc. Quæst. I, 9; Diog. Laert. VII, 156.

* The latter Stoics differed on this point from their sires. Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and even Seneca, incline to a belief in the immortality of the soul.—Ed.

mortality by proof.[1] It consists of eight parts or powers: one, and the principal (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*), or Understanding (*λόγισμος*), is the source of all the rest, namely, the five senses, speech and the generative faculty; in the same manner as the Divinity is the origin of all individual energies in the world without.[2] The emotions also, as well as the passions and appetites of the soul (*πάθη* and *ὁρμαί*), are the results of the intellectual faculty; because they are always founded on some belief of the reality of their object, on some approbation, or judgment.[3] Grief, fear, desire (*ἐπιθυμία, libido*), and joy (*ἡδονή*), are instanced as *πάθη*.*

§ 163.

Casp. Scioppii Elementa Stoicæ Philosophiæ Moralis, *Mogunt.* 1606, 8vo.

J. Fr. Buddei Exercitt. Historico-Philos. IV de Erroribus Stoicorum in Philos. Morali, *Hal.* 1695–96.

Ern. Godf. Lilie, Commentationes de Stoicorum Philos. Morali. Comment. I. *Alton.* 1800, 8vo.

† J. Neeb, Examination of the Morality of the Stoics, compared with that of Christianity, *Mainz,* 1791, 8vo.

Ern. Aug. Dankegott Hoppe, Diss. Hist. Philos.: Principia Doctrinæ de Moribus Stoicæ et Christianæ, *Viteb.* 1799, 4to. (See also the works of Conz and Wegscheider, cited § 182.)

Nichol. Frid. Biberg (præs. et auctor; resp. C. T. Latin), Commentationum Stoicarum, pars 1, *Upsal.* 1815, 4to.)

The morality of the Stoics was built upon profound observation of the essential characteristics of Human Nature, of Reason, and Free-will; and a close association of Ethics with Nature,[4] in virtue of this principle, that God, the inherent cause of all the existing forms and proportions of

[1] Chph. Meiners, Commentar. quo Stoicorum Sententia de Animorum post mortem statu et fatis illustratur; Verm. Philos. Schriften, vol. II, p. 265.

[2] Plutarch. Decret. Philos. IV. 4. 5. 21. Sextus, Adv. Math. IX, 101.

[3] Cic. Tusc. Quæst. IV, 6, sqq.; Fin. IV, 38. Diog. Laert. VII, 110. Stob. Ecl. Eth., p. 166. 170. Plutarch. De Virt. Morali; De Decret. Philos. IV, 25.

* Epictetus ably distinguishes between passive impressions and spontaneous judgments. The former are not in our power, the latter are. *Οὐκ ἐφ ἡμῖν εἶσι, σώματα, χρήματα, κ.τ.λ. Ἐφ ἡμῖν εἶσι ὄρεξις, ἐπιθυμία, κ.τ.λ.* See *Ἐγχειρίδιον.*—Ed.

[4] Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 14.

the world, is himself the supreme Reason and Law. In consequence of the Rational nature of Man, the Stoic considers Order, Legality, and Reason, as what we are above all things bound to respect, as the only condition on which man can attain to the end of his being, that is Virtue; towards which all Nature is framed to lead us. Accordingly the first of all maxims is:[1] *To live agreeably to the law of Right Reason* (*ὀρθὸς λόγος*); or, according to the formulary of Cleanthes and other Stoics: *To live conformably to Nature*, (*ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν* or *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*).[2] See above Polemo (§ 138). Such a life is the proper end of human existence.[3]

164. The most remarkable principles of the *Practical* system of this school are: 1st. *τὸ καλόν* (or Virtue), is the only absolute good (*μόνον ἀγαθὸν*): Vice, on the other hand, is the only positive evil: everything else is morally indifferent, (*ἀδιάφορον*), possessing only a relative value, which renders it in a greater or less degree capable of becoming an object of choice, of avoidance, or simply of toleration, (*λῆπτὸν, ἄλῆπτον, μέσον*).[4] 2dly. Virtue is based on wisdom (*φρόνησις*): it consists in the practical exercise of a free and independent reason, in harmony with itself and with nature, whereof the application is found in knowing and doing what is good.[5] Stoical virtue may also be defined as a mode of life entirely guided by the principle that there is no other good than to do good, and that in that alone is contained the principle of liberty.[6] 3dly. Vice is an inconsequent mode of action (*inconstantia*) that results from the contempt or perversion of reason: the evil inclination or the guilty passions that spring from it incur disgrace and responsibility.[7] All actions are conformable or unconformable to the character of the agent, *καθήκοντα, παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον*: the first being subdivided

[1] AUT. CRESS, Comment. de Stoicorum Supremo Ethices Principio, *Viteb.* 1797, 4to.

[2] CIC. Fin. III. 6; Cleanthes, Hymn V DIOG. LAERT. VII, 87. STOB. Ecl. Eth. Pl. II, p. 32. 132. 134. 138, sqq.

[3] JOH. JAC. DORNFIELD, Diss. de Fine Hominis Stoico. *Lips.* 1720, 4to.

[4] CIC. Fin. III, 3, 8. 15.

[5] DIOG. LAERT. VII, 89. *Διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη.* STOB. Ecl. Eth. II, p. 204. *Διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.*

[6] CIC. Acad. Quæst. I, 10; Fin. III, 7; Tusc. Quæst. IV. 15; Paradoxon V. PLUTARCH. De Virt. Mor. c. 3.

[7] CIC. Acad. Quæst. I, 10 Tusc. Quæst. IV, 9. 23.

into καθήκοντα τελεῖα, and κ. μέσα; the former, inasmuch as they are done in fulfilment of the law, are called *good actions*, κατορθώματα, and their contraries, *transgressions*, ἁμαρτήματα. The κατορθώματα alone are virtuous and worthy of commendation; without respect to their consequences.[1] 4thly. Virtue being the only good, can alone enable us to attain felicity, εὐδαιμονία:[2] which latter consists in a tranquil course of life (εὐρροία βίου), and cannot be augmented by any increase of duration.[3] 5thly. Virtue is one, and Vice is one: neither of them are capable of augmentation or diminution.[4] All good actions are respectively equal, and in like manner all evil, inasmuch as they flow from the same sources. Virtue is manifested under four principal characters: Prudence, (φρόνησις); Courage, (ἀνδρία); Temperance, (σωφροσύνη); Justice, (δικαιοσύνη): with a corresponding number of Vices.[5] 6thly. The Virtuous man is exempt from Passions (πάθη), but not insensible to them. It is in this sense that we must understand the ἀπαθεία of the Stoics.[6] The sage alone is free and a king. The Passions ought to be not only moderated but totally eradicated. Chrysippus also mainly contributed to systematise the

[1] Cic. Fin. 7, 9. 17, 18. Stob. Ecl. Eth. II, p. 58, sqq.

[2] Ben. Bendtsen, Progr. de αὐταρκεία της ἀρετῆς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. *Hafn.* 1811, 4to.

Joh. Colmar (præs. Ge. Paul. Rœtenbeccio), Diss. de Stoicorum et Aristotelis circa gradum necessitatis bonorum externorum ad summam beatitatem disceptatione, *Norimb.* 1709, 4to.

[3] Cic. Fin. III, 14. Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 138. 154. Diog. Laert. VII, 88.

[4] Cic. De Fin. III, 14, 15.

[5] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 10; Fin. III, 14, 15, 21; IV, 20—27, sqq. Paradox. III, 1. Plutarch. De Virt. Mor. c. 2. Stob. Ecl. Eth. Pl. II, p. 110. 116. 218. 220.

[6] Cic. Ac. Quæst. I, 10.; Tusc. Quæst. IV, 16—19. A. Gell. XIX, 2.

Joh. Barth. Niemeyer, Dissert. de Stoicorum ἀπαθείᾳ, etc. *Helmst.* 1679, 4to.

Joh. Beenii Dispp. III, de ἀπαθείᾳ Sapientis Stoici, *Hafn.* 1695, 4to.

Joh. Henr. Fischer, Diss. de Stoicis ἀπαθείας falso suspectis, *Lips.* 1716, 4to.

Mich. Fr. Quadius, Diss. Hist. Philos. tritum illud Stoicorum παράδοξον περὶ ἀπαρείας expendens, *Sedini*, 1720, 4to.

† Chph. Meiners, On the Stoic Apathy: Verm. Philos. Schriften, tom. II, p. 130, sqq.

Ethics of the Stoics, and asserted that the principle of Right was founded *in the nature of Reasonable Beings* (φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει δίκαιον): and derived from this the characteristics of Natural Right.

165. The Stoics admitted only two descriptions of men; the good, σπουδαῖοι; and the bad, φαῦλοι: without allowing the existence of any intermediate class. With such a view they drew a portrait of their ideal Wise Man;[1] with all the most sublime features of moral and intellectual perfection, but without a sufficient observation of the differences which must necessarily exist between the idea and the reality; and more as if they were describing the qualities of a superior nature, than a degree of perfection attainable by man.[2] On the same principle they permitted their Wise Man, under certain circumstances, to deprive himself of life (αὐτοχειρία), as a part of his absolute freedom.[3] In later times this licence was made still greater, particularly by the authority of Seneca.[4] The blending of the moral system of the Stoics with their views of Physics and Theology, and an imperfect estimate of the distinctions which form the limits between the Law of Nature and Free-will, Morality and Felicity, gave occasion, in this system, to many inconsistencies which are easily observable; especially in their ideas of absolute liberty, and the incompatibility of this entire independence with Fate.[5] The system bears also throughout a character of extravagant pride and asperity, which is hostile to the cultivation of moral sentiment. On the other hand, we find abundant germs of noble sentiments, calculated to elevate man, and inspire him with a sense of his own dignity; and it has on many occasions communicated to its disciples an invincible courage, and fortitude to resist all the rigours of tyranny.

[1] † Ant. le Grand, The Stoic Wise Man. *The Hague*, 1662, 12mo. Erh. Reusch (præs. Omeisio). Diss. Vir Prudens Aristotelicus cum Sapiente Stoico collatus, *Altorf.* 1704, 4to.

[2] Stob. Ecl. Eth., p. 198. 221.

[3] Chr. Aug. Heumann, Diss. de *αὐτοχειρίᾳ* Philosophorum, maxime Stoicorum, *Jena*, 1703, 4to.

[4] Cic. Fin. III, 18. Diog. VII, 130—176. Stob. Ecl. Eth. II, p. 226.

[5] Cic., De Fato, c. 12, sqq., 17. A. Gell. VI, 2.

V. *New Academy.*

Authorities: Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, Diog. Laertius, lib. IV.

† STEUDLIN, work mentioned above (§ 38, II.)

† FOUCHER, History of the Academicians, *Paris*, 1690, 12mo. Diss. de Philos. Academicâ, *Paris*. 1692, 12mo.

J. D. GERLACH, Commentatio exhibens Academicorum Juniorum de Probabilitate Disputationes, *Götting*. 1815, 4to.

J. RUD. THORBECKE, Responsio ad Qu. Philos.: quæritur in Dogmaticis oppugnandis numquid inter Academicos et Stoicos interfuerit? Quod si ita sit, quæritur quæ fuerit discriminis causa? 1820, 4to.

166. The bold and uncompromising Dogmatism which prevailed in the Porch, and the bitter attacks made by Zeno and Chrysippus on the founder of the Academy,[1] induced the successors of the latter to investigate, after a more scrupulous manner, the prevailing Dogmatical systems, and in particular that of the Stoics. The consequence was a habit of *doubting* in philosophical inquiries; a habit which characterised a whole class of Academicians, in opposition to the practice of the original school: hence the *New Academy;* the founder of which was *Arcesilaus* of Pitane, in Æolia.[2] This is sometimes called the *Second* or the *Middle* Academy, with reference to the one which followed. After having previously applied himself to the study of Poetry, Eloquence, and the Mathematics, this philosopher attended, at Athens, Theophrastus, and afterwards Polemo. Crantor and Zeno were his fellow-disciples under the latter: and their methodical and innovating spirit incited him to contradiction. He subsequently took the place of Sosicrates, as Chief of the Academy, and died 241 or 239 B.C. He was a philosopher of extensive knowledge, of great ability in Dialectics, and of stainless morals.

167. The character thus introduced, by a spirit of doubt, into the Academy, was one of Diffidence; which tended to circumscribe the pretensions of philosophic reason, without denying the possibility of certain, or at least, of probable knowledge. In this manner, by the subtilty of his Logic, Arcesilaus brought into question the principal Dogmatical doctrines, in order to open the way for more profound inquiries; and to this end introduced into the Academy the

[1] DIOG. LAERT. VII, 32.

[2] Born 318 or 316 B.C.

method of *Disputation*.[1] He attacked, above all, the conceivable representation (φαντασία καταληπτική,) as it was termed, which Zeno taught, and admitted it as a *criterium in thesi*, while at the same time he denied it *in hypothesi*.[2] Constantly opposing himself to the opinions of his adversaries, he was drawn into a general Scepticism with regard to our knowledge of the absolute *Esse* and nature of things;[3] so much so, that he denied the reality of any adequate *criterium* of Truth, and recommended, as a quality of wisdom, a suspension of all definitive Judgment.[4] In *Practical* philosophy, he maintained that the safest rule was the principle of Conformity to Reason; τὸ εὔλογον.[5] His immediate followers were *Lacydes* of Cyrene, *Evander* and *Telecles*, both of Phocis; and *Hegesinus* of Pergamus.[6]

168. But a much more distinguished personage followed, in *Carneades* of Cyrene.[7] He attended at first the school of the Stoics; afterwards he became the pupil and successor of Hegesinus at the Academy; and having been sent a deputy to Rome,[8] he excited universal admiration by his eloquence and his logic.[9] This philosopher, who has by some been considered the founder of a *Third* Academy, directed his Scepticism more especially against Chrysippus, with great oratorical and logical acumen. He started from the twofold relation of the representation (φαντασία), to the object (τὸ φανταστόν) and the subject (φαντασιούμενος), which he first correctly discriminated. He concluded that there could be no objective knowledge, inasmuch as neither the senses nor the understanding afford a sure testimony (κριτήριον) of its truth; and maintained that all that can be inferred is *probability*[10] (τὸ πιθανόν); in three distinct

[1] Cic. Ac. Quæst. I, 12; II, 6, sqq.; Fin. II, 1. Diog. Laert. IV, 28. Plutarch. Adv. Coloten. c. 27.

[2] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 24. Sextus Adv. Math. VII, 154. 408, sqq.

[3] Cic. Ac. Quæst. 1, 12. Sext. Hypotyp. I, 1. 4. 220—235 (where a distinction is made between Pyrrhonism and the principles of the New Academy). Adv. Math. VII, 153.

[4] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I, 232, sqq.; Adv. Math. VII, 150, sqq.

[5] Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 158. Cf. Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 231.

[6] Diog. Laert. IV, 59, sqq.

[7] Born about 215: died 130 B. C.

[8] See above § 158. [9] 598 of Rome; 155 or 156 B.C.

[10] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 10, sqq.

degrees: ἔμφασις, or πιθανὴ φαντασία: ἀπερίσπαστος: and διεξωδευμένη ἢ περιωδευμένη φαντασία.[1] But he regards it as a duty to explore *the probable*. In this consists the system of *Probabilities* of Carneades (εὐλογιστία). He attacked the Theology of the Stoics in detail: proving that the Divinity cannot be conceived of as a ζῶον: and that we cannot apply to him any ontological or moral ideas. He exposed, in like manner, by victorious demonstration, the defects of anthropomorphism.[2] He defended against the Stoics, the existence of a Particular Natural Right; and, on the subject of the Supreme Good, opposed to theirs the opinion of a certain *Callipho;* who made it consist in Virtue united to Pleasure. He threw considerable light on practical morals, by comparing Civil with Natural Right, and Prudence with Morality; (making Prudence the principle of action;) but for want of solving the apparent contradictions between these two principles he did injury to the cause of Virtue, though his own character was far from being opposed to it.[3] *Clitomachus* of Carthage, the disciple and successor of Carneades (129 B.C.), put the sceptical arguments of his master in writing.[4]

169. The Stoics were sensible of the danger which menaced the foundations of their system, but the only answer they were able to make was the reproach of inconsistency with which *Antipater* taxed the Academicians,[5] or they cut short their attacks by the downright assertion—That we ought not to endeavour to discover any new grounds of knowledge and certainty.[6] Nevertheless, Dogmatism and Scepticism, in their respective schools, relaxed somewhat of their rigour, and a sort of reconciliation between them was brought about by *Philo* of Larissa and *Antiochus* of Ascalon,[7] his pupil and follower, who became a teacher at Athens,

[1] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 9, 31, sqq. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 159, sqq; 161, 167, sqq. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. XIV, 7, sqq.

[2] Sext. Adv. Math. IX. 138, sqq.; 140, sqq; 182, sqq. Cic. De Nat. Deor. III, 12, sqq.; De Divin. II, 3.

[3] Lact. Div. Instit. V, 14. 16, 17. Quintil. XII, 1. Cic. De Leg. 13; Fin. II, 18.

[4] † Heinius, Dissertation on the Philosopher Clitomachus; in the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin, 1748.

[5] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 9. 34. [6] Ibid. 6.

[7] Died 69 B. C.

Alexandria, and Rome. The first was the pupil and successor of Clitomachus; he also taught at Rome, whither he retreated during the war of Mithridates, a hundred years B.C.; and by some has been considered the founder of a *Fourth* Academy. He confined Scepticism to a contradiction of the Metaphysics of the Stoics and their pretended *criteria* of knowledge:[1] he contracted the sphere of Logic:[2] made moral philosophy merely a matter of public instruction; and endeavoured to prove that the old and new Academies equally doubted the certainty of speculative knowledge.[3] *Antiochus* derived from the *Conscience* a strong argument against Scepticism,[4] to which in his youth he was inclined. Consequently, he became an opponent of his master:[5] and in the end endeavoured to demonstrate the identity of the Academic, Peripatetic, and Stoic doctrines with respect to Morals;[6] maintaining that the differences were merely nominal. He has been improperly regarded by some as the founder of a *Fifth* Academy; for he rather approximated the doctrine of the Stoics; inasmuch as he admitted that there is a degree of certainty in Human Knowledge;[7] and rejected the system of *Probabilities* of the Academy. These two attempts at union were the prelude to many more.[8]

In his moral system, Antiochus treated self-love as the *primum mobile* of men and animals; considering its operation to be at first instinctive; and afterwards aided by consciousness and reason. In this respect he modified and tempered the Stoic principle.[9]

170. Thus was the debate between Dogmatism and Scepticism for a time suspended: and the latter, at least, ceased to be heard of in the Academy. It is true that all these disputes had not settled the grand problem in question; whether there be any solid principle and foundation for

[1] SEXT. Hypotyp. I, 235. CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 28.
[2] That is, if it is of him that Cicero writes, Ac. Quæst. II, 28.
[3] CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 23. SEXT. Hyp. I, 220. STOB. Ecl. Eth. II. p. 38, sqq.
[4] CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 8, sqq., 34.
[5] Ibid. I. 4; II, 4. 22.
[6] CIC. De Fin. II, 3. 8. 25.
[7] CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 7. 11. 13, sqq., 21.
[8] Ibid. II, l. l., et 35, 43, sqq.; De Fin. V, 3. 7; De Nat. Deor. 1, 7. SEXT. EMP. Hyp. I, 233.
[9] CIC. Fin. V, 8, 9, 11, sqq., 21, sqq.

knowledge in general, and, in particular, for Philosophic Knowledge; but by the observation of Moral Consciousness the disputants had come to the conclusion that a certain knowledge is necessary; and had drawn broader distinctions between what is subjective and what is objective, in our cognitions.

The four great philosophical factions continued to maintain at Athens their several schools, close by each other, without mutually interrupting their discussions; and prosecuted, but with less vivacity than of old, their ancient disputes.

CHAPTER THIRD.

OF PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE ROMANS, AND THE NEW SCEPTICISM OF ÆNESIDEMUS, DOWN TO THE TIME OF JOHN OF DAMASCUS (FROM 60 B.C. TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY AFTER CHRIST.)

Propagation and Downfall of Grecian Philosophy.

General Sketch.

171. SCEPTICISM, after it had lost much of its influence in the Academy, re-appeared in the schools of Medicine: where it called forth, from the spirit of contradiction, new dogmatical researches founded on the intuition of the Absolute: inquiries which were fostered by the increased intercourse which had taken place between the Orientals and the Greeks, as well as by some other great external events, such as the conquests of Alexander and the Romans, and, subsequently, the growth of Christianity. Combined with other causes, these events contained the principle of the decline and fall of Grecian philosophy, at the same time that they laid open new paths to the spirit of philosophic research.

172. Alexander[1] had annihilated the republican liberty of Greece, and subdued to the Grecian arms, together with Egypt, the whole of Asia, as far as the Indus: thus opening the way for an active commerce between the East and the

[1] Died 323 B.C.

West, which contributed to enlarge the sphere of Grecian art and science. Alexandria, that mighty commercial city which gradually succeeded to the importance of fallen Athens, strengthened these distant relations, and helped to convert them to the interests of science. The Ptolemies, the successors of Alexander in Egypt,[1] aided the cause of knowledge by founding their famous Library and Museum; although original inquiry appears to have been damped by this vast accumulation of scientific resources, and the facility with which they were accessible. A progressive decline became observable in the spirit of Philosophy, which was gradually directed to humbler objects, of a more pedantic character; such as Commentaries, Comparisons, Miscellanies, Compilations, etc. etc.

Reference may be made to:

CHR. GOTTL. HEYNE, De Genio Seculi Ptolemæorum. Opusc. Acad., vol I, p. 76.

CHR. DAN. BECK, Specimen Historiæ Bibliothecarum Alexandrinarum, *Lips.* 1779, 4to.

§ 173.

(See the Works mentioned § 38.)

The Romans, a nation of warriors and conquerors, with whom the interests of their Republic outweighed all others, became acquainted with Grecian philosophy, particularly with the Peripatetic, Academic, and Stoic doctrines, only after the conquest of Greece; and more especially through the intervention of three philosophers whom the Athenians deputed to Rome.[2] In spite of determined prejudices and reiterated denunciations,[3] one of these doctrines (that of the Academy), daily gained disciples there; especially when Lucullus and Sylla had enriched the Capitol with conquered libraries. The latter, after the capture of Athens, 84 B.C., sent thither the collection of Apellicon, which was particularly rich in the works of Aristotle.

[1] Third century B.C. [2] 155 B.C.

LEVESOW, De Carneade, Diogene, et Critolao, et de causis neglecti studii Philosophiæ apud Antiquiores Romanos, *Stettin.* 1795.

DAN BOETHII Digest. de Philosophiæ nomine apud Veteres Romanos inviso, *Upsal.* 1790, 4to.

[3] A. GELL. N. A. XV, 11.

The Romans almost always looked upon Philosophy as a mean to attain some personal or political end: betraying by that very circumstance their want of a genuine philosophic spirit. Nevertheless they eventually became the depositaries of Grecian philosophy.

174. Christianity, the religion of "the pure in heart," which prescribed a disinterested love of our neighbours, and proclaimed to all mankind, independently of any scientific form, the union of God with man, afforded as it were a fresh text, of the highest interest, which directed men to Reason as well as Revelation. It has exercised a various influence over the progress of Philosophical Reason, by the matter of its doctrines, as well as by their form.

175. The spirit of research of Grecian Philosophy, once so original and independent, was exhausted. Reason had tried every path, every direction then open to her, without being able to satisfy herself; for she had not penetrated to the fundamental problem, that of the nature of Reason, and consequently had continued an enigma to herself. The different philosophic systems had viewed truth only in one of its aspects, and consequently were involved in errors. The want of philosophical method had rendered the disentanglement of these errors the more difficult; and a reconciliation or adjustment had become impossible between the different sects, whose disputes, while they prevented the understanding from sinking into lethargy, had also the effect of detracting from the pure and disinterested love of Truth. Consequently, the efforts of science were not so much directed to the investigation of the first principles of knowledge, as to maintain, consolidate, illustrate, and apply conclusions which had been already drawn.

176. The political, religious, and moral condition of the Roman Empire during the first centuries after the Christian era, were not such as to animate and sustain a spirit of philosophical research. Greece had lost her political existence; Rome her republican constitution. Beginning with the capital, luxury, egotism, and indolence had spread their reign to the remotest provinces. The characteristic features of the period were a neglect of the popular religion, a preference for foreign rites, (of which an incongruous medley was tolerated), a widely prevalent superstition, a disdain of

what was natural, a mania for what was strange and extraordinary, a curious prying into the (pretended) occult arts, with an extinction of all sentiments truly great and noble. Such are the characteristics given by the Epicurean Lucian of Samosata (2nd cent. A.C.) in a Satire, which exposes with the most poignant ridicule the false philosophy of his age. (Cf. § 181.)

See † CHPH. MEINERS, History of the Decline of Morals under the Roman Government, *Leips.* 1782, 8vo.

177. Consequently the efforts of the Reason were directed in various ways, and tended 1st. To maintain the Schools and systems already existing; not without considerable modifications. 2ndly. To revive superannuated doctrines, such as those of the Pythagorean and Orphic philosophies. 3dly. To combine by Interpretation, Syncretism, or Eclecticism,* the various systems, especially those of Plato and Aristotle; and to trace them all back to the ancient Dogmata of Pythagoras, the pretended Orpheus, Zoroaster, and Hermes.[1] 4thly To combine in one the spirit of Oriental and Occidental philosophy.

178. Nevertheless, Philosophy made at least some apparent progress in extension, and, at least apparently, in intensity. In extension, because the Romans and the Jews by this time had made themselves acquainted with the philosophical dogmas of the Greeks, and had produced some philosophical works sufficiently original. Nor does this progress of philosophy appear to have been merely external; inasmuch as Scepticism assumed a more intense character, and gave occasion for a fresh dogmatical system in the school of the Platonists. By imagining a new source of knowledge, the intuition of the Absolute; by labouring to combine the old and the new theories of the East and the West, they endeavoured to provide a broader basis for Dogmatic philosophy, to prop up the established religion, and to oppose a barrier to the rapid progress of Christianity;

* *Syncretism* professes to combine the elements of different systems: *Eclecticism* to extract from all what is consistent with a particular theory.—ED.

[1] Cf. L. E. OTTO BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS, De Librorum Hermeticorum origine atque indole, *Jenæ*, 1827, 4to.

but eventually lost themselves in the region of Metaphysical dreams. On the other hand, the Doctors of the Catholic faith, who at one time had rejected and contemned the philosophy of the Greeks, ended by adopting it, at least in part, in order to complete and fortify their religious system. The invasions of the barbarous tribes, and the disunion of the Eastern and Western empires, brought on at last an almost utter extinction of philosophical research.

Introduction and Cultivation of Grecian Philosophy among the Romans.

179. Unquestionably the national character of the Romans, more disposed for action than speculation, did not encourage philosophy to spring up among them unassisted.[1] The revolutions also in their government, the loss of their republican constitution, the tyranny of the greater part of their emperors, and the general and continually increasing corruption, were little favourable to the development of a truly philosophical spirit, yet from time to time they manifested a degree of interest in such researches, which they looked upon as indispensable to a cultivated mind, and as serviceable for certain civil offices. Agreeably to their native character and habits, they showed more predilection for the doctrines of the Porch or of Epicurus, than those of Plato and Aristotle, which were of a more speculative character. The Romans thus applied themselves to Grecian philosophy; successfully transferred into their own language some of its treatises; enriched, by the application of them, their jurisprudence and policy, but did not advance a step by any original discovery of their own. Consequently, we can distinguish only a small number of Latins who have deserved a page in the history of philosophy. We shall proceed to mention the principal of those among them, who, whether Romans or foreigners, cultivated and diffused the philosophy of the Greeks, with some partial modifications in their manner of teaching it.

[1] K. F. Renner, De Impedimentis quæ apud Vett. Romanos Philosophiæ negaverint successum, *Hal.* 1825. See also the authors mentioned at the head of § 24, *b*.

Cicero.

Authorities: The works of Cicero; Plutarch, Life of Cicero.

† Morabin, History of Cicero, *Paris*, 1745, 2 vols. 4to.

Conyers Middleton, Life of Cicero. (Several editions).

Jac. Facciolati, Vita Ciceronis Literaria, *Patav.* 1760, 8vo.

H. Chr. Fr. Hulsemann, De Indole Philosophicâ M. T. Ciceronis ex ingenii ipsius et aliis rationibus æstimandâ, *Luneb.* 1799, 4to.

Gautier de Sibert, Examen de la Philosophie de Cicéron; dans les Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr. tom. XLI et XLIII.

Chph. Meiners, Oratio de Philosophiâ Ciceronis ejusque in Universam Philosophiam meritis; *Verm. Philos. Schriften*, I, § 274.

J. Chph. Briegleb, Progr. de Philosophiâ Ciceronis, *Cob.* 1784, 4to. Et, De Cicerone cum Epicuro Disputante, *Ibid.* 1779, 4to.

J. C. Waldin, Oratio de Philosophiâ Ciceronis Platonicâ, *Jen.* 1753, 4to.

Math. Fremling (resp. Schantz), Philosophia Ciceronis, *Lund.* 1795, 4to.

† J. Fr. Herbart, Dissert. on the Philosophy of Cicero: in the Königsb. Archiv. No. I.

R. Kuhner, M. T. Ciceronis in Philosophiam ejusque partes merita, *Hamburg*, 1825, 8vo.

Adam Bursii Logica Ciceronis Stoica, *Zamosc.* 1604, 4to.

Conr. Nahmmacherii Theologia Ciceronis; accedit Ontologiæ Ciceronis specimen. *Frankenh.* 1767, 8vo.

Dan. Wyttenbachii Dissert. de Philosophiæ Ciceronianæ loco qui est de Deo, *Amstel.* 1783, 4to.

† An Essay towards settling the Dispute between Middleton and Ernesti on the Philosophic Character of the Treatise *De Natura Deorum;* in five Dissert. *Altona and Leips.* 1800, 8vo.

Gasp. Jul. Wunderlich (resp. Andr. Schmaler), Cicero de Animâ Platonizans Disp. *Viteb.* 1714. 4to.

Ant. Bucheri Ethica Ciceroniana, *Hamb.* 1610, 8vo.

Jasonis de Nores, Brevis et Distincta Institutio in Cic. Philos. de Vitâ et Moribus, *Patav.* 1597.

180. *M. T. Cicero*,[1] like many other young Romans of good family, was instructed by Greek preceptors. In order to improve himself in eloquence and the science of polity, he travelled to Rhodes and Athens; where he occupied himself with the pursuit of Grecian philosophy, directing his attention particularly to the Academic and Stoic systems. He owed, in part, his success as an orator and a statesman, to the ardour with which he devoted himself to these studies. At a later period of his life, when his career as a statesman was closed by the fall of the Republic,

[1] Born at Arpinum, 107 B.C., died B.C. 44.

with his characteristic patriotism he consecrated his leisure to the discussion of points of philosophy; labouring to transplant the theories of the Greeks into his native soil: with little gratitude on the part of his countrymen.[1] In all speculative questions he maintained the freedom of opinion and the impartiality which became a disciple of the New Academy: following the *method* also of that school in the *form* of his writings. In questions of morality he preferred the rigid principles of the Stoics,[2] but not without doing justice to Plato, Aristotle, and even Epicurus (as far as the correctness of his *life* was concerned[3]). His philosophical works, in which he appears to have made Plato his model, are a most valuable collection of interesting discussions and luminous remarks on the most important topics, e. g. On the Nature of the Divinity; On the Supreme Good; On the Social Duties; On Fate; Divination; the Laws; the Republic, etc. etc.:[4] and have proved a mine of information to succeeding ages, without, however, betraying any great depth of thought. They are likewise highly valuable as throwing light on the history of philosophy,[5] and have contributed to form the technical language of this science.

Epicureans.

181. The doctrine of Epicurus, when first disseminated in their country, attracted among the Romans a crowd of partisans, in consequence of its light and accommodating character,[6] and the indulgence it afforded to the inclinations of all;[7] as also because it had the effect of disengaging the mind from superstitious terrors. Unhappily it favoured at the same time a frivolous and trifling spirit. Very few of the Roman Epicureans distinguished themselves by a truly philosophical character; and even these adhered literally to

1 Cic. Orat. pro Sextio. Plutarch. Vit. Cic. V.
2 De Offic. I, 2. 3 De Nat. Deor. I, 5; Acad. Quæst. IV. 3.
4 De Div. II, Init.
5 M. T. Ciceronis Historia Philosophiæ Antiquæ. Ex illius Script. ed. Fried. Gedike, *Berl.* 1782, 8vo.
6 Among. the most considerable were, Catius and Amafanius; C. Cassius, Tit. Pomponius Atticus, Caius Velleius, Bassus Aufidius; add to these the poet Horace, with several more.
7 Cic. Fin. I, 7; Tusc. Quæst. IV, 3; Ep. ad Div. XV, 19. Senec. Ep. 21, 30.

the doctrines of their master, without advancing a step beyond them. Such, among others, was *Lucretius*,[1] who gave a statement of those doctrines in his didactic poem *De Rerum Natura*,[2] as a poem, a work of superior merit.[3]

Stoics and Cynics.

† C. P. Conz, Dissertations on the Hist. and Characteristics of the later Stoic Philosophy; with an Essay on Christian Morality, on Kant, and the Stoics, *Tüb.* 1794, 8vo.

G. P. Hollenberg, De Præcipuis Stoicæ Philosophiæ Doctoribus et Patronis apud Romanos, *Leips.* 1793, 4to.

J. A. L. Wegscheider, Ethices Stoicorum recentiorum fundamenta ex ipsorum scriptis eruta, cum principiis Ethicis quæ critica rationis practicæ sec. Kantium exhibet, comparata, *Hamb.* 1797, 8vo.

182. Next to those of Epicurus, the doctrines of the Stoics obtained the greatest success at Rome, especially among men of a severer character,[4] who had devoted their lives to public affairs. With such men, the Stoic philosophy being more closely applied to real life, and exercising a marked influence over legislation and the administration of the laws, naturally acquired a more practical spirit, and began to disengage itself in some degree from speculative subtilties.[5] Besides *Athenodorus* of Tarsus,[6] *C. Musonius*

[1] Born 95, died 50 B.C.

[2] Uebersetzt von Knebel, 2 Bde. (1821) 1831.

J. A. Ortloff, Abhandlung über den Einfluss der Stoischen Philosophie auf die Römische Jurisprudenz, 1797.

[3] C. Plinius Secundus, author of the Natural History, who died A.D. 79, by the eruption of Vesuvius, and Lucian of Samosata, the satirist (§ 176), who flourished in the second cent. after Christ, (see † J. C. Tiemann, On the Philosophy and Language of Lucian, *Zerbst*, 1804, 8vo.), have been numbered among the Epicureans without sufficient grounds; as well as the contemporaries of the latter, Diogenes Laertius (flourished about 211), and Celsus. The latter is known to us as an adversary of Christianity, by the work of Origen. By some he is esteemed a Neoplatonist.

[4] Such, in the days of the Republic, were the Scipios, and, in particular, the second Scipio Africanus, (cf. § 158); C. Lælius; the jurisconsult Pub. Rutilius Rufus, Q. Tubero, Q. Mucius Scævola the augur; and subsequently, Cato of Utica, and M. Brutus, the assassin of Cæsar.

[5] See the preceding note.

[6] Flourished about two years after Christ.

Rufus the Volsinian,[1] *Annæus Cornutus* or *Phornutus*[2] of Leptis in Africa (the two last expelled from Rome by Nero about 66 A.C.), *Chæremon* of Egypt, who was a preceptor of Nero, *Euphrates* of Alexandria, *Dio* of Prusa, or *Dio Chrysostom*,[3] *Basilides* and others, we must not forget as having distinguished themselves in moral philosophy or by their

† SEVIN, Researches concerning the Life and Works of Athenodorus, in the Mem. of the Acad of Inscr. tom. XIII.

J. FR. HOFFMANNI Diss. de Athenodoro Tarsensi, Philosopho Stoico, *Lips.* 1732, 4to.

We must here take notice of the sect of the Proculians, founded, in the time of Augustus, by Antistius Labeo, and his disciple Semp. Proculus. This sect was formed in opposition to that of the Sabinians, headed by Masurius Sabinus, a disciple of C. Ateius Capito. See JUST. HENNING. BŒHMERI Progr. de Philosophiâ Jurisconsultorum Stoicâ, *Hal.* 1701, 4to.

EVER. OTTONIS, Oratio de Stoicâ veterum Jurisconsultorum Philosophiâ, *Duisb.* 1714, 4to.

J. SAM. HERING, De Stoicâ veterum Romanorum Jurisprudentiâ, *Stettin.* 1719.

These three works are collected in that of GOTTLIEB SLEVOIGT, De Sectis et Philosophiâ Jurisconsultorum Opusce. *Jen.* 1724, 8vo.

CHR. WESTPHAL, De Stoâ Jurisconsultor. Roman. *Rest.* 1727, 4to.

CHR. FRIED. GEO. MEISTER, Progr. de Philosophiâ Jurisconsultorum Romanorum Stoicâ in Doctrinâ de Corporibus eorumque partibus, *Gott.* 1756, 4to.

JO. GODOFR. SCHAUMBURG, De Jurisprud. veterum Jurisconsultorum Stoicâ, *Jen.* 1745, 8vo.

† J. ANDR. ORTLOFF, On the Influence of the Stoic Philos. over the Jurisprudence of the Romans: a Philos. and Jurisprudential Dissert. *Erlang.* 1787, 8vo.

[1] † BURIGNY, Mem. on the Philosopher Musonius, in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscr. tom. XXXI.

C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiæ et Apothegmata, ed. J. V. PEERLKAMP, *Harl.* 1822, 8vo.

D. WYTTENBACHII Diss. (resp. NIEWLAND), de Musonio Rufo Philosopho Stoico, *Amstel.* 1783, 4to.

† Four unedited Fragments of the Stoic Philosopher Musonius, translated from the Greek, with an Introduction respecting his Life and Philosophy, by G. H. MOSER, accompanied by the article of CREUZER on this publication, in the Studien, 1810, tom. VI, p. 74.

[2] D. MARTINII Disp. de L. ANNÆO CORNUTO, Phil. Stoico. *Lugd. Bat.* 1825, 8vo. To him is attributed the *θεωρια περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν φύσεως*, republished by GALE, Opusc. M. et Ph. p. 137.

[3] Both flourished under Trajan and Adrian.

practical wisdom, *Seneca*,[1] *Epictetus** of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a slave who preserved nevertheless a free spirit,[2] and who, having been banished from Rome, established a school at Nicopolis in Epirus:[3] *Arrian*,[4] a disciple of the preceding, whose doctrines he preserved in writing, and *Marcus Aure-*

[1] Luc. Ann. Seneca, of Corduba in Spain; the preceptor of Nero. Born about 3, died 65 A.C.

Senecæ Opera, ed. RUHKOPF, *Lips.* 1797, sqq. 6 vols. 8vo.

Essay on the Life of the Philosopher Seneca, on his Works, and the Reigns of Claudius and Nero, with Notes (by DIDEROT), *Paris*, 1778.

It is to be found also in the collection of his works, and the French translation of Seneca by LA GRANGE.

† FEL. NUSCHELER, The Character of Seneca as deduced from his Life and Writings, *Zurich*, 1783, 8vo. 1 vol.

C. P. CONZ, On the Life and Character of Seneca: as a preface to a translation of the Consolatio ad Helv. etc. *Tübing.* 1792, 8vo.

Jo. JAC. CZOLBE, Vindiciæ Senecæ, *Jen.* 1791, 4to.

Jo. ANDR. SCHMIDII Disp. de Senecâ ejusque Theologia, *Jen.* 1688, 4to.

Jo. FH. APINI Disp. de Religione Senecæ, *Viteb.* 1692. 4to.

JUSTI SIBERI Seneca Divinis Oraculis quodammodo consonans, *Dresd.* 1675, 12mo.

FRIED. CHR. GELPKE, Tractatiuncula de Familiaritate quæ Paulo Apostolo cum Senecâ Philosopho intercessisse traditur verisimillimâ, *Lips.* 1813, 4to.

CHRIST. FRED. SCHULZE, Prologomena ad Senecæ Librum de Vitâ Beatâ, *Lips.* 1797, 4to.

† L. Ann. Seneca, by JOH. GE. CARL KLOTZSCH, *Wittemb.* 1799, 1802, 2 vols, 8vo.

HENR. AUG. SCHICK, Diss. de Causis quibus Zeno et Seneca in Philosophiâ discrepent, *Marb.* 1822, 4to.

E. J. WERNER, De Senecæ Philosophiâ, *Berol.* 1825, 8vo.

* KUHNHARDT, Ueber die Hauptmomente der stoischen sittenlehre nach Epiktet's Handbuch. In BOUTERWEK'S Neuem Museum für Philosophie und Litteratur. I und II Band.

[2] Epicteti Enchiridium et Arriani Dissert. Epictetææ; edid. J. SCHWEIGHÆUSER; Epictetæ Philosophiæ Monumenta, etc., *Lips.* 1799, 1800, 5 vols. 8vo.

† The Manual of Epictetus translated into German by LINCK, *Nürenb.* 1783; and by THIELE, *Francf.* 1790.

Works of Epictetus, translated by CARTER (Mrs.) *Lond.* 1758, 4to.

[3] Flourished about 90 A.C.

[4] Flavius Arrianus of Nicomedia, prefect of Cappadocia in 134.

† Arrian, Conversations of Epictetus with his Disciples, translated, with Remarks Historical and Philosophical, and a Brief Exposition of the Philosophy of Epictetus, by J. MATH. SCHULZ, *Altona*, 1801—3, 2 vols. large 8vo.

lius Antoninus, the philosophic emperor,[1] and disciple of the Stoic *Q. Sextus* of Chæronea, the grandson of Plutarch. *Seneca*, who appreciated the truth which he discovered in various systems of philosophy, but principally attached himself to that of the Portico,[2] was one of the first who drew a distinction between a Scholastic and Practical philosophy. The latter he judged the most essential, its primary object being individual Morality (*Philosophia Præceptiva.*) He gave admirable rules of conduct, after the principles of the Stoics,[3] but betraying at the same time considerable predilection for Exaggeration and Antithesis.[4] *Epictetus* reduced

† GILES BOILEAU, Life of Epictetus, and Account of his Philosophy, second edition, revised and corrected, *Paris*, 1667, 12mo.

M. ROSSAL, Disquisitio de Epicteto qua probatur eum non fuisse Christianum, *Gröning.* 1708, 8vo.

Jo. DAV. SCHWENDNERI Idea Philosophiæ Epictetæ ex Enchiridio delineata, *Lips.* 1681, 4to.

CHPH. AUG. HEUMANNI Diss. de Philosophiâ Epicteti, *Jen.* 1703, 4to.

LUD. CHR. CRELLII Diss. II, τὰ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου ὑπέρσοφα καὶ ἄσοφα, in Doctrinâ de Deo et Officiis erga seipsum, *Lips.* 1711–16, 4to.

Jo. ERD. WALTHERI Diss. de Vitâ regendâ secundum Epictetum, *Lips.* 1747, 4to.

† H. KUHNARDT, On the Principal Points of the Ethics of the Stoics, after the Manual of Epictetus: in the *Neues Museum der Philos. und Literatur*, published by BOUTERWEK, tom. I, fas. 2; and tom. II, fas. 1.

† J. FRANC. BEYER, On Epictetus and his Manual of Stoical Morality, *Marb.* 1795, 8vo.

[1] Became emperor in 161, died 180 A.C.

Antonini Commentarii ad seipsum (εἰς ἑαυτὸν βιβλία δώδεκα), ed. THOM. GATAKER; WOLLE; MORUS; Jo. MATH. SCHULZ; *Slesv.* 1802, sqq., 8vo. Translated into German by the same, with Observations and an Essay on the Philosophy of Antoninus, *Schlesw.* 1799, 8vo.

BACH, De M. Aurelio imp. philosophante, 1826.

CHPH. MEINERS, De M. Aurelii Antonini ingenio, moribus et scriptis, in Comment. Soc. Gotting. 1784, tom. IV, p. 107.

Cf. C. FR. WALCHII Comm. de Religione M. Aur. Antonini in numinâ celebratâ. Acta Soc. Lat. Jenensis, p. 209.

J. DAV. KOELERI Diss. de Philosophiâ M. Aurel. Antonini in Theoriâ et Praxi, *Alton.* 1717, 4to.

Jo. FRANC. BUDDEI Introductio ad Philosophiam Stoicam ad mentem M. Antonini; prefixed to the edition of Antoninus by WOLFF, *Leips.* 1729, 8vo.

J. W. RECHE, Essay towards a Statement of the Stoic Maxims according to the views of Antoninus: in his translation of Antonin. *Francf.* 1717, 8vo.

[2] Ep. 20. 45. 82. 108. [3] Ep. 94. [4] QUINTIL. Inst. X, 1.

the moral system of the Stoics to a simple formulary, *ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου* (*sustine et abstine*): and assumed as his leading principle, Freedom.

Antoninus imparted to the same system a character of gentleness and benevolence, by making it subordinate to a love of mankind, allied to Religion. These two last are much less decided advocates of suicide than Seneca (§ 165.) About this period a great number of writings of this school proclaimed a more fixed belief in the immortality of the soul.—Of the *Cynics* the most distinguished during the second century were: *Demonax* of Cyprus, who taught at Athens; *Crescens* of Megalopolis, and *Peregrinus*, surnamed *Proteus*, of Parium in Mysia; who, they say, burnt himself at Olympia about 168 A.C.

The two last contributed nothing to the cause of Science.[1]

Peripatetics.

On each of the Philosophers mentioned in this section, consult Suidas, and the first volume of Patricius, a work cited § 139.

183. The Philosophy of Aristotle was not suited to the *practical* character of the Roman mind, and such as devoted themselves to the study of it, became mere commentators of various merit or demerit. We must account *Peripatetics*: *Andronicus* of Rhodes (§ 150), who arranged and expounded at Rome the works of Aristotle;[2] *Cratippus* of Mitylene, whom Cicero the Younger and several other Romans attended at Athens;[3] *Nicolas* of Damascus;[4] *Xenarchus* of Seleucia, who, as well as the preceding, gave lessons in the time of Augustus; *Alexander* of Ægæ, one of the preceptors

[1] LUCIAN, Demonax, et De morte Peregrini.—Cf. A. GELLIUS, N. A. VIII, 3; XII, 11.

[2] Flourished about 80 B.C.

It is thought that he was not really the author of the book *Περὶ πάθων*, ed. HOESCHEL, *Aug. Vind.* 1594; and the Paraphrase of Aristotle's Ethics, ed. DAN. HEINSIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1607, 4to; 1617, 8vo.; *Cantab.* 1678, 8vo.

[3] Flourished about 48 B.C.

[4] † FRANC. SEVIN, Inquiry concerning the Life and Works of Nicolas Damascenus, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions; and the Fragments of Nicolas Damascenus, published by ORELLI, *Lips.* 1804; Suppl. 1811, 8vo. Some critics have attributed to him, without sufficient grounds, the book *Περὶ κόσμου*, found among the works of Aristotle.

of Nero;[1] *Adraştus* of Aphrodisias;[2] and more especially the celebrated commentatbr *Alexander* of Aphrodisias,[3]* the disciple of Herminus and Aristocles, who taught at Alexandria, and who founded a special exegetical school which bore his name.[4] In his work On the Soul he departed from Aristotle, and taught that the soul is not a special substance (*οὐσία*), but simply a form of the organized body (*εἰδός τι τοῦ σώματος ὀργανικοῦ*), and consequently that it could not be immortal; and in his Treatise on Destiny he attacked the Fatalism of the Stoics, which he declared irreconcileable with morality. Among the *Syncretic* Peripatetics may be mentioned *Ammonius* of Alexandria, who taught at Athens;[5] *Themistius* of Paphlagonia; *Syrianus* and *Simplicius*.[6] (See § 219). The commentaries of the latter, next to those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, are the most distinguished production of these schools.

New Pythagoreans.

184. Pythagoras, whose reputation and even whose philosophy had long been familiar to the Romans, had at the

[1] To him are attributed the Commentaries on the Meteorologics and Metaphysics of Aristotle, which by others are assigned to Alexander Aphrodisiensis.

[2] Second century after Christ.

[3] At Venice and Florence there were printed, in the sixteenth century, in a separate form, the different Commentaries attributed to him, on the following works of Aristotle:

The Analytica Priora, the Topics, the Elenchi Sophistarum, the books De Sensu et Sensibili, the Physics, with the treatises De Animâ, and De Fato (*Περὶ εἱμαρμένης καὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*).

Cf. CASIRI Biblioth. Arabico-Hisp., vol. I, p. 243, for the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

* Called, by way of eminence, the Commentator (*ἐξηγητής*).

[4] Surnamed the Alexandrians and Alexandrists. He differed from Aristotle in his doctrine respecting the soul.

[5] In the first century. Plut. de Ei apud Delph. ed. REISKE, tom. vii, p. 512, sqq., et tom. VI, p. 260.

[6] His various commentaries on the works of Aristotle (especially his physical treatises) were published at Venice, at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries.

His Comment. on the Manual of Epict. has been given by SCHWEIGH. Monum. Epict. Phil. tom. IV.

period of which we are treating a large number of followers:[1] his exemplary life, and still more the mysterious character of his history and his doctrines, being the principal causes of the species of enthusiastic reverence with which he was regarded. Some Moral Reformers wished to adopt his principles of practice, of which number were *Qu. Sextius*[2] (a Roman who wrote in Greek) and *Sotion* of Alexandria,[3] both of them acquainted with Seneca at Rome:[4] and to this class of Pythagoreans it is probable that we should refer *Apollonius*[5] of Tyana* in Cappadocia, a disciple of *Euxenus* of Heraclea in Pontus, a very remarkable man, who combined a scientific turn of mind with an exalted religious enthusiasm, who was moreover an imitator of Pythagoras, and consummate in divination; and finally, *Secundus* of Athens.[6]

[1] Cic. De Senect., c. 21; Tusc. IV, 2.

[2] Or Sextus. He flourished about 2 A.C.

He must not be confounded with Sextus of Chæronea (§ 182) the Stoic. His Moral Sentences are to be found in the dubious translation of Ruffinus, published by Th. Gale, Opusc. Mythol. Phys., etc. p. 645, sqq.

De Burigny, On the Philosophical System of Sextius, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. XXXI.

[3] About 15 A.C. [4] Seneca, Ep. 108.

[5] Flourished about 70 A.C.

Flavius Philostratus de Vitâ Apollonii Tyanæi, in Philostratorum Opp. cura Olearii, *Lips.* 1709, fol.: where are printed, with many other letters, those attributed to Apollonius.

Jo. Laur. Mosheim, Diss. de Existimatione Apollonii Tyanæi; in ejus Commentationib. et Oratt. Var. Arg. *Hamburgis.* 1751, 8vo., p. 347, sqq.

Sigism. Chn. Klose, Diss. II de Apollonio Tyanensi Philosopho Pythagorico Thaumaturgo, et de Philostrato, *Viteb.* 1723-24, 4to.

J. C. Herzog, Diss. Philosophia Practica Apollonii Tyanæi in Sciagraphiâ, *Lips.* 1719, 4to.

See also Bayle, and the article by Buhle in the great Encyclopedia published by Ersch, part IV.

* The discoveries of Modern Science have vindicated and explained the extraordinary powers attributed to Apollonius in common with Pythagoras and the Neoplatonists, by referring them to Mesmerism. See Colquhoun's Hist. of Magic, vol. I.—Ed.

[6] About 120 A.C.

For his Moral Sentences, see Secundi Atheniensis Responsa ad Interrogata Hadriani, in the work of Th. Gale, referred to above (note 2), p. 160, sqq.

Others (for instance, *Anaxilaus* of Larissa, banished from Italy under a suspicion of magical practices[1]) applied the principles of Pythagoras to the study of Nature; or, like *Moderatus* of Gades,[2] and *Nicomachus* of Gerasa,[3] endeavoured to discover, in the Pythagorean doctrine of Numbers, a sublime and occult science,[4] which they blended with the theories of Plato.

Neo-Platonists.

See the works mentioned § 201; particularly that of BOUTERWECK.

185. After the downfall of the Sceptic Academy (§ 169, 170), even in the time of Augustus, a new school of Platonists began to form itself, and became popular. Among these, *Thrasyllus* of Mendes,[5] the astrologer, distinguished himself; with *Theon* of Smyrna,[6] the author of an Exposition of Plato;[7] *Alcinous*, who has left us a brief sketch of the Platonic doctrine;[8] *Albinus*, the preceptor of Galen; *Plutarch* of Chæronea,[9] a disciple of Ammonius (§ 183), and preceptor of Adrian; *Calvisius Taurus* of Berytus, near

[1] He flourished under Augustus.

[2] Flourished first century after Christ.

[3] Second century after Christ.

Nicomachus is said to have been the author of a theory of Numbers (Introductio in Arithmeticam, Gr. *Paris.* 1538, 4to.), explained by IAMBLICHUS; and of a Manual of Harmony (apud MEIBOM.: Antiquæ Musicæ Auctores, VII, *Amst.* 1652, 4to).

Fragments of his Symbolics of the Science of Numbers (Θεολογούμενα ἀριθμητικά) are to be found in PHOTIUS, Biblioth. Cod. 187, p. 237.

[4] An Essay on this occult science of Numbers is to be found ap. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS adv. Mathem. X, 248. Cf. also PORPHYR. Vit. Pythagor., § 32, sqq.

[5] First century after Christ. [6] Second century after Christ.

[7] Theon Smyrnensis de iis quæ in Mathematicis ad Platonis lectionem utilia sunt, Gr. et Lat. ed. ISM. BULLIALDUS, *Paris.* 1644, 4to.

[8] Alcinoi introductio at Platonis Dogmata, Gr. cum vers. Lat. Mars. Ficini, *Paris.* 1533, 8vo.; republished with Platonis Dialogi IV. ed FISCHER, 1783, 8vo.

[9] Plutarchi Opera Omnia, Gr. et Lat. ed. HENR. STEPHANUS, 13 vols. 8vo. *Paris.* 1572; ed. REISKE, 12 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1774—82; ed. HUTTEN, 14 vols. 1791—1804, 8vo. Plutarchi Moralia ex recensione XYLANDRI, *Bas.* 1574, fol.; ed. WYTTENBACH, 7 vols. 4to. *Oxon.* 1725—1821, et 15 vols. 8vo.

Plutarch was born 50, died 120 A.C.

Tyre,[1] the master of *Aulus Gellius; Luc. Apuleius* of Medaurus in Numidia;[2] and *Maximus Tyrius*, the Rhetorician.[3]

These philosophers made it their object to disseminate in a popular form the Ethics and Religious Theory of Plato, and constructed for themselves a system of allegorical interpretation which connected the doctrines of that system with the ancient religious Mysteries.[4] With this they blended much that was derived from the Pythagoreans and Aristotle, and, in the Dogmatic manner, pursued the most lofty speculations (the outline of which had been traced in the treatises of Plato) on the Deity, the Creator, the Soul of the World, the Demons, the Origin of the World, and that of Evil. They supposed our conceptions to have a hypostatical existence, and applied their abstract principles to account for phenomena of their own days; for instance, the cessation of oracles.[5] The physician *Galen*,[6] the inventor of the Fourth Figure of Logic, was a calm and sedate Platonist, who admitted, to account for the phenomena of Life, the existence of a twofold Spirit (Πνεῦμα Ζωϊκὸν—Ψυχικὸν):[7] *Favorinus* of Arelas, in Gaul, was more inclined to Scepticism.[8] These Platonists were at the same time for the most part *Eclectics*, but not altogether after the manner of *Potamo* of

[1] About 139. [2] Flourished about 160.

Apuleii Opera, *Lugd.* 1614, 2 vols. 8vo.; in usum Delphini, 1688, 2 vols. 4to. Particularly his sketch therein of the Platonic Philosophy.

Apulcii Opera omnia, cum Not. var. cura RUHNKENII et BOSSCHÆ, 3 vols. 4to. *Lugd. Bat.* 1786–1823.

Cf. Apulcii Theologia exhibita a CH. FALSTERO in ejus Cogitationib. Philos., p. 37. [3] Flourished about 180 A.C.

MAXIMII TYRII Dissertationes XXXI, Gr. et Lat. ed. DAN. HEINSIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1607 et 1614; ex recens. J. DAVISII recudi curavit JO. JAC. REISKE, *Lips.* 1774–75, 2 vols. 8vo.

[4] EUSEB. Præp. Evang. IX, 6, 7.

[5] PLUTARCH. De Def. Orac.; De Is.

[6] Claudius Galenus, born at Pergamus 131, died about 200 A.C.

[7] Galeni Opera Omnia, ed. REN. CHARTERIUS, *Paris.* 1679, 13 vols. Cf. § 81.

† KURT SPRENGEL, Letters on the Philosophic System of Galen, in his Collection towards a History of Medicine, part. I, p. 117.

[8] IMM. FRIED. GREGORII Duæ Commentatt. de Favorino Arelatensi Philosopho, etc. *Laub.* 1755, 4to.

Z. FORSMANN, Diss. (præs. EBB. PORTHAN) de Favorino Philosopho Academico, *Abo.* 1789, 4to.

Alexandria,[1] who, while he selected what he judged most tenable from every system, pretended to form of these extracts a separate doctrine of his own, concerning which we have not sufficient details to enable us to judge.[2]

The Neoplatonism of the Alexandrians, as we shall afterwards see, has been improperly deduced from this isolated attempt.

Scepticism of the Empiric School.

Ænesidemus.

Authorities: Eusebii Prepar. Evangel. XIV, 7. 18; Fragments of Ænesidemus, Πυῤῥωνείων λόγων ὄκτα βιβλία, apud Photium: Myriobibilion sive Bibliotheca, cod. 212: and in Sextus Empiricus (cf. § 189); Diog. Laert. IX.

See also the article Ænesidemus by TENNEMANN, in the Encyclopedia by ERSCH, part II.

186. Ænesidemus, a native of Gnossus in Crete, settled in Alexandria,[3] revived, about the commencement of this period, the Scepticism[4] which had been silenced in the Academy, and wished to make it serve the purpose of strengthening the opinions of Heraclitus, to which he was inclined.[5] For in order to know that everything has its contrary, he maintained that we ought to admit that an *opposite* is presented to each and the same individual.[6] He assumed an external principle of Thought, making Truth to consist in the universality of the subjective appearance.[7] He accused the Academicians of being deficient in Gene-

[1] The period when he lived is uncertain.

C. G. GLOCKNER, Diss. de Potamonis Alexandrini Philosophiâ Eclecticâ, recentiorum Platonicorum Disciplinæ admodum dissimili. *Lips.* 1745, 4to.

[2] DIOG. LAERT. I, 21.

[3] He probably flourished a little later than Cicero.

[4] According to the testimony of Aristocles, related by Eusebius, loc. laud. At the same time, Diog. Laert. (IX, 114), mentions among the disciples of Timon (§ 124), a certain *Euphranor* of Selucia, whose lessons *Eubulus* of Alexandria had followed. To the latter he assigns, as disciple, *Ptolemy* of Cyrene, who, he says, revived Pyrrhonism; and whose disciple *Heraclides*, a sceptical philosopher, had been the master of Ænesidemus.

[5] SEXT. EMP. Adv. Math. IX, 337; X, 216, 233.

[6] Idem. Hypot. I, 210, sqq.

[7] SEXT. EMP. Adv. Math. VII. 349, 350; VIII, 8.

ralisation, as Sceptics, and thereby contradicting themselves.[1] In order therefore to strengthen the cause of Scepticism, he extended its limits to the utmost; admitting and defending the ten Topics (δέκα τρόποι ἐποχῆς), attributed also to Pyrrho (§ 124), to justify a suspense of all positive opinion. These Topics are deduced: 1. From the diversity of Animals; 2. From that of Mankind considered individually; 3. From the fallibility of all our Senses; 4. The circumstances and condition of the Subject; 5. Position, Distance, and other local accidents; 6. The combinations and associations under which things present themselves to our notice; 7. The different dimensions and various properties of things; 8. Their mutual relations; 9. The habitude or novelty of the sensations; 10. The influence of Education, and Institutions, Civil and Religious.[2] In short, Ænesidemus opposed Sceptical objections to every part of Dogmatical philosophy. According to him, Scepticism (πυρρώνειος λόγος) is a comparative reflection exercised on Appearances and Thoughts; which would convict them all of the greatest inconsistency and confusion.[3]

The weak side of this Scepticism is its *Aim*, and *its pretensions to Universality.*

187. The boldest attack made by any of the ancient philosophers on the possibility of demonstrative knowledge, was that attempted by Ænesidemus against the reality of the Idea of Causality, and its application in the investigation of natural causes *(Ætiology)*.[4] He argued that the notion of Causality is without signification, because we cannot understand the relations of Cause and Effect; which he endeavoured to prove by arguments *in abstracto*, and also by insisting on the logical mistakes and false inferences of the Dogmatists in their inquiries into the nature of Causes.

188. From the time of Ænesidemus to that of Sextus, followed a succession of Sceptics, all of them physicists of

[1] Photius.

[2] Euseb. Præpar. Evang. XIV, 18. Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. VII. 345; Hypot. I, 36. Cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 87.

[3] Diog. Laert. IX, 78.

[4] Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. IX, 217, sqq.; Hypotyp. I, 180, sqq.

the Empiric and Methodic Schools;[1] who confined themselves to the observation of facts, and rejected all theory respecting the causes of diseases. Among these, *Favorinus* (§ 185) attached himself to the principles of Ænesidemus. The most distinguished were *Agrippa*, *Menodotus* of Nicomedia, and *Sextus*. Agrippa[2] reduced the ten *Reasons* for doubting to five more extensive ones, viz.: 1. Difference of Opinions; 2. the necessity that every proof should be itself capable of proof; 3. The Relativeness of our impressions; 4. The disposition to Hypothesis; 5. The Arguing in a Circle unavoidable in all proofs.

Finally he insisted on this, that there cannot be any certain knowledge, either immediately, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, nor mediately, ἐξ ἑτέρου; and especially applied himself to criticise the *Formal* part of knowledge.[3]

Sextus Empiricus.

Sexti Empirici Opera, Gr. et Lat. ed. Jo. Alb. Fabricius, *Lips.* 1718, fol. Editio altera, cum Indd. 2 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1842. Recens. Struve, *Regiomont.* 1823, 2 vols. 8vo.

Criticisms on this author:

Guil. Langius, De Veritatibus Geometricis adv. Sextum Empiricum, *Hafn.* 1656, 4to.

De primis Scientiarum Elementis, seu Theologia Naturalis methodo quasi Mathematica digesta. Accessit ad hæc Sexti Empirici adversus Mathematicas decem Modorum ἐποχῆς seu Dubitationis, secundum editionem Fabricii, quibus scilicet Sextus Scepticorum Coryphæus, veritati omni in os obloqui atque totidem retia tendere haud dubitavit, succincta tum Philosophica tum critica refutatio (per Jac. Thomson), *Regiomont.* 1728, (id. 1734), fol.

Gotofr. Ploucquet, Diss. examen rationem a Sexto Empirico tam ad propugnandum quam impugnandam Dei existentiam collectarum, *Tübing.* 1768, 4to.

189. *Sextus*, surnamed Empiricus, from the School of Physicists to which he belonged, was a native, as appears, of Mitylene,[4] and a pupil of Herodotus of Tarsus,[5] the Sceptic. He put the finishing stroke to the Philosophy of

[1] Diog. Laert. IX, 116. [2] First or second century after Christ.
[3] Diog. Laert. IX, 88, sqq. Sextus, Hypotyp. I, 164—178.
[4] This has been proved by Visconti in his Iconographie, on the testimony of a medal of that city. [5] Diog. Laert. IX, 116.

Doubt about the end of the second century. While he availed himself of the works of his predecessors, especially Ænesidemus, Agrippa, and Menodotus, he contributed much to define the object, end, and method of Scepticism, particularly in his three books Πυρρώνειων ὑποτυπώσεων; and to guard against the attacks of the Dogmatists, he made more acccurate distinctions between the operations of his system and the practice of the New Academicians or of the Dogmatists themselves.

190. According to Sextus, Scepticism is the faculty (δύναμις) of comparing the appearances of the senses and thoughts (φαινόμενα τε καὶ νοούμενα), in order, by such a competition, so instituted, to arrive (διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λογοις ἰσοσθένειαν) at a suspension of all judgment (ἐποχὴ) on objects the nature of which is obscure to us (ἄδηλον, ἄφανες): hence results a certain repose of the mind (ἀταραξία), and, in the end, a perfect eqanimity (μετριοπαθεία).

His Scepticism admits the existence of representations and appearances (φαινόμενα); does not deny the possibility of cognition, but the reality of it; and abstains from its pursuit. His system is not a Doctrine, but an entirely subjective mode of viewing things, and consequently does not demand to be proved, but only requires to be stated.[1] His maxim was, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον;[2] meaning that no one thing deserves to be preferred to another.

191. Sextus appears sometimes to have forgotten this principle, when he would erect his principle into a Doctrine, and represent it as an Art of non-cognition; and an Art destructive of all inquiry after Truth, and denying the possibility of its attainment. He exposed himself to this censure because: 1. When he finds himself at a loss for arguments of Doubt, he suggests that *hereafter* they may be discovered;[3] 2. He declines all exposition of the real nature of representation and cognition;[4] 3. He intrenches himself, when he finds it necessary, in Sophisms;[5] 4. He endeavours,

[1] Sextus Emp., Hypotyp. I, 1. 4. 25.
[2] Ibid. 14.
[3] Ibid. 33, sqq.; II, 259.
[4] Idem, I, 9, sqq.
[5] Adv. Math. I, 9.

in this manner, by mere sophistical arguments, to prove that no science can be taught or learnt;[1] 5. He goes so far as to argue, in opposition to his own doctrine (§ 190), against the existence of our representations;[2] 6. He does not define with sufficient perspicuity the facts which he assumes as data, e. g. our representations, and the laws of Thought.

192. Notwithstanding these objections, his statement of Scepticism is a very important work, both in respect of the manner in which he has treated it, and as a record of the state of Science, more especially of Metaphysical Philosophy, among the ancients. In the five last books of his treatises, Πρὸς τοὺς μαθηματικούς, he reviews the doctrines of the principal philosophers in the most important subjects; setting in a strong light the incertitude of their principles, and contradictory or inconsistent conclusions. He endeavonrs to show that the Dogmatists had never discovered any solid and irrefragable *criterium* of Truth; and that they all disagree with respect to the fundamental notions and principles of Logic, Physics, and Ethics. Denying the existence of any self-apparent Certainty (in consequence of the contradictions which prevail in the theses of Philosophers), he begins by demanding that every truth should be proved; and then goes on to show that such proof is impossible, for want of self-evident data. Beginning with such principles he proceeds to demolish all the scientific labours of the human mind, not excepting the Mathematics.

193. Such a system of Scepticism had the tendency to cut short all farther research; and appearing incontrovertible, it stood forth in a terrible aspect. Nevertheless, such a Scepticism contained in itself its own contradiction; it clashes with the natural tendency of the human reason, without being able to make good the object it promised to realise, the repose of the mind. At the time when it appeared it seems to have made little impression, in consequence of the slight interest then felt for philosophical studies; and it died with *Saturninus* (also called Cythenas),

[1] Adv. Math. I, 9. [2] Ibid. 361, sqq.

a disciple of Sextus.[1] The only persons who paid attention to it were some physicians, such as Galen *(De optimo docendi genere)*,[2] and the philosopher Plotinus.[3] The latter[4] opposed to it a visionary and hyperphysical Dogmatism.

Philosophic Doctrines of the Jews and Gentiles.

194. It has not been perfectly ascertained whether at this period there existed an Eastern School of Philosophy, Ἀνατολικὴ διδασκαλία.[5] It has been asserted by Mosheim, Brucker,[6] Walch,[7] and Buhle; and denied by Meiners[8] and Tiedemann.[9] It is impossible to controvert the existence of certain opinions peculiar to the East; but the question is, whether they had already assumed a philosophical form and character, or whether they were not rather developed and brought to perfection in proportion to the progress which Grecian philosophy, and particularly that of Plato, made among the Orientals.[10] This last conjecture becomes still more probable when we reflect that at this period appeared the apocryphal writings, falsely ascribed to Zoroaster, Hermes, and others; as well as when we remark the efforts made by several Gnostics,[11] to depreciate the works of Plato.[12]

[1] DIOG. LAERT. IX, 116. [2] See § 185.

[3] See § 203. [4] PLOT. Enn. V, lib. V, II.

[5] Cf. THEODOT. in FABRICIUS, Bibl. Gr. tom. V, p. 135; PORPHYR. Vita Plotini, E. XVI; EUNAPII Vita Ædesii, p. 61.

[6] Hist. Crit. Phil. tom. II, c. 3, p. 639, sqq.

[7] Commentat. de Philosophiâ Orientali, in MICHAELIS Syntagma Commentatt. part II, p. 279. [8] † History of Philosophy, p. 170.

[9] † Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. III, p. 98. The same (a prize composition): De Artium Magicarum Origine, *Marb.* 1788, 8vo.

[10] BOUTERWECK, in an excellent treatise, which we shall have occasion to notice (§ 201), considers the mystical doctrines of Immediate Intuition, and the Emanation of Spirits, as having been derived from the East and from Persia; particularly through the channel of Alexandria, where they had already been long established.

MATTEI, Essai historique sur l'école d'Alexandrie, tom. II, ch. 8, &c.

[11] PLOTINUS, Enn. I, lib. IX, 6.

[12] See BUHLE, Compendium of the History of Philosophy (§ 37), part IV, p. 73, sqq: and the larger work of TENNEMANN on the History of Philosophy (ibid.) tom. VI, p. 438.

195. On the supposition that the Orientals had a philosophy of their own, it is natural to suppose that the immense extent of the Roman Empire would bring it into contact with that of the Western Nations, and contribute to their admixture. History has afforded us proof of this in the doctrines of the Jews, the Gnostics, and the Neoplatonists. Alexandria, where, from the time of the Ptolemies, every system of philosophy had been taught, was the principal point of union between the Eastern and Western doctrines.

I. *Jews.*

See the works mentioned in § 73.

196. During their exile the Jews had collected many opinions belonging to the religion and philosophy of Zoroaster (§ 70), for example, that of a Primitive Light, of two Principles, the Good and the Evil, and of the Demons. Subsequently, a certain number of their countrymen who had settled in Egypt, and, in consequence of their medical studies had engaged in speculation (particularly those who were devoted to a contemplative life, and therefore called Therapeutæ), acquired some knowledge of Grecian philosophy;[1] but, faithful to their national prejudice, that all wisdom must have originated from the Jews, they regarded the truths which they met among the Greeks, as well as all that agreed with their ancient religious traditions, as a theft. In order to substantiate this idea, Aristeas[2] devised the story of an ancient translation into Greek of the Old Testament; and *Aristobulus*,[3] a Peripatetic, forged certain Apocryphal books and passages.

[1] The resemblance of the Essenes to the Pythagoreans had already been observed. See J. J. BELLERMANN, Historical Evidences respecting the Essenes and Therapeutæ, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo.

[2] HUMFREDI HODY, contra Historiam Aristeæ de LXX interpretibus, etc. *Oxon.* 1685, 8vo. Et: De Bibliorum Textibus Origine, Versionibus, etc. 1705, fol.

[3] LUD. CASP. VALKENAER, Diatribe de Aristobulo Judæo, Philosopho Peripatetico, *Lugd. Bat.* 1806, 4to. Other critics however consider the very existence of this author as doubtful, and attribute the Commentaries on the books of Moses, which bear his name, to a later period. He lived, perhaps, in the time of Ptolemy Philometor.

Philo of Alexandria.

PHILONIS JUDÆI Opera. FL. JOSEPHI Opera, (see § 73).

JO. ALB. FABRICII Diss. de Platonismo Philonis, *Leips.* 1693, 4to. Idem.: Sylloge Dissertat. *Hamb.* 1738, 4to.

† C. F. STAHL, Attempt at a Systematic Statement of the Doctrines of Philo of Alexandria: in the *Allgem. Bibl. der Bibl. Literatur* of EICHHORN, tom. IV, fasc. V.

† J. CHPH. SCHREITER, Ideas of Philo respecting the Immortality of the Soul, the Resurrection, and Future Retribution: in the *Analecten* of KEIL and TZCHIRNER, vol. I, sect. 2; see also vol. III, sect. 2.

SCHEFFER, Quæstiones, P. I, II, 1829—31.

GROSSMANN, Quæctiones Philonianæ, Pars I: De theologiæ Philonis fontibus et auctoritate, 1829.

GFRÖRER, Philo und die Alexandrische Theosophie, 2 Bde, (1831) 1835.

DÆHNE, Geschichtliche Darstellung der judisch-alexandrinischen Religions-philosophie, 1 Abth. 1831.

Ibid. in the Theol. Studien und Kritiken Jahrb. 1833, p. 934.

BUCHER, Philonische Studien, 1848.

CREUZER, Kritik der Schriften des Juden Philon. (Theol. Studien und Kritiken Jahrb.) 1832, 1 Heft.

DR. RITTER'S Hist. of Ancient Philosophy, vol. IV. c. 6: (Philo the Jew.)

197. The Jew *Philo*,[1] a man of erudition and of a cultivated mind, settled at Alexandria, was not free from prejudices, but supported them in a more honourable spirit. He applied his knowledge of all the Greek systems, and especially that of Plato (who has so many points of correspondence with the Orientals), to represent his national religion as a perfect and divine doctrine. *Josephus*[2] subsequently followed the same course. On the other hand, Philo transferred into his system of Platonic philosophy many of the opinions of the East, in return for those which he borrowed from Plato. He may be considered (as Bouterweck has ranked him) as the *first Neoplatonist of Alexandria*. He assumes that the Divinity and Matter are the two first principles, existing from eternity. Agreeably to the principles of Plato, he characterizes them thus: the Divinity as a Being, Real, Infinite, and Immutable, Incomprehensible to any human

[1] Born at Alexandria, some years B.C.

[2] Flavius Josephus, born at Jerusalem, 37 A.C.

understanding (Ὄν); Matter, as non-existing (μὴ ὄν), but having received from the Divinity a form and life. He represents the Deity, by certain Oriental figures, as the Primitive Light, as an Infinite Intelligence, from whom are derived, by irradiation, all finite Intelligences. In the soul of the Divinity are concentrated the ideas of all things possible. This λόγος of the Divine Being, the focus of all Ideas (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), is in fact the Ideal World; and called also the Son of God, or the Archangel. He is the image of God, the type after which God by his creative power (λόγος προφερικός) formed the world, such as it is presented to our senses. Hence three hypostases in the Divine Being. We cannot become acquainted with the nature of God but by His immediate influence on our minds: hence the doctrine of Internal Intuition.[1] We may clearly observe how the views of the Jews were modified by the representations of Platonism, and how this admixture gave birth to new opinions. *Numenius* of Apamea in Syria,[2] in part admitted this mode of representation, and maintained that reason is the faculty of acquiring a knowledge of the Absolute and Supersensuous. He perfected the notion of the Trinity, by distinguishing, in the Divine Incorporeal Being, first, the Primitive and Supreme God, the immutable, eternal, and perfect intelligence; secondly, the Creator of the World, or Demiurgos, the νοῦς, having a twofold relation to the Divinity as his Son, and to the World as its author. The same philosopher maintained the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul, and styled Plato *the Attic Moses* (ἀττικίζων).[3]

The Cabbalists.

Authority: The Talmud.

Liber Jezirah, translatus et Notis illustr. a Rittangelo, *Amstel.* 1642, 4to.

Artis Cabbalisticæ, hoc est reconditæ Theologiæ et Philosophiæ Scriptores; (Editor, J. Pistorius), tom. I, *Basil.* 1587, fol.

Kabbala Denudata, seu doctrina Hebræorum transcendentalis et Me-

[1] Philo de Mundi Opificio, de Confusione Linguarum, de Somnis, quod Deus sit immutabilis, de Præmiis et Pœnis. Euseb. Præp. Evang. VII, 13; XI, 15; Hist. Eccles. II, 4, sqq.; 7, sqq.

[2] Second century after Christ.

[3] Euseb. Præp. Evang. XI, 10. 18; IX, 6; XIII, 5; XIV, 5; XV, 17.

taphysica atque Theologica, opus antiquissimæ Philosophiæ barbaricæ variis speciminibus refertissimum, in quo ante ipsam libri translationem difficilimi atque in literatura Hebraica summi, commentarii nempe in Pentateuchum et quasi totum scriptuarum V. T. Kabbalistici, cui nomen Sohar, tam veteris quam recentis, ejusque Tikkunim seu supplementorum tam veterum quam recentiorum præmittitur apparatus. Tom. I, *Solisb.* 1677, 4to. tom. II. Liber Sohar restitutus (editore CHRIST. KNORR DE ROSENROTH), *Francof.* 1684, 4to.

† RABBI COHEN IRIRA, Porta Cœlorum. (A Commentary on the two Cabbalistic books above). WOLFF, Biblioth. Hebr. *Hamb.* 1721, 4 vols. 4to. (in the first vol.).

† EISENMENGER, Judaism displayed, *Königsb.* 2 vols. 1711, 4to.

† DE LA NAUZE, Remarks on the Antiquity and Origin of the Cabbala, in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscr. tom. IX.

† J. FR. KLEUKER, On the Doctrine of Emanation among the Cabbalists, etc. *Riga*, 1786, 8vo.

† Life of Solomon Maimon, published by PH. MORITZ, *Berlin*, 1792, in 2 parts, 8vo.

† On the Doctrine of Emanation and Pantheism in the first ages of Antiquity, with especial reference to the writers of the Old and New Testaments. An Historical, Critical, and Explanatory Essay, *Erf.* 1805, 8vo.

HARTMANN, Leipz. Liter. Zeitung, 1834, No. 63, 64.

JOST, Geschichte der Israeliten. 3 Bd. p. 195. sqq.

ZUNZ, die Gottesdienstlichen Vortrage der Juden; p. 162, sqq., et 402, sqq.

THOLUCK, (Commentatio de vi quam Græca philosophia in theologiam tum Muhammedanorum quam Judæorum exercuerit); Part II, De Ortu Cabbalæ, 1837.

MOLITOR, Philosophie der Geschichte, oder über die Tradition im Alten Bunde und ihre Beziehungen zum Neuen Bunde, mit vorzüglicher Rücksicht auf die Kabbala. 1827—1837, 3 Bände.

FREYSTADT, Philosophia cabbalistica et Pantheismus, 1832.

ADLER, Die Kabbala, oder die Religions-philosophie der Hebräer. In den Jahrbüchern für speculative Philosophie, 1846–1847.

198. *Cabbala* (that is *oral tradition*) is a system of assumed Divine Wisdom, diversified by a variety of fables, which the Jews affect to have received from a Divine source through secret tradition. To treat of it only as far as it belongs to the history of philosophy—it had its origin as early as the first centuries of the Christian era, and was invented or systematised by the Rabbi *Akibha*,[1] and his disciple *Simeon Ben Jochai*, surnamed *the spark of Moses*. It consists in a string of philosophical legends, which represent all things as descending, in a continued scale, from the

[1] Died A. D. 138.

Ensoph (the First Light); the Deity and Creator. They are arranged in ten Sephiroths, or luminous circles; and four worlds, Aziluth, Briah, Jezirah, and Aziah. Adam Cadmon, the first man, was the firstborn of the Divinity, the Messiah, by whose means the rest of the universe emanated from the Almighty, yet in such a way that it subsists in God: God being the inherent cause of all things. By the person of the Son is probably here implied the idea of the world conceived by God. All things that exist are of a *spiritual* nature, and matter itself is nothing but a condensation or attenuation of the rays of light; in a word, every substance is divine.

To this theory of *Emanation* were added a tissue of imaginations respecting the Demons, which involved a belief in magic; respecting the four elements of souls; their origin and formation; and, lastly, with regard to man considered as a microcosm, or little world in himself. This last notion gave occasion to a new fancy, that of pretending to acquire knowledge by ecstasy.* The whole is a mass of strange and exaggerated representations, conceived under the influence of the religion of the Persians, but employed by those who advanced them to recommend to general notice the sacred history and doctrines of the Jews; especially with respect to the creation and the origin of evil. It is probable that the Cabbalistic books Jezirah and Sohar (see the works at the head of this section), the first attributed to the Rabbi Akibha, the second to Simeon Ben Jochai, have been from time to time interpolated by their expositors. The Christians became acquainted with the Cabbala, by *name* only, in the fifteenth century; the Jews having carefully concealed from them these mysteries.

II. *Gnostics.*

WALCH, De Philosoph. Oriental. Gnosticorum Systematis fonte; and MICHAELIS, De Indiciis Gnosticæ Philosophiæ tempore LXX Interpretum et Philonis; second part of his last Syntagm. Commentt.

ERN. ANT. LEWALD, Comment. ad Hist. Religionum vett. illustrandum pertinens, de Doctrinâ Gnosticorum, *Heidelb.* 1818, 8vo.

* This fancy has been substantiated by the discoveries of Animal Magnetism.—ED.

The same author had previously published: De Fidei Gnoseosque ideâ, et eâ quâ ad se invicem et ad Philosophiam referuntur ratione secundum mentem Clem. Alexandrini, *Heidelb.* 1811, 8vo.

BAUR, Das manichäische Religions-system, 1831.

† J. AUG. NEANDER, Origin and Development of the principal Gnostic Systems, *Berlin*, 1818, 8vo.

FRITZCHE'S Ketzer Lexicon.

Professor NORTON'S Hist. of the Gnostics, 1845.

199. The same spirit of extravagant speculation possessed the Gnostics also. They pretended to a superior and mysterious knowledge (γνῶσις) of the Divine Being, and the origin of the World; blending the religious dogmata of the Persians and Chaldees with those of the Greeks and Christians. The greater number of them professed Christianity, though they were looked upon as heretics. Some attached themselves to the Jewish persuasion, others became its adversaries, others again appear to have belonged to no particular religious creed whatsoever. The most distinguished among them (for the most part Orientals), were *Simon* Magus, *Menander* the Samaritan, *Cerinthus* the Jew, all belonging to the first century: then *Saturninus* the Syrian, *Basilides*, *Carpocrates*, and *Valentinus* of Alexandria, who approximated the Neoplatonists (second century); *Marcion* of Sinope,[1] *Cerdon* and *Bardisanes*, both Syrians[2] (about the middle of the second century); and *Manes*,[3] a Persian (put to death by Sapor, A.D. 277). Their followers subsisted some ages after. One division of them recognised in the Divinity the One Great Principle whence they derived all things, according to different degrees or classes of spirits called Æons; another admitted the existence of Two first principles, a Good and an Evil one, continually opposed to, and conflicting with each other. Lastly, a third divi-

[1] AUG. HAHN, Progr. de Gnosi Marcionis Antinomi, P. I and II. *Regiomont.* 1820-21, 8vo. Et: Antitheses Marcionis Gnostici, liber deperditus, nunc quoad ejus fieri potuit restitutus, *ibid.* 1823, 4to.

[2] AUG. HAHN, Bardesanes Gnosticus Syrorum primus Hymnologus. Commentat. Hist. Theol. *Lips.* 1819, 8vo.

[3] † BEAUSOBRE, Critical History of Maniches and Manicheism, *Amst.* 1734—39, 2 vols. 4to. See also BAYLE, sub hac voce, and WALCH'S Hist. of Heres. part. I, sect. 770.

† K. A. von REICHLIN MELLDEGG, The Theological System of Manes, and its Origin, etc., *Francf. on the M.* 1825, 8vo.

sion of Gnostics maintaining the existence of two Principles (of Light and Darkness), asserted that they were both derived from one common Creator. In general, they identified matter with the Evil principle, and regarded even the formation of the Universe as a fall and declension from the Divine Being. These their leading dogmata were associated with a multitude of fictions incredibly daring and extravagant; and each of which supposed a particular revelation imparted to their authors. The imagination has played, among the Orientals, a predominant part; and they delight in losing themselves in a labyrinth of hypotheses allied to the supernatural.* Morality could not but suffer in consequences of such extravagancies, and was apt to sink into a narrow asceticism.

§ 200.

BAUR, Der Begriff der christlichen Philosophie. In den theologischen Jahrbüchern, 1846. Zweyter Artikel: Die patristische Philosophie, § 72. 115.

(A.) *The Christian Gnostics.*

BAUR, Die christliche Gnosis in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung, 1835.

The Nature of the Christian Gnosis.

200. The Christian Gnosis, or the Gnosticism of the second century of our era, proceeded from the conflict of the three religious systems that prevailed at the first appearance of Christianity; Judaism, Heathenism, and their youthful opponent Christianity. It originated also in the urgent necessity of reconciling the latter with the former, and of determining how much of the new religion was derived from previously existing opinions. The objects of chief interest on which the attention of men's minds were concentrated during this process of fusion were, the relations between God and the World, Spirit and Matter, and the origin of evil attributed to the latter. Gnosticism naturally attached itself to these problems, and sought to solve the Dualism of the old world's philosophy, though often rather in a phantastic than a philosophical manner.

The universal and uniform aim of the various Gnostic

* The Rationalist Convictions of Tennemann lead him to condemn as visionary all supernaturalist tendencies.—ED.

systems is to represent Christianity as the higher religion, at the expense of Judaism and Heathenism, and to regard the whole previous religious development of the world as having reference to Christ, and as so many subordinate and progressive degrees of the spirit of humanity. All the Gnostic systems agreed in adopting the following essential elements: the supreme invisible God, and opposed to Him, ungodly perishable Matter, the successive emanation of *Œons*, or divine spirits, from God, and the Creator of the world, Demiurgos, or Christ.

These elements compose the forces out of which the world has been developed, a development that was represented by the Gnostic systems as a revelation of the Divine Being in its operations in the World. Thus the history of human development, as it steered its course towards Christ, is in reality the history of the Divine, of the purification of the divine principle from its contact with matter.

The most natural and desirable classification of the Gnostic systems will be that which assigns them their rank and estimation, according to the light in which they view Christianity as compared with previous systems.

The first great form of the Gnostic systems places Christianity and Judaism in absolute opposition with Heathenism: this is the system of the so-called *Clementine Homilies*.

The second great form represents Christianity as the goal to which all previous religions tended and pointed: *Basilides* and his followers; *Valentinus* and his disciples; the system of the *Ophites* and of the collateral sects, especially those of *Saturninus* and of *Bardesanes*, belonged to this division.

The third chief form represents Christianity as the only religion that is divine and absolute, and stands forth in sharp separation from Heathenism and Judaism: to this school belong *Marcion* and his disciples.

We have lastly the fourth chief form of Gnosticism, called Manicheism, which regards Christianity as identical with the religions of the past, and as finally perfected in the revelation of *Manes*, the appointed Paraclete.

MATTER, Essai sur l'école d'Alexandrie, (1820), (1840), 2 Th.

Neoplatonism of Plotinus; Predecessors and Successors of this philosopher.

Authorities: The works of Plotinus; Porphyry; Iamblichus; Julian; Eunapius, Vitæ Philosophorum, (see § 81); Sallustius, de Diis et Mundo; Proclus; Suidas.

† Sainte-Croix, Letter to M. Du Theil, on a new edition of all the works of the Eclectic Philosophers, *Paris*, 1797, 8vo.

Gottfr. Olearii Diss. de Philosophiâ Eclecticâ; in his translation of Stanley's History of Philosophy, p. 1205.

† Critical History of Eclecticism, or the Neoplatonists, *Avignon*, 1766, 2 vols. 12mo.

† G. G. Fulleborn, Neoplatonic Philosophy; in his Collect. fasc. III, No. 8.

† Chph. Meiners, Memoirs towards a History of the Opinions of the first century after Christ, with Observations on the System of the Neoplatonists, *Leips.* 1782, 8vo.

C. A. G. Keil, De Causis alieni Platonicorum recentiorum a Religione Christianâ animi, *Lips.* 1785, 4to.

J. G. A. Oelrich, Comm. de Doctrinâ Platonis de Deo a Christianis et recentioribus Platonicis variè explicata et corrupta, *Marb.* 1788, 8vo.

Alb. Christ. Roth, Diss. (præs. J. B. Carpzov) Trinitas Platonica, *Lips.* 1693, 4to.

Joh. Wilh. Jani Diss. (præs. J. G. Neumann) Trinitas Platonismi verè et falsè suspecta, *Viteb.* 1708, 4to.

H. Jac. Ledermüller, Diss. (præs. Ge. Aug. Will) de Theurgia et Virtutibus Theurgicis, *Altd.* 1763, 4to.

J. Aug. Dietelmaier, Progr. quo seriem Veterum in Schola Alexandrina Doctorum exponit, *Aitd.* 1746, 4to.

Imm. Fichte, De Philosophiæ Novæ Platonicæ Origine, *Berol.* 1818, 8vo.

Frid. Bouterweck, Philosophorum Alexandrinorum ac Neoplatonicorum recensio accuratior, Comment. in Soc. Gott. habita, 1821, 4to. (See Gott. gel. Anz. No. 166, 167, 1821).

201. Neoplatonism had its origin in the frequented school of the Platonists of Alexandria, and was characterised by an ardent and enthusiastic zeal. Its disciples aspired to attain the highest pinnacles of science, to acquire a knowledge of the *absolute*, and an intimate union (ἕνωσις) therewith, as the final end of man's being. The way thereto they held to be the intuition of the *absolute* (θεωρία).

202. The principal causes which led to this new system were: The decline of genuine Grecian philosophy, and the admixture with its remains of the theories of the East;

added to a continually-increasing attachment to Oriental exaggeration and enthusiasm, which they confirmed by frequent appeals to celestial revelations, while they depreciated the merit of Plato as a philosopher.[1] The prevailing spirit of the age, and the decline of the Roman empire, contributed to this. To these may be added two other causes: the opposition the Sceptics of the modern school continually made to all pretensions to rational knowledge: and the alarm which the victorious progress of Christianity occasioned to the defenders of the old religion, lest it should be utterly overthrown.

The importance which Platonism assumed in this conflict between the Christians and the Polytheists, added to the daily increasing influence of Oriental notions, caused that philosophy to assume a fresh distinction: its ardent character being aided by the scientific turn of the Greeks, and heightened by the admixture of many other doctrines.

203. Philo of Alexandria (§ 197), Numenius (ibid.) and Atticus, had already given specimens of this sort of mystical speculation, and association of Oriental ideas with those of the Platonists. The same is observable in the writings of many of the Greek Fathers of the Church, Justin for instance, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen; who not unfrequently *Platonise*. *Ammonius*[2] of Alexandria, a man of low birth, obliged to gain his livelihood as a porter, (whence his surname of *Saccas*), and probably also an apostate from Christianity,[3] but endowed with a strong love of knowledge, great talents, and an enthusiastic temper, threw himself into this new career of philosophy, and became the founder of a School,[4] which laboured to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle on the most important topics.[5] He infused the same enthusiastic spirit into his disciples, among whom *Longinus*,[6] a celebrated critic and judicious

[1] PLOTINUS, Enn. II, lib. IX, 6.

[2] DEHAUT, Essai historique sur la vie et la doctrine d'Ammonius, *Saccas*, 1836.

[3] EUSEB. Hist. Eccles. VI, 19.

[4] About 123 A.C.

[5] C. F. RÖSLER, Diss. de Commentitiis Philosophiæ Ammonicæ fraudibus et noxis, *Tub.* 1786, 4to.

[6] DAV. RHUNKENII Diss. de Vitâ et Scriptis Longini. *Lugd. Bat.*

thinker,[1] *Plotinus*, *Origen*, and *Herennius*, were the most distinguished. The three last made a solemn engagement to keep their doctrines secret.[2]

§ 204.

PLOTINI Opera, *Florentiæ*, 1492, fol., et cum Interpret. Ficini, *Bas.* 1580, 1615, fol.

PLOTINI Opera omnia, ed. CREUZER, 3 vols. 4to. *Oxon.* 1835.

PLOTINI liber De Pulchritudine, ad Codd. fidem cum Annotatione perpetuâ et præparatione, ed FRIED. CREUZER, *Heidelb.* 1814, 8vo.

PLOTINUS Περὶ τῆς πρώτης αρχῆς τῶν πάντων, etc.; VILLOIS, Anecd. Gr. II, 237. sqq.

† The Enneades of Plotinus translated, with Explanatory Remarks, by Doctor S. G. VON ENGELHARDT, preceded by the Life of Plotinus by PORPHYRY, part II, *Erl.* 1820, 8vo. See also the Studien of CREUZER, vol. I, *Francf.* and *Heidelb.* 1805.

PORPHYRII Vita Plotini, at the commencement of the editions of the works of Plotinus.

FRIEDR. GRIMMII Commentat. quâ Plotini de Rerum Principio sententia (Enn. II, lib. VIII, c. 8. 10) Animadversionibus illustratur, *Lips.* 1788, 8vo.

JUL. FRIEDR. WINZER, Progr. adumbratio decretorum Plotini de Rebus ad Doctrinam Morum pertinentibus, Spec. I, *Viteb.* 1809, 4to.

HAUFF, Neu Platonismus und Christenthum, mit besonderer Rucksicht auf Porphyr. In den Studien der evangelischen Geistlichkeit Würtembergs, 1838, 10 Bd. 3 Heft.

VOGT, Neu Platonismus und Christenthum, I Theil; neu-platonische Lehre (nach Plotin), 1836.

HEIGL, Die plotinische Physik, 1815.

STEINHART, Meletemata Plotiniana, 1840.

G. W. GERLACH, Disp. de differentia quæ inter Plotini et Schellingii doctrinam de numine summo intercedit, *Viteb.* 1811, 4to.

Plotinus was born A.D. 205, at Lycopolis in Egypt. Nature had endowed him with superior parts, particularly with a deeply feeling spirit and a lofty and vigorous imagination. He early manifested these abilities in the school of Ammonius at Alexandria. Subsequently he determined to accompany the army of Gordian to the East, in order to study the Oriental systems in their native soil. He was a

1776. and the editions of the treatise Περὶ Ὑψους attributed to him, by TOUP, MORE, and WEISKE, (*Leips.* 1809, 8vo).

[1] Born at Athens 213. Put to death at Palmyra, A.D. 275.

[2] PORPHYR. Vita Plotini. EUSEB. Hist. Eccles. 1. 1. Hierocles de Providentiâ, in PHOTIUS, cod. 251, 214.

dreamer, who perpetually laboured to attain the comprehension of the Absolute by intuitional perception; a notion which he transferred into Plato's writings. Carried away by his enthusiasm he thought that he was developing the designs of the philosopher of the Academy, when in fact he exhibited his thoughts only partially and incompletely. The impetuous vivacity of his temper, which caused him to fall into extasies,* prevented his reducing his mystical Rationalism to a system. His various scattered treatises were revised by Porphyry and edited in six Enneades.[1]

He died in Campania, A.D. 270; having taught at Rome, and enjoying the almost divine veneration of his disciples.

205. Plotinus assumes, as his principle, that philosophy can have no place except in proportion as cognition and the thing known—the *Subjective* and the *Objective*—are identical. The employment of philosophy is to acquire a knowledge of the One thing, (*τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἕν, τὸ ἀγαθόν*), the essence and first principle of all things: and that not mediately by thought or reflection, but by a more exalted method, by direct intuition (*παρουσία*), anticipating the progress of thinking.[2] The end of his philosophy, according to Porphyry (§ 215), is an immediate union with the Divine Being.[3] He was led by twofold considerations, scientific as well as moral, to this mystical sort of Idealism: the only path which human Reason had not yet essayed.

206. Every thing that exists, exists in virtue of unity, is one, and contains unity in itself. Nevertheless existence and unity are not identical; because every object comprises a plurality. Neither is Reason unity; for it perceives Unity in a complete manner, not *without* but *within* itself. It is at once the percipient subject and the object perceived: therefore it is not single but twofold; it is not the first or Primitive Being, but only Unity deduced and derived from some other principle. Primitive Unity is

* His was probably a case of Natural Somnambulism, which unravels many of the arcana of the New Platonic Philosophy.—ED.

[1] PORPHYR. Vita Plotini, c. 6 and 24.

[2] Enn. V, lib. III, 8: lib. V, 7, sqq.; Enn. VI, lib. IX, 3 et 4.

[3] Enn. V, lib. I, 1, 2.

no thing, but the principle of all things; absolute good and perfection; simple in its own nature, and not falling within the conceptions of the understanding. It has neither quantity nor quality; neither reason nor soul: it exists neither in motion nor repose; neither in space nor time; it is not a numeric unity nor a point, for these are comprehended in other things, in those namely which are divisible; but it is pure *Esse* without Accident; of which we may form a notion by conceiving it to be sufficient to itself: it is exempt from all want or dependency, as well as from all thought or will: it is not a thinking Being, but Thought itself in action: it is the principle and cause of all things, infinitely small, and at the same time of infinite power; the common centre of all things,—*Good*[1]—*The Deity.*

207. Unity is also represented as Primitive and Pure Light, from which perpetually radiates a luminous circle pervading all space. It possesses the sight and knowledge of itself, but without duality of terms, without reflection; it is at once pure virtuality, and the essence of all things that exist.[2] The *One* and the *Perfect* continually overflows, and from it Being, Reason, and Life, are perpetually derived, without deducting anything from its substance, inasmuch as it is simple in its nature, and not, like matter, compound.[3] This derivation of all things from Unity, does not resemble Creation, which has reference to time, but takes place purely in conformity with the principles of causality and order, without volition; because to will is to change.[4] From this primordial Unity there emanates, in the first place (as light does from the sun), an eternal essence of the most perfect nature; viz. Pure Intelligence (νοῦς), which contemplates Unity, and requires only *that* for its existence. From this in its turn emanates the Soul of the world (ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός or τῶν ὅλων).

Such are the three elements of all real being: which

[1] Enn. VI, lib. IX, 1, sqq.
[2] Idem. III, lib. VIII, 8, 9; Enn. VI, lib. VIII, 16; Enn. IV. lib. III, 17; Enn. V, lib. I, 7.
[3] Idem, VI, lib. IX, 9,
[4] Idem IV, 5; lib. I, 6.

themselves have their origin in Unity;[1] this is the Trinity (*Trias*) of Plotinus:[2]

208. Pure Intelligence (Νοῦς), is the product and the image of Unity; but inasmuch as it contemplates Unity as its object, it becomes itself the percipient, and is thus distinguished from that which it perceives, or Duplicity. Inasmuch as Intelligence contemplates in Unity that which *is possible*, the latter acquires the character of something determined and limited; and so becomes the *Actual* and *Real* (ὄν). Consequently, Intelligence is the primal reality, the base of all the rest, and inseparably united to real being. The thinking *Esse* and the *Esse* thought are identical; and that which Intelligence thinks, it at the same time *creates*. By always thinking, and always in the same manner, yet continually with some new difference, it produces all things: it is the essence of every imperishable *essence:* the sum total of infinite life.[3] It comprises all Gods and all Immortal Souls; Perfect Truth and Beauty also belong to it.

209. The Soul (i. e. the *Soul of the World*), is the offspring of Intelligence, and the thought (λόγος) of Intelligence, being itself also productive and creative. It is therefore Intelligence, but with a more obscure vision and less perfect knowledge: inasmuch as it does not itself directly contemplate objects, but through the medium of Intelligence; being endowed with an energetic force which carries its perceptions beyond itself. It is not an original but reflected light, the principal of action, and of external Nature. Its proper activity consists in perception direct from without (θεωρία); and in the production of objects by means of this perception. In this manner it produces, in its turn, different classes of souls, and among others the human; the faculties of which have a tendency to elevation

[1] Enn. II, lib. IX, III; lib. V, 3. V; lib. I, 3 et 6; lib. II, I.

[2] Joh. Heim. Feustking, De Tribus Hypostasibus Plotini, *Viteb.* 1694, 4to. Cf. Dissertations of Roth and Janus, quoted § 201.

[3] Enn. VI, lib. VIII, 16; Enn. IV, lib. III, 17; Enn. VI, lib. VII, 51; lib. VIII, 16, Enn. V, lib. I, 4, 7; lib. III, 5, 7; lib. V, 2; lib. IX, 5; Enn. VI, lib. VII, 12, 13.

or debasement. The energy of the lowest order, creative, and connected with matter, is Nature (φύσις).[1]

210. Nature is a percipient and creative energy, which gives form to matter (λόγος ποιῶν); for form (εἶδος—μορφή) and thought (λόγος) are one and the same. All that takes place in the world around us is the work of Perception, and for the sake of Perception.[2] Thus from Unity, as from the centre of a circle, are progressively derived Plurality, Divisible Being, and Life; by continued abstraction. In Unity, form and matter are distinguishable; for it is Form that fashions; which supposes something capable of receiving a determinate impression.[3]

211. Form and Matter, Soul and Body, are inseparable. There never was a time when the universe was not animated; but as we can *conceive* it not to have been so, the question suggests itself: *What is matter; and how was it produced by Unity* (since the latter is the principle of all Reality?) Matter is real, but devoid of Form; it is indeterminateness, capable of receiving a form, and stands in the same relation to it as shade to light. Unity, as being the cause of Reality, continually progresses from itself as a centre; and following this progressive scale of production to the end, we arrive at a final product, beyond which no other is possible; an ultimate term whence nothing can proceed, and which ceases to retain any portion of unity or perfection. The Soul, by its progressive intuitional and sensational perception, which is at the same time *production* also, creates for itself the scene of its action; that is, Space, and therewith Time also.* The Soul is a light kindled by Intelligence, and shedding its rays within certain limits, beyond which is night and darkness. It contemplates this darkness, and gives it a form, from its own incapability of enduring any thing unimpressed by Thought; and thus out of darkness it creates for itself a beautiful and diversified habitation, inseparable from the cause which produced it; in other words it bestows on itself a body.[4]

[1] Enn. V, lib. I, 6, 7; lib. VI, 4; Enn. VI, lib. II, 22.
[2] Enn. III, lib. VIII. [3] Enn. II, lib. IV, 14; Enn. III. lib. VI, 7.
* An analogous but not identical system of Mystical Idealism has been reproduced in Germany by the School of Schelling.—Ed.
[4] Enn. I, lib. VIII, 7; Enn. III, lib. IV, 2; Enn. II, lib. III, IV.

Since all Reality is present in the Intelligence in an eternal way, Plotinus draws a distinction between intelligible and sensational Matter. He appears sometimes to regard unformed or rude matter as a product of the mind, but through an imperfection in its operations: supposing the mind while occupied in creation to have been sometimes carried out of itself, without fixing its view on the First and Perfect Principle; and consequently becoming liable to indeterminateness.[1] At other times he speaks of unformed matter as possessed of reality, but *not* derived from the Soul.[2]

212. There is an Intellectual World as well as a World of Sense (*νοητὸς καὶ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος*): the latter is but the image of the former, and hence their perfect accordance. The intellectual world is a Whole, Invariable, Absolute, Living; Undivided in point of space; Unchangeable through time: it is Unity in Plurality and Plurality in Unity, like Science (the spiritual world.) Indeterminateness exists even in the Intellectual world: the greater the distance from True Being the greater the degree of Indeterminateness.

In the Sensible World, (the reflection of the former), are plants, the earth, rocks, fire, etc.—all of them endued with life; for the World itself is an animated Idea. Fire, air, and water are ideas endowed with life: a Soul inhabiting Matter, as a creative principle (*hylozoism*).

Nothing in Nature is devoid of Reason: even the inferior animals possess it, but in a different degree from man.[3]

213. Every object possesses Unity and Multiplicity. To the Body belongs Multiplicity, divisible with reference to Space. The Soul is an essence devoid of extent, immaterial, and simple in its nature; without body; or with a body which has two natures, the superior one indivisible: the inferior divisible. To each of these he assigns three forces. Souls descend from the Intellectual to the Sensational world. Their union with the Body is a Fall from the perfect and happy state.

Plotinus states very ably the metaphysical arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the Soul: but at

[1] Enn. I, lib. VIII, 3, 4. [2] Enn. III, lib. VIII, 1.
[3] Enn. IV, lib. IV, VIII, IX; Enn. VI, lib. IV, VII.

the same time gives rise to extravagant imaginations in his dreams respecting the union of the immaterial element with the corporeal substance.[1]

214. Every thing that takes place is the result of Necessity, and of a principle identified with all its consequences; (in this we see the rudiments of Spinozism, and the Theodicé of Leibnitz).[2] All things are connected together by a perpetual dependency; (a system of universal Determinism, from which there is only one exception, and that rather apparent than real, of *Unity*). Out of this concatenation of things arise the principles of natural Magic and Divination.[3] As for the existence of Evil in the external world, Plotinus considers it to be sometimes an unavoidable but necessary negation of good, at others, something positive: such as Matter, Body; and, in this latter particular, sometimes as being external to the soul, and the cause of imperfection in its productions; sometimes as seated within the soul, as its imperfect product. In this manner he falls into the very fault which he urges against the Gnostics.[4] He is also led to adopt a system of Optimism and Fatalism, adverse to Morality;[5] though occasionally he admits that moral Evil is voluntary, and the author of it accountable.[6]

215. Unity (the Divinity) being Perfection itself, is the end and object of all things, which derive from him their nature and their being; and which cannot become perfect but through him. The Human Soul cannot attain perfection or felicity but by the intuition of the Supreme Unity, by means of an absolute abstraction (ἁπλώσις, simplification) from all compound things, and by absorption into pure *Esse*. In this consists Virtue, which is twofold: Inferior Virtue, comprising the so-called *cardinal* virtues, (or πολιτική), belonging to such souls as are in the progress of purification; and Superior Virtue, which consists in an intimate union, by intuition, with the Divine Being (ἕνωσις). Its source

[1] Enn. IV, lib. I, II, III, VI.
[2] Enn. VI, lib. VII, 8—10; Enn. IV, lib. IV, 4, 5; Enn. VII, lib. II, 3.
[3] Enn. III, lib. II, 16; Enn. IV, lib. IV, 32. 40.
[4] Enn. I, lib. VIII; Enn. II, lib. IX; Enn. III, lib. II.
[5] Enn. I, lib. VIII, 5; Enn. III, lib. II, 18.
[6] Enn. III, lib. II, 9, 10.

is the Divinity himself, through the medium of light and heat. The Soul acquires from its intuition of Divine beauty a similar grace; and derives warmth from the celestial fire.[1]

216. This system is built on two principles unsupported by proof. These are: 1st. That the Absolute and Universal, which is inaccessible to the senses, is the Principle of the Universe, and may be recognised as such: 2dly. That it can be known by means of an intellectual intuition and perception, superior in its nature to Thought itself. Plotinus represents Thought as intuition and perception, transforms Philosophy into Poetry, and the pure form of our conceptions into substantial objects. His doctrine is a transcendant Mysticism containing some Platonic notions, and elicited by the enthusiasm prevalent in that age. Neglecting the question of *possibilities*, his philosophy proceeds at once to the cognition of the absolute and complete theory of universal knowledge. At the same time it certainly contains several valuable hints respecting our faculties for acquiring knowledge, and some elevated thoughts, which have been borrowed and improved by other philosophers. It acquired the highest popularity, principally because it derived knowledge from a source superior to the senses; and owing to its doctrine of a *Triad*, and the relation it supposes between it and the external world: and in short was considered a complete exposition of the theory of the Great Plato: of that Plato whom men began now to consider divinely inspired.[2] Next came the attempt to prove the correspondence of Plato's system with those anterior doctrines whence he was supposed to have derived so many of his own: viz. of Pythagoras, Orpheus, Zoroaster, and Hermes; and they were not long without apocryphal books also, attributed to the same, to substantiate this notion. They went farther, and desired to prove a like correspondence between Plato and his successors, particularly Aristotle. All these attempts, which were inconsistent with a truly philosophical spirit, did but foster the prevailing taste of the age for superstition and mystical exaggeration. (Magic and Divination, etc.).

[1] Enn. I, lib. II, VIII, 13; Enn. VI, lib. VII, c. 22; lib. IX, 9—11.
[2] Procli Theol. Platonis, lib. 1, c. 1.

Among the numerous disciples of Plotinus were principally distinguished *Porphyry* (whose proper name was *Malchus*), and *Amelius* or *Gentilianus* of Etruria. The works of the latter, illustrative of the theory of Plotinus, have not come down to us.

§ 217.

PORPHYRII Liber de Vitâ Pythagoræ, ejusdem sententiæ ad intelligibilia ducentes, cum Dissertatione de Vitâ et Scriptis Porphyrii, ed. LUCAS HOLSTENIUS, *Rom.* 1630, 8vo. Cf. § 88.

Porphyrii De abstinentia ab esu Animalium libri IV, ed JAC. DE RHOER, *Traj. ed Rhen.* 1767, 8vo.

Ejusd.: Epist. de Diis Dæmonibus, ad Anebonem (in IAMBL. de Mysteriis, *Ven.* 1497.

Ejusd.: De quinque Vocibus, seu in Categorias Aristotelis Introductio, Gr. *Paris.* 1543, 4to; Lat. per Jo. BERN. FELICIANUM, *Venet.* 1546, 1566, fol.

Πορφυρίου φιλοσόφου πρὸς Μαρκέλλαν, etc. Invenit, interpretatione notisque declaravit ANGELUS MAIUS, etc. acc. ejusdem Poeticum Fragmentum, *Mediol.* 1816, 8vo.

Malchus or *Porphyry* was born A.D. 233, at Batanea, a colony of the Tyrians in Syria, and after having been formed by the instructions of Origen and Longinus, whom he attended at Athens (§ 203), he went to Rome at the age of thirty, and there frequented the school of Plotinus, of whom he became a passionate admirer, and subsequently the biographer (§ 204). He possessed much more knowledge than his master, but less depth of understanding; coupled with considerable vanity and love of distinction. To judge from his writings, he possessed an inquisitive and critical spirit, and did not scruple to express doubts respecting some particulars of the Pagan mythology, the belief in apparitions, for instance, and demons;[1] but on the other hand he was at times carried away by mystical and extravagant notions. He appears to have been so particularly in his latter days; when, like Plotinus, he was honoured with the sight of God.[2] His labours were principally devoted to the explanation and diffusion of the philosophy of his master; to an attempt to blend the theory

[1] See his Epistle to Anebo.

[2] PORPHYR. Vita Plot. sub fin.

of Aristotle with those of Plato and Pythagoras; to the elucidation of certain topics connected with his religion, such as those of sacrifice, divination, the demons, and oracles; and lastly, to attacks on Christianity, against which he composed certain works,[1] while resident in Sicily. He taught eloquence and philosophy at Rome, after the death of Plotinus, and died A.D. 304.

Iamblichus.

IAMBLICHUS, De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum liber, seu Responsio ad Porphyrii Epistolam ad Anebonem, Gr. et Lat. ed. THOM. GALE, *Oxon.* 1678, folio; with the other works of Iamblichus.

Ejusd.: Περὶ βίου Πυθαγορικοῦ λόγος. See § 88.

Ejusd.: Λόγος προτρεπτικὸς εἰς φιλοσόφιαν, adhortatio ad Philos. Textum, etc., recensuit, interpretatione Latina, etc., et Animadversionibus instruxit THEOPH. KIESSLING, *Lips.* 1813, 8vo.

Ejusd.: De Generali Mathematum Scientia (the original in the Anecdota Græca of VILLOISON, tom. II. p. 188, sqq.), and Introductio in Nicomachi Geraseni Arithmeticam (see § 185), ed. SAM. TENNULIUS, *Arnh.* 1668, 4to, et Theologumena Arithmetices, *Paris.* 1543, 4to.

GE. E. HEBENSTREIT, Diss. de Iamblichi Philosophi Syri doctrina, Christianæ Religioni quam imitari studet, noxia, *Lips.* 1704, 4to.

218. The mystical philosophy of *Iamblichus* was even still better adapted to the temper of the age. He was born at Chalcis in Cœle-Syria, became the disciple of a certain Anatolius and of Porphyry: obtained the surname of Θαυμάσιος and Θειότατος, and died A.D. 333. In reputation he soon surpassed his master, Porphyry; but not in talent. In his life of Pythagoras he appears as a Syncretist, or compiler and combiner of different systems, but without critical talent. In the fragments of his work on the soul, and in his letters,[2] we discover some good sense, and more acquaintance with his opinions of the old philosophers, with which he is apt to blend his own philosophical tenets. It is very doubtful[3] whether he was the author of the work on the mysteries of the Egyptians, but if so, no one ever carried to a greater length than he did the mysticism and extravagance of his age. Styling himself the priest of the

[1] EUSEB. VI, 18, Hist. Eccles. [2] Preserved to us by STOBÆUS.
[3] See MEINERS, Commentat. Soc. Gotting. 1782, vol. IV, p. 50, and TIEDEMANN, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. III, p. 473, sqq.

Divinity, he there, with the most perfect assurance, gives solutions of the queries proposed by Porphyry in his letter to Anebon (§ 217), and defines with the utmost minuteness the different classes of angels, the apparitions of gods and demons; with a multitude of details of the same nature. He maintained the doctrine of union with God (*δραστικὴ ἕνωσις*) by means of theology, and theurgy or the supernatural science, to which he made philosophy subordinate.

By Theurgy he meant to express the practice of certain mysterious actions, supposed to be acceptable to the Divinity; and the influence of certain incommunicable symbols, the perfect knowledge of which belongs to God alone, whereby the Divinities are influenced according to our wishes; and to give some colour to these extravagances he referred to the Hermetical books, whence he chose to suppose that Pythagoras and Plato had derived their theories.

Successors of Iamblichus and their contemporaries.

219. Iamblichus had a great number of followers; among others *Dexippus*, *Sopater* of Apamea, *Ædesius*, the successor of Iamblichus, and *Eustathius*, the successor of the latter, both of Cappadocia. Among the disciples of Ædesius were *Eusebius* of Myndus, and *Priscus* of Molossis, both of whom rejected the belief in Magic and Theurgy,[1] to which *Maximus*[2] of Ephesus and *Chrysanthius* of Sardes were inclined. To the school of the latter belonged *Eunapius* of Sardes,[3] and the emperor *Julian*.[4] The Neoplatonic system was taught in part by *Claudian*, brother of Maximus, and by *Sallust*, the same doubtless who became consul under

[1] EUNAP. Vit. Soph. p. 69.

[2] *Μαξίμου φιλοσόφου περὶ καταρχῶν*, rec. etc. ed. GERHARD, *Lips.* 1820, 8vo.

[3] See Bibliogr. § 81.

[4] Became emperor 360, died 363, A.C.

Juliani Opera, ed. DION. PETAVIUS, *Paris.* 1630, 4to. Ed. EZECH. SPANHEIM, *Lips.* 1696, fol.

AD. KLUIT, Oratio inauguralis pro Imperatore Juliano Apostata, *Middelb.* 1760, 4to.

JOH. PET. LUDEWIG, Edicta Juliani contra Philosophos Christianos, *Hal.* 1702, 4to.

GOTTL. FR. GUDII Diss. de Artibus Juliani Apostatæ Paganam superstitionem instaurandi, *Jen.* 1739, 4to.

Julian, A.D. 363, and wrote an abstract of this system.[1] Then came the Eclectic *Themistius* of Paphlagonia[2] (§ 183), who taught at Nicomedia and Constantinople: the commentator and compiler *Macrobius*:[3] the Eclectics *Hierocles* and *Olympiodorus*, who taught at Alexandria,[4] and *Æneas* of Gaza (§ 227), the disciple of Hierocles, who subsequently became a convert to Christianity. After the close of the fourth century Athens became the principal seat of the new philosophy, where it was professed by *Plutarch* of Athens, the son of Nestorius,[5] who was surnamed the Great; by *Syrianus* of Alexandria, his disciple and successor, who taught the Aristotelian system as an introduction to that of Plato;[6] by *Proclus* (see following §); and by *Hermias*[7] of Alexandria, a pupil of Syrianus, and husband of *Ædesia*, also a disciple of this school.

Proclus.

Marini Vita Procli, Gr. et Lat. ed. J. A. FABRICIUS, *Hamb.* 1700, 4to.; ed. Jo. FR BOISSONADE, *Lips.* 1814, 8vo.

Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera e codd. MSS. Bibl. Reg. Paris. Nunc primum edid. VICTOR COUSIN, 6 vols. 8vo. *Paris.* 1819–27.

Procli in Theologiam Platonis lib. VI, unà cum Marini Vita Procli et Procli Instit. Theol. Gr. et Lat. ed. ÆMIL. PORTUS et F. LINDENBROG, *Hamb.* 1618, fol. ed. FABRICIUS, 1704, 4to.

Ejusdem: Commentariorum in Platonis Timæum lib. V, *Bas.* 1534, fol. Edidit C. E. SCHNEIDER, 8vo. *Vind.* 1847.

Commentary on the Alcibiades of Plato, by Proclus. Two portions of this work, viz. De Anima ac Dæmone; and De Sacrificiis et Magia, were published by FICINUS, in Latin, *Ven.* 1497, fol.: and often republished. Another portion, Περὶ ἑνώσεως καὶ κάλλους, has been

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HILLER, De Syncretismo Juliani, *Viteb.* 1739, 4to.

† AUG. NEANDER, On the Emperor Julian and his Age, *Leips.* 1812, 8vo.

JOH. STRAUSS, Der Kaiser Julian, oder die Romantik, 1848.

[1] Sallustii Philosophi de Diis et Mundo, lib. Gr. et Lat. ed. LEO ALLATIUS, *Rom.* 1638, 12mo.; et *Lugd.* 1639. Idem: Opusc. Myth. à GALE. Emendatius edidit, LUCÆ HOLSTENII et THOMÆ GALEI Annotationibus integris, FORMEII autem selectis aliorumque, etc., illustr. Jo. CONR. ORELLIUS, *Turici*, 1821, 8vo.

[2] In the latter part of the fourth century.

[3] Aurelius Macrobius Ambrosius Theodosius, flourished about 409.

[4] Fifth century. [5] 353—430 A.C. [6] Died about 450 A.C.

[7] Not to be confounded with the Christian philosopher of the same name, who attacked Paganism in the third century. (Irrisio Philos. Gentil. ed. GUIL. WORTH, *Oxon.* 1700, 8vo.)

published after the MSS. by CREUZER. The Dissertation of Plotinus is added thereto (§ 204.)

Initia Philosophiæ ac Theologiæ ex Platonicis fontibus ductæ, sive Procli Diadochi et Olympiodori in Platonis Alcibiadem Commentarii. Ex codd. MSS. nunc primùm Græcè ed. FR. CREUZER, 4 vols. 8vo. *Francof.* 1820-25.

Scholia Græca in Cratylum, ex PROCLI scholiis excerpta, e codd. ed. T. F. BOISSONADE, *Lips.* 1820, 8vo.

De Motu, lib. II, Gr. Lat. JUSTO VELESIO interpret. *Bas.* 1545, 8vo.

Comment. in Euclid., lib. IV, Gr. cura GRYNÆI, *Bas.* 1533, fol.

De Sphœra, Gr.; in the Astron. Vet. *Venet.* Ald. 1499, and published separately by BAINBRIDGE, *Lond.* 1620, 4to.

Paraphr. in Ptolem. Gr. per PHIL. MELANCHT. *Bas.* 1534; Gr. et Lat. ed. LEO ALLATIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1654, 8vo.

† DE BURIGNY, Life of the Philosopher Proclus, and Notice of a MS. containing some of his works hitherto unpublished: in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. XXXI.

220. This philosophy was reinforced by the accession of *Proclus*, surnamed Διάδοχος, and born at Constantinople A.D. 412. He spent his ardent and enthusiastic youth at Xanthus,[1] a city devoted to Apollo and Minerva, where his parents resided. Thence he removed to Alexandria, where Olympiodorus was teaching; and subsequently to Athens, where the lessons of Plutarch, of Asclepigenia his daughter, and his successor Syrianus[2] (§ 219) instructed him in the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato. When on his travels he procured himself to be initiated in all the mysteries and arcana of Theurgy. He united an imaginative temper to great learning, but was unable to balance his acquirements by any weight of understanding. He looked upon the Orphic poems and Chaldæan oracles, which he had diligently studied, as divine revelations (§ 71) and capable of becoming instrumental to philosophy by means of an allegorical exposition; whereby also he endeavoured to make Plato and Aristotle agree.[3] He called himself the last link of the Hermaic chain (σειρὰ ἑρμαϊκὴ), that is, the last of men consecrated by Hermes, in whom, by perpetual tradition, was preserved the occult knowledge of the Mysteries.[4] He

[1] In Lycia: hence he was called *Lycius*.

[2] Proclus succeeded the latter in his school of Platonism—whence his name Διάδοχος.

[3] Marin., p. 53—67; Procli Theol. Plat. I, 5; Comment. in Tim. V, p. 291.

[4] Marini Vita Procli, p. 76: Photius, cod. 242.

elevated faith (πίστις) above Science, as forming the closest bond of union with *Good* and *Unity*.[1]

221. His sketch of philosophy contains a commentary on the doctrines of Plotinus, and an attempt to establish this point: That there is but one real principle of things, and that this principle is unity, which by going forth from itself (πρόοδος) without ever losing unity (ἑνιαίως), produces all things by Triads. This demonstration is founded on the analysis and synthesis of the ontological accidents of a thing, whose most universal distinctions are changed and hypostatized into fundamental principles. The chief notions in this demonstration are Unity, Duality, which he considers as identical with limitation (πέρας), and boundlessness (ἀπειρία), and the mixed compound of both, or the thing which contains Esse, Life, and Intelligence (νοῦς). (Institutio theologica: Theologia Platonis, l. III.) The fundamental dispositions of things, are, 1st. Esse; 2nd, Life, or infinite production; 3rd, the Understanding (νοῦς), which leads back to unity, which again contains three Triads in itself.

He distinguished the Divinities (making these also descend from Unity and give birth to triads) into Intelligible and Intelligent, Supernatural and Natural: attributed a Supernatural efficacy to the *name* of the Supreme Being, and, like his predecessors, exalted Theurgy above Philosophy.[2] Proclus also attacked the Christian religion; being principally offended by the doctrine of the creation of the world.[3] In his three treatises on Providence, Fate, and Evil,[4] he states with great ability his notion that the latter does not spring from *Matter*, but from the limitation of Power, and labours to reconcile the system of Plotinus with the conclusions of sound reason.

1 Theologia Plat. I, 25, 29.

2 In Timæum, p. 291, 299. Theol. Plat. I, 25, 29.

3 Procli XXII Argumenta adversus Christianos, apud Philoponum; de Æternitate Mundi contra Proclum, ed. TRINCAVELLI, Gr. 1535, fol.; Lat. *Lugd. Bat.* 1557.

4 See FABRICIUS, Bibl. Gr. tom. VII et VIII, for extracts from a Latin translation.

BAUR, Der Begriff der christlichen Philosophie: In den theologischen Jahrbüchern, 1846, p. 29—72.

222. Proclus died A.D. 465, with a reputation for wisdom and even for miraculous powers, approaching adoration; leaving behind him a crowd of followers, of whom some were females, such as *Hypatia*,[1] *Sosipatra*, *Asclepigenia*, etc. His disciples were of very different degrees of talent, but little distinguished for improving the sort of philosophy he had bequeathed them. Among the most considerable were *Marinus* of Flavia Neapolis (Sichem), who succeeded Proclus as a teacher at Athens; and composed his life (see § 220); but subsequently differed from him in his interpretation of Plato; then *Isidorus* of Gaza, who took the place of Marinus at Athens, and afterwards removed to Alexandria; an enthusiastic character but devoid of originality; with *Zenodotus* the successor of the latter, in what they termed the Golden Chain: still later *Heliodorus* and *Ammonius*, both the sons of Hermias of Alexandria (§ 219), and of whom the latter taught there; then the Egyptians *Heraiscus* and *Asclepiades*, *Asclepiodotus*, *Severianus*, *Hegius*, and *Ulpian*, the brother of Isidorus. To this epoch belongs likewise *John Stobæus* the compiler.[2] The last who taught the Neoplatonic system in the Academy of Athens was *Damascius* (of Damascus),[3] a disciple of Ammonius the son of Hermias, as well as of Marinus, Isidorus, and Zenodotus. He united a certain clearness of understanding to an active imagination; and being dissatisfied with the manner in which Plotinus had subdivided Primitive Unity into many subordinate Unities (Triad of Triads—or Ennead), he laboured to reduce everything to a Simple Unity; at the same time that he perceived the inadmissibility of the idea of an absolute principle of Reality, and asserted that the Intelligible and Absolute were accessible to the human under-

[1] Jo. Chph. Wernsdorf, Diss. IV, de Hypatiâ, Philosopha Alexandrina, *Viteb.* 1747-48; et Jo. Chph. Wolff, Fragmenta et Elogia Mulierum Græcarum.

[2] John Stobæus of Stobi in Macedon, flourished at the beginning of the sixth century. For his collection see § 81.

Fragments of his treatise, Ἀπόριαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ ἀρχων, are to be found in the Anecd. Gr. of Wolff, tom. III, p. 195, sqq. Fragments of the Biography of the Philosophers by Damascius (the Fragments relate to Isidorus of Gaza), are found apud Photium, cod. 142, and 118.

[3] Damascius Damascenus flourished in the first half of the sixth century.

standing only by means of analogies and symbols, and that but partially.

Among his disciples and those of Ammonius was the celebrated commentator on Aristotle, *Simplicius* of Cilicia,[1] who, as well as his teachers, endeavoured to reconcile Aristotle and Plato. The emperor Justinian having by a severe decree caused the schools of the heathen philosophers to be shut,[2] Damascius, with Isidorus, Simplicius, and others, was obliged to fly into Persia, to the protection of the king Chosroes. They returned, indeed, A.D. 533, but the ardour of this sect which had so long and so widely prevailed, and had exerted an insensible influence even over the opinions of the Christian philosophers, was manifestly on the decline.

Philosophy of the Fathers of the Church.

† Joh. Aug. Eberhard. Spirit of Primitive Christianity, *Halle*, 1807–8, 3 vols. 8vo.

† Fr. Köppen, Philosophy of Christianity, 2 parts, *Leips.* 1813–15, 8vo. Second edition, 1825.

Baur, Der Begriff der christlichen Philosophie. In den Theologischen Jahrbüchern, 1846, pp. 29–72.

† J. W. Schmid, On the Spirit of the Morality of Jesus and his Apostles, *Jen.* 1790, 8vo.

† J. Lud. Ewald, Spirit and Tendency of Christian Morality, *Tüb.* 1801, 8vo.

† C. Fr. Rösler, Dissertation on the Philosophy of the Primitive Christian Church, in the fourth vol. of his Library of the Fathers. See also his work: De Originibus Philosophiæ Ecclesiasticæ, *Tübing.* 1781, 4to.

Joh. Ge. Rosenmuller, De Christianæ Theologiæ Origine, *Lips.* 1786, 8vo.

† Marheineke, On the Origin and Progress of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy, in the three first Ages of Christianity, *Studien*, tom. III, *Heidelb.* 1807, 8vo.

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[1] Flourished about the middle of the sixth century.

Jo. Gottl. Buhle, De Simplicii Vitâ, ingenio, et meritis, *Gott. Anz.* 1786, p. 1977. The Commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle's Categories, Physica, and the books De Cœlo, and De Animâ, were published at Venice, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Schweighæuser has given his Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus: Monum. Epict. Philos. tom. IV.

[2] A.D 529.

† C. W. Fr. Walch, Outline of a complete History of Heresies, 2 vols. *Leips.* 1762–85, 8vo.

Neander's Denkwurdigkeiten aus der Geschichte des christlichen Lebens, 1845 (Sketches of Christian Life, translated by J. E. Ryland, Bohn's Standard Library, 1852).

Milman's Hist. of Christianity, 3 vols. 8vo. *Lond.* 1840.

Neander's Church History, 8 vols. Bohn's Standard Library, 1849–52.

Gieseler's Text Book of Ecclesiastical History, 3 vols. 8vo., *Philad.* 1836.

C. Ch. Fr. Schmid, Progr. de ignavia Errorum in Religionis Christianæ Disciplina vulgarium principe causa, *Jen.* 1698, 4to.

† W. Munscher, Manual of the History of Christian Doctrines, I and II vol. second edition, *Marb.* 1802–4; III and IV vol. 1802–9, 8vo.; third edition, 1817, etc.

F. Volk. Reinhardt, Essay on the plan proposed by the founder of the Christian Religion, *Wittenberg* and *Zerbst*, 1781, 4th ed. 1798, 8vo.

G. Traug. Krug, Diss. de principio qui relig. christ. Auct. doctrinam de moribus superstruxit, *Vitt.* 1792, 4to.

Item. Letters on the perfectibility of revealed religion. *Jenæ* et *Lips.* 1795, 8vo.

J. Rust, Philosophy and Christianism, *Manheim*, 1825, 8vo.

Gfrörer, Geschichte des Urchristenthums.

223. The disciples whom Christianity was continually gaining in different countries, were imbued with very different principles and feelings, and many of them had also imbibed some philosophical system or other. The knowledge which such had already acquired of the theories of the Greeks; the necessity of replying to the attacks of Heathen adversaries; and the desire of illustrating, defining, and substantiating the Christian doctrines, and forming into a whole the solutions which were offered from time to time of the questions and cavils of their adversaries,—all these causes gradually led to the formation of a species of philosophy peculiar to Christianity, which successively assumed different aspects, as regarded its principles and object.

By these means something of the Grecian spirit of philosophy was transfused into the writings of the Fathers of the Church; and in after times proved the material germ of original speculations.

224. The Christian religion was formed for universality by its simplicity, its close alliance with Morality, and the spirit of its worship, at once mild and severe. Its first teachers considered it as a divine doctrine, based on Revela-

tion, on account of the moral greatness and divinity of its Founder. Wisdom, which had so long been sought for by human Reason, seemed at last found. The limits of Truth and of Duty had (if mankind would have been satisfied) been at last defined, and the strange dissensions of inquirers after both reconciled. But the fact of the divine origin of the religion gave occasion to various representations; and it was asked how Revelation can be established? how it can be ascertained that a doctrine is divine? and what is its true import? Hence the various degrees of authority allowed by different parties to the pretensions of Tradition and Philosophy.

225. Many of the Fathers of the Church, especially the Grecian, considered Philosophy as in harmony with the Christian religion (or at least partially so), inasmuch as both were derived from the same common source. This source of truth in the Heathen philosophy was, according to *Justin* Martyr (§ 227), derived from Internal Revelation by the λόγος and Tradition;[1] according to *St. Clement*[2] (§ 227) and the other Alexandrians, it was drawn from Tradition recorded in the Jewish Scriptures;[3] according to *St. Augustin* (§ 233) it was simply Oral.[4] In the estimation of all these Fathers Philosophy was, if not necessary, at least useful for the defence and confirmation of the Christian doctrine.

226. Other Fathers of the Church, especially certain of the Latin, as *Tertullian*,[5] *Arnobius*,[6] and his disciple *Lactantius*,[7] surnamed the Christian Cicero, deemed philosophy a superfluous study, and adverse to Christianity, as tending to alienate man from God:—nay, some of them did not scruple

[1] Apolog. II, p. 50, 51, 83.

[2] Jo. Aug. Neander, De Fidei Gnoseosque idea, et ea qua ad se invicem et Philosophiam referentur ratione secundum mentem Clementis Alexandrini, *Heidelb.* 1811, 8vo.

[3] Justini Cohortatio ad Græcos. Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. I, p. 298. 312; Euseb. Præp. Evang. XIII, 12, 13.

[4] Aug. De Civit. Dei. VII, 11.

[5] Of Carthage; became Christian about 185 A.C., died 220.

[6] Taught eloquence at Sicca, and died about 326 A.C.

[7] L. Cœlius Lactantius Firmianus, teacher of eloquence at Nicomedia, died about 330.

to pronounce it an invention of the Devil, and a fruitful source of heresy.[1]

227. Nevertheless the party which favoured such pursuits gradually acquired strength; and the Fathers came to make use, on the *Eclectic* system, of the philosophy of the Greeks.[2] Accordingly Julian thought that he was taking an effectual method of obstructing the Christian religion when he interdicted to its followers the study of that philosophy. Yet *all* the schools of the ancients were far from meeting with a like acceptation on the part of the Fathers. Those of Epicurus, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics were little considered, on account of the doubtful manner in which they had expressed themselves with regard to the immortality of the soul, the existence of a Supreme Being, and his Providence; or the opposition which existed between their views and those of Christianity. The Platonic system, on the other hand, from the degree of affinity they affected to discover in it to the Jewish and Christian Revelations, was held in high esteem.[3] Nay, the earliest Fathers themselves belonged to the school of Alexandria.[4] *Justin* Martyr affirmed that the λόγος, previously to His incarnation, had

[1] Ern. Sal. Cypriani Diatribe Academica, qua expenditur illud Tertulliani: Hæreticorum Patriarchæ Philosophi, *Helmst.* 1699, 4to.

Ad. Rechenbergeri Diss. an Hæreticorum Patriarchæ Philosophi, *Lips.* 1705, 4to.

Chr. Gottfr. Schutz, Progr. de Regula Fidei apud Tertullianum, *Jen.* 1781, 4to.

E. W. P. Ammon, Cœlii Lactantii Firmiani Opiniones de Religione in Systema redactæ, *Erl.* 1820, 8vo.

Tertullian. Apologia, c. 47: De Praescript. Hæres., c. 7; Adv. Marcion. V, 19; Lactant. Div. Instit. IV, 2; passim. De Falsa Sap. lib. III, c. I, § 10, sqq.; Clem. Alex. Strom. I, p. 278. 308; VII, p. 755. Basilius adv. Eunomium. I; Chrysostomi Homilia in Matthæum.

[2] Clem Alex. Strom. I. p. 288; Lactant. Div. Inst. VII; Augustin. de Doctr. Christ. II, 11, 39.

[3] Cf. the work of Staudlin, referred to in § 135 (note).

[4] † Souverain, Platonism unveiled, or an Essay concerning the Platonic λόγος, *Cologne*, 1700, 8vo. Translated into German, with a Preface and Remarks by J. Fr. Lœffler, second edition, *Zü.lichau* and *Freystadt*, 1792, 8vo.

† Baltus, Defence of the Fathers against the Charge of *Platonism*, *Paris*, 1711, 4to.

J. Laur. Mosheim, Comment. de turbata per recentiores Platonicos Ecclesia. In Diss. Hist. Eccl. tom. I, p. 85.

revealed Himself to the philosophers of antiquity.[1] *Clement* of Alexandria[2] enlarged on the same idea, and professed to consider Pagan philosophy as an introduction to Christianity (*προπαιδεία τοῦ ἡνωσικοῦ*). To these may be added *Athenagoras** of Athens, and *Tatianus* the Syrian,[3] the Apologists, who both discovered, as they thought, many points of resemblance between the Christian religion and Platonism. *Origen*,[4] the disciple of Clement and the adversary of Celsus, pronounced, with his master, that happiness consists in the intuition (*θεωρια*) of the Divinity; and drew a distinction between the popular acceptation of Religion, and the same when thus explained by the learned,[5] —(on which account he came to be considered by some as the first who hinted at the philosophy of Christianity).[6] To the same class also belonged *Synesius* of Cyrene,[7] a pupil of Hypatia, who flourished about 410, and died in 431, bishop of Ptolemais, and who succeeded very imperfectly in dove-

† J. A. Crajier, On the Influence of the Alexandrian School on the Progress of the Christian Religion, (in his continuation of Bossuet, II, 268.)

Cas. Aug. Theoph. Kiel, Exercitationes de Doctoribus veteris Ecclesiæ culpa corruptæ per Platonicas sententias Theologiæ liberandis, *Lips.* 1793, sqq. 4to. comment. I—XIV.

Henr. Nic. Clausen, Apologetæ Eccl. Christianæ Ante-Theodosiani Platonis ejusque Philosophiæ arbitri, *Hafn.* 1817.

[1] Justin Martyr was born of heathen parents, at Flavia Neapolis in Palestine, A.D. 89; died a Christian 165. Apol. II, p. 83.

[2] Dähne, De Gnosi Clementis, et de vestigiis neoplaton. philosophiæ in eâ obviis, 1831.

Eylert, Clemens als Philosoph und Dichter, 1832.

* I have not thought it necessary to add the works, and editions of the works, of the Fathers, as they only incidentally belong to the subject of this Manual.—Ed.

[3] Both he and Athenagoras were originally heathens, and both flourished about 170 A.D.

[4] Of Alexandria, born 185, died 253.

Schultzer, Origenes über die Grundlehren der Glaubenswissenschaft, 1835.

Redepenning, Origenes Leben und Lehre, 1841 u 1846, 2 Abth.

Thomasius, Origenes, 1837.

[5] Περὶ ἀρχων, lib. I, 1.

[6] Περὶ ἀρχων, Præf. § 3. See § 230.

[7] Flourished about 450. De Synesio philosopho, commentatus est Klausen, 1831.

tailing his old Platonism with his new Christianity; *Æneas* of Gaza,[1] and even, in some respects, *St. Augustin* (§ 233).

In this manner the Church gradually became reconciled to philosophy, especially after the discussions with Arianism had taught them the necessity for a more subtle logic. *Nemesius*,[2] bishop of Emesa, in his Essay on Man, followed Aristotle (§ 231), and *Boethius* the Roman translated and commented on several of his works on Logic (§ 235).

228. Philosophy was at first employed as an auxiliary to the Christian Religion to assist in winning over the more cultivated of the Greeks to whom it was addressed; subsequently it was turned to the refutation of heresies; and lastly applied to the elucidation and distinct statement of the doctrines of the Church. Through all these successive gradations the relations of Religion and Philosophy continued always the same: the former being looked upon as the sole source of knowledge, the most exalted and the only *true* philosophy; the latter being regarded as merely a handmaid to the former, and a science altogether earthly (*scientia mundana*.)[3] Logic was exclusively devoted to polemics.

229. The prevailing system therefore of the Fathers is a Supernaturalism more or less blended with Rationalism. The former daily acquired additional predominance in consequence of the perpetual disputes with the heretics, who were inclined to place Reason side by side with Revelation; and in consequence also of the resolution of some Christian teachers to preserve the unity and purity of the faith. Revelation came to be regarded not only as the source of all Christian belief, but as the fountain also of all knowledge, speculative and practical. As a rule for instruction, they established a formulary of belief (*regula fidei*), which was founded equally on written revelation, and on tradition orally transmitted. They did even more than this: faith

[1] Flourished about 487 · see § 219.

Boissonade, Æneas et Zacharias De immortalitate Animæ, 1832.

[2] Flourished about 380.

[3] Tertull. De Præscript. Hæret., c. 7 Lactant. Div. Instit. I, 1; V, 1; III, 1. Salvianus, De Gubernat. Dei Præfat. Euseb. Præp. Evang. IV. 22. Damasceni Dialectice, c. 1, sqq. Didymus in Damasceni Parallelis, p. 685.

itself, and the virtuous resolution of loving God and your neighbour, were also represented, according to this view, as an effect of divine grace; for the human mind, since the fall of man, has been rendered incapable of knowing truth by itself, and of rising to virtue (Passivity of Reason).

Observation. The inquiries and conclusions of the Fathers in the discussion of the particular objects of Christianity (for they meddled less with the fundamental principles) doubtless belongs to the History of Religion, on account of the peculiar Supernaturalist point of view, and its connection with various articles of the Christian creed. Nevertheless, a review of the philosophical matter which was involved, and a sketch of the system of Augustin, appear necessary for the elucidation of the opinions of following ages. (See MUNSCHER, Hand. der Christl. Dogmengesch. I and II parts.)

§ 230.

CHR. FRIED. RÖSLER, Philosophia veteris Ecclesiæ de Deo, *Tübing.* 1782, 4to. Idem: Progr. Philosophiæ veteris Ecclesiæ de Spiritu et de Mundo, *ibid.* 1785, 4to.

ALB. CHR. ROTH, (præs. JO. BEN. CARPZOV), Trinitas Platonica, *Lips.* 1693, 4to.

JO. WILH. JANI, Diss. (præs. J. G. NEUMANN), Trinitas Platonismi verè et falsò suspecta, *Viteb.* 1708, 4to.

See also the work of SOUVERAIN, § 227 (note).

The Deity, and the relation in which the world and mankind stand to God, are the principal subjects of the speculations of the Fathers; and in these we may observe an evident effort to erect a rational conviction.

The Deity. There are three ways in which God may be known: by His image; from external nature; and by immediate revelation. We find different proofs of the existence of a God drawn from mixed Physics and Theology, from Cosmology[1] and Ontology,[2] noticed by the Fathers; though in general they treat it rather as a matter of faith than knowledge, and appear to have considered the idea of a Divinity as innate, because universal. God is One, Invisible, raised in perfection above every being, immeasurable and unsearchable. Clemens says, "We cannot so

[1] GREG. NAZ. Orat. XXXIV, Opp. ed. *Colon.* 1690, tom. I, p. 559. JOH. DAMASCENUS, De Fide Orthod., lib. I, 3.

[2] AUGUST. De Libero Arbitio, II, 5—15. See also lib. VIII, 3; De Genesi ad litt., lib. VIII, cap. 14.

much discover what God is as what He is not."[1] Some of the Fathers assumed mystical intuitions of God.[2] The greater part of them at first represented the Deity as associated with Space and Time, like a corporeal being;[3] but gradually they corrected these notions, and reduced them to those of Immateriality, or at least assigned Him infinite extension.[4] St. Clement expressly admits the Immateriality of God. Their reflections were more profound than those of the Heathen philosophers respecting the attributes of the Deity, but were not altogether free from the charge of inconsistency. The doctrine of the Trinity,[5] in particular, engaged their attention as a revealed dogma. Nevertheless Origen (against Celsus), St. Clement (Strom. V), and especially St. Augustin, laboured to give it a rational basis.

231. *Relation of God to the World.* The Fathers, in opposition to the Manicheans and Gnostics, maintained the Scriptural doctrine of the Creation of the world by the will of God, and its formation out of non-existence. On this a question was moved: Did the Creation take place within the limits of Time? (which St. Athanasius,[6] Methodius, and St. Augustin affirmed); or from all Eternity? (as thought Clement of Alexandria and Origen):[7] and to what end was it created?

The Fathers admit a general and particular Providence;[8] assert the maintenance and government of the world by the ministry of angels;[9] or, some of them, *without* their ministry.[10] They opposed the fatalism of the astrologers and Stoics,[11] in order to maintain the doctrine of Free-will, and sometimes pushed their speculations on this head

[1] Orig. Adv. Cels. I, § 23, p. 340. Athenag. Leg. pro Chr. p 282-285. Justin. Dial. c. Tryph. p. 16. Theophyl. Ad Autolyc. lib. I, p. 339. Damas. De Fid. Orth. I, 4. Clem. Strom. V, p. 689.

[2] Dionys. Areop. Ep. 5; et De Mystică Theol., c. 4, sqq.

[3] Tertull. Adv. Prax. c. 7. Arnob. Adv. Gent., lib. I, p. 17.

[4] Augustin. De Div. Q. XX, Ep. 57.

[5] Baur, Die Dreieinigkeit's Lehre, in seiner geschichtlichen Entwickelung. *Tübingen*, 1841–43. 3 vols. 8vo.

[6] Möhler, Athanasius der Grosse, und die Kirche seiner Zeit, 1827.

[7] Περὶ ἀρχων, III, 5.

[8] Lactant. De Irâ Dei, c. 30. Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. c. 42, 44.

[9] Just. Martyr, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Augustin, John of Damascus.

[10] Nemesius, lib. 1. [11] Nemes. 68. 34. Augustin. De Civ. Dei, V, 9,

farther than, it is probable, they themselves intended.[1] They endeavoured to reconcile the doctrine of the omniscience of God with that of the free-agency of man;[2] and entered largely into the discussion of the origin of physical and moral Evil. Most of them taught that it was unavoidable,[3] and maintained that it took place neither with nor in opposition to the will of God, in other words, that it was simply *permitted* by Him. They attributed it in part to human agency, in part to the influence of evil Spirits.[4] They asserted the existence of spiritual beings endowed with a subtile essence,[5] who minister to the Deity in the government of the world. On the origin of evil spirits are found some superstitious and extravagant notions in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite,[6] and Psellus.[7]

Anthropology. Is man composed of two or of three essential elements, Body, Soul, and Spirit?—as Justin and all the Fathers his immediate successors (all of whom inclined to Neoplatonism) asserted. The human soul was at first thought material; subsequently, however, it was pronounced immaterial and spiritual by the Platonist Fathers; as also by Nemesius and St. Augustin.[8] As to the origin of souls, they were conceived to be created, by some, immediately, by others, mediately. (Perpetual creation, or pre-existence of souls). The immortality of the soul was thought by some (St. Augustin) to be inseparable from its essence; by others (Justin, Arnobius), a peculiar gift of God, either bestowed on all, or specially on the elect.

§ 232.

[1] BARBEYRAC, Treatise on the Morality of the Fathers of the Church, *Amsterdam*, 1728, 4to. (French). See also his Introduction to his translation of the Natural Law of Pufendorf.

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[1] NEMES. lib. 1. c. 38. [2] AUGUSTIN. lib. 1.
[3] LACTANTIUS, Div. Instit. II, 8. 12; V, 7.
[4] Of the Devil. TERTULL., AUGUST. See § 232.
[5] ORIG. Περὶ ἀρχ. I, 6. Jo. DAMASC. De Orth. Fid. II, 3.
[6] De Hierarchiâ Cœlesti. [7] De Dæmonibus.
[8] AUGUST. De Quantitate Animæ. c. 1; et al. CLAUDIANUS MAMERTINUS, a presbyter of Vienne in Gaul, composed, about 470, a treatise, De Statu Animæ, libb. III; ed. P. MOSELLANUS, *Bas.* 1520, 4to. and subsequently CAS. BARTH, *Cygn.* 1655, 8vo.

† CEILLIER, Defence of the Ethics of the Fathers of the Church, *Paris*, 1718, 4to.

† [BALTUS], Opinions of the Fathers on the Ethics of the Heathen Philosophers, *Strasb.* 1719, 4to. (French).

† J. D. MICHAELIS, Morals, part ii, *Götting.* 1792, 8vo

CAR. FRED. STAUDLIN, Progr. de Patrum Ecclesiæ Doctrinâ Morali, *Götting.* 1796. † The same: History of Christian Morals, *ibid.* 1799, 8vo.

† Essay towards a History of Christian Morals, Ascetism, and Mysticism, with a review of all the works on these subjects, vol. i, *Dortmund*, 1798, 8vo.

Ethics, or the relation of Man to God. The Ethics of the Fathers of the Church are deficient in systematic character; but in detail they are of uncompromising strictness, and tend to elevate man above the dominion of the senses. Their fundamental principle is the will of God, either subjectively or objectively, and, on the part of man, obedience to that will. The means of becoming acquainted with it are the Scriptures and Reason; the latter subordinate to the former. According to some, God requires the fulfilment of His will in virtue of His almighty power;[1] according to others, with a view to the eternal welfare and felicity of man.[2] According to a third theory, God is at the same time the Sovereign legislator and the Supreme Good and End of all reasonable beings. To be united to Him is the height of happiness.[3] To this was appended the doctrine of Duty and Conformity to His will, or Virtue. Sincerity, disinterested love of our neighbour, patience, and chastity, are virtues pre-eminently commended by the Fathers; the three last especially being enforced with peculiar strictness. Free-will is admitted by the Fathers as the subjective condition of the moral act, but it was successively limited and almost annulled, by a more consistent development of the supernaturalist system, by the dogmas of the Fall of man, of Hereditary Depravity, of Grace, and Predestination.[4] Finally, this morality being directed to the object of a negative holiness, or purification from all sin,

[1] TERTULL. De Pœnitentiâ, c. 4.

[2] LACTANT. Institut. Divin. lib. III, c. 11, sqq

[3] AUGUSTIN. De Libero Arbitrio, I, 6; II 19

[4] BAUR, Die Lehre der Versöhnung in seiner geschichtlichen Entwickelung, *Tübingen*, 1838.

was transformed into a sanctifying praxis and a pure ascetic Mysticism.

§ 233.

Augustini Confessiones, etc. Opp. tom. i.

Possidii Vita Augustini, ed. Jo. Solinas, *Rome*, 1731, 8vo. In the Acta Sanctorum, tom. V, p. 213, sqq., and in the Benedictine edition of the Works of Augustine, *Paris*, 1677–1700, 11 vol. fol.: 1700–3, 12 vol. fol.

Bindemann, Der heilige Augustin, 1844.

Wiggers, Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, 1821 und 1833, 2 Theile.

St. Augustin[1] was one of the greatest luminaries of the Latin church. After having studied the Scholastic philosophy, and become an ardent disciple of the Manicheans, he was converted to the orthodox faith by the powerful eloquence of St. Ambrose, at Milan (A.D. 387), and subsequently (A.D. 405) was appointed bishop of Hippo, and distinguished himself as a zealous preacher, a champion against heresy, and a copious writer. He employed his philosophical acquirements, and his great and versatile powers, in reducing to the form of a system the doctrines of Christianity; and ultimately produced a theory by which it was associated with much of Platonism. According to him, God, the most perfect and exalted of essences, exists of necessity (§ 230): He is the Creator of the world (§ 231); Eternal Truth and the Eternal Law of Right; of which man has certain innate ideas in his reason, by means of an intuitive perception of the supersensuous.[2] God is the supreme good of the Spiritual world, to whom we labour to reunite ourselves.[3] He has called all reasonable beings to the enjoyment of happiness through the practice of virtue; and to that end has endowed them with reason and free-will (§ 232). The use of this free-will is committed to the option of the agent, who, according to his employment of it, approaches to or withdraws himself from God, and renders himself more worthy, or more unworthy, of felicity. Moral evil is negative, and has not any *positive* cause. Evil

[1] Aurelius Augustinus, born at Tagaste in Africa, A.D. 354: died 430.

[2] De Quantit. An. c. 20.

[3] De Civit. Dei, X, 6. De Vera Religione, c. 55.

men are necessary to complete the sum of the Universe, which is perfect; and which would not be perfect without them, inasmuch as it supposes the existence of all possible classes of beings, in all possible degrees.[1] Such was the system of Augustin respecting the Divine Government. In his latter years he rejected this for another: that man, since the fall, has lost immortality and free-will, so far as the doing of good is concerned, but not as affects the commission of evil; from which principle he deduced the doctrine of Absolute Predestination and Irresistible Grace.[2] He was led to this system by a literal adherence to some expressions of Scripture to which he had occasion to refer in his dispute with Pelagius, a British monk; who, with his friend Cœlestius, came out of Ireland into Africa, and asserted the free-will of man to do good.[3] St. Augustin likewise originated several new views respecting the soul and its faculties, *e. g.* respecting the inner and outer senses, and the five degrees of Intellectual Power, which have been often revived.[4]

234. The latter supernaturalist system of St. Augustin's became the pivot of dogmatical science in the West, owing to the weight attaching to his name. The custom of depreciating reason, and the attempt to inclose the liberty of thought and action within certain limits, which are the unavoidable consequences of Supernaturalism,* were promoted by the destruction of the Roman Empire, the inroad of barbarians, and the loss of ancient civilization, at the same time that all these things concurred, in their turn, in riveting an ecclesiastical despotism on the minds of men.

[1] De Libero Arbitrio, I, 14; II, 1. 19, 20; III, 9; lib. 3, Qu. 41.

[2] De Civ. Dei, XIV, 10; XV, 21; XXI, 12; XXII, 30. De Nuptiis et Concupiscentiâ, II, 34; De Natura et Gratiâ; De Gestis Pelagii; contra duas Epp. Pelagianorum; contra Julianum de Corruptione et Gratiâ; De Gratiâ et Libero Arbitrio; De Prædestinatione Sanctorum.

[3] † PHIL. MARHEINECKE, Dialogues on the Opinions of Augustine, with respect to Free-will and Divine Grace, *Berl.* 1821, 8vo.

† G. F. WIGGERS, Essay towards an Historical Statement of Augustinianism and Pelagianism, etc., *Berl.* 1821, 8vo.

[4] De Quantit. An. n. 70, sqq.

* This censure of Supernaturalism betrays the partial spirit of the Kantian and all other Rationalisms.—ED.

Under such circumstances, the writings of the Fathers were beneficial to philosophy also, as preserving some vestiges of ancient discussions. This was especially true of the works of Augustin, and applies to the treatises on Logic, falsely imputed to him;[1] and which were recommended during the middle ages by the stamp of his name.

Boethius, Cassiodorus, and other Eclectics.

235. Besides the dry abstract of what were called the seven liberal arts, by *Marcianus Capella*,[2] we remark among the works which served as text-books to the ages following, and took a rank intermediate between the ancient and modern philosophies, the works of two Patricians of the kingdom of the Ostrogoths, Boethius and Cassiodorus, the last champions of classical literature in the West. Both were Eclectics, and endeavoured to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. *Boethius*[3] lived at the court of the Gothic king Theodoric, who caused him to be beheaded under a false suspicion of high treason.[4] By him principally was preserved in the West some faint knowledge of the system of Aristotle. He translated some treatises of that philosopher on Logic, and wrote a commentary on the translation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry by *Victorinus*, which was looked upon as a preparation for the study of Aristotle. He also composed, in his prison at Pavia, his treatise *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, which became a great favourite with following ages. His contemporary *Cassiodorus*,[5] also pre-

[1] Principia Dialectica et Decem Categoriæ, vol. I, edit. Bened.

[2] Marcianus Minæus Felix Capella, flourished about 474. His work entitled Satyricon has been frequently printed (see FABRIC. Bibl. Lat. tom. I, p. 638), and lastly by J. A. GOEZ, *Norimb.* 1794, 8vo.

[3] Anicius Manlius Torquatus Severinus Boethius, born A.D. 470. BAUR, De Boethio, 1841.

† GERVAISE, History of Boethius the Roman senator, *Paris*, 1715.

His works: *Basil.* 1570, fol.; De Consolatione, published by PERTIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1671, 8vo. *Lips.* 1753, 8vo. Ed. et Vitam Auctoris adjecit Jo. THEOD. BJ. HELFRECHT, *Hof.* 1797, 8vo.

[4] Between 524 A.D. and 526.

[5] Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus, born at Squillacci about 480; died in a convent, 575.

† FR. D. DE SAINTE-MARTHE, Life of Cassiodorus, *Paris*, 1695, 12mo. BUAT, Life of Cassiodorus; among the Dissert. of the Acad. of Sciences of Bavaria, vol. I, s. 79.

served, especially in his work *De Septem Disciplinis*, some relics of Grecian philosophy, and encouraged the monks to transcribe the ancient MSS. In Spain, under the dominion of the Visigoths, *Isidorus*, archbishop of Seville (*Hispalensis*), rendered a real service to learning by the composition of his useful book of reference.[1] In England and Ireland science survived longer than elsewhere. *Bede*, the Anglo-Saxon, surnamed the *Venerable*,[2] enjoyed there a great celebrity: and, assisted by the works above mentioned, composed his Abstracts, of which some time afterwards, Alcuin availed himself. (See § 245, sqq).

236. In the East the pretended works (of a mystical character) of Dionysius the Areopagite,[3] believed to be the contemporary of our Lord and his Apostles, and first bishop of Athens, acquired considerable celebrity, and in the middle ages proved a rich mine to the Mystics (§ 229, 230, and 246). They embraced a sort of adaptation of the doctrine of Emanation and of Platonism in general to Christianity; and are generally supposed to belong to the third or fourth century, though some, as Dallæus, refer them to the sixth.[4] It is true that literature in general still survived in the Grecian Empire, but without spirit or originality. It owed its existence to the aristocratic constitution which still sub-

Cassiodori Opera Omnia op. et stud. GARETII, *Rotomag.* 1679, 2 vols. fol.; et *Venet.* 1729.

[1] Died A.D. 636.

Isidori Hispalensis Originum seu Etymologiarum libri XX. *Aug. Vind.* 1472, fol., c. not. JAC. GOTHOFREDI in Auctorib. Lat. p. 811: and in the edition of his Opp. ed. JAC. DU BREUIL, *Paris*, 1601 fol. col. 1617.

[2] Born 673; died 735.

Bedæ Opera Omnia, tom. I, III, *Paris*, 1521 et 1544; *Colon.* 1612 and 1688, 8 vols. fol.

[3] De Cœlesti Hierarchiâ, de Divinis Nominibus, de Ecclesiasticâ Hierarchiâ, de Mystica Theologia. DIONYS. Areop. Opp. Gr. *Bas.* 1539; *Ven.* 1558; *Paris.* 1562, 8vo.; Gr. et Lat. *Paris.* 1615, fol.; *Antverp.* 1634, 2 vols. fol.; and with Dissertations on the Author, *Paris*, 1644, 2 vols. fol.

[4] The most recent inquiries on this subject are those of Jo. GE. VITAL. ENGELHARDT, Diss. de Dionysio Areopagita Plotinizante, præmissis Observationibus de Historia Theologiæ Mysticæ rite tractanda, § I et II, *Erl.* 1820, 8vo. L. FRID. OTTO BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS, Progr. de Dionysio Areopagita, *Jen.* 1823, 4to.

HELFFERICH, Die Christliche Mystik, in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen, 1842, 2 Bande.

sisted in the Greek Church (differing in this respect from the Latin, which fell under the dominion of Papacy) and to the degree of attention still bestowed on the Greek philosophers. In the sixth century, *John Stobæus*, who was inclined to the doctrines of Neoplatonism (§ 222); and subsequently, in the ninth, the patriarch *Photius*,[1] formed valuable collections of extracts from different ancient authors. Aristotle also was better appreciated in this part of the empire. *James of Edessa*, the Monophysite, caused the dialectic treatises to be translated into Syriac. *John of Alexandria*, surnamed *Philoponus*,[2] (an Eclectic), distinguished himself by his Greek Commentaries on Aristotle; from whom, nevertheless, he differed on the question of the eternity of the world; and after him *John of Damascus*,[3] not only gave to the East for the first time a system of Theology (§ 230, 231); but by his works[4] continued to direct public attention to the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, which was not extinguished till the downfall of the Greek Empire (§ 283).

[1] Born A.D. 853, died 891.

Μυριοβιβλίον, ed. HOESCHEL, *Aug. Vind.* 1601.

[2] Died about 608.

TRECHSEL, Ueber Johannes Philoponos. In den Studien und Kritiken von ALTMANN und UMBREIT, 1835.

His Commentaries—On the Analytics (First and Second), On the Physics, Metaphysics, De Anima, and other works of Aristotle, appeared, for the most part, at Venice, in the sixteenth century.

[3] Died about 754; also known by the name of Chrysorrhoas.

[4] Ἔκθεσις τῆς ὀρθοδόξης πίστεως.—Opera ed. LE QUIEN, *Paris.* 1712, 2 vols. fol.

PART THE SECOND.

SECOND PERIOD.

HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES,

OR, THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM; FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NINTH TO THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

Attempts of the Reason towards the cultivation of Science, under the influence of an extraneous principle and positive laws.

History of the Philosophy of the Middle Ages and of the Schoolmen. (From 800 to the Fifteenth Century.)

237. The spirit of philosophical curiosity which had possessed so much influence throughout the preceding period, dwindled to a very slender thread, and influenced in a very inferior degree the public mind during the days of barbarism and ignorance, on which we are about to enter. At the same time a new System and new Method were contained in embryo in the precious remains of old philosophy, and acquired the name of the *Scholastic;* because it was principally formed in the schools founded since the time of Charlemagne.[1] That great monarch, so astonishingly superior to the age in which he lived, very properly began the work

[1] See the Work of LAUNOY, § 245; and J. M. UNOLD, De Societate Literaria a Carolo M. instituta, *Jen.* 1752, 4to.

It must not be forgotten, however, that such studies were cultivated at a still earlier period in Great Britain. See MURRAY, De Britannia atque Hibernia sæculo a sexto inde ad decimum literar. domicilio; in the Nov. Comment. Soc. Gott. tom. II, part II, p. 72.

of civilization by establishing elementary schools for the clergy, where were taught, in the jejune sketches of *Marcianus Capella*, *Cassiodorus*, and *Bede*, the seven liberal arts, or, as they were termed by Boethius, the *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*. Charlemagne founded likewise an Academy attached to his court, as well as a school for the instruction of those destined for public affairs; and for the improvement of the latter he invited, principally from England, several men of eminent merit. (See *Alcuin*, § 245). His successors also encouraged the establishment and maintenance of schools for the clergy, in the convents and episcopal sees.

238. In these schools. and still more in the universities which were subsequently formed, especially in that of Paris, the model of all the rest, a degree of zeal for science, as considerable as could be expected from the information, position, and circumstances of the ecclesiastics for whom these seminaries had been principally designed, gradually unfolded itself. An alliance was now formed between faith in the objective value of revealed truths, out of which the dogmas of the church had gradually arisen and had been carefully preserved by its hierarchy, and the daily increasing desire of penetrating to the principles themselves, or to the objective certitude of these truths. The means employed were Logic and Metaphysics, or Dialectics. This was the origin of the scholastic philosophy, which was engaged in the application of Dialectics to Theology (such as it was established by St. Augustin), and an intimate association of these two sciences.

239. The human mind thus endeavoured at once, without any substantial knowledge or previous discipline, to grapple with the greatest of all questions, the Nature of the Divinity; and by a course the reverse of that pursued by Grecian philosophy, beginning with this great principle, sought in its descent to embrace the circle of all acquired knowledge. The impulse was given by Theology; which always continued to be the principal moving power as well as object. At first nothing more was designed than the confirmation of certain isolated doctrines by the authority of an appeal to Reason as well as Revelation; subsequently men were desirous of binding together into a sort of system, the results

of these reasonings; in the end it was their endeavour to consolidate, confirm, and define, by means of a closer determination and combination of conceptions, the sphere of knowledge which by such means they had extended.

240. Revelation had already supplied the highest results of such inquiries as regards the matter and contents. All that remained to be sought was the form of Rational Science and the clearness and certainty of Knowledge. All that could be obtained by investigation had been already defined, and all deviation was strictly forbidden by the Church; nor were the means employed—Dialectics—less absolutely fixed by usage. The circle of mental activity was consequently confined; and a spirit of minute subtilty began to prevail, more especially in establishments cut off from large communication with the great world, which amused the inquisitiveness of the human mind by the discussion of puerile formularies. In opposition to Dialectics arose Mysticism, which tried to establish the claims of Sentiment.

241. Dialectics themselves were a mere logical skeleton after the manner of Boethius and Cassidorus; and more recently, in conformity to the sketch of Bede (§ 235), which was adopted as his model by Alcuin; and finally, after the system attributed to St. Augustin, (§ 233). It became indeed somewhat more enlarged after they had acquired from the Arabs some slight acquaintance with the Aristotelian philosophy, by means of rude translations from the Arabic and Greek. In spite of the opposition it at first encountered, and the imputation of heresy, this philosophy became daily more prevalent, and ultimately of universal influence, in consequence of being allied to Theology.

242. It is not possible to define with accuracy the duration of the empire of scholastic philosophy. It began in the ninth century,[1] and has in some degree survived to our own days; but the revival of classical literature and the Reformation deprived it for ever of that unlimited authority which it possessed before.

[1] The origin of Scholastic philosophy is often referred to the epoch of Roscellin, about the end of the eleventh century; or lastly (as Tiedemann does), to the commencement of the thirteenth.

243. Four epochs may be defined in the history of this philosophy, deducible from the history of the question concerning the *Reality* of Conceptions; and the relations of Philosophy to Theology. *First period,* down to the eleventh century:—A blind *Realism,*[1] with scattered attempts to apply the elements of Philosophy to Theology. *Second period,* from *Roscellin* to *Alexander* of *Hales* or *Alesius,* at the commencement of the thirteenth century. The first appearance of Nominalism and of a more liberal system of inquiry, quickly repressed by the ecclesiastical authorities, which established the triumph of Realism. An alliance was brought about between philosophy and theology in generals. *Third period,* From *Alexander* and *Albert,* surnamed the Great, to *Occam:* thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. During this period, Realism had exclusive dominion: the system of instruction adopted by the Church was consolidated by the introduction of the Arabic-Aristotelian system; and philosophy became still more closely connected with theology. The age of *St. Thomas Aquinas* and *Scotus. Fourth period,* From *Occam* to the sixteenth century. A continued contest between Nominalism and Realism, wherein the former obtained some partial successes. Philosophy was gradually detached from Theology, through the renewal of their old debates. Some other attempts to introduce reforms in the systems of both appear as subordinate phenomena.

Observation. Three different relations subsisted between Philosophy and Theology during these periods: 1st. Philosophy was considered merely *subordinate:* as the *Ancilla Theologiæ:* 2ndly. It was associated with the latter on a footing of equality: 3rdly. They were mutually separated and divorced.

244. In examining the philosophy of these ages we ought, (making due allowance for the circumstances of the times, and not appreciating what was effected then by what might be achieved now), to allow all their merit to superior minds without laying to their charge the faults of their age and their contemporaries: and to show ourselves sensible to the good as well as to the evil of the Scholastic system. Among

[1] Realism supposes our *ideas* to have a *real essence:* Nominalism the contrary.—ED.

its good results were a dialectic use of the Understanding, a great subtilty of thought, an extension of the domain of Dogmatical Metaphysics, and a rare sagacity in the development and distinction of ontological notions, with individual efforts on the part of several men of genius, notwithstanding the heavy bondage in which they were held. The ill effects were, the dissemination of a minute and puerile spirit of speculation, the decay of sound and practical sense, with a neglect of the accurate and real sciences and the sources whence they are to be derived, that is:—Experience, History, and the Study of Languages. To these must be added the prevalence of the dominion of authority, and prescription; bad taste; and a rage for frivolous distinctions and subdivisions, to the neglect of the higher interests of science. Such were the ulterior consequences of these protracted habits on the intellectual culture and the social progress of the human race. In conclusion, we have to consider its further effects on the scientific culture and advancement of humanity.

*General Treatises on the History of Scholastic Philosophy.**

Lud. Vives, De Causis Corruptarum Artium (in his Works), *Bas.* 1555, 2 vols. folio, or ed. Majansius, *Valent.* 1782–90.

History of the Decline of the Arts and Sciences, to their Revival in the XIV and XV Centuries; serving as an Introduction to a Literary History of these two Centuries, *London.*

Cæs. Egassii Bulæi Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, etc. *Paris.* 1665–73, 6 vols. fol.

† J. B. L. Crevier, History of the University of Paris, from its foundation, etc. *Paris,* 1761, 7 vols. 12mo.

Joh. Launojus, De Celebrioribus Scholis a Carolo M. instauratis, *Par.* 1672. Idem: De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna in Academia Parisiensi, *Par.* 1653, 4to.; accessere J. Jonsii Diss. de Historia Peripatetica et editoris de varia Aristotelis in Scholis Protestantium Fortuna Schediasma, *Vitemb.* 1720, 8vo.

Chph. Binder, De Scholastica Theologia, *Tub.* 1614, 4to.

Herm. Conring, De Antiquitatibus Academicis Dissertt. *Helmst.* 1659–1673, 4to. Cura C. A. Heumanni, *Götting.* 1739, 4to.

Ad. Tribbechovii De Doctoribus Scholasticis et Corrupta per eos Divinarum et Humanarum rerum Scientia liber singularis, *Giss.* 1665, 8vo.; ed. II cum Præfat. C. A. Heumanni, *Jen.* 1719, 4to.

Jac. Thomasius, De Doctoribus Scholasticis, *Lips.* 1676, 4to.

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* See the Prize Essay of Jourdain: History of the Aristotelian Writings in the Middle Ages. Translated into German by Ad. Stahr, 1831.

† J. A. CRAMER, Continuation of Bossuet, part V, tom. II, sqq.
† SCHROCKH, Ecclesiastical History, part XXII—XXXIV.
FABRICII Biblioth. Lat. Mediæ et Infr. Ætatis.
F. BRUCKERI De Naturâ Indole et Modo Philosophiæ Scholasticæ; in his Hist. Philos. Crit., tom. III, p. 709, and his Hist. de Ideis, p. 198.
† TIEDEMANN, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, Parts IV and V.
† BUHLE, Manual of the History of Philosophy, tom. V. and VI.
† TENNEMANN, History of Philosophy, tom. VIII, sqq.
† W. L. G. BARON VON EBERSTEIN, Natural Theology of the Schoolmen, with Supplements on their Doctrine of Free-will, and their Notion of Truth, *Leips.* 1806, 8vo.
BAUR, Der Begriff der christlichen Philosophie und die Hauptmomente ihrer Entwickelung. In den Theologischen Jahrbüchern, 1846. Dritter Artikel: Die scholastische Philosophie, § 183—233.
RITTER, Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie. 4 Theile der Geschichte der Philosophie; 5—8 Theil, 1841, fg.)
Ditto, translation, published by BOHN, *London*, 1846.
MARBACH, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 1841. (2 Theil des Lehrbuchs der Geschichte der Philosophie.)

FIRST PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

I. *Absolute Realism down to the commencement of the Eleventh Century.*

Alcuin.

245. The attempts of philosophising Reason at this period were feeble and imperfect, though they might have been more successful but for the constraint imposed by the hierarchy. Such a state of things permitted the existence of only a small number of superior writers, who shed a doubtful light amid the general gloom of ignorance, and laid the foundations of the Scholastic system. The first of these, in the order of time, was the Englishman *Alcuin* or *Albinus*,[1] whom Charlemagne brought with him from Italy to his court. This very learned writer (for the times in which he lived) wrote upon the *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*[2] (§ 237). His pupil *Rhabanus Maurus* introduced his dialectics into Germany.[3]

[1] Born at York 736, died 804.
[2] In his work De Septem Artibus. See his Opp. Omnia de novo collecta et ed. cur. FROBENII, *Ratisb.* 1777, 2 vols. fol.
[3] Born at Mentz 776; died archbishop of that city 856.

Johannes Scotus Erigena.

† Johannes Scotus Erigena, or an Essay on the Origin of Christian Philosophy, and its sacred character, by PEDER HJORT, *Copenh.* 1823, 8vo.

STAUDENMAIER, Johannes Scotus Erigena, 1 Theil, 1834.

216. *John Scotus*, an Irishman (hence his surname of Erigena), belonged to a much higher order: a man of great learning, and of a philosophical and original mind; whose means of attaining to such a superiority we are ignorant of. He was invited from England to France by Charles the Bald, but subsequently obliged to quit the latter country; being persecuted as a heretic. At the invitation of Alfred the Great he retired to Oxford, where he died about 886.

His acquaintance with Latin and Greek (to which some assert he added the Arabic); his love for the philosophy of Aristotle and of Plato; his translation (exceedingly esteemed throughout the West), of Dionysius the Areopagite (§ 236); his liberal and enlightened views (which the disputes of the day called upon him to express) respecting predestination[1] and the eucharist;—all these entitle him to be considered a phenomenon for the times in which he lived. Add to this, that he regarded philosophy as the science of the principles of all things, and as inseparable from true religion; that he adopted a philosophical system[2] (a revived Neoplatonism) of which the foundation was the maxim: That God is the essence of all things; that from the plenitude of His nature First Causes (ἰδέαι), from which Nature is begotten, are all derived, and to Him ultimately return (*Primordiales causæ*—*natura naturata*). His labours, enlightened by so much learning and suggested by so much talent, might have accomplished more if they had not been blighted by the imputation of heresy.

[1] See on this subject his treatise, De Divinâ Prædestinatione et Gratiâ, in GILB. MANGUINI Vett. Auctorum qui IX Sæc. de Prædestinatione et Gratia scripserunt, Opera et Fragmenta, *Paris.* 1650, tom. I, p. 103, sqq.

[2] De Divisione Naturæ libri V, ed. TH. GALE, *Oxon.* 1681, fol. Extracts from Erigena are to be found in HEUMANNI Acta Philos. tom. III, p. 858; and in DUPIN, Auct. Eccles. tom. VII., p. 79.

Berenger and Lanfranc.

OUDINI Diss. de Vitâ, Scriptis, et Doctrinâ Berengarii, in Comment. t. II. p. 622.

G. E. LESSING, Berengarius Turonensis, *Bruns.* 1770, 4to. † See Historical and Literary Miscell., extracted from the library of Wolfenb., V vol. (Complete Works of LESSING, t. XX.)

BERENGARIUS TURONENSIS, Dissert. by C. F. STÆUDLIN, in his Archives of Ancient and Modern Ecclesiastical Hist. (publ. with TZCHIRNER), vol. II, fasc. 2, *Leips.* 1814. The same: Progr. Annuntiatur editio libri Berengarii Turonensis adversus Lanfrancum; simul omnino de ejus scriptis agitur, *Gott.* 1814, 4to.

MILONIS CRISPINI Vita Lanfranci, apud Mabillon Acta Sanctor. Ordin. Bened. Sæc. VI, p. 630; and his Opp. ed. LUC. DACHERIUS (D'ACHERY), *Paris*, 1648, fol.

247. Next in order comes *Gerbert*, a monk of Aurillac, who afterwards became pope Sylvester II.,[1] and acquired, at Seville and Cordova, extraordinary information, for that time, in the mathematics and Aristotelian philosophy of the Arabs, which he disseminated in the schools or monasteries of Bobbio, Rheims, Aurillac, Tours,[2] and Sens. After him appeared *Berenger* of Tours,[3] who was distinguished for his talents, his learning, and his freedom of opinion, by which he drew upon himself some severe persecutions, in consequence of discussions on the subject of transubstantiation.[4] His opponent *Lanfranc*,[5] as well as the cardinal Peter *Damianus*, or *Damien*,[6] brought to perfection the art of Dialectics as applied to Theology; and his skill therein gave to the former (in the opinion of his contemporaries), the advantage over Berenger. This discussion, which was subsequently revived, had the effect of tightening still more the bonds of authority.

[1] Born in Auvergne; pope A.D. 999; died 1003.

[2] His Dialectic treatise, De Rationali et Ratione Uti, is to be found in the Thesaur. Anecdot. PEZII, t. I, part 2, p. 146: and his Letters in DUCHESNE, Hist. Franc. Script., t. II, p. 789, sqq.

HOCK, Gerbert, oder Sylvester II, und sein Jahrhundert, 1837.

[3] Con. Berengarius, born about the commencement of the eleventh century, died 1088.

[4] Liber Berengarii Turonensis adversus Lanfrancum ex Cod. Mscpt. Guelpherbit. edit. a STÆUDLINO, *Gott.* 1823, 4to. (Progr. III.)

[5] Born at Pavia 1005; died archbishop of Canterbury, 1069.

[6] Of Ravenna; born 1001, died 1072.

St. Anselm of Canterbury.

ANSELMI Cantuariensis Opp. lab. et stud. D. G. GERBERON, *Paris.* 1675; second edition, 1721; *Venet.* 1744, 2 vols. fol.

EADMERI Vita S. Anselmi, in the Acta Sanctorum, *Antw.*, April, t. II, p. 685, sqq., and in the edit. of the Works of Anselm above:

† A. RAINERI, Panegyrical Hist. of St. Anselm, *Modena*, 1693—1706, 4 vols. 4to.: and Jo. SARISBURIENSIS, De Vitâ Anselmi, WHARTON's Anglia Sacra, part II, p. 149.

FRANCK, Anselm of Canterbury, 1842.

HASSE, Amselm of Canterbury, 1 Th. 1843.

248. *St. Anselm*, the pupil and successor of Lanfranc (whom we must not confound with the schoolman his contemporary, Anselm of Laon),[1] was born at Aosta in 1034, (or, according to Carrière, in 1033); became prior and abbot of the monastery of Bec, and died, archbishop of Canterbury, 1109. He was a second Augustin; superior to those of his age in the acuteness of his understanding and powers of logic; and equal to the most illustrious men of his day for virtue and piety. He felt a lively want of a system of religious philosophy, to be effected by combining the results of controversies on such subjects, in accordance, for the most part, with the views of St. Augustin. For this purpose, he composed his *Monologium sive Exemplum Meditandi de ratione Fidei*; in which he endeavoured to develope systematically the great truths of religion on principles of Reason, but at the same time presupposing Faith. To this he added his *Proslogium*, otherwise called, *Fides quærens Intellectum;* where he seeks to prove the existence of God from the notion of the Greatest Thing that can be thought (the most perfect Being). A monk of Marmoutier, named *Gaunilon*, ably attacked this sort of ontological argument,[2] which received from its author the name of the *Anselmian proof*, though it exchanged it at a later period for that of the *Cartesian*, and which Kant, in his *Critique of pure Reason*, shows to be nothing more than an assumption of the

[1] Died A.D. 1117.

[2] GAUNILONIS Liber pro Insipiente adversus Anselmi in Proslogio ratiocinantem; together with ANSELMI Apologeticus contra Insipientem. (In the works cited above).

thing to be proved. Anselm may be looked upon as the inventor of Scholastic Metaphysics, inasmuch as he afforded the first example of it; though other systems subsequently superseded his own, and some of his ideas were never followed up.

Hildebert of Tours.

Hildeberti Turonensis Opera, ed. ANT. BEAUGENDRE, *Paris.* 1708, fol.; and in the Biblioth. Patrum of GALLAND, t. XIV, p. 337, sqq.

† W. C. L. ZIEGLER, Memoirs towards a Hist. of the Theological Belief in the Existence of a God, with an Extract from the first Dogmatical System [in the West] of Hildebert, archbishop of Tours, *Gött.* 1792, 8vo.

249. *Hildebert* of Lavardin, archbishop of Tours,[1] and as is probable, the disciple of Berenger, was equal to Anselm in sagacity and ability as a logician; and surpassed him in clearness and in the harmonious culture of his mind. To an acquaintance with the Classics and other accomplishments, rare in his age, he added independence of mind, practical sense, and a degree of taste which preserved him from falling into the vain and puerile discussions of his contemporaries. His *Tractatus Philosophicus*[2] and his *Moralis Philosophia*, are the first essays towards a popular system of Theology. *Othlo* and *Honorius*, two monks of the same period, opposed themselves to the Logicians, and were devoted to a practical Mysticism.[3]

SECOND PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

II. *Disputes between the Nominalists and Realists, from Roscellin (end of the Eleventh Century) to Alexander of Hales.*

JAC. THOMASII Oratio de Sectâ Nominalium; Orationes, *Lips.* 1682—86, 8vo.

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[1] Born between 1053 and 1057; died about 1134.

[2] Part of this treatise is comprised in the works of HUGO DE ST. VICTOR.

[3] The latter (from Augt, near Bâle; died 1130) adopted the new Platonic-Augustinian Theology.

CHPH. MEINERS, De Nominalium ac Realium initiis; Commentatt. Soc. Gott., t. XII, p. 12.

LUD FRID. OTTO BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS, Progr. de vero Scholasticorum Realium et Nominalium discrimine et sententia Theologica, *Jen.* 1821, 4to.

JOH. MART. CHLADENII Diss. (res. Jo. THEOD. KUNNETH) de vita et hæresi Roscellini, *Erlang.* 1756, 4to. See also Thesaurus Biog. et Bibliographicus of GEO. ERN. WALDAU, *Chemnit.* 1792, 8vo.

Roscellin.

250. The practice of Dialectics, and the questions arising out of a disputed passage in Porphyry's Introduction to the Organum of Aristotle (*περὶ πέντε φωνῶν*), respecting the different metaphysical opinions entertained by the Platonists and Peripatetics of the nature of Class Conceptions—such were the causes which led to the division between the Nominalists and Realists, in part adhering to Plato, and in part to Aristotle: disputes which stirred up frequent and angry debates in the schools, without any other result than that of sharpening their powers of argumentation.[1] This long discussion was begun by John *Roscellin* (or Roussellin), a canon of Compiègne,[2] who, (on the testimony of his adversaries), maintained that the notions of Genus and Species were nothing but mere words and terms (*flatus vocis*), which we use to designate qualities common to different individual objects.[3] He was led on by this doctrine to some heterodox opinions respecting the Trinity, which he was ultimately compelled to retract at Soissons, A.D. 1092. It is certain that Roscellin is the first author who obtained the appellation of a Nominalist, and from his time the school previously established, which held the creed that Genus and Species-notions were real essences, or types and moulds of things (*Universalia ante Rem* according to the phrase of the Schoolmen), was throughout the present period perpetually opposed to Nominalism, whose partisans maintained that the *Universalia* subsisted only *in re*, or *post rem:* nor was the difficulty ever definitively settled.

[1] JOH. SARISBURIENSIS Metalog., c. II, 16, 17.

[2] About 1089.

[3] See the treatise of Anselm, De FideTrinitatis, seu De Incarnatione Verbi, c. 2: and John of Salisbury.

Abelard.

PETR. ABELARDI et Heloïsæ Opera nunc prim. edita ex MSS. codd. FR. AMBOISII, etc. stud. ANDR. QUERCETANI (AND. DUCHESNE), *Paris.* 1616, 4to. Idem: In Historia Calamitatum suarum.

† [GERVAISE], Life of P. Abeillard, *Paris*, 1720, 2 vols. 12mo.

JOHN BERINGTON, The History of the Lives of Abelard and Heloïse, etc., *Birm.* and *Lond.* 1787, 4to.

† F. C. SCHLOSSER, Abailard and Dulcin. Life and Opinions of an Enthusiast and a Philosopher, *Gotha*, 1807, 8vo.

J. H. F. FRERICH, Comment. Theol. Crit. de P. Abelardi Doctrina Dogm. et Morali, (prize comp.), *Jen.* 1827, 4to.

CARRIERE, Abälard und Heloïse. Eingeleitet durch eine Darstellung von Abälard's philosophie, 1844.

PETR. ABELARDI Opera, ed. V. COUSIN, 1850.

Abelardi et Heloisæ Epistolæ, ed. RAWLINSON, 8vo. *Lond.* 1718.

Lettres d'Abelard et d'Heloise, trad. par ODDOUL, précédées d'un Essai histor. par GUIZOT, 2 vols. 8vo. *Par.* 1839.

251. A celebrated discussion took place in the School of Paris on the mode in which the Universal is contained in the Individual, between *William de Champeaux*,[1] a renowned Logician, and *Peter Abelard*, or *Abeillard*, his pupil and opponent. Abelard, who by some has been considered the first in point of time of the Scholastic philosophers, employed in the debate none but negative arguments; but proved himself to be endowed with some qualifications superior to the narrow dispute in which he was engaged. He was born at Palais, a village near to Nantes, A.D. 1079, and possessed rare abilities, which were sedulously cultivated. To great talents as a logician, he added an extensive acquaintance with Grecian philosophy; borrowed, it is true, only from St. Augustin and Cicero. The perusal of the Classics had imparted to his mind a certain elegance as well as a thirst for scientific fame, which set off his style in teaching and writing, and which at this period was rare, and proportionably admired. He evinced even greater boldness than Anselm in his attempts to demonstrate, on rational principles, the obscure dogmas of the Christian religion, particularly that of the Trinity.[2] In this doctrine he assumes unity in the Divine Being, along

[1] G. Campellensis: he died the bishop of Châlons, A.D. 1120.

[2] In his Introductio ad Theol. Christian., libb. III. seu de Fide Trinitatis, libb. III: see his Works, p. 973 sqq.: and in the larger Treatise: Theologia Christiana, libb. V. given by EDM. MARTENE, Thes. Nov. Anecdot., t. V.

with diversity in his relations (*relationum diversitas*), in which consist the Divine Persons. He also maintains a cognition of God (as the most perfect and absolutely independent Being), by means of the Reason, which he ascribes to the heathen philosophers, without derogating from the incomprehensibility of God. He also attempted, as Hildebert had done before him (§ 249), to explain, on philosophical principles, the chief conceptions of Theological Morality, as, for instance, the notions of Vice and Virtue. He made *both* to consist in the mental resolution, or in the intention; and maintained, against the moral conviction of his age, that no natural pleasures or sensual desires are in themselves of the nature of sin.[1] He discovered the evidence of the morality of actions in the frame of mind and maxims according to which those actions are undertaken. His talents as a teacher attracted an immense crowd of admirers from among the young men at Paris, and increased the celebrity of its university; but at the same time, his reputation drew upon him the envy of others, which, backed by his ill-fated passion for Eloisa, and the zeal of theologians rigidly attached to the doctrines of the Romish church, and in particular the jealousy of St. Bernard, embittered the remainder of his life, and diminished the influence his talents would otherwise have possessed. He died at Clugny, 1142. The epistolary correspondence of Abelard and Heloise which has been preserved, bespeaking the painful reminiscence of their past happiness, and overflowing with a spirit of sublime melancholy, is a glorious monument of romantic love. The most remarkable of Abelard's scientific works are his Logic or Dialectics, his Introduction to Christian Theology, containing his doctrine of the Trinity, and his Christian Theology. He also published sermons for the nuns of the Holy Spirit, and a Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.

252. In spite of the persecutions of Abelard a great number of men of talents were willing to tread in his steps, and attempted, with various success, to associate Philosophy with Theology. The principal were *G. de Conches*,[2] and *Guilb. de la Porrée*, born in Gascony, and bishop of Poitiers;[3]

[1] Ethica, seu liber dictus Scito Teipsum, in Pezii Thes. Noviss. Anecdotorum, t. III, part 2, p. 625.

[2] Died 1150.

[3] On that account surnamed Pictaviensis. Died 1154.

Hugh de St. Victor, of Lower Saxony or Flanders;[1] *Robert (Folioth?) of Melun*;[2] *Robert Pulleyn*, an Englishman;[3] *Peter*, surnamed *Lombardus*, bishop of Paris, born in a village near Novara, in Lombardy, and died 1164. To these must be added the disciple of the latter, *Peter of Poitiers*;[4] *Hugh of Amiens*;[5] *Richard de St. Victor* the mystic;[6] *Alain de Ryssel*, etc. The most distinguished was *Lombardus*, in consequence of his *Libri Sententiarum*, which procured him the additional appellation of *Magister Sententiarum*.[8] In these he put together extracts from the Fathers on different points of faith, without adding any solution of the difficulties that occurred; supplying an abundant treasury of disputation for the logicians of his time. His works became popular—a sort of storehouse and armoury for ecclesiastical polemics; though others of those we have mentioned possessed more real merit; for instance, the two mystics, *Hugh de St. Victor*, surnamed the Second Augustin, a man of an elegant and philosophical mind; and his pupil *Richard de St. Victor*, who to his mysticism added considerable acuteness. Pulleyn also was the author of a clear and enlarged distinction of Dogmas, mixed up with Reason; and finally, *Alain de Ryssel* applied to these matters the exactness of a mathematical method.

NEANDER, Der heilige Bernard und sein Zeitalter, 1838.
ELLENDORF, Der heilige Bernard und die Hierarchie seiner Zeit, 1838.

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[1] Born 1096, died 1140.
Ejusd.: Opera stud. ed industr. Canonicorum Regiorum Abbat. St. Vict. *Rothomag.* 1618, 3 vols. fol.
See C. GFR. DERLING, Diss. (præs. C. GFR. KENFFEL), de Hugone à St. Victore, *Helmst.* 1745, 4to.

[2] Melidunensis; died 1173 A.C., according to the Literary History of France, tom. XIII, p. 1164.

[3] Pullus; died between 1150 and 1154.

[4] Pictaviensis; died archbishop of Embrun, 1205.

[5] Died archbishop of Rouen, (hence called Rothomagensis), 1164.

[6] A Scotchman; died 1173. Opera, *Venet.* 1506, 8vo. *Par.* 1518.

[7] Called also Alain de l'Isle, and Alanus ab Insulis. Died 1203.
CARL. DE VISCH, Oratio de Alano, in the Works of Alain, ed. by VISCH, *Antwerp.* 1653, fol.

[8] PETRI LOMBARDI libri IV Sententiarum: frequently published, particularly *Ven.* 1477. fol.; *Colon.* 1570, 8vo. See BOSSUET and CRAMER'S Hist. part. VI, § 586.

ROSENKRANZ, Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Literatur, 1836.
HELFFERICH, Die Christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalern, 1842, 2 Theile.
SCHMIDT, Der Mysticismus des Mittelalters in seiner Entstehung, 1824.
J. GORRES, Die Christliche Mystik. 4 Bünde, 8vo. *Regensburg* und *Tübingen*, 1836.

253. The philosophy of religion was promoted by these labours and efforts. For the aim of thinkers was now evidently directed to matters of a vast and comprehensive nature, to the welding of conflicting religious opinions into one whole, and at the same time to an extension of their limits through a farther determination of doctrines, and by answering a multitude of questions which had been started by an idle and wearisome subtilty. Their aim, however, was more especially directed to a founding and establishing of the greatest mysteries, partly by means of Cognition through *notions*, partly from Intuition (rational and mystical dogmatism). This tendency struck out daily deeper roots, notwithstanding the zealous opposition of the supernaturalist party—which was headed by *St. Bernard* de Clairvaux, (born 1091, died 1153) and *Walther*, Abbot of St. Victor, (about 1180) who attempted to condemn these efforts as heretical, and to decry the Dialectics of Aristotle, which had already attained the highest consideration. It is true, that the latter defined the limits of Dialectics with tolerable accuracy; but this alone was quite insufficient to check the tendency to rational insight deeply rooted in the human mind, and favoured by the spirit of the age.

254. *John of Salisbury* (J. parvus Sarisburiensis), a pupil of Abelard, and a man of classical erudition, in spite of his predilection for Aristotle clearly perceived the faultiness of the philosophy of his age, and the futility of that logic which he attacked with considerable ability. Together with these abuses there was manifested a certain energy of reason, which, although it was as yet imperfectly restrained, was nevertheless well adapted and inclined to grapple with

[1] In his POLICRATICUS, sive de Nugis Curialium et Vestigiis Philosophorum, libb. VIII, folio *s. l. vel a.* (*Colon.* 1472?); et METALOGICUS, libb. IV, 8vo. *Par.* 1610; *Lugd. Bat.* 1639; *Amst.* 1664, 8vo.; and in his CCCI Epist., *Paris*, 1611, 4to.

authority. The adverse party, however, succeeded for a time in bridling it by means of persecutions, interdicts, and anathemas. Dialectics came in the end to be employed both for and against the system of the Church, as was shown by the example of *Simon de Tournay* (Tornacensis) of *Amalric* (or Amauric de Bene, in the district of Chartres), who died 1209; and by his pupil *David de Dinant*.[1] Besides a great number of paradoxical doctrines, the last taught a species of Pantheism, borrowed, it is probable, from J. Scot Erigena.[2] Their heresy naturally turned into derision and well-founded contempt the School Dialectics.

THIRD PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY: FROM ALEXANDER OF HALES TO OCCAM.

Exclusive dominion of Realism; Complete alliance between the Church and the Aristotelians.

J. LAUNOJUS, De Varia Aristotelis Futurâ. (Above, at the head of § 245).

255. It was precisely at the time when everything appeared to have a tendency to discard the philosophy of Aristotle from all interference with the doctrines of the church, that it acquired the greatest ascendancy. About the year 1240 men began to be better acquainted with his works *collectively*, in consequence of being brought into contact with the Greeks, who had never altogether deserted him;[3] and still more through the Arabians. The very circumstance that the perusal of these works was prohibited in 1209, 1215, and 1231, increased the avidity with which

[1] David de Dinant was moreover the author of a system of Christian Socialism. See the article on his name in BAYLE'S Dictionary.

[2] GERSON, De Concordia Metaphysicæ cum Logica, part. IV. THOMAS AQ. Lib. Sent. II. dist. 17, Qu. I, a. I. ALBERTI Summa Theol. part I. Tract. IV. Qu. 20.

[3] In the eleventh century appeared in the Greek empire the philologist MICHAEL CONSTANTINE PSELLUS, born 1020, died about 1100: the author of Commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry; Paraphrasis Libri Arist. de Interpretatione, Gr., with the Commentaries of Ammonius and Magentinus, about 1503. Compendium in Quinque voces Porphyrii et Aristotelis Prædicamenta, Gr., *Paris.* 1541; and σύνοψις εἰς τὴν

they were read to such a degree, that the Dominicans and Franciscans, the staunchest maintainers of orthodoxy, who had recently assumed authority in the University of Paris, eagerly devoted themselves to the same study. The question appears of interest: How was it that the works of Aristotle came to be known in the West? From the East by the way of Constantinople, or by the way of Spain through the Arabs?[1] From this question is to be excepted the *Organum*, which was known as early as the time of Charlemagne; having been sent as a present to him from Constantinople.

Arabians.

256. The Arabians, a nation gifted with powerful and active faculties, originally devoted to Sabeism, had derived a religious and warlike enthusiasm from the religion of Mahomet, which combined the sensualistic and the rationalistic elements. The stirring addresses of his successors

Ἀριστοτέλους Λογικήν, Gr. et Lat. *Aug. Vind.* 1597; besides Introductio in sex Philos. Modos, etc., Gr. c. Lat. vers. JAC. FOSCARINI, *Ven.* 1522. *Paris.* 1541, 12mo.; and a book on the Opinions of the old Philosophers respecting the Nature of the Soul, Gr. et Lat., with, Origenis Philocalia, *Paris.* 1618 and 1624, 4to., subsequently reprinted. To Psellus succeeded EUSTRATIUS, metropolitan of Nicæa, in the beginning of the twelfth century (FABRIC. Bibl. Gr. lib. III, c. 6, p. 151, sqq. note A), and other writers of the thirteenth century, who abridged the Logic of Aristotle; such as NICEPHOR. BLEMMYDES (flourished about 1254) and GEGR. ANEPONYMUS (Nicephoræ Blemmydæ Epitome Logicæ Doctrinæ Aristotelis, Gr. et Lat. *Aug. Vindel.* 1606, 8vo.; GEORGII ANEPONYMI Compendium Philos siv. Organi Aristot. Gr. et Lat. *Aug. Vind.* 1600); GEOR. PACHYMERUS, who survived till 1310, author of a Paraphrase of the Philosophy of Aristotle in general, of which extracts have been published (Gr. et Lat. *Oxon.* 1666, 8vo.; Epitome Philos. *Bas.* 1560, Lat. fol.); and THEOD. METOCHITES, who survived till 1332, and commented on the works of Aristotle relating to Physics (FABRIC. Bibl. Gr. vol. IX.)

[1] See BUHLE, Manual of the History of Philosophy, part V. p. 247. HEEREN, History of the Study of Classical Literature, vol. I, p. 183. This question has been thoroughly discussed, and decided in favour of a Saracenic origin, in the following prize composition of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, at Paris: Critical Inquiry respecting the Age and Origin of the Latin Translations of Aristotle, and the Greek or Arabic Commentaries employed by the Schoolmen, etc., by M. JOURDAIN, *Paris*, 1812. 1819, 8vo. On this work see Götting. Gel. Anz. 1819, No. 142.

respecting the revelations of the Divinity to their Prophet contributed to influence their ardent temperaments. He died 632; but the flame was kept alive by the fiery zeal of his successors, who insisted more and more on his pretended mission from on high. In a short time they had subjected to their belief a large portion of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Their relations with the conquered nations, especially the Syrians, Jews, and Greeks; the progress among them of luxury, and all its consequences; the demand for foreign physicians and astrologers, and the influence acquired by the latter, engendered among them an ardent emulation for the sciences, which was encouraged in every way by the Caliphs of the house of the Abbassides, Al Mansour,[1] Al Mehdi,[2] Haroun al Raschid (the contemporary of Charlemagne),[3] Al Mamoum,[4] and Motassem;[5] who caused the Greek authors to be translated into Arabic, founded schools, and collected valuable libraries.[6]

§ 257.

CHPH. CHR. FABRICII (resp. J. ANDR. NAGEL), De Studio Philosophiæ Græcæ inter Arabes, *Aldt.* 1745, 8vo.; id.: in the Frag. Hist. Philos. of WINDHEIM, p. 57.

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[1] Reigned from 753 to 775.
[2] Died 784.
[3] Reigned from 786 to 808.
[4] From 813 to 833.
[5] Died 841.

[6] ABULFEDÆ Annales Moslemici Arab. et Lat. Opera REISKII, etc. ed. J. G. C. ADLER, *Havn.* 1789, sqq. tom. I—V, 4to.

G. ELMACINI, Historia Saracencia, ed. T. ERPENIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1625, fol.

† K. E. OELSNER, Mahomet: Influence of his Religion during the Middle Ages: prize composition of the Institution, 1809; translated and enlarged by E. D. M., *Francf.* 1810, 8vo.

OLAI CELSII Hist. Linguæ et Eruditionis Arabum, *Upsal.* 1694, 8vo.

RICHARDSON, Dissertation on the Languages, Manners, and the Literature of the Eastern Nations; prefixed to his Persian, Arabic, and English Dictionary, *Oxford*, 1777, fol.

J. GOTTL. BUHLE, Commentatio de Studii Græcarum Literarum inter Arabes initiis et rationibus. Comment. Soc. Gotting. vol. XI. p. 216.

Jo. LEO AFRICANUS, De Viris quibusdam illutribus apud Arabes Libellus; in FABRIC. Bibl. Gr., tom. XIII.

CHR. FRIEDR. SCHNURRER, Bibl. Arabicæ Specimen, part. I—V, *Tub.* 1799—1803, 4to; et Bibliotheca Arabica, *Hal.* 1811, 8vo.

HENRICI MIDDELDORPII Commentatio de Institutis Literariis in Hispaniâ quæ Arabes auctores habuerunt, *Gott.* 1811, 4to.

CAR. SOLANDRI Diss. de Logica Arabum, *Ups.* 1721, 8vo.
EUSEBII RENAUDOTI De Barbaricis Aristotelis Librorum Versionibus Disquisitio, in FABRIC. Biblioth. Gr. tom. XII.
† TIEDEMANN, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. IV, and BRUCKER, Hist. Philosophiæ, tom. III.
TAYLOR, History of Mahomedanism and of its sects, drawn from Oriental sources, 1837.
† JOS. VON HAMMER, A Brief History of Arabian Metaphysics, and an Article of the Leipz. Lit. Gaz. 1826, No, 161—163.
SCHMŒLDERS, Documenta philosophiæ Arabum, 1836.
WUSTENFELD, Die Akademie der Araber und ihre Lehrer, 1837.
SCHMŒLDERS, Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes, 1842.

On Mohammedan History, consult:

The Life of Mahomet and his Successors, by WASHINGTON IRVING, 2 vols. 1850.
SAM. OCKLEY'S History of the Saracens. Bohn, *Lond.* 1848.
PRICE'S Mohammedan History, compiled from Persian authorities, 4 vols. 4to. 1821.

As early as the second century of the Hegira there arose variations in doctrine, and there appeared orthodox and heterodox parties which were respectively subdivided into sects. In this manner a sort of natural reasoning was developed among the Arabians, which at a later date was built on the foundation of the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Aristotle and his commentators down to J. Philoponus, were almost the only philosophers who found favour with the Arabians. The body of his philosophy they received indeed only through the doubtful medium of Neoplatonism, and by means of inadequate translations.[1] To the study of these they added Mathematics, Natural History, and Medicine. But many obstacles were in their way. In the first place, the Koran, which opposed limits to the free exercise of their understandings: the opposition also of a formidable party who pretended to maintain the orthodox belief: the difficulty of understanding Aristotle himself: and the absolute supremacy they presently accorded to him: lastly, their national tendency to exaggeration and superstition. All therefore they effected was to interpret, and very frequently, to misinterpret, the system of that philosopher, without ever advancing beyond him; attempting to apply his principles to their own blind faith. Hence arose amongst them a philosophy not very dissimilar to that of the Christian

[1] See the works of JOURDAIN and BUHLE mentioned in p. 225 (note).

nations in the middle ages, who were also preoccupied with dialectic quibbles, having a positive religion for their basis. The consequence was an abundant harvest of futile refinements. To such a philosophy was superadded, accidentally, a sort of Mysticism; especially among the Pantheistic sect of the *Sofis* or *Ssufis* (*Sofismus*, *Sufismus*), founded before or during the second century of the Hegira, by *Abu Said Abul Cheir*; a sect which continues to survive in sufficiently large numbers in Persia and India.[1]

After all, the records of Arabic philosophy have been too little investigated to enable us to speak of them with sufficient certainty.

258. The principal Arabian philosophers (for the most part exclusively devoted to the system of Aristotle), were:

1. *Alkendi*, or *Alkindi*,[2] of Basrah, a physician and philosopher, the master of copious and various learning, and well versed in the Sciences. He flourished A.D. 800, under the reign of Al Mamoum. 2. *Alfarabi*[3] of Balah, in the province of Farab, who died A.D. 954; a man of superior parts; and styled the *second* teacher of intellectual knowledge. His Logic, as well as his treatise on the origin and subdivision of the Sciences, was greatly in vogue with the schoolmen. 3. *Avicenna*,[4] born about 980, at Bokhara: died 1036. He devoted himself especially to Logic and Metaphysics (which he thought the first of the Sciences, inasmuch as it has for its subject the Thing itself, *per se*); as well as to Medicine and Alchemy. He manifested an original vein of thought in his commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle.[5] He there asserts that it is no more possible to assign a definition of a Thing *per se*, than it is to give

[1] Ssufismus sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica, quam e MSS. Biblioth. Regiæ Berol., Persicis, Arabicis, Turcicis eruit atque illustravit FRIEDR. AUG. DEOFIDUS THOLUCK, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo. The opinion of this author is, that Sofism had its origin neither in India nor Persia, but in the religion of Mahomet itself. His hypothesis is controverted by the author (Qu. VON HAMMER?) of a critique in the Lit. Gaz. of Leipsic (1822, Nos. 252—258), on an important work relative to Oriental Mysticism, entitled, Reschati Ainol Hajat, etc.

[2] Otherwise called Abu Yusuf Ebn Eschak Al-Kendi.

[3] Abu Nasr Mohammed Ebn Tarchan Al Farabi.

[4] Abu Ali Al Hosain Ebn Sina Al Schaüch Al Raus.

[5] Metaphysica, per BERNARD. VENETUNI, *Venet.* 1493. Opera, *Ven.* 1523, 5 vols. fol.; *Bas.* 1556, 3 vols.

one of *the Necessary*, *the Possible*, and *the Real*. From the abstract notion of Necessity, he concludes that what is necessary *is* without an efficient cause; and that there is only one Being existing of necessity. He assumed that matter is eternal, and that the substantial form is created by the active understanding which is a substance separate from man. He admits the eternity of matter, and that substantial forms are apperceptible to the active intellect, which is a substance distinct from man. 4. *Algazel* of Tus,[1] an acute Sceptic, who proved himself able to defend the cause of a supernatural Revelation with ability in opposition to the doctrine of Emanation, as well as that of the harmony of causes, and the materiality of the soul; with many others of the opinions of the Aristotelians and Neoplatonists. He maintained the infallibility of the Koran, and asserted the miracles of Mahomet to be incontestible proofs of his mission. 5. *Thophail*, or *Abubekr*,[2] of Cordova; died at Seville, 1190. He was distinguished for his philosophical romance *Hai Ebn Yokdan*, or the Man of Nature;[3] in which he sets forth in an original manner the enthusiastic doctrine of the Neoplatonists respecting Intuition.

Averroes.

Commentary of Averroes on the Arabic trans. of Aristotle, viz., Averrois Commentaria et Introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis, cum eorum Vers. lat. 11 vols. 8vo. *Venet.* 1562–74, and in various editions of the Works of Aristotle. Also his work; Destructio destructionis Philosophiæ Algazelis, in the Latin translations, *Venet.* 1497, and *Venet.* 1527, fol. See FABRICII Bibl. Gr. XIII, p. 282, sqq.

259. 6. *Averroes*,[4] the disciple of Thophail, was born at Cordova, and died at Morocco, 1206 or 1217. He was the most celebrated of the learned men of his nation, and the close and almost servile follower of Aristotle. He was styled, by way of eminence, *the Commentator;* and, in spite of the great number of his secular employments, was a most copious writer. His treatment of Aristotle ought to be

[1] Abu Hamed Mohammed Ebn Mohammed Ebn Achmed Al Gazali, born 1062, died 1111.

[2] Abu Dsafar Ebn Thophail.

[3] Philosophus Autodidactus, tr. Lat. per ED. POCOCKE, *Oxon.* 1761, 4to.

[4] Abul Walid Mohammed Ebn Achmed Ebn Mohamed Ebn Rashid.

appreciated by a reference to the state of opinions in his day. Though he professed to do no more than interpret him, he imputed to him many opinions which in reality were not his: blending with his system the Alexandrian doctrine of Emanation, in order to assign a living First-principle to account for all contingent things. His theory of the active Understanding is a necessary consequence of this manner of interpreting the doctrine of Aristotle. The great Primal Essence produces all the various modifications of things, not by the way of Creation, (because ex nihilo nihil fit) but by uniting matter and form, or by developing the form involved and contained in the matter.[1] Thought, as well as sensible Representation, supposes three things: a receptive material, and, as it were, a formal Understanding; the Understanding receiving the forms of Thought as the thing that is thought; as well as an active operating Understanding, which causes both the material and the abstract forms of Thought to be thought of as operating principles. There exists an universal Active Understanding, in which all mankind partake equally, and which is derived to us from without: its principle being, perhaps, the same which influences the moon.[2] Averroes was a man of a clear-sighted enlightened mind, who believed in the authority of the Koran, but regarded it as a sort of exoteric doctrine, the foundation of which he sought to place on scientific grounds. Besides these philosophers, M. von Hammer mentions others, such as *Al Rasi*, who died 1209; *Seiffedin*, who died 1233; *Nasireddin* of Tus, who died in 1273; *Beidhair*, born in 1286, and *Adhaddedin Aldschi*, who died in 1355.

Sects of Arabian Philosophers.

260. Speaking generally, the Arabian philosophers were divided into two parties; viz. the philosophers simply so called (Idealists), who, according to the belief of the Platonists of Alexandria, held that the world was eternal, and endeavoured to unite this belief to their own prescribed

[1] Averroes, lib. XII, Metaphys.

[2] Ibid., De Animæ Beatitudine. Epitome Metaph. Tract. IV. Cœl. Rhodog. Ant. Lect. lib. III, c. 2.

religion; to which school belonged also the Ascetics or Sofis (§ 257): and, secondly, the *Medabberins* (dialectic Philosophers, or Reasoners), who took their ground on the positive doctrines of the Koran; endeavoured to explain, on philosophical principles, the origin of the world; and combated the Idealists.[1] We are not as yet perfectly acquainted with these two sects. A third likewise is mentioned, that of the *Assariah*, or fatalists, who referred everything to the will of God.

Jews.

261. The doctrines of the Arabians were communicated to the Christian world principally through the medium of the Jews, who imported them from Egypt, where the sciences had been prosecuted with great ardour. The Jews themselves took a prominent part in these philosophical researches, and were distinguished for more than one philosopher. Of this number was *Moses Maimonides*:[2] born at Cordova, A.D. 1139, and brought up under Thophail and Averroes, and inclined to the study of Aristotle; but for these reasons persecuted by the fanatical part of his own countrymen up to the period of his death, which happened in 1205. In his work entitled *More Nevochim* (*Ductor Perplexorum*),[3] he manifests an acute and enlightened understanding in the exposition of the Jewish religion, and in the philosophical principles which he assumes. As a proof, he resists his inclination for the Arabic-Aristotelian system so far as to call in question many of its hypotheses, e. g. that of the Intelligences of the spheres, and of the Active Universal Intelligence.

It may be observed, that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Jews acted as interpreters between the Saracens and the Western nations, by their frequent translations into Hebrew of the works of the Arabians; which were re-translated from the Hebrew, (a language then

[1] AVERROES in Metaph. lib. XII, c. 18. MOSES MAIMONIDES, More Nevochim, lib. I, c. 71, p. 133—135.

[2] Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon.
BEER, Leben und Wirken des Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon, 1834.
FALKENHEIM, Die Ethik des Maimonides deutsch bearbeitet, 1832.

[3] Translated into Latin by J. BUXTORF, *Basil*, 1629, 4to.

better known than the Arabic), into Latin; very imperfectly indeed, but pretty generally.

262. The consequence of this dissemination of the Aristotelian philosophy from an Arabian source, was the increased reputation of that philosopher, who was in a manner installed the sovereign and infallible arbiter of truth and falsehood in all matters of science. The circle of the sciences and the field of inquiry was enlarged, new ideas and new combinations were developed to the advantage of Dialectics, the exercise of which they called forth. Philosophy came to be less and less confounded with the sciences, and was allowed to retain a place distinct from them. One of the principal co-operating causes was the formation of the University of Paris, and of similar institutions in other cities. Out of this arose a sort of polemical contest between Theology and Philosophy, in which the former obtained the ascendancy; the latter being depressed to an inferior position, and a distinction established between Theological and Philosophical truths. To this succeeded an attempt to reconcile and associate the two, which was for some time successful.

Alexander of Hales and his Contemporaries.

263. The first author who turned to account the works of the Arabians was *Alexander of Hales* (*Alesius*), so called from a convent in Gloucestershire, and surnamed *Doctor Irrefragabilis*. Tiedemann makes him the first Schoolman. He taught Theology at Paris, and in his *Summa Theologiæ*[1] enlarged upon the Manual of Lombardus (§ 252), by a rigorous syllogistical statement of the different opinions contained in his book. *William of Auvergne*[2] devoted himself to the statement and discussion of philosophical questions respecting Morals and Metaphysics, with less general views. *Vincent of Beauvais*,[3] in his books of reference

[1] *Ven.* 1475, fol. *Norimb.* 1481. *Ven.* 1576, 4 vols. fol.

[2] Gulielmus Arvernus, and Parisiensis, because bishop of Paris, died 1249. Opera, *Ven.* 1591, fol. *Aurel.* 1674, 2 vols fol.

[3] Bellovacensis. Died about 1264. Speculum Universale, *Argent.* 1473, fol. Speculum Quadruplex, opera et stud. Theologor. Bened. *Duaci*, 1624, 4 vols. fol. See Vincent de Beauvais. etc. by Fr. Chph. Schlosser, *Francf. a. M.* 1819, 2 vols. 8vo.

(*Specula*), gave a picture of the state of the Sciences at this period, particularly of moral philosophy, and has enlightened us with respect to the discordant opinions of the Nominalists and Realists. *Michael Scott* (was living at Toledo A.D. 1217) translated the works of Aristotle, *De Cœlo et de Mundo*, and *De Animâ*, as well as the *Historia Naturalis*; according to the Arabian arrangement: a labour in which he was assisted by a Jew named Andrew. He commented on Aristotle, and availed himself of his Logic. *Robert Grosseteste*, or *Greathead* (*Robertus Capito*), who taught at Paris and Oxford, and died bishop of Lincoln A.D. 1253, besides other treatises, composed some Commentaries on Aristotle.

Albert the Great.

Rudolphus Noviomagensis de Vitâ Alberti M. libb. III, *Colon.* 1499, et: Alberti M. Opera ed. PET. JAMMY, *Lyon.* 1651, 21 vols. fol.

264. *Albert* of *Bollstädt*, or *the Great*, was the first who gave a decided direction to the general tendency in favour of the Aristotelian system. He was born at Lauingen in Swabia, A.D. 1193 or 1205, and studied at Pavia, where he entered the order of the Dominicans, and by his great application to study, especially to that of Natural History, (a department then very generally neglected), he acquired so great a mass of information that he came to be looked upon as a prodigy, and a sort of enchanter. He lived principally at Cologne and Paris: in 1260 was made bishop of Ratisbon, but subseguently resigned that dignity, in order to devote himself to study. He died in his convent at Cologne, 1280. He was rather a learned man and a compiler of the works of others, than an original and profound thinker. He wrote commentaries on most of the works of Aristotle, in which he makes especial use of the Arabian commentators, and blends the notions of the Neoplatonists with those of his author. Logic, Metaphysics, Theology, and Ethics, were rather externally cultivated by his labours than effectually improved. With him began those minute and tedious inquiries and disputes respecting Matter and Form, Essence and Being (*Essentia* or *Quidditas*, and *Existentia*, whence subsequently arose the farther distinction of *Esse Essentiæ* and *Existentiæ*). Of the Universal, he assumes that it

exists partly in external things and partly in the Understanding. Rational Psychology and Theology are indebted to him for many excellent hints. The latter science he treated in his *Summa Theologiæ*, as well according to the plan of Lombardus as his own. In the former he described the soul as a *totum potestativum*. In his Theology he laboured to define our rational knowledge of the Nature of God (excluding from such inquiries the doctrine of the Trinity), and enlarged upon the metaphysical idea of Him, as a necessary Being (in whom pure Esse and his determinate or qualified Nature (*Seyn und Wesen*) are identical), endeavouring to develope in this manner His attributes. These inquiries are often mixed up with idle questions and dialectic absurdities, and involve abundant inconsistencies; as for instance, when he would account for the creation by the doctrine of Emanation (*causatio univoca*), and nevertheless denies the Emanation of Souls: he insists upon the universal intervention of the Deity in the course of Nature, and yet asserts the existence of natural causes, defining and limiting His operations. He considered Conscience to be the highest law of reason, and distinguished the moral disposition (*synteresis*, συντήρησις) from its habitual exercise (*conscientia*). All virtue which is acceptable to God is infused by Him into the hearts of men. His scholars were distinguished by the name of Albertists.

Bonaventura.

† Abridged History of the Life, Virtues, and Religious System of St. Bonaventura, etc. *Lyon*, 1749, 8vo. and: Bonaventuræ Opera, *Argent.* 1482, fol. Idem: Jussu Pii V, *Romæ.* 1588-96, 7 vols. fol. (best edition).

265. The contemporary of Albert, *John* of *Fidanza* or *Bonaventura*,[1] surnamed *Doctor Seraphicus;* was possessed of less extensive learning than the other, but of more talent; and a pious frame of mind, tinctured with mysticism.[2] It was his endeavour to reconcile the views of Aristotle and

[1] Born at Bagnarea 1221, died 1274, at Lyons.

[2] Bonaventura's Weg des Geistes zu Gott. Aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt. Herausgegeben von Luttenback, 1836.

Widmer, Bonaventura's kurzer Inbegriff der Theologie. Aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt, 1839.

the Alexandrians. In his commentary on Lombardus[1] he contracts the sphere of speculation, and studies to employ the principles of Aristotle and the Arabians, not so much for the satisfaction of a minute and idle curiosity, as for the resolution of important questions, and to reconcile opposite opinions; especially in the important inquiries respecting Individuation and Free Will. Occasionally he rests his arguments rather on the practical destination of man than on theoretical notions; for instance, respecting the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul. The Supreme Good he affirms to be Union with the Deity; by which alone mankind can attain a perception of Truth, and the enjoyment of happiness. This leads him to ascribe[2] all knowledge to Illumination from on high; which he distinguishes into four species: Exterior—Inferior—Interior—and Superior. He defines also[3] six degrees whereby man may approximate the Deity; and refers to these six as many distant faculties of the Soul: an ingenious idea and copiously detailed; but in a great degree arbitrary and forced.

Finding speculation insufficient for the attainment of the Supreme Good, he abandoned himself with all his heart to Mysticism.

Thomas Aquinas.

Thomæ Aq. Opera Omnia, stud. et curâ VINC. JUSTINIANI et THOMÆ MANRIQUEZ, *Romæ* 1570-71, 18 vols. fol,, (best edition). Idem: curâ Fratrum ordin. Prædicat. *Par.* 1636-41, 23 vols. fol. (containing the dubious works, but less correct). Opera Theologica curâ BERN. DE RUBEIS, *Ven.* 1745, sqq. 20 vols. 4to.

BERN DE RUBEIS (de' Rossi), Discertatt. Criticæ et Apologeticæ de Gestis et Scriptis ac Doctrinâ S. Thomæ Aquinatis, *Venet.* 1730, fol. Idem (prefixed to the above edition).

† A. TOURON, Life of St. Thomas Aquinas, with an account of his Doctrines and Works, *Par.* 1731, 4to.

LUD. CARBONIS A COSTACIARIO Compendium Absolutissimum totius Summæ Theologicæ S. Thomæ Aquinatis, *Venet.* 1587, 8vo.

Thomæ Aquinatis Summa Philosophiæ per S. CAS. ALEMANNIUM. *Par.* 1640, fol.

Summa S. Thomæ hodiernis Academiarum moribus accommodata, sive cursus Theologiæ operâ CAROLI RENATI BELLUART, *Ultraj.* 1769, 8vo.

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[1] Comment. in Magistrum Sententiarum.
[2] Reductio Artium ad Theologiam.
[3] Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. See his works above.

PLACIDI RENTZ, Philosophia ad mentem D. Thomæ Aquinatis explicata, *Colon.* 1723, 3 vols. 8vo.

PUT. ZORN, De Varia Fortuna Philosophiæ Thomæ Aquinatis. Opusc. Sacr. tom. I.

KLING, Ueber die Theologie des Thomas. In SENGLER'S Religiöser Zeitschrift für das Katholische Deutschland, 1833. Bd. III, H. 1.

266. Nearly at the same time with Bonaventura, St. *Thomas Aquinas* (or *ab Aquino*), obtained a celebrity which eclipsed that of almost every writer of his age. He was born A.D. 1224, in the castle of Rocca Sicca in the kingdom of Naples, of a great feudal family; and in opposition to the wishes of his parents, was determined by his ardent love for study to enter the order of the Dominicans, (1243). The same attachment to letters carried him to Paris and to Cologne, to profit by the lessons of Albertus, and caused him to decline all offers of advancement in his order, beyond that of *Definitor;* while it procured him the reputation of the greatest Christian philosopher of his century, and the appellations of *Doctor Universalis* and *Angelicus*. He died 1274, and, as well as Bonaventura, was canonised. Thomas Aquinas was endowed with a genius truly philosophical; had amassed great knowledge; and cherished an ardent zeal for the advancement of fundamental science. He rendered real service to the Aristotelian philosophy by the pains he took to effect a translation of the works in which it was contained, and by his commentaries on them. He was a Realist, inasmuch as he maintained that the Universal did not exist actually, but as a possibility, and regarded the object of the understanding or the abstract Form of things as the original nature of things. This system he endeavoured to place on a firmer basis by extending the theory of Thought propounded by Aristotle, to which he superadded some ideas of the system of Plato and of the Alexandrians. With this is connected his explanation of the conceptions* of Matter and Form, as elements of compound substances, as also his explanation of the principle of Individuation. The rational Soul, the nature of which he discusses after Aristotle's system, is the Substan-

* It may be well to refresh the memory of the reader, by reminding him that Notions or Conceptions are viewed in this work as the offspring of the Understanding, and subordinate to Ideas, which are the product of the Reason or Intuition.—ED.

tial *Form* of man, immaterial and indestructible. But his meditations were principally devoted to the study of Theology, which he endeavoured to reduce to a systematical form by a more accurate determination of Notions in the manner of the Aristotelian and Alexandrian Schools. Such was the design of his Commentary on Lombardus, of his work against the Heathens,[1] and of his *Summa Theologiæ*. The latter is the first attempt at a complete system of Theology comprehending one of Ethics, and is enriched with many solid and wise observations, without the observance of any rigorous order in its details. Its principles are not laid down with sufficient precision, and the different sources of information are not clearly distinguished. He taught that Evil, or the negation of Good, is necessary to the completion of the Universal system, and that God is only the accidental cause of it. We may observe in this system (as well as in St. Augustin's, from whom he derived them), many of the principal features of that of Leibnitz respecting the Divine Government. He treats the subject of Morals, which he divides into General and Special, in part according to the conceptions of Theology, and partly after those of Aristotle: and although his fundamental conceptions are not very clearly defined or largely developed, that science is much indebted to his labours. He continued to be for a long time the highest authority in matters of Religion and Philosophy, and had a large number of disciples, (especially among the Dominicans and Jesuits) who called themselves by his name. The aim of Aquinas, as a Christian philosopher, was to prove the reasonableness of Christianity, which he attempted to accomplish by showing, 1st, that it contains a portion of truth; 2nd, that it falls under the cognizance of reason; and 3rd, that it contains nothing contradictory to reason. In connection with the latter argument he starts from the assumption that the truths of reason are essentially one with Divine truth, because reason is derived from God. Philosophy consists, according to him, in Science searching for truth with the instrument of human reason; but he maintains that it was necessary for the salvation of man that Divine Revelation should disclose to him certain things transcending the grasp of human reason. He regarded Theology, therefore, as the offspring of the union of philoso-

[1] Summa Catholicæ Fidei adversus Gentiles, *Burdig.* 1664, 8vo.

phy and religion, and as a science derived from the principles of a higher Divine and spiritual science. Among the followers of Aquinas we remark *Ægidius Colonna*, a Roman, *Hervæus* (§ 269), *Thomas de Vio Cajetanus*, *Gabr. Velasquez*, *Petrus Hiertadus de Mendoza*, *P. Fonseca*, *Dominic* of *Flanders* (died 1500) and *Fr. Suarez* (died 1617).

Contemporaries of Thomas Aquinas.

267. Other contemporaries of Thomas deserve to be briefly mentioned; for intance, *Petrus Hispanus*, of Lisbon, afterwards pope, under the style of John XXI, and who died 1277. He distinguished himself by the *Summulæ Logicales*, an abridgment of the Scholastic Logic; and it is to him we probably owe the ingenious arrangement of the different forms of argument, so often republished.[1] To him must be added *H. Goethals*, of Muda near Ghent, better known under the name of *Henricus Gandavensis*, surnamed *Doctor Solemnis*, who became a professor at Paris, and died archdeacon of Tournay, 1293.[2] He was endowed with great sagacity of understanding, attached to the system of the Realists, and blended the Ideas of Plato with the formularies of Aristotle: attributing to the first a real existence independent of the Divine Intelligence. He suggested some new opinions in Psychology, and detected many speculative errors, without, however, suggesting corrections of them, owing to the faultiness of the method of the philosophy of his time. He frequently opposed Thomas Aquinas himself. To these we may add *Richard de Middleton (Ricardus de Mediâ Villâ)*, surnamed *Doctor Solidus*, *Fundatissimus*, and *Copiosus*, who died a professor at Oxford, A.D. 1300, and was a skilful interpreter of Lombardus.

Duns Scotus.

His works are very numerous. A list will be found in Brucker, Panzer, &c. They were published collectively, viz.: Joh. Dunsii Scoti Opera Omnia, collecta, recognita, Notis, Scholiis et Commentariis illustrata (ed. WADDING), *Lugd.* 1639, 12 vols. fol.

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[1] † JOH. TOB. KÖHLER, Complete Account of Pope John XXI, celebrated as a Physician and Philosopher under the name of Petrus Hispanus, *Götting.* 1760, 4to.

[2] HENR. GANDAVENSIS Quodlibeta in IV libb. Sententiar. *Par.* 1518, fol. Summa Theologiæ, *ibid.* 1520, fol.

Hugonis Cavelli Vita Joh. Duns Scoti; prefixed to Quæstiones in Sententias, *Antwerp.* 1620. Apologia pro Joh. D. Scoto adversus Opprobria, Calumnias, et Injurias quibus P. Abr. Bzovius eum onerat, *Par.* 1634, 12mo.

Lud. Wadding, Vita Joh. Duns Scoti, *Mont.* 1664, 8vo. (Id.: in his edition above).

Mathæi Veglensis Vita Joh. Dunsii Scoti, *Patav.* 1671, 8vo. Id.: in the Thesaurus Biog. Bibliographicus of Waldau, part I, p. 75, sqq.

J. G. Boivin, Philosophia Scoti, *Par.* 1690, 8vo. The same: Philosophia quadripartiti Scoti, *Par.* 1688, 4 vols. fol.

Joh. Santacrucii Dialectica ad mentem Eximii Magistri Johannis Scoti, *Lond.* 1672, 8vo.

Fr. Eleuth. Abergoni Resolutio Doctrinæ Scoticæ, in quâ quid Doctor Subtilis circa singulas, quas exagitat, quæstiones sentiat, etsi oppositum alii opinentur, brevibus ostenditur, in subtilium studiosorum gratiam, *Lugd.* 1643, 8vo.

Joh. Duns Scotus (Doctor Subtilis) per Universam Philosophiam, Logicam, Physicam, Metaphysicam, Ethicam contra adversantes defensus, Quæstionum novitate amplificatus, ac in tres tomos divisus. Autor Bonaventura Baro, *Colon. Agr.* 1664, fol.

Joh. Arada, Controversiæ Theologicæ inter S. Thomam et Scotum super quatuor libros Sententiarum, in quibus pugnantes Sententiæ referuntur, potiores difficultates elucidantur, et Responsiones et Argumenta Scoti rejiciuntur, *Colon.* 1620, 4to.

Joh. Lalemandet, Decisiones Philosophicæ, *Monach.* 1664–1645, fol.

Crisper, Philosophia Scholæ Scotisticæ, *Aug. Vindel.* 1735; et Theologia Scholæ Scotisticæ, 4 vols., *ibid.* 1748, fol.

L. F. Otto Baumgarten-Crusius, De Theol. Scoti Prog. *Jen.* 1816, 4to.

268. *John Duns Scotus*, born at Dunston in Northumberland (about 1275 ?), became a Franciscan, and was surnamed *Doctor Subtilis*, which he deserved by the pregnancy of his parts. He studied at Oxford and Paris, and died prematurely, A.D. 1308. His celebrated attack on the system of Thomas Aquinas occasioned his having recourse very frequently to vain and idle distinctions, but in all his dialectic disputes he maintained a steady zeal for a deeper foundation of true science. He endeavoured to ascertain a fundamental basis for the certainty of knowledge, whether rational or empirical, and applied himself to demonstrate the truth and necessity of Revelation. As a Realist, he differed from Thomas Aquinas, by asserting that the Universal is based upon Objects, not merely *in posse* but *in actu*: that it is not created by the Understanding but communicated to it: that Neutral Reality or Essence *(die Sachheit)* being indifferent, must be determined to particular or universal by a higher principle intimately united with the former Neutral Reality

or essence.* This higher principle is a Greater Unity, i.e. the principle of Individuation (*hæccity*). In Psychology he combated the real difference of the Soul's Faculties, and maintained an undetermined Freedom. The object of Philosophy was, in his opinion, to become cognizant of the nature of things, or what is. Although human philosophy teaches the sufficiency of reason, and that supernatural disclosures are superfluous, the theologian regards a certain supernatural revelation as necessary; because man can never attain to certain truth by inspecting effects or secondary causes, whether Ideas or Sensations.

The object of theology is God, an Infinite Being, and the first principle of all things. Yet He is not to be regarded in the light of his Infinity but of his Divinity, the latter idea being more perfect than the former, because God cannot be conceived apart from Infinity, though Infinity can be conceived without God. He attributed indeterminate Freedom to God, and hence regarded the subjective will of God as the principle of Morality. Sometimes he expressed doubts as to the possibility of a rational Theology.

Duns Scotus was the founder of a school, the *Scotists*, who distinguished themselves for subtlety of disputation, and for incessant disputes with the *Thomists*. These disputes were so frequently mixed up with human passions, that Science derived from them little benefit; and it very frequently happened that the points in question, instead of being elucidated, were obscured through their controversies.

Disciples of Thomas; or Thomists.

269. Among the Thomists of the thirteenth century we may remark: 1. *Ægidius Colonna*, a Roman,[1] a consistent Realist; according to whom, Truth resides in the understanding as well as the object. His principal merit was that he unravelled with perspicuity certain metaphysical problems, and endeavoured to reconcile discordant opinions respecting the questions of Being, Form, Matter, and Indi-

* The subtle nature of this argument, and the peculiar structure of the German tongue, render this passage necessarily obscure. The idea to be conveyed is, that there is an Absolute principle determining both the universal and particular nature of things.—ED.

[1] Ægidius Columna Romanus, surnamed *Doctor Fundatissimus s. Theologorum Princeps:* born 1247, died 1316.

viduality. 2. *Hervæus*,[1] whose learned but abstruse logic was even yet more unintelligible than that of his predecessors.

Scotists.

270. The most celebrated contemporary disciples of Scot were *Fr. Mayronis*, a Franciscan,[2] who first set the example of disputes in the Sorbonne (*Actus Sorbonici*), and wrote esteemed commentaries on Aristotle, St. Augustin, St. Anselm, Lombardus, etc.:—*Hieron. de Ferrariis*, *Antonius Andreæ*,[3] *Walter Burleigh* (§ 274). To these may be added the Franciscan *Petr. Tartaretus* (in the fifteenth century), *J. B. Monlorius* (flourished about 1569) and *Major*.

271. At this period also appeared two men highly remarkable for the reformation which they attempted, but were not able to effect, in the philosophy of the age. The first of these, *Roger Bacon*, a Franciscan, was born at Ilchester, 1214; and acquired some celebrity by his knowledge of Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, and Languages, as well as by the fertility of his original ideas and inventions. He was surnamed in consequence *Doctor Mirabilis*; but unhappily, also, was accused of witchcraft, and imprisoned by command of the general of his order. He had the perspicacity to detect the false principles of the philosophical system of his time, and instead of the frivolous distinctions then established, was desirous of opening new paths to inquiry through the study of Nature and the Languages. Unfortunately the monkish spirit of the time repressed his investigations, and the influence they would have insured to him. He taught at Oxford, A.D, 1240, and died 1292 or 1294.[4] *Raymond Lulli* (*Lullus* or *Lullius*, born at Palma in the isle of Majorca, 1234), was as distinguished in his

[1] Hervé Noel, or Hervæus Natalis, born in Bretagne; at first a monk, then general of the order of the Preachers; professor of Theology and rector of the university of Paris. Died at Narbonne, 1323.

[2] Franciscus de Mayronis, *Doctor Illuminatus et Acutus, Magister Abstractionum*. Died at Placentia, 1325.

[3] *Doctor Dulcifluus*, born in Arragon. Died about 1320.

[4] See his Opus Majus ad Clementem IV, SAM. JEBB, *Lond.* 1733, fol.; Epistolæ de secretis operibus Artis et Naturæ, et de Nullitate Magiæ. Opera J. DEE castigata et restituta, 8vo. *Hamb.* 1618; and the Biographia Britannica, IV, 616, sqq.

mature days for a devout piety, as he had been notorious in youth for his love of pleasure. He devoted himself to the conversion of the Mahometans and Pagans, asserting to this intent illumination from above, and the gift of the Great Art (*Ars Magna*[1]). His endeavours not being as successful as he had hoped, he devoted this Great Art to the reformation of Philosophy and the Sciences. His art was nothing more than a Mechanical Logic, calculated to solve all questions without any study or reflection on the part of him who should use it. He added thereto some hints borrowed from the philosophy of the Arabians and the Cabbala, which he appears to have been the first Christian author to cultivate. In his numerous works and those of his School we frequently discover more clear and elevated views of Morality, though he was not able to escape canonical censure on this head. He died 1315. His followers (*Lullists*), disseminated a superstitious enthusiasm, together with the belief he entertained in the possibility of making gold; but occasionally struck out new and valuable ideas. Long after his death the *Ars Magna* of Raymond Lulli found admirers among men of talent, (e. g. Giordano Bruno).

At this period also appeared *Petrus ab Apono* (or *Abano*), near Padua, born 1250, died 1315 or 1316; a physician, attached to the Arabian doctrines, and author of a book entitled, *Conciliator Differentiarum Philosophicarum et præcipue Medicorum*:[2]—and *Arnold de Villanova*, who died in 1312, a zealous fellow-labourer with the former, and inclined to the opinions of Raymond Lulli.[3]

[1] Jacobi Custerer, De Raimundo Lullio Dissertatio in Actis SS. *Antwerp.* tom. V, p. 697. † Perroquet, Life of Raymond Lull6, *Vendôme*, 1667, 8vo.

Raymundi Lulli Opera Omnia, ed. Salzinger, *Mogunt.* 1721–42, 10 vols. fol. Et: Opera ea quæ ad Inventam ab ipso Artem Universalem pertinent, *Argent.* 1598, 8vo.

See also J. H. Alstadtii Clavis Artis Lullianæ et Veræ Logicæ, *Argent.* 1609, 8vo.; and, Bruck, Hist. Phil. p. 1353, sqq.

He obtained the appellation of *Doctor Illuminatissimus*.

[2] *Ven.* 1471—1483, fol. His life is to be found in the *Quartalschrift* of Canzler and Meissner, second year, No. IV, fasc. 1.

[3] Opera Omnia cum Nic. Taurelli Annotat. *Bas.* 1585, fol.

FOURTH PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE.

III. *Disputes between the Nominalists and Realists renewed by Occam, in which the former gain ground. (From the Fourteenth Century to the end of the Fifteenth.)*

272. About the close of this century a man of great merit contributed much to the downfal of Realism, and the cessation of those endless logical disputes, by removing difficulties after a clearer and more precise manner, and establishing the foundations of a more exact knowledge of the properties of the Object and Subject. This was *G. Durand de St. Pourçain.*[1] He was at first a Thomist, but subsequently became a candid adversary of that School.[2]

Occam.

JOH. SALABERTI Philosophia Nominalium vindicata; or, Logica in Nominalium Viâ, *Lut. Par.* 1651, 8vo. (very scarce). Some extracts are to be found in CRAMER, Continuation of Bossuet, VII, p. 867.

Ars Rationis ad Mentem Nominalium, *Oxf.* 1673, 12mo.

GUIL. OCCAM, Quæstiônes et Decisiones in IV libb. Sententiar. *Lugd.* 1495-6-7, fol. Centiloquium Theologicum, *ibid.* 1494-5-6, fol. Summa Totius Logicæ, fol. *Par.* 1488; *Bonon.* 1498; *Oxf.* 1675, 8vo.

Opus nonaginta dierum, folio, *Lov.* 1481; *Lugd.* 1495—6.

Dialogorum Libri VII advers. Hereticos, et de Dogmatt. Johannis Papæ XXII, folio, *Par.* 1476; *Lugd.* 1495—8.

Quodlibeta VII, una cum Tract. de Sacram. Altaris, folio, *Par.* 1487; *Arg.* 1491.

Compendium Errorum Johannis Papæ XXII, folio, *Lov.* 1481; *Lugd.* 1496.

Commentum in I Librum Sententiarum, 1483.

Summulæ in Physic. Aristotelis, *Bon.* 1494.

Decisiones octo quæstion. de Potestate summi Pontificis, *Lug.* 1496.

Disputatio inter Clericum et Militem super Potestate Prelatis atq. Principib. terrar. commissa, *Par.* 1498.

273. *William of Occam* (or *Ockham*), an Englishman, born in Surrey, and surnamed *Doctor Singularis, Invicibilis et Venerablis Inceptor*, a disciple of Scot, and, like him a Franciscan, began a new era in philosophy and history by his talents, and the courage with which he opposed himself most

[1] Durandus de Sancto Porciano, bishop of Meaux, named *Doctor Resolutissimus*, was born at Auvergne. Died 1332.

[2] LAUNOII Syllabus Rationum, quibus durandi causa Defenditur, in Opp., tom I, p. 1. See his Comment. in Magistr. Sentent. *Par.* 1508.

zealously to the despotism of the prevailing dogmata. He was a teacher at Paris at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and having defended the rights of the king of France and the emperor against the usurpations of the pope, died, persecuted but not subdued, at Munich, 1347 or 1353. He proposed to effect no more by his Logic than a better demonstration of common opinions; refused to submit implicitly to authority; and closely following the principles of more rational Dialectics, and in particular the dictum that —*Entia non sunt multiplicanda prœter necessitatem:* he demonstrated the absurdity of Realism; refuted it in a variety of particulars, and directed the attention of others to the doctrine of the Nominalists. He denied that universal conceptions had any other objective existence than what they possess in the understanding; because such an hypothesis is not necessary either for the purposes of the possibility of judgment, or of a real science, and because it leads to extravagant consequences: on the contrary, such notions have only an objective being in the mind itself, are a product of Abstraction, and either images (*figmenta*) of the same, or qualities subjectively present in the Soul, which it employs to designate classes of external objects.[1] He did but sketch the principles of a philosophy afterwards completed; but his labours sufficed to withdraw the attention of his followers from the all-engrossing question of the principle of *Individuality*, and directed them rather to the acquirement of fresh knowledge. In his theory of knowledge, Occam receded still farther from the opinions of the Realists, and by maintaining that Thought was Subjective, afforded a greater handle to Scepticism and Empiricism than possibly he himself might have intended. Though too absolutely laid down, such a proposition, was, nevertheless, in the circumstances of the times, serviceable to the cause of philosophy. William of Occam, by controverting established dogmata, by his Scepticism, and by the new ideas he started, impaired the authority of existing principles, and gave occasion to more extended inquiries. On the same ground, he endeavoured, in Theology, to circumscribe the subjects of investigation, and rejected the established Scholastic proofs of the Existence, Unity, and Omnipotence of the Divinity; as also of His Wisdom, and that he is an Intelligence and the Free Cause

[1] Comment. in Lib. I, 2; Quæst. 4 and 8.

of the World; asserting that all these are matters of faith alone. Nevertheless, he departed so far from his own principles as to offer a proof of the existence of God, derived from the preservation of all things in their original state; asserting that for such preservation some active efficient cause must be assigned, which can be no other than the First Creative Principle. In Psychology he threw out some ingenious notions respecting the Soul, the diversity of its faculties, and their relations to their objects. He refuted at length the hypothesis of Objective Images (*Species*); up to this time regarded as necessary to a theory of intuitional and sensational Perception and Thought. On many points Occam adhered to the opinions of his master, Scotus; for instance, respecting Free-will, and the origin of Morality in the subjective Will of God.

ERNER, Ueber Nominalismus und Realismus, 1842.

Opponents of Nominalism.

274. Occam in his turn was opposed by the partisans of Realism, though in a much more feeble manner; and among others by his fellow-student *Walter Burleigh*,[1] or *Burlæus* (*Doctor Planus et Perspicuus*), born 1275; at first a professor in England, then at Paris, and lastly at Oxford, and who died about 1337. The debates between the two schools appear now to have been mainly confined to oral disputation. With regard to the writings of *Thomas de Bradwardine*,[2] and *Thomas de Strasburg*,[3] we need only remark that the former resisted the tendency to Pelagianism contained in the theory of Scotus, and the second did but reproduce what had been already taught by Ægidius Colonna. *Mar-*

[1] He composed Commentaries on the Ethics and Physics of Aristotle and a Biography of the Philosophers and Poets, "De Vitâ et Moribus Philosophorum et Poetarum," *Colon.* 1472, often reprinted; A Defence of the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, *Venet.* 1494, folio; and various other works. See HEUMANN, Acta Philos., No. 14, p. 282, sqq.

[2] Of Hertfield; died archbishop of Canterbury, 1339. Wrote De Causâ Dei contra Pelagium et de Virtute Causarum, lib. III, ed. HENR. SAVILE, *Lond.* 1618, fol. Thomas de Bradwardine was also celebrated for his mathematical works.

[3] Thomas Argentinensis, died prior-general of the order of the Hermits of St. Augustin, A.D. 1357; composed Comment. in Magistr. ntentiarum, *Argent.* 1490, fol.

silius of Inghen[1] appears to have been a moderate Realist according to the principles of Occam and Scotus, as respected the theory of Volition.

Nominalists.

275. The most celebrated Nominalists who succeeded, were *John Buridan* and *Peter D'Ailly*. John Buridan of Bethune, professor of philosophy and theology at Paris,[2] was looked upon by his contemporaries as one of the most powerful adversaries of Realism, and distinguished himself also by his rules for finding the Middle Term in Logic; a species of contrivance denominated by some the *Ass's Bridge;* as well as by his inquiries concerning Free-will, wherein he approached the principles of Determinatism,[3] maintaining that we necessarily prefer the greater of two goods. As for the celebrated illustration, which bears his name, of an ass dying for hunger between two bundles of hay, it is not to be found in his writings. *Peter D'Ailly*, a cardinal (died 1425),[4] assisted to mark still more broadly the limits between Theology and Philosophy, and opposed the abuses of the Scholastic system. His opinions respecting the degree of certainty belonging to human knowledge, and his examination of the proofs advanced of the existence and unity of God, deserve particular attention.[5] The other

[1] Surnamed *Ingenuus:* He taught at Paris and Heidelberg, which latter University he helped to form. Died 1396. He composed Comment. in IV libb. Sententiarum, *Hagen.* 1497, fol.

Dan. Lud. Wundt, Commentatio Historica de Marsilio ab Inghen, primo Universitatis Heidelberg. Rectore et Professore, *Heidelb.* 1775, 8vo. The same, in the Thesaurus Biog. et Bibliograph. of Waldau.

[2] In the year 1358 he was still living at Paris.

[3] See his Quæstiones in X libb. Ethicorum Aristot. *Paris.* 1489, fol.; *Oxf.* 1637, 4to. Quæst. in Polit. Arist. *ibid.* 1500. fol.; Compendium Logicæ, *Ven.* 1499, fol. Summula de Dialectica, *Paris.* 1487, fol. See Bayle's Dict.

[4] Peter de Alliaco, styled *Aquila Galliæ*, born 1350 at Compiègne: chancellor of the University of Paris, 1389, bishop of Puy and Cambrai, and finally a cardinal.

[5] Petri de Alliaco Cardinalis Cameracensis Vita, by Dupin, in 1st vol. of Opp. Gersoni, p. 37.

Petri de Alliaco Quæstiones super IV libb. Sententiarum, *Arg.* 1490, fol. De Concordantia Astronomiæ cum Theologia, *Aug. Vind.* 1490. *Ven.* 1494. Tractatus super Meteora Aristot. *Lips. s. a.* Tract. de Potestate Papæ et Auctoritate Cardd., *s. l. vel a.*, 4to.; and many other works.

partisans and supporters of Nominalism were *Robert Holcot*, an Englishman (died 1349), *Gregory of Rimini*,[1] *Richard Suisset* (or *Swinshead*), an Englishman and a Cistercian monk (taught at Oxford about 1350), *Henry of Oyta*, and *Henry of Hesse*,[2] *Nicolas Oramus*,[3] *Matthew of Cracow*,[4] and *Gabriel Biel*,[5] who died 1495, and was the author of a brief and luminous exposition of the principles of Occam. Almost all were celebrated as professors, and men of cultivated parts, but without any true philosophical talent, though Henry of Hesse[6] distinguished himself by some discoveries in Mathematics and Astronomy.

276. Up to this time the disputes between the two sects continued to be pursued with the like animosity, and with equal admixture on both sides of human passions. Though Nominalism had been proscribed at Paris,[7] it nevertheless made good its ground, and even gained from day to day fresh adherents; nay, it more than once obtained, even at Paris, as well as in the universities of Germany, the pre-eminence, but without completely defeating the opposite party. The same scenes were perpetually acting on both these theatres of contention; the metaphysical contest respecting Universal Conceptions not being the only point of dispute, but combined with a complete diversity of opinions in general. On the part of the Nominalists might be noticed the gradual increase of a spirit of independence and a tendency to more liberal principles, and a more fundamental cast of thought, though asserted by very imperfect philosophical methods. This spirit especially manifested itself in opposition to the theses of the Idealist *Nicolas of*

[1] Greg. Ariminensis, died at Vienna, 1358. A distinguished divine, and general of the Augustinian order.

[2] Both Germans; the latter died 1397.

[3] Or Oresmius, died bishop of Lisieux, 1382.

[4] Or Chrochove, in Pomerania; died 1410.

[5] Born at Spires; provost of Aurach, and professor of theology and philosophy at Tübingen.

Epitome et Collectarium super IV libb. Sententiar. *Tub.* 1495, 2 vols. fol.; Epitome Script. Guil. Occam circa Duos Priores Sententiarum.

Hieron. Wiegand Biel, Diss. (præs. Gottlieb Wernsdorf) de Gab. Biel celeberrimo Papista Antipapista, *Vitcb.* 1719, 4to.

[6] Henricus Hessiæ, Secreta Sacerdotum in Missa, *Heidelb.* 1480, 4to, often reprinted; and many other works.

[7] In 1339, 1340, 1409, 1473.

Autricuria (bachelor of Theology at Paris, 1348), and of *John de Mercuria* (about the same year),[1] yet eventually proved abortive, and the customary opinions of the age resumed their sway.

HUNDESHAGEN, Ueber die mystische Theologie Gerson's, 1831.
LIEBNER, Ueber Gerson's mystische Theologie, 1835.

277. The ultimate consequence of these repeated discussions was a diminution of the credit and influence of the Scholastic system, and at the same time a diminished regard for philosophy, especially for Logic, of which in his time Gerson already saw reason to complain; and this induced a disposition to Mysticism, arising out of a feeling of disgust for unmeaning verbal disputes. Mysticism was accordingly preached with ardour by *John Tauler*, who died at Strasburg, 1361, and more especially by the celebrated *John Chalier de Gerson* of Rheims, born 1363, the disciple of Peter D'Ailly, and his successor as chancellor of Paris, in 1395; died almost in exile in 1429, at Lyons. He devoted his principal attention to discussing the obligations of practical Christianity, which procured for him the appellation of *Doctor Christianissimus;* and held mystical theology to be true philosophy, if it is founded on internal experiences of God in devout minds, or in other words, on Internal Perception or Intuition.[2] He nevertheless opposed himself to enthusiastic extravagancies, retaining the use of Logic, and employing it after a new method.[3] Next to him we must place *Nicolas de Clemange* (*de Clemangis*), a courageous thinker; who opposed the narrow subtilties of the Schools.[4] He was rector of the university of Paris (1393), and died about 1440. But the man who, as a religious writer, possessed the greatest influence in his own and succeeding ages, was the ascetical mystic *Thomas Hamerken*[5]

[1] See BOULLAY, Hist. Univ. Paris, tom. IV, p. 308, sqq.

[2] De Mystica Theol. Consideratt. II.

[3] Centilogium de Conceptibus, liber de Modis Significandi et de Concordiâ Metaphys. cum Logicâ.

J. G. ENGELHARDTI Commentationes de Gersonio Mystico, part I, *Erl.* 1822, 4to.

Gersonis Opera, *Bas.* 1488, vol. III, fol.; ed. EDM. RICHER, *Paris.* 1606, fol., et LUD. ELLIES DUPIN, *Antverp.* 1756, 5 vols. fol.

[4] Opera ed. Jo. MART. LYDIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1613, 4to.

[5] Especially by his well known book De Imitatione Christi. A good edition of his Works by SOMMEL, *Antwerp*, 1600—1607, 4to.

(Malleolus), styled *Thomas à Kempis*, from the name of a village, Kempen, in the archbishopric of Cologne, where he was born A.D. 1380. He died 1471. Another eminent mystic * was *John Wessel*, surnamed *Gansford*, or *Gœsevôt* (Goose-foot),[1] styled by his contemporary admirers *Lux mundi et Magister contradictionum*. He was at first a Nominalist, and an opponent of the dogmatism of the Schoolmen. The same dislike of the same system may be observed in the Natural Theology of *Raymond de Sebonde* (or Sebunde) who taught at Toulouse in the first half of the fifteenth century, about 1436. He asserted that man has received from the Almighty two books, wherein he may discover the important facts which concern his relation to his Creator,—namely, the book of Revelation and that of Nature: the latter he affirmed to be the most universal in its contents, and the most perspicuous. He endeavoured by specious rather than solid arguments to deduce the theology of his age, even in its more peculiar doctrines, from the contemplation of Nature and of Man. His attempt deserved, for its just observations on many subjects, especially on Morals, greater success than it met with, until Montaigne directed to it the attention of his contemporaries.[2]

Observation. It cannot be expected that a minute account should have been rendered of the respective opinions, in detail, of each Schoolman, involved as they are in endless disputes and distinctions respecting the same subjects:—such a specification, if it had been possible, would, in an abridgment like the present, have been superfluous. The Sentences of Lombardus and the works of Aristotle were the constant subjects of their discussions from the time of Albert the Great; respecting which their commentaries and disquisitions were as minute as they were voluminous and unprofitable.

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* It is well to remark that the term *Mystic*, as employed by our author, and all liberal minded German philosophers, does not imply, as in England, any stigma on the capacity of the thinker.—Ed.

[1] Born at Gröningen, 1409; died 1469. He must not be confounded with his contemporary the Nominalist, John Burchard von Wessel. See Görze, Comment. de J. Wesselo, *Lut. Par.* 1719, 4to. J. Wesselii Opera, ed. Lydius, *Amst.* 1717, 4to.

[2] Montaigne has translated, under the title of Natural Theology, his Liber Creaturarum sive Naturæ. The Latin editions are, *Francof.* 1635, and *Amstel.* 1761. See Montaigne's Observations, in his Essays, lib. II, c. 12.

PART THE THIRD.

THIRD PERIOD.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM OPPOSED BY A RETURN TO, AND BY NEW COMBINATIONS OF, FORMER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

From the Fifteenth Century to the end of the Sixteenth.

FEUERBACH, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, von Bacon bis Spinoza. (1833–1844) § 150–214.

CARRIERE, Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformations Zeit, 1847, § 609–725.

BLAKEY, History of the Philosophy of Mind. 4 v. 8vo.

RIXNER, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3: Geschichte der neuern und nuesten Zeit, 2te Ausg. *Sulzb.* 1829.

RITTER Geschichte der Philosophie, 9 Theil. Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, erster Theil, 1850.

SIGWART. Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 und 3 Band, vom 16ten Jahrhunderte bis auf die Gegenwart, 1844.

278. Scholasticism, which had now accomplished its mission, may be defined as the one-sided course of dogmatising Reason attempting to bring about philosophical knowledge through the solution and combination of conceptions under the dominion of a foreign principle, and in conformity with the fundamental axioms of the Aristotelian philosophy, which were adopted without submitting them to any test. The disputes of the two adverse sects into which its supporters were subdivided, gradually loosened its hold on the public mind, and the Nominalists in the end openly attacked its authority; so that men became more and more awakened to the necessity (though as yet imperfectly understood) of giving Science a new foundation and fresh fuel, by a more accurate observation of Nature. and by increased study of the Languages. The party of the Mystics especially, animated as they were by a deep want and longing for a better

spiritual nourishment, were dissatisfied with the meagre and pedantic forms which were, as yet, their only support. Nevertheless, it was from another quarter that the revolution was destined to commence.

279. The human mind had too long lost the true path of Science, to be able immediately to recover it. In consequence of its long subjection to prescriptive notions, we find that it continued for some time to labour to unravel the consequences of those it had inherited, rather than apply itself to the legitimate objects of inquiry—the principles of knowledge, and of its objects. From want of skill to detect the concatenation of different branches of knowledge, and from the habit of confounding cognitions derived from very different sources, the human mind was unable to discover the faultiness of its own method, and the influence of the old manner was necessarily prolonged. Other circumstances contributed to the same result: the inveterate reverence for Aristotle's authority—the want of real and accurate knowledge—the bad taste of the age, and the low state of classical learning—added to the redoubtable authority of the Papal Hierarchy, slavish attachment to the dogmas handed down and sanctioned by the Church, and the jealous zeal with which the guardians of the ancient Dogmatism protected their errors;—all these auxiliary circumstances long continued to make it difficult to shake off the intolerable yoke imposed on the reason, against which some bolder spirits had already begun to rebel.

280. Nevertheless certain political events in Europe gradually prepared the way, though at first distantly, for a complete change in its civil and ecclesiastical constitution; shook the supports of the old philosophy; and, by ultimately destroying it, helped to produce a revolution in the literary world, rich in important consequences. These were: the Crusades—the Invention of Printing—the Conquest of Constantinople—the Discovery of the New World—and the Reformation; with the direct or indirect results of these events; such as the formation of a Middle Class of citizens—the influence acquired by public opinion—the increase of the Temporal at the expense of the Spiritual Power—the consolidation of civil authority on firmer and better-established bases—the advancement of experimental knowledge and the sciences—the acquisition of models for imitation

and sources of instruction in the recovery of the authors of antiquity—and, lastly, the improvement and cultivation of the languages of Modern Europe. The human mind became sensible of its need of instruction and of the imperfection of its present systems, and demanded a better philosophy; but, too weak as yet to support itself without such assistance, it leaned upon the authors of antiquity for guidance and support. The cultivation of this study brought with it an improved spirit of refinement and moral improvement, and at the same time showed by reflection the evils of that state of mental subjugation to which so many centuries of mankind had been reduced, and awakened in those who prosecuted it a desire to liberate themselves from such thraldom.

281. At the same time that these circumstances from without operated, or contributed to operate, so great a change in the freer use of Reason, a strong desire prevailed among many for a higher knowledge and wisdom revealed by God; because, owing to the path which mental cultivation had followed, and from the still imperfect development of the Reason, there had arisen a conviction that certainty of knowledge and a completely satisfying wisdom could alone come from God; and, consequently, to the Bible was added also the Cabbala, as a frequent source of Philosophy. A prejudice which appears to have been derived by the Fathers, and which was in part kept alive and recommended by the constant disputes and uncertainties of a vast number of contending sects, into which the Philosophical world was soon divided, fostered this thirst for secret Divine Wisdom.

282. The consequence of all these different causes was that a variety of systems of greater or less validity began to prevail; knowledge was cultivated and improved;[1] some of the Grecian systems of philosophy were cultivated and adopted; discussions were set on foot with regard to their respective merits, and the attempt was made to combine them (either partially or entirely), and to reconcile them with Christianity. The systems themselves were consequently submitted to examination, attempts were made to extend the dominion of Science, more especially in the

[1] ERHARD'S Geschichte des Wiederaufblühens wissensschaftlicher Bildung. 1827–32. 3 Bände.

department of Natural History (as yet so imperfectly cultivated), though accompanied with a thirst for occult and mysterious wisdom. Lastly came the desire to combine several of these controversies in one system, with a special reference to the fundamental principles of Christianity. An attempt was also made to unite Theology and Philosophy, Ideas and Conceptions;—the doctrines of Plato and those of Aristotle.

Revival of Greek Literature in Italy; with its immediate consequences.

283. When the Greeks, who had always retained a certain degree of attachment for letters, derived from their renowned ancestors (§ 236), came to solicit in Italy assistance against the Turks, and, after the capture of Constantinople, sought there a safer residence than in their own country, they brought with them a rich fund of various arts and literary treasures, and infused a new energy into the minds of the Western nations, who were already in a state to profit by such acquisitions.[1] Among these precious remains of Ancient Greece were the works of Aristotle and Plato in their original form: the knowledge of which was presently disseminated through Europe with remarkable celerity. The Greeks who respectively supported the two systems of those great philosophers (such as *George Gemisthus Pletho*,[2] on the one side, a partizan of the Neoplatonic

[1] To this age belong the poets *Dante Alighieri*, *Petrarca*, and *Boccaccio*, who contributed much to the general diffusion of a literary taste, though not immediately and directly to that of philosophy.

For the learned Greeks who were instrumental in bringing about this revival of Classical literature, (*Emmanuel Chrysoloras*, *Th. Gaza*, *George of Trebizond*, *John Argryopulus*, etc.), see HUMPHR. HODIUS, De Græcis illustribus Linguæ Gr. Literarumque Humaniorum restauratoribus, *Lond.* 1742, 8vo. HEEREN, Hist. of the Study of Class. Lit. CHPH. FR. BÖRNER, De Doctis Hominibus Græcis Literarum Græcarum in Italia restauratoribus, *Lips.* 1750, 8vo. CHPH. MEINERS, Biography of celebrated Men.

[2] Of Constantinople; came to Florence 1438.

GEO. GEMISTHI PLETHONIS De Platonicæ atque Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ Differentiâ, Gr. *Ven.* 1540, 4to.

Among his Philosophical Works, was:

Libellus de Fato, ejusd. et Bessarionis Epist. Amœbocæ de eodem

doctrine; and on the other *George Scholarius*, subsequently called *Gennadius*, *Theodore Gaza*,[1] and more especially *George* of *Trebizond*,[2] all Aristotelians), engaged in a warm dispute respecting the merits of their favourite systems,[3] which it required all the moderation of cardinal Bessarion[4] in any degree to temper.

Attack on the Scholastic System.

284. The first result of all these circumstances was a conflict with the Scholastic system, which, beside the inherent causes of its barbarous style, bad taste, and narrow views, was occasioned also by the recent discovery of the great difference between the Aristotelian theory as taught in the Schools, and the freer, purer spirit that runs through the original writings of Aristotle and Plato. The philologists *Hermolaus Barbarus*,[5] the translator of Aristotle, of Themistius, and Dioscorides, and *Angelus Politianus*,[6] were the first to enter the lists with its champions: *Laurentius Valla*,[7]

Argumento cum Vers. Lat. H. S. Reimari, *Lugd. Bat.* 1722, 8vo. De Quatuor Virtutib. Cardinalib. Gr. et Lat. Adr. Occone interprete, *Bas.* 1522, 8vo., et. al. De Virtutibus et Vitiis, Gr. Lat. ed. Ed. Fawconer, *Oxon.* 1752, 8vo. See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. tom. X, p. 741.

[1] Came into Italy about 1430; died about 1478. He was born at Thessalonica.

[2] Born 1395, in the isle of Crete; professor of Greek literature in various places in Italy; died 1484 or 86.

Besides several commentaries, he wrote the dissertation styled, Comparatio Aristotelis et Platonis, *Ven.* 1523, 8vo.

[3] On this subject see a Dissert. of Boivin in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscript., tom. II, p. 775, sqq.

See his work: In Calumniatorem Platonis libb. IV, *Ven.* 1503 et 1516, directed against the Aristotelians. Ejusd.; Epist. ad Mich. Apostolicum de præstantiâ Platonis præ Aristotele, etc., Gr. cum vers. Lat.; Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript., tom. III, p. 303.

[4] Born in 1395, at Trebizond, came to Florence in 1438, died in 1472.

[5] Hermolao Barbaro, of Venice; born 1454, died 1493.

[6] Properly Angelo Ambrogini, or Cino; surnamed *Poliziano:* born at Monte Pulciano 1454; died 1494.

[7] Lorenzo Valla of Rome; born 1403, died 1457.

Laurentii Vallæ Opera, *Basil.* 1543, fol. De Dialecticâ contra Aristoteleos. *Venet*, 1499, fol. De Voluptate et Vero Bono libb. III, *Basil.* 1519, 4to. De Libero Arbitrio, *ibid.* 1518, 4to.

and *Rodolph Agricola*[1] the German, endeavoured, by removing the rubbish with which the field of Dialectics was encumbered, to render them more available for useful purposes: then succeeded *H. Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim* (see § 289), *Ulrich von Hutten*,[2] *Erasmus*,[3] and his friend *J. L. Vives*,[4] *Philip Melanchthon* (§ 294), *Jacobus Faber*,[5] *Marius Nizolius*,[6] *Jac. Sadoletus*,[7] and *Jac. Acontius*.[8] The methods pursued by these learned men in their attacks on the system of the Schools were very dissimilar, according to the different lights in which they viewed that system, and the different objects which engrossed their attention.

Renewal of the Ancient Systems.

285. In consequence of these pursuits the systems of the Grecian and Arabian philosophers were brought into discussion, and the opposition to the Scholastic system reinforced. The doctrines of Aristotle and Plato were the first which thus regained their place; (the sort of knowledge then cultivated favouring their reception); and, subsequently, other theories allied to theirs. In this manner the Cabbala, the

[1] Rudolph Husmann or Hausmann; born at Bafflen, near Gröningen, 1443, died 1485.

RUDOLPHI AGRICOLÆ De Inventione Dialectica lib. III, *Colon.* 1527, 4to. Ejusd.: Lucubrationes, *Basil.* 1518, 4to.; et Opera, cura ALARDI, *Colon.* 1539, 2 vols. fol.

[2] Born 1488, died 1593. Opera (ed. MUNCH) tom. I—V, *Berol.* 1821–5, 8vo.

[3] Desiderius Erasmus, born at Rotterdam 1467, died 1536.

DES. ERASMI Dialogi et Encomium Moriæ. Opera, ed. Clericus, *Lond.* 1703, 11 vols. fol.

[4] Born at Valencia 1492, died 1540.

LUDOVICI VIVES, De Causis Corruptarum Artium, *Antverp.* 1531; and De Initiis, Sectis et Laudibus Philosophiæ. Idem: De Anima et Vita lib. III, *Bas.* 1538. Opera, *Basil.* 1555, 2 vols. fol.; or, ed. MAJANSIUS, 8 vols. fol. *Valent.* 1782–90.

[5] J. Lefevre, of Etaples in Picardy; died 1537.

[6] Of Bersello; died 1540.

JAC. NISOLII Antibarbarus, seu de Veris Principiis et Vera Ratione Philosophandi contra Pseudo-Philosophos libb. IV, *Parma.* 1553, 4to. Ed. G. W. LEIBNITZ, *Francf.* 1674, 4to.

[7] Of Modena; died 1547.

JAC. SADOLETI Phædrus, seu de Laudibus Philosophiæ libb. II. In Opp. *Mogunt.* 1607, 8vo. *Patav.* 1737, 8vo.

[8] Born at Trent; died 1566.

Methodus sive Recta investigandarum tradendarumque Artium ac Scientiarum Ratio. *Bas.* 1558, in 8vo.

so-called Mosaic philosophy, Theosophy and Magic, were annexed to the theories of the Platonists; and the Ionian and Atomistic doctrines with the Aristotelian. The Stoic and Sceptic systems at first had few defenders; nevertheless, as it is impossible that any of the ancient theories should give entire satisfaction in an age so different from that in which they first appeared, and as their effects were of course gradually brought to light, it followed that attempts were occasionally made to *combine* different views, while at other times they were separately attacked with Sceptical objections. In their choice of a sect, and their efforts to establish or destroy a theory, men were influenced by two sets of considerations, according as they proposed to themselves to establish a Theological system, or to promote discoveries in Natural Science.

I. *Revival of Platonism: Cabbalism, Magic, and Theosophy.*

Besides the works mentioned § 283, see the Sketch of the History of Philosophy by BUHLE.

LUDW. DANKEGOTT CRAMER, Diss. de Causis Instauratæ Sæc. XV, in Italiâ, Philosophiæ Platonicæ, *Viteb.* 1812, 4to.

SIEVEKING, Die Geschichte der platonischen Akademie zu Florenz, 1812.

286. The Platonic philosophy, which was eagerly received in Italy by men of fanciful minds, was fostered at Florence by the two Medici, Cosmo and Lorenzo,[1] and excited there a vivid enthusiasm; though wearing rather the character of the Neoplatonic school than of the Academy. Among the recommendations it possessed in their eyes was one which in fact was purely gratuitous, viz., that it was derived, as some of the Fathers believed, from the Jewish philosophy and religion; and hence its reputation of being allied to Christianity.[2] A similar prejudice caused them to connect with Platonism the Cabbalistical and Mosaical doctrines. In addition to this, Platonism continually acquired fresh adhe-

[1] ROSCOE, Life of Lorenzo de' Medici. Bohn, *Lond.* 1846.
ROSCOE, Life and Pontificate of Leo X, 2 vols. Bohn, *Lond.* 1846.

[2] JOH. PICI Heptaplus, p. I, *Franc.* PICI Epist. lib. IV, p. 882.

rents in consequence of the meagre logical system of the Schools, and its inaptitude to satisfy all the wants of human nature. Hence it allied itself to Mysticism; adopted the interests of the ideas of Reason; supported by argument the Immortality of the Soul; and served to balance the Naturalism of the mere Aristotelians; but also unfortunately in some respects favoured superstition, especially by the doctrine of the Intervention of the Spiritual World in the government of nature.[1]* An honourable exception must be made in the case of Astrology, which it uniformly rejected.

§ 287.

SCHARPFF, Der Cardinal und Bischoff Nikolaus von Cusa, 1843.
CLEMENS, Giordano Bruno und Nikolaus von Cusa, 1847.
C. HARTZHEIM, Vita Nicolai de Cusa, *Trevir.* 1730, 8vo.

Among the first of those who bade adieu to the Scholastic creed was the *Cardinal Nicolas Cusanus*,[2] a man of rare sagacity and an able mathematician; who arranged and republished the Pythagorean Ideas, to which he was much inclined, in a very original manner, by the aid of his Mathematical knowledge. He considered God as the unconditional Maximum, which at the same time, as *Absolute Unity*, is also the unconditional Minimum, and begets of Himself and out of Himself, Equality and the combination of Equality with Unity (Son and Holy Ghost). According to him, it is impossible to know directly and immediately this Absolute Unity (the Divinity); because we can make approaches to the knowledge of Him only by the means of Number or Plurality. Consequently he allows us only the possession of very imperfect notions of God, and those by mathematical symbols. It must be admitted that the Cardinal did not pursue this thought very consequently, and that his view of the universe which he connected with it, and which represented it as the Maximum *condensed*, and

[1] FICINI Præfatio in Plotinum; POMPONATIUS, De Incantionibus, c. I.

* With our present imperfect knowledge of the mysterious agencies operating in Nature we are hardly justified in stigmatizing as superstition what may after all turn out to be true.—ED.

[2] Nicolaus Chrypffs of Kuss or Kusel (hence called Cusanus) in the archbishopric of Treves; born 1401, died 1464.

thus *become finite*, was very obscure. Nor was he more successful in his view of the *one*-ness of the Creator and of Creation, or in his attempt to explain the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, by means of this Pantheistic Theism. Nevertheless, numerous profound though undeveloped observations on the faculty of cognition, are found in his writings, interspersed with his prevailing Mysticism. For instance, he observes, that the principles of knowledge possible to us are contained in our ideas of Number (*ratio explicata*) and their several relations; that absolute knowledge is unattainable to us (*precisio veritatis inattingibilis*, which he styled *docta ignorantia*), and that all which is attainable to us is a *probable* knowledge (*conjectura*). With such opinions he expressed a sovereign contempt for the Dogmatism of the Schools.[1]

§ 288.

FICINI Opera in II tomos digesta, *Bas.* 1561, *Par.* 1641, fol.

Commentarius de Platonicæ Philosophiæ post renatas Literas apud Italos restauratione, sivo Mars. Ficini Vita, auctore JOH. CORSIO ejus familiari et discipulo. Nunc primum in lucem eruit ANGELUS MARIA BANDINI, *Pis.* 1772.

J. G. SCHELHORN, Comment. de Vita, Moribus, et scriptis Marsilii Ficini. In the Amœnitatt. Literar. tom. I.

† Life of J. Picus, Count of Mirandola, in MEINER'S Lives of Learned Men, 2 vols.: and Pici Opp. *Bonon.* 1496, fol. Opera utriusque Pici, *Bas.* 1572-3 et 1601, 2 vols. fol.

The examples of Pletho and Bessarion (§ 283) were improved upon by *Marsilius Ficinus*,[2] a Florentine physician, who engaged with zeal and ability in the defence of the Platonic philosophy; both by his translations of Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, etc.; and also his original productions, devoted to the commendation of that system. Cosmo de' Medici, (who died 1464), availed himself of his services in the foundation of a Platonist Academy, about 1460.[3] But Ficinus was a Neoplatonist, who added to the

[1] NICOLAI CUSANI Opera, *Paris.* 1514. 3 vols. fol.; *Basil.* 1665, 3 vols. fol. De Doctâ Ignorantiâ. tom. III. Apologia Doctæ Ignorantiæ, lib. I. De Conjecturis libb. II. De Sapientiâ libb. III.

[2] Born at Florence 1433, died 1499.

[3] † R. SIEVEKING, History of the Platonist Academy at Florence, *Götting.* 1812, 8vo.

system of the Academy some Aristotelian doctrines, and regarded the Hermes Trismegistus of the Alexandrians as the inventor of the theory of Ideas. In his *Theolcgia Platonica* he displayed ability in the statement of certain arguments to establish the Immortality of the Soul,[1] and opposed the doctrine imagined by Averroes, and maintained by the Aristotelians, of an Universal Intelligence. The object he proposed to himself was to apply his views of the Platonic system to the defence and explanation of Christianity. His enthusiasm won over *John Picus*, count of Mirandola,[2] a learned man, of superior parts but extravagant imagination. He had studied the Scholastic philosophy, and imbibed the notion that the philosophy of Plato was derived from the books of Moses, whence he was inclined to deduce all the arts and sciences.[3] In consequence of such a persuasion, he devoted himself to the study of the Oriental languages and Cabbalistical books; from which he drew a large proportion of the theses which he proposed to maintain in a public disputation as announced by him at Rome, but which never really took place.[4] From the same sources he drew the materials of his Essay towards a Mosaical philosophy, in his Heptaplus. He held in great esteem the Cabbalistical writings, to which he was tempted to ascribe a divine origin, and considered necessary to the explanation of the Christian religion; at the same time that he asserted their entire accordance with the philosophical systems of Pythagoras and Plato.[5] His favourite design, which however he did not live to realise, was to prove the consistency of the Aristotelian and Platonic systems.[6] In his maturer age when he had emancipated himself from many of the common prejudices of his time, he composed an able refutation of the superstitions of the astrologers. The reputation of the Count of Mirandola, his works, and his numerous friends, contributed to establish

[1] Theologia Platonica, sive de Immortalitate Animorum ac Æternâ Felicitate libb. XVII. Idem: in Opp. tom. I, *Paris.* 1641, fol.
[2] Count and Prince of Concordia, born 1463, died 1494.
[3] Heptaplus, part I, *Basil.* 1601.
[4] Conclusiones DCCCC. *Rom.* 1486, fol.; *Col.* 1619, 8vo.
[5] Apol. p. 82, 110, 116.
[6] Joh. Pici Epist. ad Ficinum, tom. I, p. 753.

the credit of the Platonic and Cabbalistical doctrines. His nephew, *J. Fr. Picus* of *Mirandola* (killed 1533), followed his steps, without possessing his abilities; but more exclusively devoted than his uncle to Revealed philosophy,[1] he opposed at the same time the Heathen and the Scholastic systems.

Cabbalistic and Magical Systems.

† BUHLE, History of Cabbalistic Philosophy in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century, in his History of Modern Philosophy, II, 1, 360, sqq.

289. *John Reuchlin*,[2] a zealous restorer of philosophy and classical literature, travelled into Italy, where his intimacy with Ficinus and Picus inclined him to the Pythagorico-Platonic doctrine, and to the study of Cabbalistic writings:[3] which he disseminated in Germany by means of his works, *De Verbo Mirifico*,[4] and *De Arte Cabbalistica*.[5] The extravagant performance of the Franciscan monk *Franc. Giorgio Zorzi*,[6] *De Harmonia Mundi istius, Cantica tria*, Venet. 1525, doubtless was thought too full of daring reveries, and was far from possessing the influence enjoyed by the works of *H. Cornelius Agrippa* of Nettesheim.[7] The latter united to great talents universal information; but his greediness of reputation and money, and his fondness for occult sciences, imparted a character of indecision and inconsistency to his life as well as to his works. At Dôle he gave with the greatest success public lectures on the work of Reuchlin, *De Verbo Mirifico;* and at the suggestion of *Tritheim*, the most celebrated adept of his time, he composed his treatise, *De*

[1] He wrote: De Studio Divinæ et Humanæ Sapientiæ, edid. J. F. BUDDEUS, *Hal.* 1702, 8vo. Examen Doctrinæ Vanitatis Gentilium. De Prænotionibus. In the Opp. utriusque Pici (see above): Epp. ed. CIPH. CELLARIUS, *Jen.* 1682, 8vo.

[2] Called also Capnio. He was born 1455, at Pforzheim, was professor at Tübingen, and died 1522.

[3] Life of Reuchlin, in the work of MEINERS already quoted, part I, No. 2. S. F. GEHRES, Life of John Reuchlin, etc., *Carlsruhe*, 1815, 8vo.

[4] Libri III, *Bas.* fol. (1494).

[5] Libri III, *Hagen.* 1517—1530, fol.

[6] Franciscus Georgius, surnamed *Venetus*, because a native of that city. He flourished in the beginning of the sixteenth century.

[7] Born at Cologne, 1486.

Occulta Philosophia,[1] a system of visionary philosophy, in which Magic, the complement of philosophy, as he terms it, and the key of all the secrets of Nature, is represented under the three forms of Natural, Celestial, and Religious or Ceremonial; agreeably to the three-fold division of the Corporeal, Celestial, and Intellectual Worlds.* He there enumerates, with a superficial show of scientific classification, the hidden powers which the Creator has assigned to the different objects of the Creation, through the agency of the Spirit of the World. It was natural that Agrippa should become a partisan of Raymond Lulli (§ 271), and he accordingly wrote a commentary on his Ars Magna. Nevertheless his caprice sometimes inclined him to opinions directly the reverse; and in such a mood he composed his Cynical treatise, as he terms it, *De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum*.[2] This work, which had great reputation in its day, occasionally presents us with sophistical arguments; occasionally with admirable remarks on the imperfections and defects of scientific pursuits.[3] Agrippa and his follower *John Weir*,[4] were of service to philosophy by opposing the belief in witchcraft. After an adventurous life, Agrippa died (1535) at Grenoble.

Theosophy.

290. The physician and theosophist *Aureolus Theophrastus Paracelsus* (such were the names he assumed[5]), blended Chemistry and Therapeutics with the Neoplatonic and Cabbalistic mysticism. He was an ingenious and original man, with much practical information, and a profound spirit of

[1] Lib. I, 1531; lib. II, *Colon.* 1533, 8vo.

* There is little doubt that several of the mystical writers of this age were acquainted with the phenomena of Mesmerism, which unlocks many of their secrets.—Ed.

[2] *Cologne*, 1537; *Paris*, 1529; *Antwerp*, 1530, 4to.

[3] On this writer consult Meiners, Lives, etc.; and Schelhorn, in the Amœnitat. Litt., tom. II, p. 553.

Ejus Opera, in duos tomos digesta, *Lugd. Bat.* without date, 8vo.; republished 1550 et 1600.

[4] Born at Grave in Brabant, 1515; died 1588.

[5] His real names were Philip Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim; born at Einsiedeln in Switzerland, 1493; died at Salzbourg, 1541.

observation, who, though destitute of scientific information, aspired to the character of a reformer in Medicine. To effect this he made use of the Cabbalistic writers, whom he endeavoured to render popular, and expounded with a lively imagination. Among the principal theosophic and theurgic ideas which he enlarged upon without method or consistency (very frequently so as scarcely to be intelligible), were those of an internal illumination*—an emanation from the Divinity,—the universal harmony of all things,—the influence of the stars on the sublunar world,—and the vitality of the elements, which he regarded as spirits encased in the visible bodies presented to our senses. His grand principle was a pretended harmony and sympathy between Salt, the Body, and the Earth: between Mercury, the Soul, and Water; between Sulphur, Spirit, and Air. His views found a great number of partisans.[1] As a mystic and theosophist, *Valentine Weigel*,[2] followed the steps of Paracelsus and Tauler (§ 277); but the doctrines of the former were especially propagated by the society of the *Rosy-Cross*, formed in the seventeenth century, probably in consequence of a satiric poem[3] of the theologian *Valentine Andreæ* (born at Würtemberg, 1586, died 1654).

* Evidently Clairvoyance.—See Colquhoun's Hist. of Magic, Witchcraft, and Animal Magnetism, 1 vol.—ED.

[1] † J. J. LOES, Theophrastus Paracelsus von Hohenheim: a Dissertation in the *Studien* of CREUZER and DAUB, tom. 1. Cf. SPRENGEL, Hist. of Medicine, part III. Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Physicians of the close of the Sixteenth and commencement of the Seventeenth Centuries, published by THAD. ANSELM RIXNER, and THAD. SIBER, fasc. I. Theophrastus Paracelsus, *Sulzbach*, 1819, 8vo.

PHIL. THEOPHRASTI PARACELSI Volumen Medicinæ Paramirum, *Argent.* 1575, 8vo., and Works of Paracelsus, published by JOH. HUSER, *Bas.* 1589, 10 vols. 4to. *Strasb.* 1616—18, 3 vols. fol.

[2] Born at Hayne in Misnia, 1533; was a Lutheran minister at Tschopau in Misnia, and died 1588.

HILLIGER, De Vitâ, Fatis, et Scriptis Val. Weigelii; and FÖRTSCH, de Weigelio, in the Miscell. Lips. tom. X, p. 171.

Weigelii Tractatus de Opere Mirabili; Arcanum Omnium Arcanorum; † The Golden Touch, or the Way to learn infallibly all Things, etc. 1578, 4to., and 1616. Instruction and Introduction to the Study of German Theology, Philosophy, Mysticism, etc. 1571. Studium Universale; Nosce Teipsum, sive Theologia Astrologizata, 1618.

[3] † The Chymical Marriage of Christian Rosenkreutz, 1603. The

§ 291.

Cardanus de Vitâ Propriâ; in the first part of his Works, *Lugd.* 1663, 10 vols. fol.—See BAYLE'S Dictionary. His Life, by W. R. BECKER, in the *Quartalschrift* of CANZLER and MEINERS, year 3rd, 3 qu. fasc. V. Id.: In his Lives and Opinions of celebrated Physicians, etc., fasc. II, *Sulzbach*, 1820, 8vo.

Jerome Cardan,[1] a celebrated physician, naturalist, and mathematician, resembled Paracelsus in his eccentricities; but was greatly superior to him in information. During his youth, a delicate constitution and tyrannical treatment retarded his progress, and the prejudices of the day in favour of astrology, and the imagination of a familiar spirit, gave a misdirection to his studies, to be traced in his writings; which treat of all sorts of subjects, and without any systematic order.[2] Sometimes he supports, sometimes he opposes the superstitions of the Astronomers and Cabbalists, and mixes up profound observations and ingenious and elevated ideas with the most capricious absurdities. The Theologians of his day, who condemned him as heterodox, have accused him, without sufficient grounds, of atheism.

II. *Revival of the System of Aristotle. Opponents of the same.*

See the work of J. LAUNOY, De Varia Aristot. Fort. etc., mentioned § 245.

W. L. G. BARON VON EBERSTEIN, On the Logical and Metaphysical System of the Peripatetics, properly so called, *Halle*, 1800, 8vo.

292. Nevertheless, the theories of Aristotle had many defenders. The Scholastic system had long nourished in the minds of men a profound veneration for the author of the *Organum;* and the education of the age inclined men to the reception of his philosophy. When his works came to be known in their original form, they were eagerly studied, explained, translated, and abridged. Among the theolo-

same (ANDREÆ); Universal Reformation of the World by means of the *fama fraternitatis* of the Rosy-Cross, *Ratisb.* 1614, 8vo.

[1] Geronimo Cardano, born at Pavia, 1501; died 1576.

[2] See especially his treatises. De Subtilitate, et Rerum Varietate.

gians, and physicists in particular, was formed a numerous school of his adherents. The latter especially, who were inclined to Naturalism, were enabled to restate on his authority certain doctrines belonging to natural religion and philosophy. The distinction they drew between philosophical Truth and the Belief of the Church, served to protect them from the censures of some zealous theologians. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Aristotelians were divided into two sects: the *Averroists*, attached to the commentary of Averroes (§ 259), and the *Alexandrists*, or successors of Alexander Aphrodisiensis (§ 183). These two parties drew upon themselves so much notice by the acrimony of their disputes on the principles of Thought, and the Immortality of the Soul, that in 1512 the Lateran council endeavoured to cut short the dispute by pronouncing in favour of the more orthodox party.

Italian Peripatetics.

293. Among the most renowned Peripatetics of Italy, we may remark *P. Pomponatius*,[1] of Mantua. His devotion to the doctrines of Aristotle did not prevent his originating many of his own, and detecting the weak points of his master's system. He endeavoured to arouse his contemporaries to more profound investigations, discussing with singular force and acuteness various subjects, such as: the Immortality of the Soul,—the relation of Free-will to Fate and Providence,—Miracles and Sorcery; or, to express it more fully—the question whether the wonderful appear-

[1] Born 1462, died 1525 or 1530.

Petri Pomponatii De Naturalium effectuum admirandorum Causis seu de Incantationibus liber. Ejusdem: De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, Prædestinatione, Providentia Dei, libb. V, in quibus difficillima capita et quæstiones Theologicæ et Philosophicæ ex sana Orthodoxæ Fidei Doctrina explicantur et multis raris historiis passim illustrantur per auctorem, qui se in omnibus Canonicæ Scripturæ Sanctorumque Doctorum judicio submittit, *Basil. Ven.* 1425—1556—1567, fol.

Ejusdem: Tractatus de Immortalitate Animæ, *Bonon.*.1516, etc. The latest edition, published by Chph. Gottfr. Bardili, contains an account of the life of Pomponatius. See also Jo. Gfr. Olearii Diss. de Petro Pomponatio, *Jen.* 1709, 4to.

Porta, De Rerum Naturalibus Principiis: de Anima et Mente Humana, *Flor.* 1551, 4to.

ances of nature are produced by the agency of Spirits (as the Platonists pretended), or that of the constellations. He, moreover, distinctly pronounced the deviation of the Aristotelian doctrine from the creed of the Church;[1] and he gave utterance to freer views than were then current, especially on the subjects we have enumerated, thereby exciting a deeper spirit of research. Having asserted that, according to Aristotle, there is no certain proof to be adduced of the Immortality of the Soul, Pomponatius drew upon himself a violent and formidable controversy, in which he defended himself by asserting the distinction to be maintained between natural science and positive belief. Many superior men were formed in his school, such as *Simon Porta* or *Portius*,[2] *Paulus Jovius*,[3] *Julius Cæsar Scaliger*,[4] who subsequently opposed Cardan;[5] the cardinal *Gasparo Contarini* and *Augustus Niphus*[6] (who became his adversaries); the Spaniard *J. Genesius Sepulveda*;[7] and lastly, the paradoxical freethinker *Lucilio Vanini*,[8] burnt at Toulouse in 1619. Besides Pomponatius (who was the head of the School of Alexandrists), this sect boasted other learned men who were not among his disciples; such as, *Nicolas Leonicus*, surnamed *Thomæus*;[9] *Jacobus Zabarella*,[10] who differed on some points from Aristotle; *Cæsar Cremoninus*,[11] and *Francis Pic-*

[1] De Fato, III, 1.

[2] Sim. Porta, died 1555.

[3] Paolo Giovio, born at Como 1483, died 1559.

[4] Della Scala, born at Ripa 1484, died 1559.

[5] In his Exercitationes de Subtilitate.

[6] Born 1473, died 1546. Libri VI, De Intellectu et Dæmonibus, *Ven.* 1492, fol. Et: Opera Philos., *Ven.* 1559, 6 vols. fol. Opusc. Moralia et Politica, *Paris.* 1645, 4to.

[7] Born 1491, died 1572.

[8] Lucilio, or Julius Cæsar Vanini, was born at Naples, about 1586.
Amphitheatrum Æternæ Providentiæ, etc., *Lugd.* 1615, 8vo.
De Admirandis Naturæ Arcanis, etc., libb. IV, *Paris.* 1616, 8vo.
Life, Misfortunes, Character, and Opinions of Lucilio Vanini, an Atheist of the seventeenth century, etc., by W. D. F., *Leips.* 1800, 8vo.

[9] Born at Venice 1457, died 1533.

[10] Born at Padua 1532, died 1589. De Inventione Primi Motoris, *Fcf.* 1618, 4to. Opp. Philosophica, ed J. J. Havenreuter, *Fcf.* 1623, 4to.

[11] Cesare Cremonini, born at Cenli, in the duchy of Modena, A.D. 1552, died 1630.
Cæs. Cremonini liber de Pædiâ Aristotelis. Diatyposis Universæ Naturalis Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ. Illustres Contemplationes de

Colomini, etc. On the side of the Averroists, with the exception of *Alexander Achillinus* of Bologna[1] (who was styled the second Aristotle); *Marc Antony Zimara*,[2] of San Pietro in the kingdom of Naples; and the famous Aristotelian *Andrew Cesalpini*,[3] we find no names of great celebrity. Cesalpini turned Averroism into an absolute Pantheism, by representing the Deity not only as the operating cause, but as the constituting cause of the world, as the nature of things, and the active intellect of the World; and he, moreover, identified with the Universal Intelligence the minds of individual men, and even of animals. He asserted the immortality of the soul, because Consciousness is inseparable from Thought; and the existence of Dæmons.

German Peripatetics

See the Dissertation of ELSWICK, quoted § 243.

† A. H. C. HEEREN, A few words on the Consequences of the Reformation as affecting Philosophy. In the *Reformations-almanach* of KAYSER, 1819. p. 114, sqq.

CARRIERE, Die Philosophische Weltanschauung des Reformations Zeitalters, 1847.

294. Although *Luther* and *Melanchthon*,[4] in the beginning of the Reformation, entertained unfavourable sentiments towards the Aristotelian philosophy, on the same principle that they denounced the system of the Schoolmen, both, nevertheless, lived to renounce this prejudice; and Melanchthon, especially, not only asserted the indispensability of philosophy as an auxiliary to theology, but recommended especially that of Aristotle, without confining this praise to his logic.[5] In Ethics, however, he maintained the principle

Anima. Tractatus tres de Sensibus Externis, de Internis et de Facultate Appetitiva.

1 Alessandro Achillini, died 1512.

2 Died 1532.

3 Born at Arezzo 1509, died 7603.

Andreæ Cesalpini Quæstion. Peripateticæ libb. V, *Venet.* 1571, fol. Dæmonum Investigatio Peripatetica. *Ven.* 1593, 4to.

4 Born at Bretten 1497, died 1560.

5 MELANCHTHONIS Oratio de Vitâ Aristotelis, habita a. 1537, tom. II. Declamatt. p. 381, sqq.; et tom. III, p. 351, sqq.; Dialectica, *Viteb.* 1534. Initia Doctrinæ Physicæ, 1547, Epitome Philosophiæ

of Morality to be the will of God. According to his view the law of Morality is found in God's immutable and eternal Wisdom and Justice. On one occasion only was war afterwards declared against philosophy (about 1621), by *Dan. Hoffmann*,[1] professor of Theology at Helmstädt; and his two disciples, *J. Angelus Werdenhagen* and *Wenceslaus Schilling*. The philosophy of Aristotle, disencumbered of the subtilties of the Schoolmen (though these were speedily succeeded by others), owed the favour which it enjoyed in the Protestant universities, to the authority of Melanchthon; and a swarm of commentaries and abridgments of this system presently appeared, which at all events served to keep in practice those attached to such studies. Among such we may particularise *Joachim Camerarius*, who died at Leipsic 1574.

The credit of Aristotle became in this manner re-established, and so continued till about the middle of the seventeenth century; nor was it materially affected by the desertion of a few, who like *Nicolaus Taurellus*,[2] the opponent of Cesalpini, seceded a little from the prevailing doctrines. Among this class of philosophers we must add *Jac. Shegk*, and his pupil *Philip Scherbius*,[4] as also *Jac.* and *Corn. Martini*.[5]

Moralis, *Viteb.* 1589; De Anima, 1540, 8vo.; Ethicæ Doctrinæ Elementa, *Viteb.* 1550. These different works have been frequently republished, and were edited with his works at large by CASPAR PEUCER, *Viteb.* 1562, 4 vols. fol. Editio nova, ed. BRETSCHNEIDER, 4to. *Halæ*, 1834, &c.

[1] DAN. HOFMANN, Qui sit veræ ac sobriæ Philosophiæ in Theologia usus? *Helmst.* 1581. See CORN. MARTINI Scriptum de Statibus controversis, etc. Helmstadii agitatis inter Dan. Hofmannum et quatuor Philosophos, *Lips.* 1620, 12mo.

[2] Born at Mümpelgard 1547, died 1606.

NIC. TAURELLI Philosophiæ Triumphus, *Basil.* 1573, 8vo. Alpes Cæsæ [against Cesalpini] *Fcf.* 1597, 8vo. Discussiones de Mundo adv. Fr. Piccolominium *Amb.* 1603, 8vo.; *Marb.* 1603, 8vo. Discussiones de Cœlo, *Amb.* 1603, 8vo. See JAC. G. FEUERLIN, Diss. Apologetica pro Nic. Taurello, De Rerum Æternitate, *Norimb.* 1734, 4to. With the Synopsis Aristotelis Metaphysices.

[3] Professor of Nat. Phil. at Tübingen, died 1587.

[4] Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Altdorf, 1605.

[5] Corn. Martini died as Professor at Helmstadt, in 1621.

Opponents of the Aristotelian Philosophy.

295. Notwithstanding, the adversaries of the Aristotelian system daily increased in number. Without touching upon other Schools more or less opposed to his (whose universality of system impeded *their* progress), we may enumerate besides *Nicolaus Taurellus* just mentioned, *Franc. Patrizzi*, *Bruno*, *Berigard*, *Magnenus*, *Telesius*, and *Campanella*: (all of whom we shall have occasion to mention hereafter); with *Peter Ramus*,[1] one of the ablest opponents of the Peripatetic System, and a distinguished mathematician. He engaged in the dispute from a disgust for the technicalities of the Schools, and laboured to give popularity to a more accessible kind of Philosophy, but was deficient in a true philosophical spirit, and without an adequate comprehension of the principles of Aristotle; which he attacked without measure or moderation; asserting that they were a tissue of error. Logic was the first point he objected to;[2] asserting that it was altogether factitious, without order, and without perspicuity; at the same time that he composed a new one,[3] more adapted to practical use, which he wished to substitute for that of Aristotle. He defined it to be, "Ars bene disserendi," and considered Rhetoric to be an essential branch of it. Notwithstanding the attacks of his many enemies, who were by no means temperate in their animosity, he attracted some partisans (called after him *Ramists*), especially in Switzerland, England, and Scotland. Among others, *Audomar Talæus*[4] (*Talon*), his two disciples *Thom. Freigius* of Fribourg,[5] and *Franc Fabricius; Fr. Beuchus; Wilh. Ad. Scribonius;* and *Gasp. Pfaffrad.*[6] At last a party

[1] Properly called P. de la Ramée, of a poor family in Picardy; born 1515; killed at Paris in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, 1572.

JOH. THOM. FREIGII Vita Petri Rami, at the end of Audomari Talæi Orationes, *Marb.* 1599. Besides the works of Ramus mentioned § 143 and 146; see the following notes.

[2] Animadversiones in Dialecticam Aristotelis, libb. XX, *Paris.* 1534, 4to.

[3] Institutiones Dialecticæ, lib. II, *Paris.* 1543, 8vo., 1508; Scholæ Dialecticæ in Liberales Artes, *Bas.* 1559, fol. Orationes Apologeticæ, *Paris*, 1551, 8vo., et al.

[4] The friend of Ramus. Died at Paris in 1562.

[5] Died 1583. [6] Died 1622.

arose that tried to unite the Method of *Ramus* with the Aristotelian Logic of *Melanchthon*. To these Eclectics belong *Rud. Goclenius*,[1] who was of service to Psychology, and whose pupil *Otto Cassman* prosecuted his researches into psychological anthropology.[2] To these may be added the celebrated English poet *Milton*. The principal opponents of Ramus were *Ant. Govea*, *Joach. Perionius*, and *Charpentier* the Aristotelian, (see bibliography of §§ 139, 141, 143); who also was his murderer on the day of St. Bartholomew.

III. *Revival of Stoicism.*

296. The Stoic doctrines during this period were not altogether without partisans and supporters; but notwithstanding all the advantage they may be supposed to have derived from the dissemination of the works of Cicero and Seneca, and their seeming consistency with the Christian Morals, they did not gain as many adherents as some other philosophical systems. This is ascribable in part to the peculiar theories (in physics and morals) of the Stoics, and partly to the influence of the prevailing spirit of the age, and the established cultivation of the intellect. The writer who principally attached himself to these doctrines, at the period of which we are treating, was *Justus Lipsius* (*Joost Lipss*).[3] Originally he favoured the Scholastic system, which he abandoned for the cultivation of Classical literature; particularly the works of Cicero and Seneca. Celebrated as a critic and philologist, he became (though never, in the proper sense of the word, a philosopher) an able expositor of the Stoic system. All that he wanted to make him a true Stoic (as he himself has confessed), was Constancy and Consistency. He seems rather to have aimed

[1] Born at Corbach 1547, died at Marburg 1628.

Ψυχολογία, h. e. De Hominis Perfectione, Animâ et imprimis Ortu, etc., *Marb.* 1590—1597, 8vo. Ejusd.: Isagoge in Org. Aristotelis, *Fcf.* 1598, 8vo. Problemata Log. et Philos., *Marb.* 1614, 8vo. Cf. § 129.

[2] Psychologia Anthropologica, sive Animæ Humanæ Doctrina, *Hanau.* 1594, 8vo.

[3] Born at Isca, near Brussels, 1547; died 1606.

Justi Lipsii libb. II, De Constantiâ, *Francof.* 1591, 8vo. Ejusd. Opera, *Antverp.* 1637, 4 vols. fol.

at preparing the minds of his readers for the study of these doctrines, especially as given in Seneca, than to have attempted the restoration of the system. *Gasp. Scioppius (Schoppe)*,[1] a man of equivocal character, published extracts from the works of Lipsius. *Thom. Gataker*, an Englishman,[2] occupied himself with the historical department of this system, as well as *Cl. Salmasius*. and *Dan. Heinsius*.[3]

ORIGINAL ESSAYS AND PARTICULAR COMBINATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

I. *Various Essays.*

297. In the midst of these attempts to re-establish the theories of antiquity, while the old and the new doctrines were brought into constant competition, and the established system not only endeavoured to repulse the attacks which were constantly levelled at it, but to acquire fresh credit by reconciling its discordant doctrines,[4] might be remarked from time to time some superior spirit who had the courage to quit the beaten track, and attempt a new one of his own; though unhappily, from the want of well-established principles for his guidance, he too usually fell into considerable errors. Among these we must reckon the German, *Nic. Taurellus*, already mentioned (§ 294), who laboured to draw a still stronger line of demarcation between philosophy and theology, and looked upon Reason as the proper source of philosophic knowledge. Of the Italians, *Cardan* (§ 291), and *Vanini* (§ 293), and of the French *P. Ramus*, who meditated a reform of philosophy. As by this time the old-established Scholastic method of drawing all knowledge from Conceptions, was insufficient to satisfy men's minds, they attempted to attain more certain conclusions by the way of experience. This principle was especially followed up by the Political writers and Naturalists. Among the former,

[1] Born 1576; died 1649. [2] Born 1574; died 1644.

[3] DAN. HEINSII Oratt. On the Works of Scioppius and Gataker, consult the Bibliog. § 158 and 163.

[4] A writer who particularly distinguished himself on this side was the Thomist FR. SUAREZ (died 1617); by his Disputationes Metaphysicæ, *Mogunt.* 1614.

Niccolo Macchiavelli,[1] a statesman, matured by the study of the Classics and by knowledge of the world, had in his *Principe* (1515) given with great ability a picture of political men, such as he had generally found them: and *John Bodin*[2] (or *Bodinus*) having in his *Republic* discarded the opinions of Plato and Aristotle, had endeavoured to explain the principles of a form of government neither an absolute Monarchy nor a Democracy, and regulated by mixed principles of strict justice and accommodating prudence.

II. *Telesius.*

Fr. Baco, De Principiis et Originibus secundum Fabulas Cupidinis et Cœli, sive de Parmenidis et Telesii et præcipue Democriti Philosophiâ tractatâ in Fabulâ de Cupidine. Opp. tom. III, ed. Elzev. p. 208.

Jo. Ge. Lotteri Diss. de Benardini Telesii Philosophi Italici Vitâ et Philosophiâ, *Lips.* 1726–1733, 4to.

† Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Physicians at the end of the Sixteenth and beginning of the Seventeenth Centuries. Published by Th. Aug. Rixner and Siber, fasc. III, *Sulzb.*

298. A reformation was attempted in Natural Philosophy by *Bernardinus Telesius*. Born 1508, at Cosenza, in the kingdom of Naples, he received a classical education from an uncle at Milan, and subsequently at Rome; and at Padua devoted himself with ardour to philosophical and mathematical studies, from which he imbibed a disinclination for the doctrines of Aristotle. At a more advanced age, he published with great success his *De Naturâ juxta Propria Principia*.[3] He became a teacher of Natural Philosophy at Naples, and founded an academy named after him, *Telesiana*

[1] Born at Florence 1496; died 1527.

Joh. Fr. Christii De Nic. Macchiavello libb. III, *Lips.* et *Hal.* 1731, 4to. Opere 1550, 4to., etc., *Milan.* 1805, 10 vols. 8vo.; *Flor.* 1820, 10 vols. 8vo.

[2] Born at Angers about 1550; died 1596.

Guhrauer, Das Heptaplomeres des Bodin, zur Geschichte der Cultur und Litteratur im Jahrhunderte der Reformation, 1841.

Vergleiche die Anzeige dieser Schrift, in den Deutschen Jahrbüchern für Wissensch. und Kunst, No. 186–193, § 744–780.

De la République, *Paris*, 1576, fol. and 1578. In Latin 1586, fol.

[3] The two first books appeared at Rome, 1565, in 4to. The entire work was published at Naples in 1586 and 1588.

and *Consentina;* which was intended to demolish the Aristotelian philosophy. He was compelled by the persecutions he underwent from the monks, which injured his health, to retire to Cosenza, where he died 1588. His system is one of Naturalism, and bears some resemblance to the views of Parmenides and Anaxagoras (§ 99, 107), and is closely connected with the doctrines relating to God and Morality. His chief objection to those of Aristotle is, that he laid down as principles mere abstractions (*abstracta et non entia*). He himself maintained the existence of two incorporeal and active principles, Heat and Cold; and a corporeal passive principle, Matter; on which the other two exercise their influences. He derived the heavens from Heat, and the earth from Cold; and attempted, in a very unsatisfactory manner, to account for the origin of secondary natures by a supposed perpetual conflict between the Heavens[4] and Earth. Having attributed sensation to his two incorporeal principles, he went on to assign souls to plants and animals in general. He drew, however, a broad distinction between the immortal soul of Man, and that of other animals, and asserted that it was the immediate gift of God at the time of conception.[1] He maintained that sensation was not absolutely passive, but a perception of changes operated in the mind itself.[2] Knowledge acquired by means of inference he described as a species of imperfect Sensation. Independently of these theories, Telesius was an Empirist and Materialist. His adversaries *Marta* and *Chiocci* were, in their turn, attacked by Campanella,[3] (infra).

III. *Fran. Patrizzi*, or *Patritius.*

† Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Physicians, etc.; published by RIXNER and SIBER; fasc. IV: FR. PATRIZZI, *Sulzb.* 1823, 8vo.

299. *Fr. Patrizzi*,[4] the author of a new theory of emanation, borrowed the materials of it from all quarters, but principally from the Neoplatonists, and the records of Primitive

[1] De Rer. Nat., lib. V, c. 1, sqq. [2] Ibid. VIII, 21.
[3] Campanellæ Philosophia sensibus demonstrata, etc., *Neapolis*, 1590, 4to.
[4] Born at Clisso in Dalmatia, 1529; professor of the Platonic philosophy at Ferrara and Rome, where he died 1593.

Mysticism collected by them; as well as from the system of Telesius. He commenced this undertaking by an elaborate refutation of Aristotle.[1] Nevertheless, he attempted[2] a theory of light according to the Aristotelian method. He affects to divide his subject into four parts, viz.: *Panaugia, Panarchia, Pampsychia*, and *Pancosmia:* and cites to support his theories a number of apocryphal mystic books.[3] Wisdom he defines to be Universal Science. Light is in all things the primal object of knowledge. Philosophy, therefore, or the investigation of Truth, ought to begin with the contemplation of Light. 1. All Light is derived from the first source of illumination—GOD. 2. God is the highest principle of all things. 3. The universe is animated. 4. It is endowed with the qualities of unity and cohesion by means of Space and Light; both of them incorporeal essences.

Such are among the principal ideas which Patrizzi follows up in the work above mentioned. It may be observed that this was not the last occasion when by metamorphosing material forms into Spiritual Essences, an alliance was attempted between the mysticism of the Neoplatonists and the philosophy of Aristotle.

IV. *Giordano Bruno.*

STEFFENS, Ueber das Leben des Jordanus Bruno; In Steffens nachgelassenen Schriften, 1846, § 43–70.

CLEMENS, Giordano Bruno und Nikolaus von Cusa (Die Philosophie Bruno's), § 5–36, 1847.

† For Giord. Bruno, see BRUCKER, tom. IV: and BUHLE, History of Modern Philosophy, tom. II, p. 703, sqq. FULLEBORN, Beiträge, etc., fasc. VI. HEUMANN, Acta Philos. fasc. III—IX. XV.

CAR. STEPH. JORDANI Disquisitio Historico-Literaria de Jordano Bruno Nolano, *Primislaviæ* (no date), 8vo.

FR. CHRIST. LAUCKHARD, Diss. de Jordano Bruno, *Hal.* 1783, 4to.

† Biographical Memoir of Giord. Bruno, by KINDERVATER; In the Memoirs of Cæsar, relative to the Philosophical World, tom. VI, No. 5.

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[1] Discussiones Peripateticæ, published at first separately, *Ven.* 1571—1581, 4 vols. See above § 139.

[2] Nova de Universis Philosophia in quâ Aristotelicâ Methodo non per Motum sed per Lucem et Lumina ad primam causam ascenditur, &c., *Ferrar.* 1591, fol., *Ven.* 1593, *Lond.* 1611.

[3] Attributed to the ancient Persians.

† Biography of Bruno, in ADELUNG: History of Human Folly, 1 vol.

FR. JACOBI, Letters to Mendelssohn on the Doctrine of Spinoza; second edition, *Breslau*, 1789, 8vo. Suppl. I.

† HEYDENREICH, Appendix to the History of Revolutions in Philosophy, by CROMAZIANO, p. 257, tom. I.

† Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Natural Philosophers, etc. (see prec. §).

300. The most interesting thinker of this age was another Italian named *Giordano Bruno* (*Jordanus Brunus;*) remarkable for his history, as well as his learning and great abilities. He was endowed with a comprehensive and penetrating intellect, united to a fruitful imagination; of an elevated, but restless and passionate character; and greedy of fame. He possessed extensive knowledge of the mathematics, physics, and astronomy; and a mind splendidly enriched by the influence of classical literature. He was born at Nola, in the kingdom of Naples, about the middle of the sixteenth century. Little is known of his early life. He professed himself a Dominican, but the year and place of his noviciate are not known. Some religious doubts and bold strictures on the monkish orders obliged him to quit Italy, probably in 1580. He retired to Geneva, where his love for dispute and paradox, and the intolerance of the adherents of Calvin, brought him into trouble. Thence he retreated to Paris, where he gave public lectures on the Ars Magna of Raymond Lulli. After a visit to London, he returned to Paris, 1585; and there openly announced himself the adversary of Aristotle, which procured him a great number of enemies. In 1586 he became a private teacher of moral philosophy and mathematics at Wittemberg; afterwards he took up his abode at Prague, at Helmstädt (where he taught as professor of philosophy), and at Frankfort on the Maine. In 1592 he returned once more to Padua, it is not known for what reason; and, after having passed some years in tranquillity, was arrested (in 1598) by the Inquisition, sent to Rome, and there, on the 17th of February, 1600, burned as a heretic, and apostate from his religious vows.

301. Bruno was formed by the character of his mind to reject the dry system which had prevailed under the sanction of Aristotle's name. He was naturally inclined to the study and cultivation of the Classics, and in particular was

carried away by the bold and comprehensive views of the Eleatæ and Alexandrian Platonists, which at that time found in Italy many minds disposed to receive them. He dived deep into their mysteries, and transfused them into his own writings with talent and originality. He assumed the appellation of *Philotheos*, and under that name, in various writings, composed with considerable fancy as well as learning,—occasionally with wit, and always with ability—he maintained as his great thesis, the idea of the Oneness of the Godhead and of the World; or, that God is the internal principle and substantial essence of all things, and that in Him power and activity—the Real and the Possible, form at all times one indivisible whole. He added to these notions many more, for instance, that of carrying to perfection the art of Lulli, whom he looked upon as the harbinger of his own reform in philosophy; and while he availed himself of the bold discoveries of Copernicus, (which possibly first inclined him to doubt the traditional system), he associated with the truth of these the prejudices of his age in favour of Astrology and Magic. His ardent imagination and restless temper were less fitted for testing such reveries with cold criticism, than for detailing them with an exuberance of fancy.

His books (especially those in Italian) are extremely scarce: Fülleborn and Buhle have been at the pains to make a complete list of them. It is sufficient to enumerate here the principal.

JORDANI BRUNI Acrotismus, seu Rationes Articulorum Physicorum adversus Peripateticos Parisiis propositorum, etc., *Viteb.* 1588, 8vo.

PHILOTHEUS JORDANUS BRUNUS Nolanus de compendiosâ architecturâ et complemento Artis Lullii, *Paris*, 1582, 12mo.

De Umbris Idearum, *Par.* 1582, 8vo.; part II is entitled Ars Memoriæ.

Idem: Della Causa, Principio, ed Uno, *Venice* (more probably *Paris*), 1584, 8vo. An extract from it is to be found in the letters already mentioned of FR. JACOBI.

Idem: Dell' Infinito Universo e Mondi, *Venet.* (probably *Paris*), 1584, 8vo.

Spaccio della bestia trionfante, *Paris*, 1584, 8vo.

Degli Eroici Furori, *ibid.* 1585, 8vo.

La Cena delle ceneri, descritta in cinque dialoghi, *s. l.* 1584, 8vo.

Cabala del cavallo Pegaseo, con l'aggiunto dell' Asino Cillenico, *Paris*, 1585, 8vo.

Cantus Circæus, ad eam Memoriæ praxim ordinatus, quam ipse Judiciariam appellat, *Par.* 1852.

Articuli de Natura et Mundo, a NOLANO in principibus Europæ academicis propositi, &c., quos Jo. HENNEQUINUS, &c., defendendos evulgavit, &c. *Paris.* 1586.

JORDANI BRUNI, Recens et completa Ars Reminiscendi; et, Candelaio, Comedia. *Par.* 1582; Explicatio Triginta Sigillorum ad omnium Scientarum et Artium Inventionem, Dispositionem, et Memoriam; quibus adjectus est Sigillus Sigillorum, *s. l. vel a.*

Idem: De Lampade combinatoria Lulliana ad infinitas Propositiones et media invenienda, *Viteb.* 1587, 8vo. De progressu et Lampade venatoria Logicorum, etc., *Viteb.* 1587, eod. De Specierum scrutinio et Lampade combinatoria Raym. Lullii, *Prag.* 1588. Articuli CLX adv. hujus temp. Mathematicos atque Philosophos, item CLXXX Praxes ad totidem Problemata, *ibid.* De Imaginum, Signorum, et Idearum compositione ad omnia Inventionum, Dispositionum, et Memoriæ genera libb. III, *Francof. ad M.* 1591, 8vo. De triplici, minimo, et mensura, ad trium Speculativarum Scientiarum et multarum activarum Artium Principia libb. V, *Francof.* 1591, 8vo. De Monade, numero et figura liber consequens (libros) quinque de minimo, magno, et mensura. Item de Innumerabilibus, Immenso, et Infigurabili, seu de Universo et Mundis libb. VIII, *Francof.* 1614, 8vo.

The Italian works of Giordano Bruno have been recently published in a collected form, 2 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1830.

302. The principal points of what may be termed his Theology are the following: God—the First Principle, is that which all things are, or may be. He is *One*, but in Him all essences are comprehended. He is the substance also of all things, and at the same time their Cause—(Final, Formal, and Creative):—Eternal without limit of duration; *Natura naturans.* As the first Efficient Cause, He is also the Divine and Universal Reason which has manifested itself in the form and fashion of the Universe: He is the Soul of the Universe, which permeates all things, and bestows upon them their forms and attributes. The end contemplated by this Great Cause is the perfection of all things, which consists in the real development of the various modifications of which the different parts of Matter are susceptible. To be—to will—to have the power—and to produce, are identical with the Great Universal Principle. He is incomprehensible to us, because Absolute and Uncompounded. His *Esse* and his creative energies are determined by his Nature; He cannot act otherwise than he acts; His will is necessity; and this necessity, at the same

time, the most perfect freedom. The Divinity, as the first and vital energy, has revealed himself from all eternity in an infinite variety of productions; yet continues always the same; Infinite, Immeasurable, Immoveable, and Unapproachable by any similitude. He is in all things, and all things in Him; because by Him and in Him all things live, act, and have their increase: He pervades the smallest portions of the Universe, as well as its infinite expanse: He influences every atom of it as well as the whole. It follows, that all things are animated; all things are good; because all things proceeded from good, and intended for good.

303. Bruno follows the same train of ideas in his reflections on the world (*Universum*, or *Natura naturata)*, which he represents as One, Infinite, Eternal, and Imperishable. Nevertheless the world, in its external nature, and as containing the development of all things, is but the shadow of the Supreme Principle. Its element is *Matter*, as regards itself, formless; but identical with the primitive and eternal Form, it develops out of itself all accidental form. He maintained that none had better expressed than Pythagoras, in his theory of Numbers, the manner in which all things are derived from the Infinite Being as Unity: towards which the human understanding perpetually aspires. By the multiplication of its own Unity the First Principle causes the production of multifarious beings; but at the same time that It is the source of species and individuals beyond all calculation. It is Itself unlimited, and unconfined by Number, Measure, or Relation. It remains always One, and in every respect Indivisible; at once Infinitely Great and Infinitely Little. Inasmuch as by It all things are animated, the Universe may be represented as a Living Being: an immense and infinite animal, in which all things live and act in a thousand and a thousand different ways.

Bruno endeavours to establish by a variety of proofs this eternity of the world; from the immortal destiny of Man; from the infinitude of the Creator's power, which must be productive of like infinite effects; from the goodness also of the Divine Being; as well as by metaphysical arguments drawn from our ideas of Infinite Space, and the impossibility of finding a Central Point; which last proof he ingeniously applies to the defence and confirmation of the

Copernican system: refuting the opposite theories, especially that of the Peripatetics. As the material world is but a shadow and reflection of the First Principle, so our knowledge altogether consists in the perception of Similitudes and Relations; and as the First Principle, descending from Its elevation, produced, by multiplication of Itself, the infinite diversity of natural objects, so do we gradually acquire the notion of Unity, by combining the Multifarious. The end of all philosophy is this recognition of the Unity of all in Contraries. In every individual the Soul assumes a particular form: inasmuch as its nature is simple and uncompounded it is immortal, without limits to its energies, and, by extension and contraction, it forms and fashions its own body.

To be born is the consequence of such expansion of the centre; Life consists in the maintenance of a spherical shape, and Death is the contraction into the same centre. The highest end of all free agents is the same with that of the Divine Intellect; namely, the perfection of the Whole.

Bruno's system is nothing more than that of the Eleatæ and Plotinus purified and extended: a sort of Pantheism, by many misunderstood as a system of Atheism; set forth with a persuasive eloquence springing from the author's own conviction, and with great richness of imagination; and engaging the attention by a multitude of striking and noble ideas. The system of Bruno continued long neglected or misunderstood, till the theories of Spinoza and Schelling directed towards it a degree of revived attention.*

V. *Sceptical writers.*

304. Many combined views and ideas now gave birth to a new species of philosophical scepticism in certain calm and vigorous minds, which manifested itself according to the peculiar characters and habits of each. The causes of these new views were, the renewed study of the old

* Pantheism is of various kinds, two of which are the most obvious and prevalent, i. e. the Idealistic and the Realistic Pantheisms. In both cases the Absolute is unconscious, only becoming conscious in the Finite. (Hegel, Strauss, &c., are Idealistic Pantheists of this class). Bruno's Pantheism was of a neutral kind, as he admits a conscious Absolute.—Ed.

philosophers; the awakened spirit of original investigation; the extended sphere of experimental observation; with the craving which began to be felt for more certain knowledge and better established principles; with all the discussions and theories which these causes set in motion, diversified according to the characters of their respective authors.

Montaigne.

Essais de Michel de Montaigne, *Bordeaux*, 1580; *Lond.* 1724; *Paris*, 1725, 3 vols. 4to.; *Lond.* 1739, 6 vols. 12mo. etc.

Eloge de Mich. de Montaigne, couronné à l'Acad. de Bordeaux en 1774 (par L'ABBE DE TALBERT), *Par.* 1775, 12mo. Eloge Analytique et Historique par DE LA DIXMERIE, *Par.* 1781, 8vo.

305. *Michel de Montaigne*, or *Montagne*,[1] was the first of his age who inclined to the philosophy of Doubt. With a mind highly cultivated by the study of the Ancients and of history; with great knowledge of the world and men; he embraced the image of human life as it is in itself and also in the phase of its multiplicity; without analysing these discrepancies so as to arrive at unity. His acute observation of the disagreement existing between all philosophical theories produced in him a way of thinking akin to positive Scepticism in matters of philosophy; and he pronounced the *uncertainty of human knowledge* and the *feebleness of human reason* to be the grand conclusions to which all his observations had led him; reposing with a sincere faith on the authority of Divine Revelation. The uncertainty which he ascribed to all human science he extended even to matters of practice, without however denying the truth of practical obligations. His opinions are expressed with admirable candour and modesty in his delightful *Essays*, the originality and graces of which have always made the book a favourite with men of taste, and have exerted a great influence; though his philosophy has been very differently estimated by different critics. Though his own character and conduct were free from the reproach of immorality and irreligion, his work has unquestionably the defect of easily leading to an opposite mode of thought, and of strengthening and forwarding it, as has actually taken place.

[1] Born in a castle of the same name in Perigord 1533; died 1592.

Pierre Charron.

† De la Sagesse: trois livres; par P. CHARRON, *Bordeaux*, 1601; edit. expurg. *Par.* 1604.

Eloge de P. Charron, par G. M. D. R. (GEORGE MICHEL DE ROCHEMAILLET), prefixed to the Works of Charron, *Par.* 1607. See BAYLE.

306. Montaigne had great influence over two distinguished authors of his own day: *Etienne Boëtie* (died 1563), counsellor of the parliament of Bordeaux; who in his *Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*, set forth with considerable talent his republican principles: and *Pierre Charron* (born at Paris 1541), an excellent spiritual orator, and a man of ability and spiritual character; but who, in consequence of his intimacy with Montaigne, having contracted a habit of Scepticism, expressed himself with greater freedom on religious points. According to him, Wisdom (*la Sagesse*), is the free investigation of what is common and habitual. The desire of knowledge is natural to man; but Truth resides with God alone, and a description of his Nature is undefinable by human reason. On this principle he grounds another, of distrust and indifference with regard to all science; a bold disbelief of Virtue (in its manifestation); and even of the great doctrines of Religion (particularly the immortality of the Soul), as well as of the foundations of all positive Religion, not excepting the Christian; alleging that its external history did not correspond with its divine original, and the ideal of God in the Reason, and the worship of God. On the other hand he insisted upon the obligations of a certain Internal Religion connected with Virtue, and founded in the knowledge of God and Self, and exhorted with power and dignity to the practice of moral duties derived from a certain everlasting and imperishable law of Nature, which has been implanted in the reason by God himself, and contains the highest good of Man. This crude theory he expressed with some eloquence, and died 1603, decried by many as an atheist; which he did not altogether deserve.

307. We perceive that the human mind had, in the period of which we are treating, attempted many paths, already opened, to the attainment of science, by the ways of Revelation, Reason, and Experience. None of them had

been pursued far enough, in order to lay a sure foundation; because, occupied with the pursuit of results and conclusions, men had omitted to begin by giving them a solid basis. They had not yet inquired in what respects Revelation may be justly expected to be a source of knowledge: nor had the pretensions of Experience and Reason to be severally the fountain-heads of knowledge, been balanced or adjusted. A sort of Scepticism, grounded on experience, discouraged the pride of philosophical speculation, without having the effect of silencing its inquiries; and rather busied itself with diving again into the exhausted mines of ancient doubts, than attempted any fresh proofs of the certainty of knowledge. A species of intellectual anarchy and chaos seemed for a time to prevail: the more exact knowledge derived from the writings of the ancients contributing rather to increase than to still the commotion; till it ended in something like an universal *fermentation*, which slowly defæcated. An immense mass of unorganized knowledge and manifold views contended together, till the necessity came to be gradually felt of more systematic and better-founded inquiries and knowledge; and to attain this end deeper and freer efforts were made, which became continually more effectual and more universal.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO OUR OWN TIMES.

A free and progressive spirit of inquiry into the principles, the laws, and limits of human knowledge; with attempts to systematise and combine them.

308. It was time that the human mind should assume confidence in itself, and, relying on its own powers, force its way through the deep labyrinth of knowledge. Many causes which we have already enumerated combined to stimulate its exertions; and among the most powerful were the desire of elucidating the grounds of Religious and Moral knowledge; and the wish to reconcile and associate the

Empiric and Rational systems. The philosophical systems of the Greeks continued to be examples of what might be effected, though they were no longer adhered to as models. The improvement in social habits, and the clearer views of moral duties, which Religion and established forms of Government had promoted, brought with them the necessity for a more perfect system of Ethics than was to be found in the theories of the Ancients; while the Scholastic system was found less and less capable of satisfying the demands of an increasing curiosity. The improvement effected in the mathematical sciences by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Torricelli, awakened a like enthusiasm among philosophers of another class, which the analogy subsisting between their pursuits tended to promote.

309. A want that appears to have been especially felt by the philosophic mind about this time, and which the Greeks had been unable to satisfy, was that of bringing the whole mass of human knowledge to systematic unity. Greater attention was bestowed on the questions of the Origin, the Truth, and the Certitude of Knowledge, especially as relates to the belief in God, Immortality, Free Will, Human Destiny, and the foundation and obligation of Morality. Hence arose systems differing in their consequence and in their principles, according as they admitted experience or reason as sources of knowledge. Scepticism, which had been resuscitated by the discordance of doctrines and the pretensions of the Dogmatists, became more cautious and deliberate, and confined its attacks chiefly to the sphere of false speculation.

Revelation became daily less regarded as a source of philosophical knowledge, and Reason gradually obtained the casting-vote; yet Supernaturalism was maintained by a strong party; and as soon as an exclusive system of Dialectics showed its head, Mysticism and Theosophy were sure to rise up against it. The most influential philosophers acknowledged the accord of Reason and Revelation; but positive Theology still arrogated to itself the right of summoning Reason before its own tribunal.

310. The following is a summary of the chief merits of that period. 1.—Philosophy began at length to obtain the right of occupying an independent field and domain of

human knowledge. 2.—The system of knowledge began to be better studied as a whole and in its branches. 3.—Philosophy began to be freer in its relations with Theology, though the latter still maintained the right of admonition and censure. 4.—Science daily gained in depth; it passed from the *material* to the *formal*, i. e., to the examination of knowledge in its nature and origin. The same path is followed by Scepticism. 5.—The Philosophic method was applied more carefully to establish systematic unity in knowledge; and attempts were made to find the art of introduction to philosophy (*Propädeutik*).

311. This period may be subdivided into two: the first extending to the end of the eighteenth century, and capable of being distinguished into smaller epochs by the names of the great men who illumined it; the efforts at knowledge then made being principally of a Dogmatic character. This period also embraces the parallel movement of Mysticism and Theosophy. The second part, from the last twenty years of the eighteenth century to our times, presents the attempt by which men tried, through the assistance of the critical method, to set up philosophical Reason in its proper independence, and, moreover, the systematic movements and efforts to which this struggle has given birth.

FIRST PERIOD.

FROM BACON TO KANT.

FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH.

Fresh and independent Essays of Reason, with a more profound and Systematical Spirit of investigation.

312. Two great spirits, Bacon and Descartes, determined the direction of the human mind for a long period; they respectively advocated Experience and Speculation as the secrets for deciphering philosophy. This new teaching originated first in Italy; but it only obtained a fair field in England, France, and Germany. Both parties sought to establish the nature of things on a sure foundation, and endeavoured to give currency and credit to their systems by the manifold nature, the oneness, and the completeness of their results. As, however, they neglected to lay firm foundations, owing to the rapid erection of this structure, they were not able to give them that degree of perfection which would secure them universal supremacy. The Reason fell into schisms, owing to the opposite tendencies to unscientific Empiricism, or to an exaggerated love of Demonstration, through the conflict existing between the interests of the Understanding and the Reason, between Common Sense and Speculation.

Philosophers had, previous to this time, a divided interest, either in favour of *theory* or *praxis*. Hence there resulted, of necessity, a onesidedness. It was, therefore, easy to find defects in the conflicting systems; and in these defects to find a confirmation of one's own system. The opponents on each side repeated the same game; and from these causes there originated struggles which resulted at last in a spiritless indifference to all peculiar philosophical researches.

313. Although the basis of philosophical Science had not been fundamentally and exhaustively examined, yet the philosophic spirit received continually additions to its power and elasticity. The particular *Scientific Sciences* made continual advances towards a greater perfection, and philosophy received the greatest extension through the application of its form to the whole province of human knowledge. The *Method* was, moreover, perfected, the language more developed, and a deeper and more penetrating research was diffused.

314. Practical philosophy was long neglected, because the aim of philosophers was principally directed to speculation. Thomas Aquinas (§ 266), together with his numerous commentators, the Casuists, and (among the Protestants) Aristotle, were long the leaders during this epoch. The Theologians sought zealously to appropriate to themselves the entire province of practical knowledge as their property, and to keep down all spirit of inquiry. A leading thought had been inherited from the Scholastic age, i. e., that God, *as Creator of the World, is the Ultimate Basis of all Legal Obligations* which spring either from subjective or objective motives and foundations in His Will.

This view, which is true in itself, found a support in the consideration attached to divine Revelation; and not only Theologians, but also theologizing philosophers, sought to develope and substantiate it in conformity with their individual points of view. Municipal Legislation,[1] which was the farthest removed from Theology, and the juristic relations of states and peoples, gradually occasioned examinations of these matters. The spirit of inquiry was gradually guided into the province of practical philosophy, through the effort of giving a firm hold to the ruling convictions by means of rational insight and a rational faith; and also, of confirming revealed religion by rational grounds. Hence a certain zeal was awakened for exploring the moral nature of man, and for uniting theoretic and practical philosophy.

[1] See Professor SAVIGNY's Works on Jurisprudence, and the Development of Municipal Institutions in Europe, especially his Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, 3 vols. 8vo. *Heidelb.* 1834.

ATTEMPTS TO GROUND PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCE ON EXPERIENCE.

I. *The Empirism of Bacon.*

MALLET'S Life of Bacon, prefixed to his Works.

RAWLAY, the same; and R. STEPHEN, Letters and Remains of Lord Chancellor Bacon, *Lond.* 1734, 4to.

For the services rendered by Bacon to Philosophy, see HEYDENREICH, in his translation of Cromaziano, vol. I, p. 306.

† SPRENGEL, Life of Bacon, in the (Halle) Biographia, vol. VIII, No. 1.

FEUERBACH, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, von Bacon bis Spinoza (1833), 1844, secc. 32—91.

315. *Francis Bacon*, lord Verulam, appeared in England as a reformer of Philosophy; a man of clear and penetrating judgment, great learning, great knowledge of the world and men, but of a character not free from reproach. He was born in London, A.D. 1561; attained the highest offices in the state, which he ultimately lost through his failings, and died 1626. In his youth he studied the Aristotelian system of the schools, and the Classics. The latter study, as well as the practical pursuits to which he presently devoted himself, taught him the poverty and insufficiency of the former. In his maturer age he applied himself to consider the means of reforming the Method of Philosophy, to which end he composed some works,[1] which by the new principles they developed had even greater influence over the fortunes of philosophy than if he had completed an entire system of his own.

316. Bacon chose a new path, altogether opposed to the beaten one: he wished to see the fabric of human knowledge built not on conceptions through conclusions, but on *Experience* or perception through *Induction*, a method which had already been imperfectly attempted by Telesius (§ 298).

[1] De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (Latin) 1603; (English), *Lond.* 1605.

His Works, *Amsterd.* 1662, 6 vols. 12mo., with a Life by W RAWLAY: *Lond.* 1740, fol. 4 vols. by MALLET: and 1765, 5 vols. 4to.

Novum Organum Scientiarum, *Lond.* 1620, fol.

F. BACON'S Neues Organ der Wissenschaften, aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen begleitet von ANT TH. BRUCK, *Leipz.*

Although his views may be said to be in some degree partial, yet he deserves the highest admiration and praise for his triumphant attacks on the School-philosophy; for having applied for information to Nature and Experience; for having referred the question of Final Causes to Metaphysics rather than Physics; for a clear development of certain notions in Psychology, e. g. that of the Association of Ideas, as also by his well-digested refutation of some of the superstitions of his age, and the composition of his *Organum*, in which he sets forth a new method of extending knowledge by means of Induction; and his systematic review of all sciences, with his determination of their position at that time, and suggestions for their improvement and extension, in his book, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*.[1] To show how far Bacon was from being a mere Empirist, it is sufficient to refer to his expressions relative to the science and object of Philosophy. Science, he says, is nothing more than the image of Truth, inasmuch as the Truth of Being (*esse*,) and the Truth of knowing, only differ as a direct ray of light does from a refracted one.[2] The object of Philosophy is threefold, God—Nature—Man. Nature presents itself to our understanding, as it were, by a *direct* ray of light, while God is revealed to us only by a reflected one.[3]

II. *Philosophical system of Campanella.*

THOMÆ CAMPANELLÆ De Libris propriis, et recta ratione studendi Syntagma (ed. GABR. NAUDÆUS), *Par.* 1642, 8vo.; *Amstel.* 1645; *Rotterd.* 1692, 4to. See also, CRENII Collectio Tractatuum de Philologiæ studiis, liberalis Doctrinæ Informatione et Educatione Literaria, *Lugd. Bat.* 1696, 4to.

ERN. SAL. CYPRIANI Vita et Philos. Thomæ Campanellæ, *Amstel.* 1705, 8vo.; ed. II, 1722, 8vo.

Consult *German Museum*, 1780, No. XII, p. 481; and SCHRÖCKH, Biogr. etc., tom. I, p. 281.

Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ, id est, Dissertationis de Natura Rerum Compendium secundum Vera Principia ex scriptis Th. Campanellæ præmissum (per TOB. ADAMI), *Francof.* 1617, 4to.

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[1] It is very likely that the works of Bacon suggested to J. Barclay his Treatise, called Icon Animorum, *Lond.* 1614, 8vo. We shall have occasion to speak of Cumberland and Hobbes presently.

[2] De Augm. Sc., I, col. 18. [3] Ibid. Sc. III, c. I.

† Doctrine of Campanella on Human Knowledge, with some Remarks on his Philosophical System, by FULLEBORN, Collect. Fasc. VI, p. 114.

We have already had occasion (§ 298) to mention one work of Campanella, to which we may add these:

De Sensu Rerum et Magia, *Francf.* 1620. Philosophiæ Rationalis et Realis partes V, *Paris.* 1638, 4to. Universalis Philosophiæ sive Metaphysicarum Rerum juxta propria Dogmata partes tres, *Paris.* 1638, fol. Atheismus Triumphatus, *Romæ,* 1631. fol. Ad Doctorem Gentium de Gentilismo non retinendo et de Prædestinatione et Gratia, *Paris.* 1636, 4to. Realis Philosophiæ Epilogisticæ partes IV: hoc est, De Rerum Natura, Hominum Moribus, Politica, cui Civitas Solis adjuncta est, Œconomica cum Adnotationibus Physiologicis a TOBIA ADAMO, nunc primum edita, *Francf. ad M.* 1623, 4to. Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ. Civitas Solis, *Ultraj.* 1643, 12mo.

Scelta d'alcune Poesie Filosofiche di SEPTIMANO SQUILLA, 1632, (sine loco).

317. The contemporary of Bacon, *Thomas Campanella,* (born at Stilo in Calabria, 1568), made a like attempt to deduce all knowledge from Nature and Experience. Endowed with admirable talents, and carefully brought up, he entered the order of Dominicans, and pursued his philosophical studies as a novice in the convent of Cosenza; but when, by his own reflections as well as in consequence of the objection of Telesius,[1] he was led to suspect the universal authority of Aristotle, he shook off the prejudices of his education, and endeavoured to satisfy his doubts by studying the remains of other ancient philosophers. But finding that these, as well as the remarks of Telesius himself, who attracted him by the freedom of his inquiries, were insufficient to set his mind completely at rest, he sought for philosophy by a path of his own. He admitted the existence of two sources, and only two, of all knowledge. *Revelation* and *Nature:* the first the source of *Theology,* the last of *Philosophy:* in other words, the Histories of God and of Mankind. Scepticism, with Campanella, was but a transitory state of the mind: he was too eager to supply its place by a dogmatic edifice of his own, without having cleared his way to it by previous preparation *(Propädeutik).* He had embraced too great a diversity of pursuits, and aspired to effect a reformation in every art and science, without

[1] Telesius was born at Cosenza, where he died, 1588.

having acquired a sufficient command of the necessary details. The adversities of his life contributed much to impede his progress as a philosophical reformer: for having been accused of disloyalty to the Spanish government, he was kept twenty-seven years in strict confinement; and when at last, in 1626, acquitted and set at liberty, he was obliged to remove for security to Paris, where he died in 1639.

318. Campanella had a clear and philosophical head, and extensive knowledge; with a genuine love of Truth; which last he asserted to be the proper foundation of all philosophy. He also proposed a new arrangement of the Sciences. His views were often just and clear respecting philosophizing as well as other matters, but his hasty and impatient spirit prevented his bringing them to perfection. His principal efforts were directed to the construction of a system of Metaphysics containing the principles of Theology, Natural History, and Morals. He looked upon the Metaphysics of Aristotle (so called) as nothing more than a sort of Logic, and a Vocabulary. Metaphysics is a *necessary* science, because our senses convey to us only that which is contingent and individual, without informing us as to the general relations of things and their real nature. Logic is not a science of that which is *real* and *necessary*—God and His creation; but an art of language adapted to philosophy (Phil. Rat. II, 2). The only avenue to knowledge is by the senses: Sensation and Emotion (*Empfindung*) are the sources of knowledge (*Sentire est Scire*). Consistently with this theory he resolved into Sensation all the operations of the mind. Sensation or Feeling is the perception of being affected or suffering: hence Memory is also Sensation, only under certain conditions. He also asserted that Thought itself is nothing but a combination of the results of Sensation; which combination itself is presented to us by means of Sense or Feeling.

319. The object which Campanella had most at heart was the completion of a system of Dogmatism, which might be successfully opposed to Scepticism; and of which he gave a sufficiently accurate outline in his Metaphysics (lib. I). He either replies to the causes of doubt assigned by the Sceptic School, or invalidates them, or their consequences. He

appeals to the natural desire of the reason to *know*, and to ascertain the truth of objects as they are. It is impossible even to deny the certainty of knowledge, without some ascertained principles of knowledge, which the Sceptic himself is compelled to refer to. He lays down certain incontestible principles of this kind drawn from universal notions. These inform us, That we are; and that we are possessed of power, knowledge, and will: That our power, knowledge, and will are limited: That because we have power, knowledge, and will, these faculties must have relation to a something external and foreign to themselves. Campanella did not advance beyond these first principles, because he was satisfied that the external world was a Revelation afforded by the Divine Being (*operando*), which, in act, when compared with the oral Revelation of God, afforded the only satisfactory means of being convinced of the truth.

320. The great Metaphysical problem is, to explain things and their existence. To solve this Campanella begins with the axiom, That things exist and are presented to us. These appearances must be either true or false; agreeably to the obvious rule that a thing must either be, or not be; and to the laws (*Primalitates*) of existence and non-existence. The *Primal laws* of existence are, Possibility or Power (*Potentia*); Knowledge or Science (*Sapientia*), and Attraction or Love (*Amor*). What can be—is: what is—must be. Every thing must possess sensation or emotion, and be the object of it or of cognition; otherwise it would not exist to us. Every thing has its principle of self-preservation, and abhors annihilation; without which it could not endure, nor energise, nor exist. The *Primal laws* of *non-existence* are Impossibility (*Impotentia*); Ignorance (*Insipientia*); and Aversion (*Odium metaphysicum*). The three objects of the Primal laws of existence are, Being, Truth, and Good, of which the outward token is Beauty. These principles conduct the argument up to the consideration of God; the highest Esse, or the highest Unity (Metaph. VII, 1, sqq.). Campanella then describes the attributes and operations of the Divine Unity: Necessity is the result of Power; Destiny, of Knowledge; and Harmony, of Love. He built his system of Cosmology on Theology,

as well as his theory of Pneumatology, Psychology, etc., in which he attempted to explain the nature and aim of things according to the views of the Neoplatonists and Cabbalists, as well as those of Telesius. He recognised in nature an Unity of Life (*Mundum esse Dei vivam statuam*); and deduced his system of Divine Justice and the laws of necessity and chance, from certain considerations on the connection between Necessity and Existence, and Non-existence and Accident. He maintained the Existence of an Incorporeal world, and of Spirits, which put in motion the stars. The Soul is a corporeal spirit, which can recognise its own nature to be subtile, warm, and light. From its fundamental attributes, its efforts after and instinct for felicity (unattainable in this life), he demonstrated its immortality.

In his *practical* system, which he grounded on his Ontology, he brought forward several new ideas. The Infinite Being is the Supreme Good, the object and end of all things. Religion has revealed Him to us; and points out the way by which we may pass from the sensible to the invisible world, and to the highest perfection. It consists in the obedience to God, the love of Him, and the contemplation of things earthly and divine. Some clear views are disclosed respecting Natural and Revealed religion, Internal and External, Innate and Acquired.

321. The object of Ethical, Economical, and Political Science is, according to Campanella, the world of human volition. The aspiration of ages, as well as the penetration of Science, point to the termination of all evils; but they can only cease in the Kingdom of God, which does not admit of divisions, but unites all nations and all forms of government under the sway of the Messiah. He drew a picture of an ideal human society in the Kingdom of God, in his work *Civitas Solis;* and he represented this ideal as the aim of the historical development of humanity, and as shortly to be attained. He was one of the first modern Socialists.

322. The system of Campanella is to be praised rather for its negative than its positive qualities. He displayed a genuine love of the true interests of Reason in the contest

he sustained with the Aristotelian System of the Schools, with Atheism, and the false politics of Machiavelli; as well as in the manner in which he asserted the right of the Reason to attempt fresh and untried paths of Science; and his effort to start from fixed fundamental principles bears witness to his philosophic spirit. But he has shown himself unable to solve the grand problem of philosophic knowledge, by the inadequacy of his principles, the want of coherence in his system, and the slender union that subsists between his own ideas and those he has associated with them of others. It ought not, however, to be forgotten, that he had the merit of having first distinctly shown the want of a solution, and attempted to effect the same, in the interests of Rational Knowledge and Theology.

(See his Treatise, De Gentilismo non retinendo).

III. *Modifications of the Ionic and Atomistic Schools.*

Basso, Berigard, Magnenus, Sennert, Gassendi.

323. When the Aristotelian system was laid aside as confessedly deficient, particularly with respect to Natural History, an attempt was made to revive the Ionic and Atomistic doctrines. After *Sebastian Basso's*[1] attack on the Physics of Aristotle (see Bibliography § 143) many others came forward to revive ancient doctrines or propose new ones. *Claude de Guillemert de Bérigard*[2] advanced a theory, on the Eclectic plan, borrowed partly from the Ionians, and partly from the Atomic philosophers, and maintained that it was conformable to the Christian system, while he opposed the Aristotelian hypothesis of an original Matter.[3] Another Frenchman, *Jean Chrysostôme Magnenus*,[4] recommended the system of Nature of Democritus, as affording

[1] About 1621.

[2] Or Beauregard; born at Moulins 1578; died at Padua 1667, or later.

[3] CIRCULI PISANI, seu de Veterum et Peripatetica Philosophia Dialogi, *Udin.* 1643—47, 4to. *Patav.* 1661.

[4] Born at Luxevil, and professor of Medicine at Pavia; the author of Democritus Reviviscens, sive Vita et Philosophia Democriti, *Ticini*, 1646, 12mo. *Lugd. Bat.* 1648; et *Hag. Com.* 1658, 12mo.

an adequate solution of natural phenomena. *Dav. Sennert*[1] also attempted to remodel Physics on the principles of Democritus.[2] He maintained that Form and Matter are independent of each other, and asserted that souls were created by the Divine Being out of nothing; which brought him into a dispute with *J. Freitag* (a professor at Gröningen), in which he was defended by his disciple *J. Sperling*. *Pietro Gassendi*,[3] styled by Gibbon "the most learned of the philosophers of his age, and the most philosophical of the learned," undertook to defend and review with impartiality the system of Epicurus,[4] which he asserted had not yet been done. He distinguished himself by his discoveries in Mathematics, Physics, and Philosophy, in all of which he displayed great judgment and learning; and was a redoubtable adversary of Aristotle,[5] Fludd,[6] and Descartes.[7] With a laudable love of truth, he drew a true picture of the life and character of Epicurus,[8] and illustrated his philosophy, without concealing the faults he had committed in respect

[1] Born at Breslau 1572; died 1637.

[2] DAN. SONNERTI Hypomnemata Physica de Rerum Naturalium Principiis, *Francof.* 1635–36, 12mo. Physica, *Viteb.* 1618, 8vo. Opera Omnia, *Venet.* 1641; *Lugd. Bat.* 1676, 6 vols. fol.

[3] Petrus Gassendus; born at Chartansier in Provence, 1592; died at Paris 1655.

[4] SAM. SORBERII Diss. de Vita et Moribus Petri Gassendi, prefixed to his Syntagma Philos. Epicuri.

† BERNIER, Abrégé de la Philosophie de Gassendi, *Paris*, 1678, 8vo. *Lugd. Bat.* 1684, 12mo.

BUGEREL, Vie de P. Gassendi, *Paris*, 1737, 12mo. See also Lettre Critique et Historique à l'auteur de la Vie de P. Gassendi, *ibid.* 1737, 12mo.

PETRI GASSENDI Opera Omnia, *Lugd.* 1658, 6 vols. fol., et *Flor.* 1727.

[5] Exercitationes Paradoxicæ adv. Aristoteleos, libb. I, *Gratianopl.* 1624, 8vo.; libb. II, *Hag. Com.* 1659, 4to.; (and the Answer of ENGELCKE); Censor Censura dignus; Philosophus Defensus, *Rostoch.* 1697. With Disput. adv. Gassendi, lib. I, Exercitationum V, *ibid.* 1699.

[6] Examen Philosophiæ ROB. FLUDDI.

[7] Dubitationes et Instantiæ adv. Cartesium.

[8] Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri cum refutationibus Dogmatum quæ contra Fidem Christianam ab eo asserta sunt; præfigitur SORBERII Dissert. de Vita et Moribus P. Gassendi, *Hag. Com.* 1655–59, 4to.; *Lond.* 1668, 12mo. *Amst.* 1684, 4to.

of Theology and the doctrine of Final Causes. He endeavoured to erect upon Epicurism a philosophical system of his own.[1] *Em. Maignan* (or *Maignanus*),[2] who attempted to revive the dreams of Empedocles, excited less attention.

IV. *Law of Nations of Grotius.*

324. But philosophy now began to extend her researches from External Nature to the questions of Civil Right. *Hugo Grotius* (properly *Hugo de Groot*,)[3] a distinguished Philologist, Theologist, Jurist, and Statesman, of great learning, and a clear and sound judgment, opened the way to a new study, that of International Law, by his celebrated work on the Rights of Peace and of War,[4] the first example of a philosophical statement of National Law. Some learned men had indeed prepared the way by similar labours, among others, *J. Oudendorp*,[5] *Nicolas Hemming*,[6] *Bened. Winkler*, and *Alb. Gentilis*.[7] The humane and exalted mind of Grotius was led to this undertaking by the Christian wish to diminish, if possible, the frequency and horrors of war. He took as the foundation of his argument the elements of Natural Right, and applied him immense erudition to show the universal assent paid by all nations to the notions of Right and Justice. His mode of proof was obviously a

[1] Syntagma Philosophicum, Oper. vol. I.

[2] Born 1601; died 1671.

MAIGNANI Cursus Philosophicus, *Tolosæ*, 1652, 4 vols., and *Lugd.* 1673, fol.

[3] Born at Delft 1583; died at Rostock 1645.

[3] Vita Hugonis Grotii, *Lugd. Bat.* 1704, 4to. (P. AMBR. LEHMANN), Grotii Manes ab iniquis Obtrectionibus vindicati, *Delft.* 1721; *Lips.* 1732, 8vo. Life of Grotius, by GASP. BRAND and ad. V. CATTENBURG. *Dordr.* 1727-32, 2 vols. fol. (Dutch).

† Vie de M. Hugo Grotius, par. M. de BURIGNY, *Paris*, 1752, 2 vols. 12mo.

† Hugo Grotius, his Life, etc. by H. LUDEN, *Berl.* 1807, 8vo.

[4] De Jure Belli et Pacis, *Paris.* 1625, 4to., cum Commentario W. VAN DER MUELEN et aliorum, *Amstelod.* 1696—1703, 3 vols. fol. Best edition, *Lausanne*, 1751, 4 vols. 4to. Grotius illustratus Op. H. et S. DE COCCEJI, *Wratislv.* 1745-52, 4 vols. fol.

[5] Born 1506; died 1567.

[6] Born at Laland 1513; died 1600.

[7] Born 1551, at Castello di San Genesio, in the March of Ancona, died 1611.

De Jure Belli libri tres, *Hanau.* 1589, 8vo.; *ibid.* 1612.

species of Induction, which he may have borrowed from his contemporary, Lord Bacon. Grotius is sometimes carried away, by the abundance of his learning, from the course of his argument, but nevertheless distinguished himself above any of his predecessors by his superiority to prejudice and prescription. He considers our notion of Right to be the result of a moral faculty, and derives its first principles from the *love of society (socialitas)*; hence the obligation of defending that society *(societatis custodia)*; and distinguishes between *natural Right and Law, (Dictamen rectæ rationis)*, and *positive (Jus voluntarium)*, whether of Divine or Human original; although he described it as identical with a *universal, Divine*, and *positive* law. He draws a distinction also between perfect and imperfect Right; between legal and moral obligation *(facultas, aptitudo moralis)*. Although Grotius did but lay open this rich mine of inquiry, we are indebted to him not only for having suggested the pursuit, but for having contributed towards it a valuable stock of materials. His work has formed an era in literature, and been the subject of numerous, and often contradictory, commentaries. *Selden*,[1] by his Natural Law of the Hebrews, which was followed up by *Zentgrave*[2] and *Alberti*,[3] authors of the Natural Law of Christianity,—pursued a totally different system, and derived Right from the conditions of a state of Innocence.

V. *Materialism of Hobbes.*

Thomæ Hobbes, Angli Malmesburiensis Vita (Auct. J. Aubery), *Carolopoli*, 1681, 12mo.

Fr. Casp. Hagemii Memoriæ Philosophorum, Oratorum, *Baruthii*. 1710, 8vo.

Rettwig, Epistola de Veritate Philosophiæ Hobbesianæ, *Brem.* 1695, 8vo.

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[1] Born at Salvington in Sussex, 1584; died 1654.

Jo. Seldeni De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Disciplinam Ebræorum libb. VII, *Lond.* 1640, fol. *Arg.* 1665, 4to.

[2] Born at Strasbourg 1643; died 1707.

Joach. Zentgravii De Jure Naturali juxta Disciplinam Christianorum libb. VIII, *Strasb.* 1678, 4to.

[3] Valent. Alberti, Compendium Juris Nat. Orthodoxæ Theologiæ conformatum, *Lipsæ*. 1676, 8vo.

325. The influence of Bacon's philosophy was, as might have been expected, especially felt in England. *Thomas Hobbes*, a friend of his, entered into some of his views, from which he deduced a system of Materialism. He was born in 1588, at Malmsbury. Like Bacon he had contracted from the study of the Classics a contempt for the philosophy of the Schools; and his travels and intimacy with his illustrious countryman, as well as with Gassendi and Galileo, had led him to think for himself. But the *practical direction* which he laboured to give to his speculations, had the effect of limiting them. When the civil wars broke out, he proclaimed himself by his writings a zealous advocate of unlimited monarchy, as the only security for public peace. He died 1679; having published several mathematical and philosophical Essays, which have drawn upon him the reproach of fondness for paradox, and the stigma of Atheism.

His works: Opera, *Amstelod.* 1668, 2 vols, 4to. Moral and Political Works, *Lond.* 1750, fol. Complete works, English and Latin, edited by Sir Wm. Molesworth, 16 vols. 8vo. 1839–45. Elementa Philosophica de Cive, *Par.* 1642, 4to.; *Amstel.* 1647, 12mo. Leviathan, sive de materia, forma et potestate Civitatis Ecclesiasticæ et Civilis (English, *Lond.* 1651, fol.), Lat. *Amstel.* 1668, 4to.; Appendix, *Amstel.* 1668, 4to. Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, *Lond.* 1650, 12mo. Elementorum Philosophiæ sectio prima de Corpore (English, *Lond.* 1656, 4to.), Lat. *Amstel.* 1668, 4to. De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law, Moral and Political, *Lond.* 1659, 12mo. Quæstiones de Libertate, Necessitate et Casu, contra Doctorem Bramhallum (English, *Lond.* 1656, 4to.) Hobbes's Tripos, in Three Discourses, *Lond.* 1684, 8vo. Behemoth, Philosophical Problems, etc. 1682.

326. Hobbes appears to have aimed, above all things, at freedom and a firm foundation in his speculations, and, rejecting everything hypothetical, (of all *qualitatum occultarum*) affected to confine himself to the comprehensible, or in other words, to the phenomena of Motion and Sensation. He defines philosophy to be the knowledge, through correct reasoning, of phenomena or appearances from the causes presented by them; or, vice versâ, the ascertaining of possible causes by means of known effects.[1] Philosophy embraces as an object every body that admits the representation of production and presenting the phenomena of

[1] De Corp. p. 2.

composition and decomposition. Taking the term *Body* in its widest extent, he divides its meaning into Natural and Political, and devotes to the consideration of the first his *Philosophia Naturalis*, comprehending the departments of Logic, Ontology, Metaphysics, Physics, etc.; and to that of the second his *Philosophia Civilis*, or *Polity*, comprehending Morals. All knowledge is derived from the senses: but our sensational representations are nothing more than appearances within us, the effect of external objects operating on the brain, or setting in motion the vital spirits. Thought is calculation (*computatio*), and implies addition and subtraction. Truth and Falsehood consist in the relations of the terms employed. We can become cognizant only of the Finite: the Infinite cannot even be imagined, much less known; the term does not convey any accurate knowledge, but belongs to a Being whom we can know only by means of Faith. Consequently, religious doctrines do not come within the compass of philosophical discussion, but are determinable by the laws of Religion itself. All, therefore, that Hobbes has left free to the contemplation of philosophy is the knowledge of our natural bodies (somatology), of the mind (psychology), and polity. His whole theory has reference to the External and Objective, inasmuch as he derives all our emotions from the movements of the body, and describes the soul itself as something corporeal, though of extreme tenuity. Instead of a system of pure metaphysics, he has thus presented us with a psychology, deficient, it is true, in general depth; but which with some narrow and limited doctrines, contains occasionally others more enlightened and correct.

327. His *practical* philosophy, however, attracted more attention than his speculative. In this, also, Hobbes pursued an independent course, and altogether departed from the line of the Schoolmen. His grand object was to ascertain the most durable posture the Body Politic could assume, and to define Public Right. An ideal form of government and state of morals had been imagined by *Plato* in his Republic, by *Sir Thomas More*[1] in his Utopia,[2]

[1] Born at London, 1420; beheaded 1535.
[2] *Basil*, 1558; besides many other editions.

by *Campanella* in his Civitas Solis,[1] and by *Harrington*[2] in his Oceana.[3]* Hobbes, on the contrary, assumes the existence of a notion of Natural Right, which he deduces from the assumption of a state of nature empirically represented.[4] Agreeably to the lowest law of nature, manaims at the injury of his neighbour. Yet every one grasps, by a natural instinct, at everything which can contribute to his own well-being, and shuns everything that can cause the contrary. Self-preservation is the highest object of his pursuit, just as death is of his avoidance. All that tends to this end, and to the removal of pain, is conformable to reason, and therefore lawful. Right is the liberty of employing our natural powers agreeably to reason.‡ Man has therefore the right of self-preservation and self-defence; and consequently of using the means to this end: and he is himself the judge and arbiter of these means; hence also he has a *Right to all things*. But the consequence of these rights, in a state of nature, must be an universal war of all with all; who must be perpetually brought into opposition with one another, to the destruction of all repose and security, and even of the power of self-preservation. Self-love, therefore, (or Reason), or Natural Law, ordain peace, and produce a new state of things, under the form of a civil compact (*status civilis*), in which a portion of the individual liberty of each is resigned by him, and intrusted to one or more. With this epoch commences that of external, obligatory Right. Absolute power on the part of the government, and implicit submission on the part of the governed, are necessary to the well-being of a state; and the best of all forms of government is therefore the monarchical. The laws of a Christian state are not contrary to the laws of God.

[1] See above, bibliography of § 317. [2] Born at Upton, 1677.
[3] *Lond.* 1656. With his works, 1700 and 1737.
* All these writers belong to the brotherhood of Socialists.—Ed.
[4] In his treatise De Cive.
‡ A somewhat analogous view of Ethics and Deontology has been advanced in modern times by Charles Fourier. His axiom was: "*Les attractions sont proportionées aux destinées.*" Fourier differed widely however from Hobbes in the conclusion he draws from his axiom. With the former the full swing of liberty gives birth to harmony; with Hobbes, to discord.—Ed.

Self-love is the fundamental law of Nature, and Utility its End: the law of Nature prescribing Peace, is also the law of Morals (*lex moralis*). Hobbes referred to the Bible for confirmation of his consequently deduced Theory of the State.

His success was not great, and the little which he had was principally among foreigners. Of the number of his impartial judges, was the Dutchman *Lambert Velthuysen*:[1] and of his adversaries, *Richard Cumberland*[2] and *Robert Scharrock*.[3]

VI. *Lord Herbert of Cherbury.*

328. Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury,[4] who had especially in view the philosophy of religion, followed a course exactly the reverse of that pursued by Hobbes. He defended the notion of innate cognitions, and derived our knowledge, not from the understanding nor the senses, but from a certain *instinctive reason*[5] to which he made the former subordinate. Instead of tracing our acquaintance with religion (according to his ideas of it) to historical tradition, as Hobbes had done, he derived it from an original immediate knowledge afforded to all mankind. Agreeably to these views, he pursued his researches more in an idealistic Rational than in an Empirical direction, and he dived deeper, particularly with respect to the nature of Truth; on which subject he published a separate work.[6] He described the soul not as a *tabula rasa*, but as a *closed book*, which opens only when Nature bids it. It contains in itself general truths (*communes notitiæ*); which are common to all men; and ought to remove doubts and differences in philosophy and theology. He maintained the existence of a Religion of Reason, and claimed the right to

[1] LAMBERTI VELTHUYSEN de Principiis Justi et Decori, Dissertatio Epistolica, continens Apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbesii de Cive, *Amstelod.* 1651, 12mo.

[2] To be mentioned afterwards.

[3] De Officiis secundum Jus Naturale, *Oxon.* 1660, 8vo.

[4] Born 1581; died 1648.

[5] *Naturalis instinctus.*

[6] Tractatus de Veritate prout distinguitur a Revelatione, a Verisimili, a Possibili, et a Falso, *Lut. Paris.* 1624 et 1633; *Lond.* 1645, 4to.; 1656, 12mo. (With the Essay De Causis Errorum). De Religione Gentilium, Errorumque apud eos Causis, *Lond.* 1645, 8vo. Part I, completed 1663, 4to., and 1670, 8vo.

examine and all verify pretensions to revelation.[1] The obscurity of his own thoughts and expressions, and the dominion at that time enjoyed by the Empirical system of philosophy, caused him to be but little noticed in his day. He was, however, attacked by Divines, as a Naturalist and as an enemy to Christianity.

VII. *Mystical Naturalists and Theosophists of this period.*

FEUERBACH, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon bis Spinoza (1833) 1844, § 150–214.

CARRIERE, Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit, 1847, § 609—725.

HAMBERGER, Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen Jacob Böhme, 1844.

BAUR, Die christliche Gnosis, 1835, § 557–611.

329. *J. Baptist van Helmont*[2] about this time united a study of the phenomena of Nature to a degree of mysticism. He had been taught at Louvain the meagreness of the Scholastic system, by the Jesuit Martin del Rio; and had imbibed from the study of Kempis, Tauler (§ 277), and Paracelsus, a degree of enthusiasm which he carried into his art, that of medicine. With many fanciful notions of his own, he nevertheless detected errors in others, and started several good ideas. In order to effect by means of Alchemy and Philosophy a reformation in his own art, he sought a Philosophy over the *Universum*. With such a design, he attached himself principally to the doctrines of Paracelsus, and derived all knowledge from direct and immediate illumination of the Reason, by God. He maintained that all Nature is animated; but, at the same time, asserted that neither things nor their operating causes partake of the Divine Nature, which is incommunicable. All corporeal beings are replete with spirits (*Archei*), which by means of air and water, the only true elements, and their mutual fermentation, produce every thing else. Such were the principles of his spiritual Physiology.[3] His son *Fr. Mer-*

[1] De Veritate, p. 265, sqq.; 282, sqq.

[2] Born at Brussels, 1577; died at Vilvoorde, near Brussels, 1644.

[3] † J. J. Loos, J. Baptista van Helmont, *Heidelberg.* 1807, 8vo.

curius van Helmont,[1] endeavoured to enlarge the "Holy Art," (Theosophy); and by a new division of its nature and its relation to Unity, sought to compose a system which combined, in an original manner, the doctrines of the Platonists and Cabbalists with those of Christianity. He taught especially the theory of an universal Sympathy of all things,* a transition of the soul and of the body, and of the body to the soul, asserting that they differed not in essence but in form, and stood in the relation of Male and Female, and therefore are present in all visible forms. To this he added a sort of Metempsychosis, combined with a belief in the necessity of a future judgment after death.[2] *Marcus Marci von Kronland*[3] set forth a system of Cosmology of his own, in which he blended the Ideas of Plato with the Forms of Aristotle, and endeavoured to destroy the *qualitates occultæ* of the Schoolmen to make way for his *ideæ seminales*, which he affected to consider more intelligible. *Ideas* are the powers of Nature which, with the aid of light, create and form all things. Nay, the very constellations operate on the sublunary world by means of light, and by the agency of the Ideas.[4]

330. In England, the enthusiastic system of Paracelsus found a patron in the learned physician *Robert Fludd*,[5] who

See also B. ab Helmont. Opera, *Amstel.* 1648, 4to.; and *Francf.* 1659, 3 vols. fol.

[1] Born 1618: spent his life in travelling in Germany and England; and died 1699.

* It is now well established that J. B. Van Helmont, as well as the Ancients, anticipated Mesmer in the discovery of the power of Animal Magnetism. See Van Helmont's admirable Dissertation, and his Mentis Imago; and also Colquhoun's Hist. of Magic.—Ed.

[2] Paradoxical Discourses, *Lond.* 1690. Seder Olam, sive Ordo Sæculorum, hoc est historica enarratio Doctrinæ Philosophicæ per unum in quo sunt omnia, 1693, 12mo.

[3] Died 1676.

[4] Joh. Mac. Marci a Kronland, Idearum Operatricium Idea sive Delectio et Hypothesis illius Occultæ Virtutis, quæ Semina fœcunda et ex iisdem Corpora Organica producit, *Prag.* 1635, 4to. Philosophia Vetus restituta, in qua de mutationibus quæ in Universo sunt, de Partium Universi Constitutione, de Statu Hominis secundum Naturam et præter Naturam, et de Curatione Morborum, etc. libb. V. *Prag.* 1662, 4to.

[5] Robert Fludd, or De Fluctibus, born at Milgate in Kent, 1574·

sought to ally it to the Mosaic history of the creation.[1] He was answered by *Gassendi*. In Germany a like theosophic enthusiasm excited the pious and truth-loving temper of the shoemaker of Görlitz, *Jacob Böhm*,[2] who, with a mind highly moved by the study of the Scriptures, to which he added the natural philosophy of Paracelsus and his contemporaries, with a peculiar depth of spirituality, although in a rude unscientific manner and a barbarous style (partly composed of the terms of Chemistry then in use), gave vent to deep philosophical truths, intermingled with singular and extravagant dreams respecting the Deity and the origin of all things. He delivered these as Divine Revelations, and wrote in his native language, whence his appellation of *Philosophus Teutonicus*. A considerable analogy may be traced between Swedenborg and Böhm, but the former never borrowed from the latter. They approximate naturally in the depth and volume of their spirituality and their giant sweep of thought. Böhm's mysticism gained disciples in Germany, and even abroad, being adopted in France by *Poiret*, and in England by *H. More* and *John Pordage*, a clergyman and physician, who even wrote a commentary on him. Of all these hereafter. In more recent times, *St. Martin* has given, as it were, a new and able version of this species of Theosophy.

331. Böhm and Fludd had endeavoured to find authority in the Bible for the extravagancies of their fanciful speculations. A Mosaic philosophy is so naturally connected with the character of the Cabbala and of Theosophy, that we ought not to be surprised at its diffusion. The like attempt was made by others, particularly by *Jo. Amos Comenius*,[3] who in his *Synopsis Physices ad lumen Divinum reformatæ*,[4]

died 1637. His works are numerous, and form 6 vols. fol. The most complete list of them is given by EBERT, Bibliogr. Dict. 4to. *Lips.* 1821–30.

[1] Historia Macro- et Microcosmi, Metaphysica, Physica, et Technica, *Oppenh.* 1717. Philosophia Mosaica, *Gudæ*, 1638.

[2] Born at Alt-Seidenberg, near Görlitz, 1575; died 1624.

† Jacob Böhm: a Biographical Essay, *Dresden*, 1802, 8vo.

† Works of J. Böhm. *Amsterd.* 1620, 4 vols. 8vo. etc.; 1730, 10 vols. 8vo. Selections from his Works, *Amst.* 1718; *Francf.* 1801, 8vo. Translated from the Dutch and English.

[3] Of the village of Comna, near Prerau in Moravia; born 1592, died at Amsterdam 1671.

[4] *Lips.* 1632, 8vo.; 1663, 8vo.

detailed more clearly the opinions of Fludd and others. He supposes three elementary principles of all things; Matter, Spirit, and Light. The first is the corporeal essence, the second is subtile, self-existing, invisible, imperceptible, dispensed by the Divine Being to all living creatures, to animate and possess them. Light is the plastic spirit; an intermediate essence, which penetrates matter and prepares it for the admission and reception of spirit, investing it at the same time with a form. He has also originated some remarkable ideas on philanthropy, in which he followed Val. Andreæ.[1] *J. Baier*,[2] the successor of Comenius, and some others, have bequeathed works to the same effect.*

VIII. *Sceptics.*

332. Scepticism was revived in a complete form by *Fr. Sanchez* (Franc. Sanctius), a Portuguese,[3] who taught medicine and philosophy at Toulouse with considerable reputation, up to the time of his death, which happened in 1632. He was obliged by his office to teach the Aristotelian system, and not venturing openly to controvert it, assailed it under cover of his Scepticism; and having proved by means of arguments already brought forward, but to which his lively manner imparted an air of novelty, the uncertainty of all human knowledge, he undertook to give in another work a method of his own for attaining to certainty. This promised work, however, never made its appearance. *François de la Mothe le Vayer*,[4] an author of great learning, talent, and

[1] See several articles in the *Tageblatt des Menschheitlebens*, published by CH. CHRIST. FR. CRAUSE, 1811, No. XVIII, sqq., on a work of Comenius, entitled, General Observations on the Improvement of Human Nature, etc., *Halle*, 1702. [2] About 1606.

* There appears no doubt that the facts and phenomena of Animal Magnetism were familiar to a large school of writers of this age, including Paracelsus, Van Helmont, Fludd, Ficinus, Mirandola, and Maxwell, the author of *Medicina Magnetica*. See Colquhoun's Hist. of Magic, Witchcraft, and Animal Magnetism, Vol. II.—ED.

[3] Born 1562, at Bracara in Portugal.

Francisci Sanchez Tractatus de multum Nobili et Prima Universali Scientia quod nihil scitur, *Lond.* 1581, 4to et 12mo.; *Francf.* 1618, 8vo, with the remarks of DAN. HARTNACH, entitled, Sanchez aliquid sciens, *Stettin.* 1665, 12mo. Tractatus Philosophici, *Rotterd.* 1649, 21mo. [4] Born at Paris 1586; died 1672.

judgment, enlarged upon the grounds of Scepticism, with a special reference to Religion. He denied the existence of all rational principles of religion, in consequence of the diversities of belief that have always prevailed, and maintained that Reason in theology must give place to Faith, a superior faculty, and conferred immediately by Divine Grace. He represented life as a miserable farce, and virtue as almost a dream.

RATIONALISM OF DESCARTES, AND THE SYSTEMS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE.

I. *Descartes.*

Baillet, La Vie de R. Descartes, *Par.* 1690, 4to; abrégée, *Paris*, 1693, 12mo.

God. Guil. Leibnitii Notata circa Vitam et Doctrinam Cartesii, in Thomasii Historia Sapientiæ et Stultitiæ, tom. II, p. 133, and in the 3rd vol. Epistolarum Leibnitii ad Diversos, p. 388.

Réflexions d'un Académician sur la Vie de Descartes, envoyées à un Ami en Hollande, *La Haye*, 1692, 12mo.

Eloge de René Descartes, par Gaillard, *Paris*, 1765, 8vo; par Thomas, *Paris*, 1761, 8vo; par Mercier, *Genève et Paris*, 1765, 8vo.

Joh. Tepelii Historia Philosophicæ Cartesianæ, *Norimb.* 1672, 12mo. De Vita et Philos. Cartesii, *ibid.* 1674.

Recueil de quelques Pièces curieuses concernant la Philosophie de M. Descartes (par Bayle), *Amsterd.* 1684, 12mo.

Petri Dan. Huetii Censura Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, *Paris.* 1689, 12mo. Philosophiæ Cartesianæ adversus censuram Pet. Dan. Huetii Vindicatio, aut D. A. P. (Augusto Petermann), *Lips.* 1690, 4to. Réponse au Livre qui a pour titre: P. Dan. Huetii Censura, etc.; par P. Silvain Regis, *Par.* 1692, 12mo. Huet answered by his (anonymous) Nouveaux Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Cartésianisme; par M. G. *Paris*, 1692, 12mo.

Admiranda Methodus Novæ Philosophiæ Renati Descartes, *Ultraj.* 1643, 12mo.

Balth. Bekkeri De Philosophia Cartesii Admonitio candida et sincera, *Wesel.* 1668, 12mo.

Ant. le Grand, Apologia pro Cartesio, contra Sam. Parkerum, *Lond.* 1672. 4to; *Norimb.* 1681, 8vo.

P. de Villemandy. See § 139.

Cinq Dialogues faits à l'Imitation des Anciens, par Horatius Tubero (par Francois de la Mothe le Vayer), *Mons*, 1671, 12mo; 1673, 8vo. and an Answer by M. Nahle, *Berl.* 1744, 8vo. Œuvres, *Paris*, 1654 et 1667—1684, 4 vols. fol.

Hock, Cartesius und seine Gegner, 1835.
Jacobi, Ueber Descartes Leben und seine Methode, 1846.
Schaarschmidt, Descartes und Spinoza, 1850.

333. *René Descartes* (*Cartesius*), was born 1596, at La Haye, in Touraine, and attempted a reformation in the philosophy of his country by a method opposed to the Empirical, on the principles of pure Rationalism. His system was favourable to independent research, and met with equally violent opponents and partisans, attracting, as it did, universal attention. In the school of the Jesuits at La Flèche he early distinguished himself by his lively fancy and his love of knowledge. Fired with this passion, and eager to satisfy it by study, he devoured without a plan a multitude of books, which working upon his own ardent temper, left him more uncertain than he was at first; his subsequent travels, instead of curing, contributing to increase the malady. Presently his adventurous spirit conceived the plan of erecting a philosophy of his own, no part of which should be borrowed from others. With this view he repaired to Holland, where he trusted to find leisure and freedom, and where he composed the greater part of his works.[1] He presently attracted great attention, became involved in controversies, especially with theologians, and after maintaining an extensive and learned correspondence, was invited into Sweden by Queen Christina, and died there shortly after, in 1650.

His works: Opera, *Amstelod.* 1692-1701, 9 vols. 4to. Opera Philosophica, *Francf. ad M.* 1692, 4to. Principia Philosophiæ, *Amstel.* 1644-1656, 4to. Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, etc., *ibid.* 1641, 4to. Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire la Raison et chercher le Vérité dans les Sciences. Plus, la Dioptrique, les Météores, et la Géométrie, etc. *Par.* 1637, 4to.; a Latin translation (by Courcelles) revised by Descartes, 1644. Specimina Philosophiæ, seu Dissertatio de Methodo, Dioptrice, etc. *Amstel.* 1656, 4to. Meditationes. Tractatus de Passionibus Animæ, *ibid.* 1656, 4to. Tractatus de Homine et de Formatione Fœtûs, cum notis Lud. de la Forge, *ibid.* 1677, 4to. Epistolæ (translated), *ibid.* 1688, 4to.

334. Descartes was not merely a metaphysical philosopher; he was distinguished as a mathematician, an astronomer, and a natural philosopher. His very reputation and

[1] Between 1629 and 1649.

success as a philosopher, was in a great measure owing to the services he conferred on those sciences. His object was to constitute philosophy a demonstrable science: but he rushed too eagerly from the state of doubt, which he considered a necessary preparation for all knowledge, to knowledge itself. He begins with the empirical Self-Consciousness or Thought, as that which is immediately certain: and from this concludes the existence of the thinking substance—(*Cogito: ergo Sum*)—of the soul; which thus distinguishes itself from material substances, and consequently is independent of them. Its essence consists in *thought*, and is on that account more easy to be recognised than that of the body. Clearness and distinctness he regarded as the criteria of truth. The soul does not think all subjects with equal distinctness, which proves its nature to be imperfect and finite. It possesses, nevertheless, in itself, the idea of an Absolute, Perfect Being, or Spirit; the first and necessary attribute of whom is existence;[1] and as such an idea cannot be derived from the Imperfect Soul, it must flow from the Perfect Being to whom it relates, and consequently must be innate. On this cognition of the existence of an All-perfect Being, the evidence and certainty of all knowledge is grounded; on the principle that the Divine Being will not suffer us to fall into error while lawfully employing the faculties for knowledge bestowed by Him. The essence of the body consists in extension. The body and the thinking essence (the body, that is, and the soul) are essentially opposed to each other.

335. God, as the Infinite Being, is the author of the

[1] Sam. Werenfels, Judicium de Argumento Cartesii pro Existentia Dei petito, et ejus Idea; in his Dissertatt. var. Argument. Pars. II; and, on the other side, Jacquelot. Examen d'un Ecrit qui a pour titre, Judicium de Argumento, etc. Many articles on the subject appeared in the Journal des Savans, 1701; the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, 1700, 1701, and the Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, 1701, 1702, et 1703.

Andr. Richter, Diss. (resp. Jo. Foubin) de Religione Cartesii, *Gryphis*. 1705, 4to.

Chr. Breithaupt, Dissert. De Cartesii Theologia Naturali et Erroribus ea commissis, *Helmstad.* 1735, 4to.

Lud. Fr. Ancillon, Judicium de Judiciis circa Argumentum pro Existentia Dei ad nostra usque tempora latis, *Berol.* 1792, 8vo.

universe, which is infinite; but the material and thinking substances of which it is composed are imperfect and finite. The assistance or co-operation of the Divinity *(assistentia sive concursus)* is necessary to the very preservation and maintenance of these.[1] Descartes did not distinguish between Matter and Space, and consequently found no difficulties to oppose the application of his theory of *vortices* (which he described as deriving their immediate impulse from God), to account for the physical frame-work of the world.

The Soul, whose nature consists in Thought, he asserted to be simple in its nature, or in other words, purely *immaterial* (spiritualism of Descartes), but intimately connected with the body. The pineal gland may be supposed to be its seat, because it there appears to energise in immediate connection with the vital spirits. From the immateriality of the soul he deduced its immortality; and, lest he should be obliged by his argument to extend the same properties to other animals, he pronounced these to be *living machines*. The soul is free, because it thinks itself so; and in its freedom consists its liability to error. He drew a distinction amongst representations (*cogitationes*) between the passive impressions and the active decisions (*passiones et actiones*) of the soul. The operations of the Will, the Imagination, and Thought, belong in their basis to the latter class. He constituted three classes of Ideas, those which we acquire, those which we create, and those which are born with us. The first are derived from external objects, by means of impressions communicated to our organs. Vital warmth and motion do not proceed from the Soul, but from the Animal Spirits. He accounts for the communion existing between the Soul and Body by his doctrine of *assistentia*. The Soul determines the direction of the Vital Spirits.

336. Notwithstanding the confusion Descartes made between thinking and cognition,—the want of solidity in his principles, and of conclusiveness in his inferences, as well as the many contradictions they imply, which would have become more apparent to himself if he had treated of practical philosophy also,—we cannot shut our eyes to the great

[1] This doctrine was converted by GEULINX and others into one of *Occasionalism*. See § 328.

effect produced by his philosophy. His discussions awakened men to independent thought, both by their matter and their manner,—the form as well as the substance of his doctrines, no less than by their bold and striking character. Men were impelled to investigate the theory of Thought and Knowledge, and the differences which exist between them; efforts were made to decide the controversy between Empiricism and Speculative philosophy, between Rationalism and Supernaturalism; at the same time that he gave the last blow to the Scholastic system, and introduced into the philosophical world a new life and energy, animating to the pursuit of Truth and the detection of Error. His doctrines presently attracted the notice of a great number of distinguished thinkers. In *Hobbes*, *Gassendi*,[1] *P. Dan. Huet*,[2] *Gabr. Daniel*,[3] etc., he encountered able adversaries, who subjected his leading principles to a severe, but at the same time calm and philosophical examination; but he was attacked in a more intemperate manner by several schoolmen and theologians, such as *Gisbert Voetius*,[4] *Martin Schoock*[5] the Eclectic, *Cyriac Lentullus* the Jesuit, *Valois*, and others, who taxed him with Scepticism and Atheism. A number of talented persons were formed in his school, or attached themselves to his system; and in spite of the interdictions levelled against it in Holland by the Synod of Dort (1656), and also in Italy (1663), it gained ground in the Netherlands and France. In England, Italy, and Germany, it made less progress, though it produced an effect on all departments of Moral Philosophy, Logic, Metaphysics, and Morals,[6] nay, even on Theology.[7]

[1] Ger. de Vries, Dissertatiuncula Historico-Philosophica de Renati Cartesii Meditationibus a Gassendo impugnatis, *Ultraj.* 1691, 8vo.

[2] Censura, etc. (see bibliography § 333). This works called forth several answers.

[3] See his Romance: Voyage du Monde de Descartes, *Paris*, 1691, 12mo. Iter per Mundum Cartesii, *Amstelod.* 1694, 12mo. Nouvelles Difficultés proposées par un Péripateticien, *Amst.* 1694, 12mo. Idem (en Lat.) Novæ Difficultates, etc. *ibid.*

[4] Born at Heusden 1581; died 1676.

[5] Born at Utrecht, 1614; died 1665. See bibl. 324.

[6] L'Art de Vivre Heureux, *Paris*, 1692, 8vo. In Lat.: Ethica Cartesiana, sive ars Bene Beateque Vivendi, *Hal.* 1776, 8vo.

[7] Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres (by L. Meyer, a physician and

337. Among the partisans of the philosophy of Descartes we may specify his friend *De la Forge*,[1] a physician at Saumur; *Claude de Clerselier* (died 1686), the editor of his posthumous works; *Jacques Rohault* (died 1675); *Pierre Sylvain Regis*,[2] a pupil of the latter, and an able commentator on Descartes; with many Jansenists of the Port Royal,[3] who opposed a more rigid morality to the doctrines of the Jesuits. Among these were *Ant. Arnauld*,[4] *Blaise Pascal*,[5] *Nicole*,[6] and also *Father Malebranche* (see § 341), *Antoine le Grand*,[7] a physician at Douai, *J. Clauberg*,[8]

friend of Spinoza), *Eleutheropoli*, 1666, 4to. third edition by SEMLER, *Hal.* 1776, 8vo.

VALENTINI ALBERTI Tractatus de Cartesianismo et Coccejanismo, *Lips.* 1678, 4to. *Viteb.* 1701, 4to.

[1] L. DE LA FORGE, Traité de l'Esprit de l'Homme, *Paris*, 1664, 4to. In Lat.: Tractatus de Mente Humana, ejus Facultatibus et Functionibus, *Amstelod.* 1669; *Brem.* 1673, 4to,; *Amst.* 1708, 8vo.

[2] Born 1632; died 1707.

P. SYLVAIN REGIS, Système de la Philosophie, contenant la Logique, la Métaphysique, la Physique, et la Morale, *Paris*, 1690, 3 vols. 4to. Réponse aux Réflexions Critiques de M. DUHAMEL sur le Système Cartésien de la Philosophie de M. Regis, *Paris*, 1692, 12mo. see Bibl. of § 333. L'Accord de la Foi et de la Raison, *Paris*, 1734, 4to.

[3] Among other distinguished works, this society has produced l'Art de Penser, *Paris*, 1664, 12mo. Translated into Lat. by J. C. BRAUN, with a preface of FR. BUDDEUS. *Hal.* 1704, 8vo. (This treatise has been sometimes improperly ascribed to ARNAULD).

See Sir J. STEPHEN'S Article on the Port-Royal party, in vol. I of his Ecclesiastical Biography (previously published in the Edinburgh Review).

[4] Born 1623; died 1694. His works, *Lausanne*, 1777, 30 vols. 4to.

[5] Born at Clermont 1623; died 1662 (§ 341).

PASCAL, Pensées sur la Religion, *Amst.* 1697, 12mo. *Paris*, 1720, 12mo. Lettres écrites par Louis de Montalte [PASCAL] à un Provincial de ses Amis, avec Notes de Guill. Wendrock [NICOLE], *Cologne*, 1657, 12mo, et 1648, 8vo.; *Leyde*, 1771, 4 vols. 12mo. Translated into Lat. by NICOLE.

[6] Died 1695. Essais de Morale, *Paris*, 1671, 6 vols. 12mo. Instructions Théologiques et Morales, *Paris*, 1709, 12mo. Œuvres, *Paris*, 1718, 24 vols. 12mo.

[7] ANT. LE GRAND, Philosophia Veterum e mente Renati Descartes, *Lond.* 1671, 12mo. Institutio Philosophiæ secundum Principia Renati Descartes Novo Methodo adornata, *Lond.* 1672, 8vo.; 1678, 4to. Dissertatio de Carentia Sensus et Cognitionis in Brutis, *Norimb.* 1679, 8vo.

[8] Professor at Duisburg; born at Chartres 1625; died 1665.

Adrian Heerebord, and more particularly *Arnold Geulinx* of Antwerp.[1] From the principles of Descartes, the last derived the doctrine of Occasional Causes (*Systema causarum occasionalium—Occasionalismus*), which supposed the Deity to be the actual cause of the motions of the body and affections of the mind, the soul and the limbs merely affording the means of their development. This notion was extended and explained by *Balthazar Becker*, *Volder*, *Malebranche*, and *Spinoza*. Geulinx added to this strange doctrine a purer system of morality, and maintained that the main defect of ancient and modern systems of Ethics was the encouragement afforded by them to Self-love; and made Virtue to consist in a pure love of and devotion to the injunctions of practical Reason (*amor effectionis non affectionis*); or, in other words, in obedience to God and to Reason, for the sake of Reason itself. The characteristics of Reason thus contemplated he pronounced to be attention (*diligentia*), docility (*obedientia*), conformity to moral obligations (*justitia*), and a disregard of all other goods (*humilitas*). Though his ideas on Morals were often admirable for their truth and refinement, they did not meet with much success; partly because they were entangled with his doctrine of Occasionalism; and partly because the foundations on which they should rest were not perfectly established; added to which they prescribe nothing but a blind submission to the Divine will, to such a degree as almost to take away the free exercise of Reason. *Balthazar Becker*,[2]

JOH. CLAUBERGII Opera Philosophica, *Amstelod.* 1691, 4to. Logica Vetus et Nova. Ontosophia, de Cognitione Dei et Nostri, *Duisb.* 1656, 8vo. Initiatio Philosophi, seu Dubitatio Cartesiana, 1655; *Mulh.* 1667, 12mo.

[1] Born at Antwerp about 1625; died 1669.

ARNOLDI GEULINX, Logica Fundamentis suis, a quibus hactenus collapsa fuerat, restituta, *Lugd. Bat.* 1662, 12mo.; *Amstelod.* 1698, 12mo. Metaphysica Vera et ad mentem Peripateticorum, *Amstelod.* 1691, 12mo. Γνῶθι σεαυτόν, sive Ethica, *Amstel.* 1665, *Lugd. Bat.* 1675, 12mo. ed. PHILARETHUS, *Amstel.* 1696, 12mo.; 1709, 8vo. Annotata præcurrentia ad R. Cartesii Principia, *Dordraci*, 1690, 4to. Annotata Majora ad Principia Philosophiæ R. Descartes; accedunt Opuscula Philosophica ejusdem auctoris, *Dordraci*, 1691, 4to.

[2] Born in West Friesland, 1634; died 1698.

Besides the work of his already mentioned (bibliography § 331); he wrote the *Betoverte Wereld*, or Enchanted World (Dutch), *Leuwarden*,

taking for his ground the doctrines of Occasionalism and the Spiritualism of Descartes, denied that men were capable of being influenced by the agency of Spirits; and in particular attacked the opinions then prevalent in favour of sorcery and witchcraft; which cost him his employment. On the other hand *Pierre Poiret*,[1] at first a Cartesian, then a Mystic, tried to deduce from the principles of Descartes a proof of the immediate agency of God and of spiritual beings on the mind of man.* Several theologians and philosophers endeavoured to reconcile the Cartesian system to Revealed Religion, and defended or explained it in writings partly didactic and partly polemical. Among others may be enumerated *J. Coccejus*,[2] *Christopher Wittich*,[3] *Gerard de Vries*,[4] *Hermann Alex. Roëll*,[5] and *Ruard Andala*.[6]

1690; *Amsterd.* 1691–93, 4 vols. 4to. WILH. HEINR. BECKER, Schediasma critico-literarium de Controversiis B. Bekkero ob librum *Die bezauberte Welt* motis, *Königsb. et Leipz.* 1721, 4to. See the Life, Opinions, and Fortunes of B. BECKER, by J. M. SCHWAGER, *Leipz.* 1780, 8vo.

[1] Born at Mentz, 1646; died 1719 (See §§ 330, 340).

P. POIRET, Economie Divine, 1647, 7 vols. 8vo. Cogitationes de Deo, Animâ, et Malo, *Amstelod.* 1677–1685–1715, 4to.

* Poiret has been of service to the cause of truth in drawing up a list of those remarkable characters in the history of the Church who have laid claim to, or adduced evidence of special spiritual illumination.—ED.

[2] Died 1669.

[3] Born at Brieg 1625; died 1687.

CHRISTOPHER WITTICH, Consensus Sanctæ Scripturæ cum Veritate Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, *Neomag.* 1659, 8vo. Theologia Pacificata, *Lugd. Bat.* 1675, 4to. Annotationes, in quibus Methodi celeb. Philosophi succincta notitia redditur, *Dordr.* 1688, 4to. Anti-Spinoza, seu Examen Ethices Bened. de Spinoza, *Amstel.* 1690, 4to.

[4] GER. DE VRIES (see § 336, note [1]). Exercitationes Rationales de Deo Divinisque perfectionibus; necnon Philosophemata Miscellanea, *Traj.* 1685, 4to. Edit. nova, ad quam præter alias accedit Diatribe singularis gemina, altera de Cogitatione ipsa mente, altera de Ideis rerum Innatis, *Ultraj.* 1695, 4to.

[5] He was professor of Theology at Franeker and Utrecht, and died 1718.

HERM. ALEX. ROELL, Dissert. de Religione Naturali, *Franeq.* 1686, folio. Disputationes Philosophicæ de Theologia Naturali duæ, de Ideis Innatis una; Ger. de Vries Diatribæ oppositæ; fourth edition, *Franeq.* 1700, 8vo.; *Ultraj.* 1713.

[6] Born in Friesland 1665; professor of Theology at Franeker; died 1727.

II. *Spinoza.*

His works: Benedicti de Spinoza Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophiæ pars prima et secunda More Geometrico demonstratæ Accesserunt ejusdem Cogitata Metaphysica, in quibus difficiliores, quæ tam in parte Metaphysicæ generali quam speciali occurrunt Quæstiones brevitur explicantur, *Amstel.* 1663, 2 vols. 4to. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus continens Dissertationes aliquot, quibus ostenditur Libertatem Philosophandi non tantum salva Pietate et Reipublicæ Pace posse concedi, sed eandem nisi cum Pace Reipublicæ ipsaque Pietate tolli non posse, *Hamb.* (*Amsterd.*) 1670, 4to. Under various fictitious titles: Dan. Heinsii Operum Historicum collectio prima. Ed. II, priori multo emendatior et auctior, *Lugd. Bat.* 1675, 8vo. Henriquez de Villacorta, M.D. a cubiculo Philippi IV, Caroli II, Archiatri, Opera Chirurgica Omnia, sub auspiciis potentissimi Hispaniarum Regis, *Amstel.* 1673, 8vo.; 1697, 8vo. In French; La Clef du Sanctuaire, par un savant homme de notre siècle, *Leyde*, 1678, 12mo. Traité des Cérémonies superstitieuses des Juifs, tant Anciennes que Modernes, *Amsterd.* 1678, 12mo. Réflexions Curieuses d'un Esprit désintéressé sur les Matières les plus importantes au Salut, tant public que particulier, *Cologne*, 1678, 12mo.

Annotationes Ben. de Spinoza ad Tractatum Theologico-Politicum, ed Chr. Theoph. de Murr, *Hag. Com.* 1802, 4to.

Bened. de Spinoza Opera Posthuma, *Amstel.* 1677, 4to. (containing: Ethica, Tractatus Politicus, de Intellectus emendatione Epistolæ).

Bened. de Spinoza Opera quæ supersunt omnia, ed. H. Eberh. Gottlob Paulus, *Jen.* 1802, 1803, 2 vols. 8vo. with a Biography.

Renati Descartes et Benedicti de Spinoza præcipua Opera, philos. recognovit, notitias historico-philosophicas adjecit, K. Riedel. Vol. I, Cartesiæ Meditationes; Spinozæ Dissertationes philosophicæ. Vol. II, Spinozæ Ethica, *Lips.* 1843.

Ejus Opera philosophica omnia, edid. præfat. adjecit, A. Gfrörer, *Stuttg.* 1830–31.

Works on Spinoza and his Doctrines.

C. Matthias, Ben. Spinozæ Doctrina, ex Ethica ejus recensita, Dissert. inaug. *Marb.* 1829.

John Colerus, Life of Spinoza, etc. etc. Originally published in Dutch, *Utrecht*, 1697; in French, *The Hague*, 1706, 8vo.; in German, *Francof.* and *Leips.* 1733, 8vo.

Ru. Andala, Syntagma Theologico-Physico-Metaphysicum, *Franeq.* 1710, 4to. Cartesius verus Spinozismi eversor et Physicæ Experimentalis architectus, *Ibid.* 1719. In answer to J. Regius, Cartesius versus Spinozismi architectus: *Leovard.* 1718. Exercitationes Academicæ in Philosophiam Primam et Naturalem, in quibus Philosophia Cartesii explicatur, confirmatur, et vindicatur, *Franeq.* 1709, 4to. Examen Ethicæ Geulinxii, *Ibid.* 1716, 4to. Questiones Physicæ, 1720. Apologia pro Vera et Saniore Philosophia, etc.

Réfutations des Erreurs de BENOIT DE SPINOZA, par M. FENELON, par le P. LAMY, et par le COMTE DE BOULAINVILLIERS, avec la Vie de Spinoza, écrite par M. JEAN COLERUS, augmentée de beaucoup de particularités tirées d'une Vie Manuscrite (from the next book), de ce Philosophe; faite par un de ses amis, *Bruxelles*, 1731, 12mo.

La Vie et l'Esprit de M. BENOIT DE SPINOZA, *Amsterd.* 1719, 8vo. The author was a physician named *Lucas* or *Vraese*, councillor of the Court of Brabant at the Hague. Only seventy copies of a very limited edition were offered for sale, at a very high price; which caused a number of MS. copies to be taken. The second part was burnt, but the biographical part (also very scarce) was published under this title: La Vie de Spinoza par un de ses Disciples: nouvelle édition non tronquée, etc. *Hamb.* 1735, 8vo.

H. FR. VON DIETZ, Ben. von Spinosa nach Leben und Lehren, *Dess.* 1783, 8vo.

M. PHILIPSON, Leben Ben. von Spinosa, *Braunschw.* 1790, 8vo. (nach Colerus).

JARIGES, Ueber das System des Spinosa und über Bayle's Erinnerungen dagegen in der Histoire de l'Acad. des Sciences de Berlin a. 1740, und in Hissmann's Magazin, 5. Bd. S. 5 ff.

FR. H. JACOBI, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an Hrn. Moses Mendelssohn, *Bresl.* 1785; 2te Auflage, 1789, 8vo., und in Jacobi's Schriften, 4 Bde. I. Abth. MOSES MENDELSSOHN, Morgenstunden (see § 331, etc.): An die Freunde Lessing's, ein Anhang zu Jacobi's Briefwechsel, *Berl.* 1786, 8vo. F. H. JACOBI, wider M. Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, *Leipz.* 1786. (MATH. CLAUDIUS) Zwei Recensionen in Sachen Lessing, M. Mendelssohn und Jacobi, *Hamb.* 1786. Ueber MENDELSSOHN'S Darstellung der Spinozistischen Philosophie; in Cæsar's Denkwürdigkeiten, 4 B. K. H. HEYDENREICH, Animadversiones in Mosis Mendelii filii Refutationem placitorum Spinosæ scripsit, *Lips.* 1786, 4to. Derselbe: Natur und Gott nach Spinosa, 1 B. (mit Auszugen aus der oben angegebenen Vie von Lucas), *Leipz.* 1789, 8vo.

Gott: einige Gespräche; von J. G. HERDER, *Gotha*, 1787, 8vo.

D. G. S. FRANCKE, Preisschr. über die neuern Schicksale des Spinozismus und seinen Einfluss auf die Philosophie überhaupt, und die Vernunfttheologie insbesondere, *Schleswig*, 1812, 8vo.

ERN. STIEDENROTH, Nova Spinozismi delineatio. *Gött.* 1817, 8vo.

LUD. BOUMANN, Explicatio Spinozismi. Diss. inaugural. *Berol.* 1828, 8vo.

C. ROSENKRANZ, De Spinozæ Philos. Diss., *Hal. et Lips.* 1828, 8vo.

FR. KELLER, Spinoza und Leibnitz, über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, *Erlang.* 1847.

338. The Jew *Baruch* (*Benedict*) *Spinoza*, or *Spinosa*, entered into the speculative views of the Cartesian School with all the originality of a profound and penetrating genius. He was born at Amsterdam, 1632, and even in his childhood distinguished himself for his ardent love of the knowledge

of truth. His doubts with respect to the authority of the Talmud, and his frame of mind, devout, but free from superstition, rendered him indifferent to the ceremonial service of his fellow-believers, and were the means of bringing upon him many persecutions. Concealed in the houses of some charitable Christians, he applied himself to the study of Latin and Greek, Mathematics and Metaphysics, especially those of Descartes, the clearness and simplicity of whose system attracted his attention, without being able to satisfy the depth of his genius. After having devoted his life to tranquil thought, pursued in retirement, he died at the Hague, A. D. 1677, with the reputation of an estimable man and a distinguished philosopher. Spinoza made it his principle to admit nothing to be true, which he could not recognize on sufficient grounds; and endeavoured to found a system which should deduce the fundamental principles of moral life by strictly Mathematical demonstrations, founded on the knowledge of God. To this end he called his system one of Ethics. These strictly scientific aims carried him into the highest region of speculation, and gradually led him to the remarkable theory proposed also by Descartes,[1] which asserts the existence of only one Absolute Essence,—(the Deity),—Infinite Being, with Infinite Attributes of Extension and Thought, reducing all finite beings to the state of apparent substances, and limitations or *modi* of those Attributes. *Substance* is not an individual being, but the foundation and substratum of all individual beings: it never has begun to be, but exists *per se* and of necessity, and can only be thought by itself (see Eth. P. I, prop. 5). Nothing can be said to have a beginning but finite objects, or the mutable limitations of the Attributes of Infinity: in this manner from the attribute of Infinite Extension arises the modification of Motion and Repose; from that of Infinite Thought, those of the Understanding and Will. Infinite Extension is, on the same principle, the ultimate element of all finite corporeal objects, and Absolute or Infinite Thought, of all finite thinking beings. The primordial Elements—Infinite Extension and Infinite Thought—are mutually re-

[1] H. C. W. Sigwart, Ueber den Zusammenhang des Spinozismus mit der Cartesianischen Philosophie, *Tübing.* 1816, 8vo.
H. Ritter, Ueber den Einfluss Descartes, auf die Ausbildung des Spinozismus, *Leipz.* 1816, 8vo.

lated, without having been produced the one by the other. All finite things (e. g. Body and Soul) exist in the Deity; the Deity is their *immanent Cause, Natura naturans.* He himself is not finite, though from him all finite things have necessarily proceeded: there is no such thing as Accident, but an universal Necessity, which in the case of the Deity is united to Liberty; because the Deity is the only Substance, and alone is not circumscribed by the existence or operations of any other being. He operates according to the *internal necessity* of His own nature; and His will and knowledge are inseparable. There is no free Causality of Ends and final Causes; but only the Causality of Necessity and natural Causes. The immediate and direct conception of any real and present thing is called the Spirit or Soul (*Mens*) of such a thing; and the thing itself, or the direct and immediate object of such a conception, is called the *Body* of such Spirit. United, they compose one and the same individual object; which may be apprehended in a twofold relation, under that of the attribute Thought or the attribute Extension. All ideas, as far as they have a relation to the Deity, are true; because all ideas which exist in the Divine mind are perfectly correspondent to their respective Objects; and consequently every idea of our own which is absolute, perfect, and corresponds with its object, is true also, and discloses itself;[1] and the Reason contemplates things according to their true nature, inasmuch as it contemplates them with a view to their eternal and necessary properties.[2] Falsehood has its origin in the negation of Thought; which entails the admission of irregular and imperfect thoughts.[3] Every idea of a real object embraces at the same time the eternal and infinite essence of God, (Prop. 45): the knowledge of the Infinite and Eternal Essence of God which every idea embraces in itself is adequate and complete. The human understanding can therefore adequately apprehend the nature of God.[4] On the other hand, the knowledge we are able to acquire of individual objects is neces-

[1] Prop. 43. "Sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est."

[2] "E natura rationis non est, res ut *contingentes*, sed ut *necessarias* contemplari (et) sub quadam eternitatis specie percipere."—Propos. 44.

[3] Eth. P. II, Propos. 32—34 sqq.

[4] Prop. 46, 47.

sarily imperfect. In the lively knowledge of the Deity consists our greatest happiness: since the more that we know of God, the more inclined we are to live according to his will;[1] in which consists at the same time our happiness and our free-will:—Deo parere summa libertas est. Nevertheless our Will is not absolutely free, inasmuch as the mind is directed to this or that end by some external cause, which cause is dependent on another, and so on in perpetual concatenation. In like manner no other faculty of the mind is altogether absolute and uncontrolled. (P. II, prop. 48).

339. The leading ideas of his system Spinoza had amassed in the course of his early study of the Rabbinical writings, and the theory of Descartes had only supplied him with a scientific form. He draws all his conclusions, after the mathematical method, by a regular deduction from a small number of axioms and a few leading conceptions, which he assumes to be self-evident, such as those of Substance and Causality. His conclusions have all a mathematical strictness, and constitute a perfect edifice if you grant him his premises; but they appear to labour in this respect, that it may be questioned how the infinitude of finite objects is a necessary result of the infinite attributes of the Deity. The grand defect of his theory is, that all Individuality and Free-will is lost in subordination to the Divine Substance, and that his system of Ethics is made one of mere Physics, because all finite things, in so far as they are determinations of the Infinite, belong to the necessary Essence of God, but as finite determinations form parts of a chain of absolute and necessary Causality.[2] The profoundness of his ideas; the syllogistic method of his reasoning; the hardihood of his attempt to explain things *finite* by *infinite;* give an air of obscurity to the whole system, and make it difficult to be apprehended in its peculiar character: it does not, however, deserve the appellation of an atheistic theory, which has been liberally bestowed upon it ever since its first appearance, rather in consequence of the passions of the disputants, than from anything contained in

[1] "Amor Dei non nisi ex cognitione ejus oritur."—Tract. Theol. cap. IV, p. 42. [2] Ep. 62. See Tract. Theol.-Polit. cap. XVI.

the work itself. It is rather a system of Pantheism (not *material* like that of the Eleatæ, but *formal*), which embraces and illustrates the most exalted idea of the Divinity, as the Original *Esse* (*Urseyn*), so far as it was attained by speculations purely ontological. Nevertheless, such a conception does not satisfy the reason, and contradicts the principles of Theism, such as reason is obliged to presuppose, especially in their *practical* relations and applications.

340. Spinoza's character was no less misrepresented than his doctrines. Few at first dared to profess themselves his friends and adherents.[1] His first opponents, either from not having understood his system, or from some secret attachment to it which they were at pains to conceal, allowed him to have the advantage, and contributed to his reputation. Of this number were: *Fr. Cuper*,[2] *Boulainvilliers*,[3] *Chr. Wittich*,[4] (who answered him the most fully of them all), *P. Poiret*,[5] *Sam. Parker* (§ 342), and *Isaac Jacquelot*.[6] Those who undertook the conflict with more sincerity (such as *J. Brendonburg*),[7] found themselves involved in contra-

[1] Of these we may mention, J. Oldenberg, who nevertheless, on many points, differed from Spinoza. The following writers have, perhaps improperly, been designated as Spinozists: the physicians L. Meyer and Lucas, the first the author of a work entitled Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ interpres: see § 336, note; X. Jelles, Abr. Cufaeler, who defended and exposed Spinozism in two treatises: Specimen Artis Ratiocinandi Naturalis et Artificialis ad Pantasophiæ Principia manuducens, *Hamb. (Amst.)* 1684; et Principiorum Pantosophiæ, P. II, et P. III, *Hamb.* 1684; J. G. Wachter, Concordia Rationis et Fidei, etc., *Amstel. (Berol.)*, 1692, 8vo.; and Theod. Lud. Law: Meditationes de Deo, Mundo, et Homine; *Francof*, 1717, 8vo,: et: Meditationes, Theses, dubia Philosophico-Theologica, *Freystadt*, 1719, 8vo.

[2] Arcana Atheismi Revelata; a work severely censured by H. More, Opp. Philos. tom. I, p. 596, and by Jæger: Fr. Cuperus mala fide aut ad minimum frigide Atheismum Spinozæ oppugnans, *Tub.* 1710.

[3] The Comte de Boulainvilliers; born 1658, died 1722. See bibliography of § 337.

[4] See § 337.

[5] See § 337. Poiret, Fundamenta Atheismi eversa; in his Cogitata de Deo, etc.

[6] Born in Champagne, 1674; died 1708.

Isaac Jacquelot, Dissertations sur l'Existence de Dieu, etc., par la Réfutation du Système d'Epicure et de Spinoza, *La Haye*, 1697. See § 334, note.

[7] Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-Politici, una cum Demonstatione geometrico ordine disposita, Naturam non esse Deum, *Roterod.* 1675, 4to

dictions, being unable to refute the demonstration of Spinoza, and not enduring to admit its validity.

It is only of late that the talents and opinions of Spinoza have been better appreciated; at the same time that the *Critical* method of the Rationalists has enabled them to detect the weak side of his system.[1]

The most recent philosophical system approaches in many respects that of Spinoza.

III. *Malebranche. Fardella.*

FONTENELLE, Eloge de Malebranche, dans le tom. I, de ses Eloges des Académiciens, *La Haye*, 1731, p. 317.

NIC. MALEBRANCHE, De la Recherche de la Vérité, *Paris*, 1673, 12mo.; seventh edit. 1712, 2 vols. 4to., or 4 vols. 12mo. In Lat. by LENFANT, De Inquirenda Veritate, *Genev.* 1691, 4to.; 1753, 2 vols. 4to.

NIC. MALEBRANCHE, Conversations Chrétiennes, 1677. De la Nature et de la Grâce, *Amst.* 1680, 12mo. Méditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques, *Cologne (Rouen)*, 1683, 12mo.

MALEBRANCHE, Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion, *Rotterd.* 1688, 8vo. Entretiens d'un Philosophique Chrétien et d'un Philosophe Chinois, sur la Nature de Dieu, *Paris*, 1708. Réflexions sur la Prémotion Physique, etc. *Paris*, 1715, 8vo.; Œuvres, *Paris*, 1712, 11 vols. 12mo.

341. *Nicole Malebranche*,[2] one of the Fathers of the Oratoire, whose disadvantageous person concealed a pro found genius, and indisputably the greatest metaphysician that France has produced,* developed the ideas of Descartes, and imparted to them a fresh originality, and greater clearness and vivacity: but his views of religion led him to superadd some tenets of his own inclining to mysticism.

[1] CHRISTIAN WOLFF, for instance, and BAYLE; the first of whom has refuted the system of Spinoza in his † Translation of his Ethics, *Francf.* and *Hamb.* 1744, 8vo. See also JARIGES, quoted at the head of § 338. The dispute between Jacobi and Mendelssohn on the Spinozism of Lessing, was the occasion of a great number of writings respecting the tenets of Spinoza. See the same section. The † Translation of the Ethics of Spinoza, by EWALD (*Gera*, 1791—33, 8vo.), also contains a refutation of Spinozism, on the principles of the Critical system.

[2] Born at Paris 1638; died 1715.

* This observation requires limitation. In the nineteenth century *V. Cousin, P. Leroux, Jouffroy*, &c., may probably dispute the palm with Malebranché.—ED.

He has been peculiarly successful in discussing the theory of knowledge, the sources of error, (especially those which have their origin in illusions of the Imagination), as well as in his examination of the proper Method for the investigation of Truth. He described the understanding as *passive;* maintained *extension* to be the characteristic of Body; the soul to be an essence simple in its nature, and therefore distinct from its body; and represented the Deity as the only Real Basis of all thought and all being. These opinions led him to controvert, by acute arguments, the doctrine of Innate Ideas, and gave rise to the extraordinary assertion peculiar to him, that it is *in* and *through* the Divinity that we have an intuitive perception of all things, which are comprehended *intellectually* in His essence; that the Divinity is the Intellectual World; Infinite and Universal Reason, and the abode of Spirits: in these respects making near approaches to Spinozism. The doctrine of Occasionalism (which he enlarged and extended) is closely connected with such speculations; by which he was farther led to assign to the Soul and Body a sort of passive activity, and to represent the Deity as the only original cause of all their changes: a species of religious-mystical Idealism. We may trace in it the consequences of a blind devotion to Demonstration, as the only method of attaining philosophical knowledge. The *Abbé Foucher*[1] opposed to his system one of scepticism.

[1] SIMON FOUCHER, Critique de la Recherche de la Vérité.

Among the authors who discussed and opposed the theory of Malebranche, we may mention FATHER DU TERTRE (who did not understand it): Réfutation du nouveau Système de Métaphysique composé par le Père Malebranche, *Paris*, 1718, 3 vols. 12mo.; and ANT. ARNAULD: Des Vrais et des Fausses Idées contre ce qu'enseigne l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité, *Cologne*, 1683, 8vo. To the latter work Malebranche replied by his Réponse de l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité au livre de M. Arnauld, des Vrais et des Fausses Idées, *Rotterdam*, 1684. Défense de M. Arnauld contre la Réponse au livre des Fausses Idées, *Cologne*, 1684, 12mo.; Trois Lettres de l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité, touchant la Défense de M. Arnauld contre la Réponse, *Rotterd.* 1685, 12mo. The dispute was prolonged in some other writings; by LOCKE, in the second vol. of his Miscell. Works, *Amsterd.* 1732, 8vo. and by LEIBNITZ, in the second vol. of a Collection of Philosophical Pieces, by LEIBNITZ, CLARKE, NEWTON, etc., 2nd edit. *Amst.* 1740, 8vo.

Michael-Angelo Fardella,[1] in his Logic,[2] employed in the defence of Idealism the same arguments which had been used by Malebranche, namely, that the existence of the material world is incapable of demonstration, and can only be maintained on the grounds of revealed religion.

IV. *Supernaturalists and Mystics of this period.*

342. The dissensions of the Empirical and Speculative Schools brought once more upon the stage the opposite factions of the Supernaturalists, the Mystics, and the Sceptics. Among these by far the most distinguished was *Blaise Pascal*,[3] who, in consequence perhaps of his early devotion to Mathematics, imbibed a distrust of philosophical speculation, and in the latter part of his life, when his bodily sufferings increased, devoted himself to a sort of ascetism. *Theophilus Gale* (*Galeus*) was a thinker of a different stamp. He was a presbyterian minister,[3] and maintained that all true philosophy is contained in the revealed word of God, made known immediately to the Jews, and from them at various epochs and in various ways, handed over to other nations. Consequently, philosophy is subordinate to theology. He recommended for these pursuits the study of the Neo-platonic writers.[4] *Ralph Cudworth*[5] pursued the same system, but (with greater originality) turned it against the Materialists and Atheists, in defence of Revealed Religion. He collected proofs of the existence of God (Syst. c. V. § 101—102), and of the Creation out of nothing; and maintained the doctrine of a Rational system of knowledge, founded on Innate Ideas, according to the views of Plato. The *Plastic Nature*,[6] which he supposes may account for the conformity of created things to their uses, is nothing more than the *Soul of the World* of Plato; to make room for which he denies the existence either of blind chance, of mechanical necessity, or of an immediate and continual creation on the part of God. He reproached Descartes for having excluded from Physics the doctrine of

[1] Died at Padua, 1718. [2] *Venice*, 1696. [3] Born 1628; died 1677.
[4] THEOPH. GALE, Philosophia Universalis, *Lond.* 1676, 8vo. Aula Deorum Gentilium, *Ibid.* 1676, 8vo.
[5] Born in the county of Somerset, 1617; died a Professor at Cambridge, 1688. [6] Cap. III, § 25, sqq.

Final Causes. He derives the principles of Moral Good and Rectitude from certain *Moral Ideas*, which are copies of the Divine Wisdom, and not from notions acquired by experience:[1] on many other points also, adopting the principles of Plato, *Henry More*,[2] a member of the same university, followed the same line of argument. He was a learned man, and of an acute understanding, who finding the Peripatetic system insufficient to satisfy his doubts, which had carried him so far as to question his own Individuality, embraced the Neo-platonic theory, borrowed principally from the works of Ficinus; studying also the Cabbalistic writings, which he defended in several of his compositions, but without moulding these different materials into an uniform system (see § 320). He derived all philosophical knowledge from intellectual Intuition, and maintained that all genuine philosophy is deducible from Revelation, and has reference to Man and his destiny. In his metaphysics —the subject of which is Immaterial Nature—he placed all Reality in an immoveable space, distinct and separate from moveable matter; and affected to deduce from this principle the laws of all motion, and of all matter liable to motion. He attributes to this space a real existence, and Divine attributes; describing it as the universal circumscription of the Divine presence. He maintains that the nature of the souls of men and other animals is simple, but supposes them to possess a certain *extent*. He pointed out the faults of the systems of Descartes and Spinoza, at the same time

[1] RALPH CUDWORTH, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, *Lond.* 1678, folio: 1743, 2 vols. 4to.: 4 vols. 8vo. with Life by Birch, *Oxford*, 1830. Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, etc., Lat. vert. J. L. MOSHEMIUS; with a Life of Cudworth, *Jen.* 1733, folio, cum Correctionib. posth. *Lugd. Bat.* 1773, 2 vols. 4to. Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, *Lond.* 1731.

[2] Born 1614; died 1687.

HENRICI MORI Opera Philosophica Omnia, *Lond.* 1679, 2 vols. folio. Ejusdem, Conjectura Cabbalistica in tria prima capita Geneseos. Defensio Cabbalæ Triplicis. Apologia contra SAM. ANDREÆ Examen Generale Cabbalæ Philosophicæ. Trium Tabularum Cabbalisticarum decem Sephiroth. Questiones et Considerationes in Tractatum primum libri Druschim. Catechismus Cabbalisticus, sive Mercavæus, fundamenta Philosophiæ, sive Cabbalæ Ætopædomelissææ Enchiridium Metaphysicum, *Lond.* 167[illegible] Enchiridium Ethicum, *Lond.* 1660—1668—1672, 8vo.

expressing great respect for their talents. In Ethics he blended the principles of Aristotle and Plato. The contemporary of the two former, *Samuel Parker*,[1] bishop of Oxford, criticised the atomistic theory of Descartes, and his proof of the existence of the Deity; and defended theology (whence he derived his proofs of the existence of God) against Atheism.[2] One of the most remarkable writers of this age was the physician and preacher *John Pordage*,[3] who declared himself the decided advocate of a mystical Supernaturalism. He endeavoured to systematize the theosophic enthusiasm of *Jacob Böhm*[4] (see § 330), and asserted, on the evidence of well-attested facts, that he had been assured of the truth of his theosophic doctrines by special revelation.[5] His pupil *Thomas Bromley*, disseminated the same notions. The writings of this remarkable man contain some original and ingenious views on the spiritual interpretation of Scripture, as also on the phenomena of apparitions.[6] In France, *Pierre Poiret*, originally a Cartesian (§ 337), devoted himself altogether to a mystical Supernaturalism, which denied to the mind all independent agency; and declared war against speculative philosophy.[7] A remarkable knot of Mystics appeared in England about this time, including, besides Pordage and Bromley, *Jane Lead*, a woman of elevated piety and enthusiastic spirituality, who has scattered several luminous thoughts and memorable relations in the midst of the obscurity that generally characterises her style.

[1] Died 1688.

[2] A Free and Impartial Account of the Platonic Philosophy, *Oxford*, 1666, 4to. Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo, *Lond.* 1669, 8vo. 1673. Disputationes de Deo et Providentia, *Lond.* 1678, 4to.

[3] Born about 1625; died in London 1698.

[4] Die Lehre des Deutschen Philosophen Jacob Böhm, 1844.

[5] Metaphysica Vera et Divina, *Francof. et Leips.* 1725, 3 vols. 8vo. Sophia, seu Detectio Cœlestis Sapientiæ de Mundo interno et externo, *Amst.* 1699. Theologia Mystica, sive Arcana Mysticaque Doctrina de Invisibilibus, Æternis, etc. non Rationali Arte sed Cognitione Intuitiva descripta, *Amst.* 1691.

[6] See his Sabbath of Rest.

[7] De Eruditione Triplici, Solida, Superficiaria et Falsa, *Amst.* 1629—1706, 1707, 2 vols. 4to. Fides et Ratio collatæ ac suo utraque loco redditæ adversus Principia Jo. Lockii, *Amst.* 1707, 8vo. Opera Posthuma, *Amst.* 1721, 4to., and elsewhere. See § 340, note.

V. *Sceptics.*

343. Scepticism was propagated in France by two disciples of Le Vayer, *Simon Sorbière*[1] and *Simon Foucher* (§ 332). The first translated the Sketch by Sextus Empiricus of the Pyrrhonean philosophy (§ 151, bibliogr.). The latter employed himself upon the history of the Academic system (see at the head of § 166), and opposed Scepticism to the speculations of Descartes and Malebranche. On the other hand appeared, as opponents of Scepticism, *Peter Mersenne*,[2] *Martin Schoock* (§ 336),[3] and *Jean de Silhon*.[4] In England the preacher *Joseph Glanville*[5] endeavoured to moderate by a degree of Scepticism the unbounded extravagancies of Dogmatism, (particularly of the Aristotelians and Descartes), with the hope of promoting the cause of philosophy.[6] He enlarged with ability on the causes of doubt, and applied them to the different departments of science; more particularly, the discoveries in physics effected in his own time. His remarks on Causality, in which he coincides with those of Algazel (§ 258), and appears to have forestalled Hume, deserve especial attention. We do not, says he, detect the existence of any cause immediately by sensational or intuitional perception, but only by mediate representations, and therefore by inference, which may be erroneous.[7] *Jerome Hirnhaym*[8] also

[1] Born 1615; died at Paris 1670. [2] Died 1648.

P. MERSENNE, La Vérité des Sciences contre les Sceptiques, *Paris*, 1625, 8vo.

[3] MART. SCHOOCKII De Scepticismo pars prior, libb. IV, *Groning.* 1652, 8vo. [4] Died 1666.

JEAN SILHON, De la Certitude des Connaissances Humaines, etc. *Paris*, 1661, 8vo. [5] Died 1680.

[6] JOS. GLANVILLE, Scepsis Scientifica, or Confessed Ignorance the Way to Science; in an Essay of the vanity of dogmatizing and confident opinion. With a reply to the exceptions of the learned THOMAS ALBIUS, *Lond.* 1665, 4to. De Incrementis Scientiarum inde ab Aristotele ductarum, *Lond.* 1670. HENR. STABIUS has published a Dissertation in answer to the latter work. [7] Scepsis Scient., p. 142.

[8] A monk of the order of Præmonstratenses, and Doctor of Theology at Prague; died 1679.

HIERONYMUS HIRNHAYM, De Typho Generis Humani, sive Scientiarum Humaniorum inani ac ventoso tumore, difficultate, labilitate,

allied Scepticism to Supernaturalism. Declaiming with considerable ability against literary presumption, and the arrogance of the learned, and maintaining that all knowledge is delusive, and that every axiom (so esteemed) of Reason had been annulled by Revelation, he insisted that Revelation from God, Supernatural Grace, and an internal Divine illumination, are the only true sources of certain knowledge. His Scepticism led him to recommend an enthusiastic Asceticism.

It may be remarked in general, that about this period Scepticism was called in to support the Catholic religion, whose advocates endeavoured by the use of it to recall Protestants to the pale of the church.*

PROGRESS OF SCEPTICISM IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

I. *Sensationalism of Locke.*

An Essay concerning the Human Understanding, in four books, *Lond.* 1690, fol. tenth edition; *Lond.* 1731, 2 vols. 8vo.

Thoughts on Education, *Lond.* 1693; *Lond.* 1732, etc.

Posthumous Works, *Lond.* 1706. The Works of John Locke, 1714, 3 vols. fol. third edition, 1727. Collection of Several Pieces of John Locke, *Lond.* 1720, 8vo.

On his Philosophical System consult:

Jean Le Clerc, Eloge Historique de feu M. Locke, en avant du tom. I des Œuvres Diverses.

Tennemann's Abh. über den Empirismus in der Philosophie, vorzüglich den Lockischen; in d. III. Th. d. Uebersetzung.

Darstellung und Prüfung des Lockischen Sensualsystems, in G. E. Schulze's Kritik der Theoretischen Philosophie, I. B, s. 113; II. B, s. 1.

Christlieb Gottwald Wabst, Diss. (resp. Jo. Godofr. Schuler) Jo. Lockii de Ratione Sententias excutit, *Viteb.* 1714, 4to.

Life of Locke, by Lord King, 2 vols.

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falsitate, jactantia, præsumtione, incommodis et periculis, tractatus brevis in quo etiam vera sapientia a falsa discernitur, et simplicitas mundo contempta extollitus, idiotis in solatium, doctis in cautelam conscriptus, *Prag.* 1676, 4to.

* The same remark is applicable at the present day with additional force.—Ed.

344. John Locke, (born at Wrington near Bristol, 1632, died 1704), renounced the intricacies of Scholastic philosophy for the more congenial study of the classics. The writings of Descartes inspired him with fresh ardour, particularly for the cultivation of Medicine and Metaphysics. He rejected indeed many of his master's notions, more particularly that of Innate Ideas; but was not the less captivated by his love of perspicuity and distinctness. The endless disputations of the learned led him to suspect that they had their origin in an improper use of words and a defective use of conceptions; which he proposed to rectify by ascertaining the grounds and extent of human knowledge, through investigation of the properties of the human understanding. This was the origin of his renowned work on the Human Understanding, by which he justly acquired the greatest distinction for the modesty und tolerance of his way of thinking, the clearness and rectitude of his understanding, evinced in the course of a correspondence with the most accomplished men of his day, and his penetrating acuteness and manly honesty. He so far adopted Bacon's principles that he pursued the method of experiment and observation, in preference to that of speculation; applying it principally to our inner nature. His method of philosophizing has many advantages, but at the same time some great defects; especially that of avoiding the great obstacles and difficulties in the course of philosophical knowledge instead of directly sounding them by a more radical and a deeper research. Notwithstanding, the opposition which he encountered was not so much the consequence of this radical fault, as of certain deductions from his system. (See § 346, note, and 348, note). By his treatises on Toleration and Education, Locke has rendered indisputable and undisputed services to mankind.

345. Locke's great object and merit, was the investigation of the origin, reality, limits, and uses of knowledge. He contested the hypothesis of Innate Ideas, throwing great light on one side of the question; and endeavoured to prove by an induction which was necessarily incomplete, that all our representations are acquired by experience. The two ultimate sources of all our representations are impressions through the external Senses, and Reflection, or the perception

of the operations of our minds; which has caused his system to be called one of Sensationalism; since he gives even to Reflection the appellation of an Internal Sense. Our representations are partly simple, partly compound: among the first are those of Solidity, Space, Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest: those of Thought and Will: those of Existence, Time, Duration, Power, Enjoyment, and Pain. Our simple notions have an objective, or absolute and independent reality. The soul, like a piece of white paper (*tabula rasa*), merely receives their impressions through perception, without adding anything thereto of her own. They represent partly primary, partly secondary qualities or properties: among the first are Extension, Solidity, Figure, Number, Movement: among the latter, (which are *deduced* and *derived* as the first are *direct* and *original*), Colour, Sound, Scent. Compound notions are deduced from simple ones by an activity of the understanding, for instance by Connection, Opposition, Comparison, or Abstraction. The representations so acquired are those of Accident, Substance, and Relation. The understanding either applies Experience and Observation to the formation of compound notions, or by a totally different course, develops simple and absolute ones, such as those belonging to Mathematics and Ethics.

Locke has also suggested some admirable ideas on Language, and the abuses to which it is liable. He defines knowledge to be the perception of the Connection and Agreement or the want of Connection and Disagreement of certain representations, which may be reduced to four sources; Identity or Discrepancy—Relation—Co-existence or necessary connection, and Real Existence.[1] As relates to the *mode* of this perception, knowledge becomes either Immediate or Mediate: Immediate, if the result of intuition, and Mediate, if produced by demonstration: to these must be added a third class relating to particulars ascertained by sensational cognition, and confined to matters presented to our Senses. It must be remarked, however, that his observations on the limits and use, etc. of knowledge do not penetrate far enough, nor, by any means, exhaust the question: he may even be said to have pronounced judgment upon the

[1] Essay, B. IV, ch. I, § 1—3.

reality of knowledge, before he had set up his theory on the subject. His reasoning is far from being satisfactory on the principles of thought and knowledge, all of which, (even that of contradiction) he describes as *derived* and secondary. His analysis only embraces the material, without extending to the formal part of knowledge; and unravels only a few of the least intricate of our compound notions. He deduces all knowledge from experience, yet nevertheless proposes to support and confirm the latter by various inadequate proofs; and in this manner he maintains the possibility of a demonstrative knowledge of the Existence of God,[1] and the Immortality of the Soul; and endeavours to erect a system of Metaphysics on the uncertain foundation of empirical knowledge.

346. It was the object of Locke to liberate philosophy from vain disputations and unprofitable niceties; but his work had the effect of discouraging, by the facility and accomodating character of its method, more profound investigation; at the same time that he gave a popular air to such inquiries, diminishing the interest they excited, and affording advantages to Eclecticism and Materialism. In Morals he adopted the principles of Experiment and a theory of Eudæmonism.[2] On the other hand his system promoted the knowledge of Metaphysics on the grounds of Experience, and contained a variety of admirable rules relative to *Method*, as well as many valuable hints on points up to that time neglected, His theory gained a great number of adherents in England, France, and the Netherlands, where *J. Le Clerc*[3] and *Gravesand* embraced his principles.

[1] In Books IV. X. he developes his *Cosmological* proof.

[2] On the faults of Locke's Empiricism consult Lord Shaftesbury: Letters written by a Nobleman to a young man at the University, *Lond.* 1716.

Two inconsiderable works in answer to Locke were published by HENRY LEE (Anti-Scepticism) and by JOHN NORRIS, *Lond.* 1704, 8vo. That by BP. BROWN: The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding, *Lond.* 1729, 8vo. second edit., made more noise, and was continued under the title of Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human, etc. *Lond.* 1733. (Against the First Part BERKELEY composed his Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher). To these must be added: Two Dissertations concerning Sense and Imagination, with an Essay on Consciousness, *Lond.* 1728, 8vo.

[3] Clericus; born at Geneva 1657; died 1736.

Thence it gradually extenced its influence into Germany. A great number of eminent men became his partisans, and deduced from his Empiricism its direct or remote consequences, such as the hypothesis of a peculiar sense for the apprehension of Truth in matters of speculation and practice (Reid, Beattie, Rüdiger); the attempt to establish the *objective* Reality of knowledge, (Condillac, Bonnet, D'Alembert, Condorcet); the analysis of the faculties of the Soul, (Hartley, Condillac, Bonnet); the farther development of excellent rules for the investigation of Truth, (Gravesande, Tschirnhausen); an inadequate view of Metaphysics considered as nothing more than Logical reasonings on given facts (Condillac); the increase of Materialism and Atheism (La Méttrie, Systéme de la Nature: and Priestley); and lastly the conversion of Morality into interested calculation (La Rochefoucauld, Helvetius).

II. *Isaac Newton.*

Works: Naturalis Philosophiæ Principia Mathematica, *Lond.* 1687, 4to. Augmented, 1713, and 1726; edid. Lesueur et F. Jaquier, *Geneva*, 1739 and 1760, 3 vols. 4to.; 4 vols. roy. 8vo. *Glasg.* 1822. Translated by Thorp, 4to. 1802; by Davis, 3 vols. 8vo. *Lond.* 1819.

Treatise of Optics, etc. *Lond.* 1704, 4to. Optica; Lat. reddita a Samuel Clarke, *Lausann.* 1711, 4to.

Opera, comment. illustr. Sam. Horsley, *Lond.* 1779, 5 vols. 4to..

A View of Newton's Philosophy, by Henry Pemberton, *Lond.* 1726, 4to.

Guill. Jac. S. Gravesande, Physices Elementa Mathematica Experimentis confirmata; sive Introductio ad Philosophiam Newtonianam, *Lugd. Bat.* 1720, 2 vols. 4to.

Voltaire, Elémens de la Philosophie de Newton, mis à la portée de tout le monde, *Amst.* 1738; and La Métaphysique de Newton, ou Parallèle des Sentimens de Newton et de Leibnitz, *ibid.* 1740, 8vo.

Wright's Commentary on Newton's Principia, 2 vols. 8vo. 1823. Regaud on Newton's Principia, 8vo. *Oxon.* 1838.

† Comparison between the Metaphysics of Newton and Leibnitz, in Answer to M. de Voltaire, by L. M. Kayle, *Gött.* 1740, 8vo.

† Maclaurin, Statement of the Discoveries of Newton, 1748; translated into Lat. by Gr. Falck, *Vienna*, 1761, 4to.

347. The tendency in favour of Empirical philosophy, which had already become prevalent in England, was con-

Joh. Clerici Opera Philosophica, *Amst.* 1692 et 1693. Œuvres complètes, 1710, 4 vols. 4to. et 1722. See § 343.

firmed by the authority of Newton.[1] This illustrious philosopher, whose great discoveries in Physics, (e.g. the theory of Colours and the laws of Gravitation) achieved by the calm prosecution of experimental observations, naturally inclined him to recommend to others the same career, was so far from giving any encouragement to hypothetical speculation, that he made it his maxim, that "Physics should be on their guard against Metaphysics." Nevertheless he himself occasionally indulged in such inquiries; for instance, when he suggested that Infinite Space, in which the celestial bodies revolve, might possibly be the *sensorium* of the Deity. He supposed the existence of certain properties inherent in bodies—e.g. that of weight in atoms—and even presumed that when Natural Philosophy should have completed her course of Experiment, she might contribute to the perfection of Moral Philosophy: inasmuch as a more adequate knowledge of the First Great Cause, and of our relations to Him, may assist us in acquiring a fuller sense of our duties towards Him.[2]

III. *English School of Moral Philosophy, and Reaction excited against the Empiricism of Locke.*

348. A school was formed in England, whose object was to establish the principles of Moral Philosophy on the basis of natural reason, and who to this end adopted the experimental method of Bacon. They sought for our first ideas of moral obligation not in the Understanding itself but in a peculiar and separate sense, (*Moral Sense*); inasmuch as it is by the senses that we acquire all knowledge of real objects. With the desire of opposing the selfish system of Hobbes (see § 326), and with the hope of exposing some of his inconsistancies, *Richard Cumberland*[3] endeavoured to established the existence of a principle totally different—of Benevolence towards man and devotion to God; and proceeded to prove by reasoning that such a principle was the

[1] Born at Wolstrop in Lincolnshire, 1642; Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge 1669; died 1727.

[2] Optic. lib. III, Qu. xxxi, p. 330.

[3] Born 1632; died 1719.

legitimate foundation of all our duties and of our highest happiness.[1]

These new views were carried still farther by a memorable character—*Antony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury*;[2] the friend of Locke, but whose penetration detected the consequences which might be deduced from a system of exclusive Empiricism (see § 346). He made virtue to consist in the harmony of our social and selfish propensities, and in the internal satisfaction which is the result of disinterested actions, accompanied necessarily by the happiness of the individual.[3] Like Plato, he was inclined to identify the Beautiful and the Good.

The ingenious *W. Wollaston*[4] maintained that Truth is the Supreme Good, and the source of all pure Morality; laying it down as the foundation of his argument that every action is a good one that expresses in act a true proposition.

349. The consequences of the Empiricism of Locke had become so decidedly favourable to the cause of Atheism, Scepticism, Materialism, and Irreligion,[5] that they induced

[1] RICHARD CUMBERLAND, De Legibus Naturæ Disquisitio Philosophica, in qua, etc., Elementa Philosophiæ Hobbesianæ cum Moralis tum Civilis considerantur et refutantur, *Lond.* 1672, 4to. Translated into English by Dr. JNO. TOWERS, 4to. *Dublin*, 1750. Trad. Franç. avec des Remarques de BARBEYRAC, *Amsterd.* 1744, 4to.

[2] Born at London 1671; died at Naples 1713.

[3] SHAFTESBURY, Characteristics of Man, *Lond.* 1733, 3 vols. 12mo. An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, 1699. And, The Moralists. The same, published by BASKERVILLE, *Birmingham*, 1773, 3 vols. 8vo.

See Memoirs towards a Life of the Earl of Shaftesbury, drawn from the Papers of Mr. Locke, and collected by LE CLERC, in the second volume of the Miscell. Works of Locke.

[4] Born 1659; died 1724.

W. WOLLASTON, The Religion of Nature Delineated, *Lond.* 1724—1726—1738.

Examination of the notion of Moral Good and Evil advanced in a late book entitled The Religion of Nature Delineated, by JOHN CLARKE, *Lond.* 1725, 8vo.

J. M. DRECHSLER, On Wollaston's Moral Philosophy, *Erlang.* 1801, and 1803, 8vo. second edition.

[5] We may here refer to many writings which arose out of a dispute on the Immateriality of the Soul, between WILLIAM COWARD, a physician, who denied it in several works (from 1702 to 1707), and his opponents J. TURNER, J. BROUGHTON, etc. To these may be added the controversy excited by H. DODWELL, who had maintained that it was mortal.

the celebrated *Dr. Sam. Clarke*,[1] after Locke and Newton, the most distinguished of the English philosophers, to enter the lists as a redoubtable adversary of the new opinions.[2] Admitting the existence of a necessary connection between natural and revealed religion based on Reason, Clarke endeavoured to renew the proof of the existence of God, by maintaining the necessity that an independent and unchangeable Being should have existed from all eternity. He described the Deity as the subject or *substratum* of infinite space and time, and asserted that space and time were His accidents: alleging some insufficient reasons for moral free-will; and sinking virtue into a compliance with *propriety*.[3] On the other hand, the Scepticism of Bayle in-

[1] Born at Norwich 1675;—the pupil of Newton—died 1729.

[2] In opposition to the opinion of Dodwell, already referred to, he endeavoured to deduce the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul from our ideas of Immaterial existence: A Letter to Mr. Dodwell, wherein all the arguments in his Epistolary Discourse against the Immortality of the Soul are particularly answered, etc. *Lond.* 1706, 8vo. The noted Freethinker, ANT. COLLINS (a disciple of LOCKE, born at Heston 1676; died 1729), pointed out the defects of this answer in his Letter of the learned Mr. H. Dodwell, containing some Remarks on a pretended demonstration of the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul, in Mr. Clarke's Answer to his late Epistolary Discourse, *Lond.* 1708, 8vo., which gave occasion to several writings exchanged between Collins and Clarke. See the collection mentioned in bibliogr. § 356, and, Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty, *Lond.* 1715; with Supplements, 1717, 8vo. etc.

Clarke's Natural Theology is contained in his various Sermons, under this general title: A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, *Lond.* 1705 et 1706, 2 vols. 8vo. And, Verity and Certitude of Natural and Revealed Religion, *Lond.* 1705. The collection to which we have referred contains also the compositions of Clarke relative to his dispute with Leibnitz on the subject of Space and Time, etc. (See also the Collection of POLZ, mentioned in § 38, II. *c.*)

The Works of Sam. Clarke, *Lond.* 1738—42, 4 vols. folio. HOADLEY has written his life.

[3] SAM. CLARKE, Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, *Lond.* 1706. In answer to this appeared: The foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice, considered in an Examination of Dr. Sam. Clarke's opinion concerning the original of Moral Obligation; as also of the notion of Virtue advanced in a late book entitled: An Inquiry into the original of our ideas of Beauty and Virtue, by JOHN CLARKE, *York* (without date).

duced the archbishop of Dublin, *William King*,[1] to publish a system of Divine Justice, prior to that of Leibnitz; which was republished under another and more extended form by *John Clarke* (the brother of Samuel), who did not hesitate to make Self-love the principle of Virtue.[2] The naturalists *John Ray*[3] and *William Derham*[4] took part in these disputes by publications half physical and half theological. *Collier*[5] and *Berkeley*[6] followed a course completely different. The last, in particular, a profound and enlightened thinker, animated by an honest love for humanity, and venerable for his personal character, was moved by the evil consequences which the prevailing theory of Empiricism had produced. He was led to imagine that the fruitful source of all such aberrations was the unfounded belief in the reality and existence of the external world; and adopted a system of abso-

[1] De Origine Mali, auctore GULIELMO KING, etc. *Lond.* 1702, 8vo. Subsequently translated into English. Leibnitz, in his System of Divine Justice, frequently has an eye to this work, which Bayle has combatted in his Réponse aux Questions d'un Provincial.

[2] An Inquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil, etc., *Lond.* 1720—21, 2 vols. 8vo.

[3] *John Ray*, or *Wray;* born 1628; died 1705.

[4] Died 1735.

WILL. DERHAM'S Physico-Theology, etc. *Lond.* 1713, 8vo. Astro-Theology, etc. *ibid.* 1714. In German, by T. A. FABRICIUS, *Hamb.* 1765–8. Three Physico-Theological Discourses, *Lond.* 1721, 8vo.; and, The Wisdom of God in the Works of Creation, sixth edition, *Lond.* 1714.

[5] Clavis Universalis, or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility, by COLLIER, *Lond.* 1713, 8vo. Reprinted, *Edinb.* 1836; and by Dr. PARR, in a volume of Metaphysical Tracts, pub. 1828.

[6] Born at Kilkrin, in Ireland, 1684; bishop of Cloyne 1734; died 1753. Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, *Lond.* 1710, 8vo.; 2nd ed. 1725. Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, *ibid.* 1713, 8vo. Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, *ibid.* 1732, 8vo.; 1734, 2 vols. 8vo. Theory of Vision, *ibid.* 1709, 8vo. The Works, *ibid.* 1784, 2 vols. 4to.

Attached to his works is a life of the author, by ARBUTHNOT; probably the same which appeared separately under the title of An Account of the Life of G. Berkeley, *Lond.* 1776, 8vo.

A work has been published by † J. C. ESCHENBACH, *Rost.* 1756, 8vo., which contains a statement of the opinions of all the philosophers (particularly of Collier and Berkeley) who have denied the existence of their own bodies and of the external world; with notes in refutation of the text.

lute *Idealism* as the only corrective and as the only true system. Berkeley has evinced no little sagacity in the arguments he adduces to show the difficulties attendant on outward experience, and the obscurity of our notions of Substance, Accident, and Extension; maintaining that our senses convey to us none but sensational properties, and do not afford us any proof of the existence or substantiality of objects of sense; and that consequently the existence of an external world independent of our representations is a chimæra. Consequently none but Spirits exist: man can perceive nothing but his feelings and representations; but as he certainly is not the cause to himself of these, it is no less certain from their multiplicity and variety, as well as their harmony and consistency, that they are communicated by a Spirit, (as none but spirits exist), and by a Spirit of infinite perfections—God. Though dependent on God for knowledge, man is nevertheless endowed with absolute free-will, and the cause to himself of his own errors and crimes. Collier's work never attained the celebrity enjoyed by the elegant dialogues of the Bishop of Cloyne, but both, with a laudable wish to preserve from decay the elements of natural Ethics, alike attempted to demonstrate the necessity of Idealism, on principles first advanced by Malebranche; and trusted that they had destroyed to the root Scepticism and Atheism. Their doctrines, however, had little influence over the fortunes of the English school of philosophy.

Berkeley's remarks on the theory of Vision are also of interest.

350. The system of *Benevolence* we have referred to (§ 348), was more fully developed by a new philosopher. *Francis Hutcheson*,[1] who has been looked upon as the founder of the Scottish School, placed in a still stronger light than his predecessors the contradiction existing between

[1] Born in Ireland 1694; became a professor at Glasgow 1729; died 1747.

Francis Hutcheson, Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, *Lond.* 1720. Essay on the Nature and Guiding of Passions and Affections, with illustrations on the Moral Sense, *ibid.* 1728. System of Moral Philosophy, in three books, etc., to which is prefixed some account of the life, writings, and character of the author, by Will. Leechmann, *ibid.* 17 . . 4to.

Self-love and Virtue. He allows the appellation of Good to those actions alone which are disinterested and flow from the principle of Benevolence. The last has no reference to expediency nor personal advantages, nor even to the more refined enjoyments of moral sympathy, the obligations of Reason and Truth, or of the Divine Will. It is a distinct and peculiar principle; a moral sentiment or instinct of great dignity and authority; and the end of which is to regulate the passions, and decide, in favour of Virtue, the conflict between the interested and disinterested affections. On this foundation Hutcheson erected all the superstructure of the Moral Duties.

His inquiries are valuable also as tending to illustrate the principles of the Fine Arts.

IV. *French Moral Philosophers.*

351. In France Moral Philosophy took nearly the same *experimental* direction. The Jesuits having endeavoured to render popular the species of morality which favoured their ends by founding it on looser principles of obligation,[1] the fathers of the Oratoire or Port Royal, *Arnauld*, *Pascal*, *Nicole*, *Malebranche* (§§ 337, 341, 342), opposed to theirs a rigid system of Ethics, but which, being occasionally mystical and enthusiastic, was not likely to be permanently established. *François Duc de la Rochefoucauld*[2] on the other hand painted human nature as he had found it; representing it as directed solely by Self-love; and supplying a convenient sort of Morality for the use of the most corrupted portion of the upper classes. *Bernard de Mandeville*[3] went so far as to assert that Virtue is nothing more than the artificial effect of Policy and Ostentation, and that private vices are public benefits: a detestable doctrine,

[1] See La Morale des Jésuites, etc. *Mons*, 1669, 8vo.

[2] Born 1612; died 1680.

Réflexions, ou Sentences et Maximes Morales de M. de La Rochefoucauld, *Paris*, 1690, 12mo.; *Amsterd.* 1705, 12mo. Avec des Remarques par AMELOT DE LA HOUSSAYE, *Paris*, 1714. Maximes et Œuvres complètes, *Paris*, 1797, 2 vols. 8vo.

[3] He was born at Dort, 1670, of a French family, and lived in London, where he practised as a physician. Died 1733.

which removed all fundamental distinction between right and wrong, justice and injustice.[1]

V. *Sceptics of this Period.*

352. Scepticism had been employed by Nicole and by Bossuet,[2] and by several other writers, as the means of bringing back the Protestants to the pale of the Catholic Church; and of exalting its authority by setting forth the incertitude and fallibility of human reason.[3] Two individuals, however, of a more comprehensive and liberal spirit of criticism, undertook still farther to defend the cause of Scepticism for its own own sake. The first was the prelate *P. Dan. Huet*,[4] one of the most learned men of his day, and versed in almost every department of science. He had in his youth embraced the Cartesian system, but became dissatisfied with it on studying the works of Empiricus (see § 336); and renounced Gassendi's theory, because adverse

[1] See his celebrated Fable of the Bees, which he published in 1706: The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turned Honest. Eight years afterwards he published, with illustrations: The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices made Public Benefits, *Lond.* 1714. To defend his doctrine, he composed six dialogues, which form the second volume of the entire work in the edit. of 1728, and in those which followed. To these he added: An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, sixth edit. 1732, 2 vols. 8vo. It has been already remarked that the Alciphron of Berkeley is principally directed against this author. He was answered also by other writers, particularly by W. Law: Remarks upon a book: The Fable, etc., in a letter to the author, *Lond.* 1724; second edit. 1725. And [Bluet] Inquiry whether a general practice of Virtue tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People, etc. *Lond.* 1725, 8vo.

Mandeville, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, Government, etc. *Lond.* 1720.

[2] Bishop of Meaux; born 1617; died 1704.

[3] Franc. Turretini, Pyrrhonismus Pontificius, *Lugd. Bat.* 1692.

[4] Born at Caen 1630; died 1721.

Petri Dan. Huetii Commentarius de Rebus ad eum pertinentibus, *Hag. Com.* 1718, 12mo. Demonstratio Evangelica, *Amstel.* 1679, 8vo. 1680, 8vo. Censura Philosophiæ Cartesianæ; and other works.

Quæstiones Alnetanæ de Concordia Rationis et Fidei, *Cadom.* 1690; 4to.; *Lips.* 1693—1719, 4to.

Traité de la Faiblesse de l'Esprit Humain, *Amst.* 1723, 12mo. In answer to this: Ant. Muratori, Trattato della Forza dell' Intendimento Umano, ossia il Pirronismo confutato, *Venet.* 1745; third edit. 1756, 8vo.

to a pious faith. In this manner he fell into philosophical Scepticism, which in his later writings he made public. He admits that truth must doubtless exist in Objects, but asserts that it can be known only to God. The Human Understanding has so many obstacles to encounter in its progress towards knowledge, that it cannot hope to attain it, nor can it be assured of the complete correspondence of its cognitions with their objects. Faith alone can impart certainty; but this is not attainable on Sceptical principles, because it does not spring from Reason, but from a supernatural working of God, and has reference to a Truth absolute in itself, and the offspring of a distinct revelation.

Pierre Bayle[1] appears not to have been so intimately convinced as Glanville (§ 343) of the possibility of a true Philosophy, although he contributed more than the other had done to open a way to the discovery of it, by his ingenious attacks on the Dogmatic Systems, and by showing that Scepticism cannot be the ultimate end of Reason. This great scholar and honourable man possessed not so much a profound spirit of philosophical research, as a quick sagacity and critical judgment. These talents, improved by extensive reading (particularly of Plutarch and Montaigne) and the study of the various philosophical systems and religious tenets of his time, had the effect of forming in him a sceptical way of thinking, and encouraging a spirit of historical criticism, of which up to that time there had been no example. He was born at Carlat in the county of Foix, 1647, his father being a reformed minister; and after many vicissitudes which befel his party in the Church, held a professor's place at Sedan, and afterwards

[1] Pierre Bayle, Pensées sur les Comètes, 1681, *Amsterd.* 1722—1726, 4 vols. 8vo.

Dictionnaire Historique et Critique.

Réponses aux Questions d'un Provincial, *Rotterd.* 1704, 5 vols. 8vo. Lettres, *Rotterd.* 1712; *Amst.* 1729, 8vo. Œuvres Diverses, *La Haye*, 1725—1731, 4 vols. fol.

Des Maizeaux, La Vie de P. Bayle, *Amst.* 1730, 12mo.; *La Haye*, 1732, 2 vols. 12mo.: et en avant du Dictionn. edit. d'Amsterd. 1730 et 1740; et *Bâle*, 1741.

C. M. Pfaffii Dissertationes Anti-Bælianæ tres, *Tubing.* 1719, 4to.

Feuerbach, Pierre Bayle nach seinem für die Geschichte der Philosophie und Menschheit interessantesten Momenten, dargestellt und gewürdigt, 1838.

at Rotterdam (1681); became embroiled in many controversies, and died in a fortunate state of independence, A.D. 1706. He was a firm and sincere friend of Truth, and succeeded in combating the prejudices, the errors, the follies, and especially the superstitions of intolerance with the arms of reasoning, of erudition, and of a lively wit. At first he embraced the Cartesian system, but having compared it with others, and accustomed himself to Sceptical discussions, he ceased to confide even in the possibility of a positive rational knowledge, and brought himself to believe *That Reason was clear-sighted enough to detect error, but not sufficiently so, without external aid, to attain to Truth.* In short, that without a Revelation from above she only leads astray. With such views he applied himself constantly to detect the weak sides, contradictions, and imperfections of every sect and system, which nevertheless had had their supporters: particularly insisting on the difficulties which belong to the questions of the attributes of the Deity,—Creation—Providence—Evil, Moral and Physical—Immateriality—Free-will, and the reality of our knowledge of an external world. At the same time that he opposed Reason to Revelation, and regarded the latter as a beacon in the discussion of such subjects, he did not fail to point out, on the other hand, whatever, in the Christian doctrine and theological morals, is at variance with Reason, and force men thereby to inquiries still more profound. In his discussions on Providence carried on with *Jean Le Clerc*[1] (§ 346), with *Isaac Jacquelot* (§ 340), and with *Leibnitz*, on

[1] Le Clerc wrote in answer to Bayle: Défense de la Providence contre les Manichéens; dont les Raisons ont été proposées par M. Bayle dans son Dictionnaire Critique (dans le t. I, des Parrhasiana, p. 303). This work is composed on the principles of Origen. Le Clerc also undertook the defence of Cudworth's System, especially of his hypothesis of *Plastic Natures:* the discussion produced a multitude of writings on both sides, and finally led Le Clerc to accuse Bayle of Atheism.

Jacquelot attacked the theological opinions of Bayle in his work, Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, ou Défense de la Religion contre les principales Difficultés répandues dans la Dictionnaire Historique et Critique de M. Bayle, *Amst.* 1705, 8vo. Bayle replied to him in his Réponses aux Questions d'un Provincial. Jacquelot then published an Examen de la Théologie de M. Bayle; and the latter rejoined by, Entretiens de Maxime et de Thémiste, ou Réponse à l'Examen de

the origin of Evil (§ 359), and others, he always preserved the calmness and dignity of a philosopher. His works have greatly contributed to the dissemination of knowledge, and on the other hand also, to the propagation of an untenable spirit of free-thinking. *Jean-Baptiste de Boyer, Marquis d'Argens*[1] also appeared as a Sceptic of a narrow spirit.

The Sceptical School was attacked, but not overcome, by *P. de Villemandy*,[2] *J. P. de Crouzaz*,[3] and *Formey*.[4]

PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY.

Puffendorf.

354. About the middle of the seventeenth century Philosophy acquired in Germany renewed energies, though these were at first confined to a limited sphere. *Samuel Fr. Baron von Puffendorf* reduced Natural Law to the forms of a science. He was born 1632, at Flöke, near Chemnitz; and having studied the Cartesian philosophy at Jena, became in 1661 professor of the Law of Nature and Nations at Heidelberg, afterwards at Lund, and died historiographer of the House of Brandenburg, at Berlin, 1694. He attempted to reconcile the opinions of Hobbes and Grotius, and discussed Natural Law as a separate question, independent of the obligations of Revealed Religion or Positive Civil Law. The philosophers of the Theological school became in consequence, his enemies; particularly Valent Alberti and Joachim Zentgrave.

Puffendorf first gave a currency to the principle of Sociability, which Grotius had started; and maintained that

la Théologie de M. Bayle, par M. Jacquelot. This work appeared in Rotterdam in 1707, after the death of the author. Jacquelot replied to it by another.

[1] Chamberlain of Frederick the Great; died at Aix, his native town, 1770. His principal works are: Histoire de l'Esprit humain, 14 vols. 12mo. (best edition), *Berlin*, 1765; Lettres Cabalistiques, 7 vols. 12mo. *La Haye*, 1769; Lettres Juives, 6 vols. 8vo. *La Haye*, 1738. He translated Julian, Ocellus Lucanus, Timæus Locrus, &c.

[2] PETRI DE VILLEMANDY, Scepticismus Debellatus, seu Humanæ Cognationis Ratio ab imis radicibus explicata, etc. *Lugd. Bat.* 1697, 4to. See § 139.

[3] See the works mentioned § 124, [4] Ibid.

in virtue of this motive, which is allied to Self-love, man desires the society and co-operation of his fellow-men; but that, at the same time, through the corruption of his nature, (the state of Nature described by Hobbes), and in consequence of the multiplicity of his desires, and the impossibility of easily satisfying them, as well as the instability of his natural disposition, he is no less inclined to do injury to others, and is furnished with the means of doing so in his address and cunning. From these considerations he infers, on the principle of Self-love, the first law of society, that we should each individually labour to maintain the social compact, which derives its authority direct from God, as the Creator of mankind. From this origin Puffendorf deduces the laws of Morality and Jurisdiction. He does not, indeed, discriminate between Natural and Moral Right, and frequently recurs to Christianity for positive precepts; yet he may be said to have laid the foundations of an Universal philosophy *of practice*. The multifarious disputes in which he was engaged, particularly with Alberti (§ 336), were of little service to the cause of philosophy. He has, perhaps, been as much encumbered by his commentators as his adversaries.

Sam. Puffendorf, Elementa Jurisprudentiæ Universalis, *Hag. Com.* 1660; *Jen.* 8vo.

De Jure Naturæ et Gentium libb. VIII, *Lund.* 1672; *Francof.* 1684, 4to.; cum Notis Hertii, Barbeyraci, et Mascovii, *Francof. et Lips.* 1744, 1749, 2 vols. 4to., and other editions. Translated into English by Kennet, folio, 1729, and 1749. De Officio Hominis et Civis libb. II, *Lund.* 1673, 8vo. and other editions. Cum Notis Variorum, *Ludg. Bat.* 1769, 2 vols. 8vo. Eris Scandica, *Francof.* 1686. On the Natural Law of Puffendorf, see Leibnitz. (Cf. § 360, note.)

I. *Leibnitz.*

Fontenelle, Eloge de M. de Leibnitz, dans l'Histoire de l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences de Paris, 1716. † The biography it contains was founded on a Memoir communicated by J. G. von Eccard, which has been published by Von Murr, in the Journal of the History of the Arts, etc., part VII, *Nürnb.* 1779.

Bailly, Eloge de M. de Leibnitz, qui a remporté le Prix de l'Académie de Berlin, 1769, 4to.

Leben und Verzeichniss der Schriften des Herrn v. Leibnitz, in Ludovici's Ausführlichem Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Leibnitz'schen Philosophie, im ersten Bande, *Leipz.* 1737, 8vo.

LAMPRECHT, Leben des Herrn v. Leibnitz, *Berlin*, 1749, 8vo.

Geschichte des Herrn von Leibnitz, aus den Franz. des RITTER v. JANCOURT, *Leipz.* 1757, 8vo.

A. G. KASTNER'S Lobschrift auf Leibnitz, *Altona*, 1769, 4to.

MICH. HISSMANN, Versuch über das Leben des Freiherrn von Leibnitz, *Münster*, 1783, 8vo.

A Life of Leibnitz, by REHBERG, is to be found in the † Hanoverian Magazine, 1787, year XXV; and another among the † Lives and Characters of distinguished Germans, by KLEIN, 1 vol.; as well as a third in the † German Pantheon, by EBERHARD.

GUHRAUER, Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibnitz: eine Biographie, (1842—1846).

355. The comprehensive genius of *Gottfried William Leibnitz* embraced the whole circle of philosophy, and imparted to it, in Germany at least, a new and powerful impulse. All that can interest or exercise the understanding was attempted by his great and original mind, more especially in Mathematics and Philosophy. He was ignorant of no one branch of learning, and in all he has shown the fertility of his mind by the discoveries he suggested or attempted. He was the founder of a school in Germany, which distinguished itself for the fundamental nature of the principles it embraced, and the systematic manner in which these were developed—a school which effected the final overthrow of the Scholastic system, and extended its beneficial influence over the whole range of the sciences. Leibnitz, by his example and his exertions, laid the foundations of this great revolution, by combining the philosophical systems which had prevailed up to his time—by his well-trained and original spirit—by his extraordinary learning—the liberality of his mind, and that spirit of toleration which led him always to discover some favourable point of view in what he criticised—something, even in the most despised and neglected systems, which might suggest matter for research. To this must be added his sense of harmony, and the infinitude of bright ideas, hints, and conjectures, which were perpetually, as it were, scintillating from his brilliant mind, though he left to others the task of collecting and combining them.

He was born June 21, 1646, at Leipsic, where his father was professor of moral philosophy, and studied the same

science under J. Thomasius (born 1622, died 1684), applying himself at the same time to the Mathematics[1] and the study of Natural Law; read the Classics in the original tongues, particularly Plato and Aristotle, whose doctrines he endeavoured at an early age to combine. The cultivation of his mind was advanced, and the versatility and address of his natural parts promoted, by immense reading and a multifarious correspondence—by his early independence of mind—by his travels, particularly to Paris and London—and by his acquaintance with the most distinguished statesmen and princes, and most illustrious sages of his time. He died, November 14, 1716, at Hanover, of which state he was a privy-councillor and keeper of the library; scarcely less honoured after his death than during his life, as is testified, among other things, by a monument recently erected to him.

§ 356.

Works: His Dissert. de Principio Individuationis. *Lips.* 1664. Specimen Quæstionum Philosophicarum ex Jure collectarum, *ibid. eod.* Tract de Arte Combinatoria, cui subnexa est Demonstratio Existentiæ Dei ad Mathematicam certitudinem exacta, *Lips.* 1666; *Frcf.* 1694. The first Philosophical Treatises of Leibnitz are to be found in the Acta Eruditorum, from 1684; and in the Journal des Savans, from 1691.

Gottfr. W. Leibnitii Opera, studio Lud. Dutens, *Genev.* 1768, 6 vols. 4to. Opera Philosophica, ed. Erdmann, roy. 8vo. *Berol.* 1840.

German works, ed. by Guhrauer, 8vo. *Berl.* 1838, *et seq.* Œuvres Philosophiques, par M. Rud. Erich Raspe et M. Kastner, *Amsterd.* 1765, 4to. The German edition contains Remarks and Additions, by J. H. F. Ulrich, *Halle*, 1778—1780, 2 vols. 8vo.

A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned M. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, in the years 1715 and 1716, relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion; *London*, 1717, 8vo.

Leibnitii Otium Hanoveranum, sive Miscellanea G. W. Leibnitii, ed. Joach. Fs. Feller, *Lips.* 1718, 8vo.; et, Monumenta varia inedita, *Lips.* 1724, 4to. Epistolæ ad Diversos, ed. Chr. Korthold, *Lips.* 1734, 1742, 4 vols. 8vo.

Commercium Epistolicum Leibnitianum, ed. Jo. Dan. Gruber, *Hanov. et Götting.* 1745, 2 vols. 4to.

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[1] Under Erh. Weigel, at Jena, (who died 1690).

Commercii Epistolici Leibnitiani typis nondum evulgati selecta specimina, ed JOH. GE. H. FEDER, *Hanov.* 1805, 8vo.

† Comparison between the Metaphysics of Leibnitz and Newton (§ 347, bibliogr.), by L. MART. KAHLE, *Götting.* 1741; translated into French, *Hague*, 1747, 8vo. A similar work (French), by BEGUELIN, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Berlin, 1756.

Recueil de Diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie, la Religion, etc., par MM. Leibnitz, Clarke, Newton (publ. par DES MAIZEAUX, *Amsterd.* 1719, second edit. 1740, 2 vols. 8vo.)

Leibnitz, Essai de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme, et l'Origine du Mal, *Amsterd.* 1710, 8vo.; 1712-14-20-48, (Lat.): *Colon.* 1716, 8vo.; *Francf.* 1719, 2 vols. 8vo. Leibnitii Tentamina Theodicæ de Bonitate Dei, Libertate Hominis, et Origine Mali. Versionis novæ editio altera cum Præf. AUG. FR. BOECKHII, *Tubing.* 1771, 2 vols. 8vo. Theodicee, oder Versuch von die Güte Gottes, &c., *Ham.* 1763.

† Doctrine of Leibnitz, etc., translated from the French by J. H. KOHLER, *Francf.* 1720, 8vo.; new edition by HUTH, *Francf.* 1740, 8vo.

Ejusd.: Principia more geometrico demonstrata, cum excerptis et Epistolis Philosophi et Scholiis quibusdam ex Historia Philosophica, auctore MICH. GOTTL. HANSCHIO, *Francf. et Lips.* 1728, 4to.

Leibnitz was led to the composition of his philosophical system by various causes: by the acute comparison he was induced to make of the most celebrated of former systems with a reference to the exigencies of his own time; by a capacity fruitful in ingenious hypotheses and in improvements or the accommodation of opposite systems; as well as by his great mathematical acquirements. His object was so completely to reform Philosophy that it might possess a strictness of demonstration analagous to that of the Mathematics, and to put an end to all disputes between its factions, as well as the differences existing between it and Theology;[1] with the hope of diminishing the principal difficulties belonging to some great questions, and, at the same time, the causes of dispute, by improving the *method* of philosophy, and ascertaining, if possible, some positive and invariable principles. It was his opinion that the same course should be pursued as in the Mathematics, which led him to prefer the method of Demonstration and the system of Rationalism; such as it had been embraced by Plato and Descartes; without entirely concurring with either. The *method* thus adopted induced him to appreciate even the

[1] Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison (in the Théodicée).

labours of the Schoolmen. *There are certain necessary Truths* (such was his opinion) *belonging to Metaphysics as well as Mathematics, the certainty of which cannot be ascertained by Experience, but must be sought within the Soul itself.* This is the corner-stone of the Rationalism of Leibnitz, who endeavoured to liberate the Cartesian system from its attendant improbabilities; without, however, effecting any accurate determination of the principal conditions of philosophical knowledge, by a profoundly penetrating Reflection, or any complete definition of its method or limits. The Rationalism of Leibnitz is especially apparent in his Theory of Knowledge, essentially opposed to that of Locke, in his Monadology and his Théodicée. Leibnitz interested himself in the investigation of the possibility of a *Characteristic* or Universal Language—which might contain in itself the art of discovering and of judging, and which might be of the same service to universal knowledge as arithmetical and algebraic signs, which express the proportion of numbers and quantity. (Œuvres Philosophiques, p. 535, sqq.; Princip. Philos. § 30, 33, 35, 37.)

357. According to Leibnitz, Necessary Truths are innate: not that we are from our birth actually conscious of them, but are born with a capacity for them. Our representations, however, differ by being clear or obscure, distinct or confused. Sensational representations are indistinct—*all precise knowledge being the property of the understanding.* The criterium of Truth which Descartes laid down (§ 334), is inadequate; the rules of Logic, which are the same in substance with the laws of Mathematics, are more appropriate to the purposes of Philosophy. All our conclusions must be founded on two grand principles; 1st. That of Identity and Contradiction. 2ndly. That of a Sufficient Basis. These two principles are as applicable to necessary as to contingent truths. Necessary truths are discoverable on the principle of Contradiction, by the analysis of compound objects into their simple elements; accidental truths, on the other hand, are ascertained by virtue of the Sufficient Basis, which conducts us to an ulterior and absolute Basis, beyond the range of what is contingent.[1] The represen-

[1] Princ. Philos. § 31—46. Théodicée, p. 1, § 44.

tations which relate to objects *without* the soul, must have a correspondency with such objects; otherwise they would be mere illusions. The ultimate foundation of innate and necessary principles resides with the Deity, as the source of all necessary and eternal Truths, which are dependent on the Divine Understanding (not the Divine *Will*) as their inner object.

LEIBNITII Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate, et Ideis; in the Acta Eruditorum, 1684.

Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, par l'Auteur de l'Harmonie pré-établie; in the Œuvres Philosophiques, published by RASPE.

358. His *Monadologia* is the central point of the system of Leibnitz, by which he believed himself to have ascertained the ultimate grounds of all real knowledge. Plato's theory, and possibly the ideas of the physician *Francis Glisson*,[1] led him to these speculations, by which he also believed himself to have found a way of reconciling the Aristotelian and Platonic systems. Experience proves to us the existence of compound objects; consequently, we are led to believe in the existence of simple ones (*Monades*) of which the other are compounded.[2] Our senses cannot apprehend these, inasmuch as they present to us knowledges or objects of which we are cognizant in their confused and compound state, the understanding alone contemplating them with precision. That which is Simple is the elementary principle of the Compounded, and as the former cannot be distinctly apprehended by the senses, it appears to us multiplied and confused. The *Monades* cannot be influenced by any change from without, their principle of modification being internal to themselves; and inasmuch as all real substances must have their internal properties, by which they are mutually discriminated,[3] and as there is no other internal property but that of representation, it follows that the *Monades* are

[1] Died 1677.
Tractatus de Natura Substantiæ Energitica, sive de Vita Naturæ ejusque tribus facultatibus perceptiva, adpetitiva, et motiva, auct. FRANC. GLISSONIO, *Lond.* 1672, 4to.

[2] Princip. Philos. p. 1.

[3] "Because there cannot be two things which completely agree in their internal properties."

Spiritual powers and faculties, which are continually labouring to change their condition (or perceptions). God is the *Monas Monadum*—the necessarily existing Essence. Every real essence is a *fulguration* from His, modified by the limited nature of the being which attaches to all receptivity. The Essence of God is absolute Perfection; it embraces all possible Realities without limitation; none of them conflicting with the rest. He is the absolute and sole cause of the *actuality* of the world and the existence of all things: the all-sufficient cause, unlimited by action or condition. On this depends the proof of God's Being and Unity. God is the original source of all knowledge, Reality, and the Nature of Things. There exists, therefore, an infinite and original or primordial Monad, and also secondary, finite, and limited Monades, which latter are distinguished from one another by the degree and quality of representing. Some Monades are without Apperception (inert bodies); some possess it (souls); some are endowed with an obscure consciousness (the inferior animals); some possess a clear and perfect one (rational souls or spirits). Distinct representations are the sources of Action; obscure and confused ones, of Passion and Imperfection. Every simple substance, or Monad, forming, as it were, the Central-point of a compound substance (for instance that of an animal), is the nucleus of an infinitude of other Monades, which constitute the external body of the first; and, agreeably to the affections of these aggregated Monades, the Central Monad apprehends and, as it were, concentrates in it a common focus, the impressions of external objects. Furthermore, as every thing in this world is connected with something else, and as all bodies affect others, and are themselves affected in the ratio of their respective distances, it follows that each individual Monad is a sort of *living mirror*, endowed with an internal activity of its own, enabling it to image forth the whole Creation, being itself constituted on the same principles as the Universe at large. There exists no immediate influence (*influxus physicus*) of one simple substance on another (e. g. Soul and Body), but merely an *ideal connection:* that is, the internal affections of each Monad harmonise with those of the Monades which are in immediate connection with the first. This gives them the

appearance of being mutually influenced by each other. The cause of this correspondence is the infinite wisdom and power of God, who, at the first, so constituted all things, that there exists an universal preordained harmony, or *Harmonia præstabilita*.[1] Space is the arrangement of all things simultaneously existing; the phenomenon of Extension is the consequence of the confused manner in which such arrangement is represented by the senses; and Time is the order of successive changes which take place in the external world. Time and Space have merely an ideal and relative existence.

The following works may be consulted:

Principes de la Nature et de la Grace fondée en Raison, par feu M. le Baron de Leibnitz; dans l'Europe Savante, 1718, Novembre, Art. VI; et Recueil, etc., tom. II. See the works mentioned § 355.

Godfr. Ploucquet, Primaria Monadologiæ capita, *Berol.* 1748, 8vo.

Institutions Leibnitiennes, ou Précis de la Monadologie, *Lyon*, 1767, 8vo.

De Justi, Dissertation qui a remporté le Prix proposé par l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences de Prusse, sur le Système des Monades, *Berl.* 1748, 4to. By the same author: † Defence of the Dissertation on Monades, etc., *Francf. and Leips.* 1748, 8vo.

Beguelin, Essai d'une Conciliation de la Metaphysique de Leibnitz avec la Physique de Newton (Mem. de l'Acad. de Berl. 1756). Dans le Magasin de Hissmann, tom. 5.

† Plan of a Brief Account of Works relative to Monades or Elementary Bodies, from the time of Leibnitz to our own; in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd vols. of the Philosophical Bibliotheca of Göttingen, by Windheim, 1749.

G. Bern. Bilfinger, Commentatio de Harmonia Animi et Corporis Humani maxime præstabilita ex mente Leibnitii, *Francf. et Lips.* 1723, 8vo.; second edition, 1735, 8vo.

Ancillon (Senior), Essai sur l'Esprit du Leibnitzianisme, en Franç. dans les Dissertations de la Classe Philosophique de l'Acad. des Sciences de Berlin, 1816, 4to.

H. C. W. Sigwart, The Doctrine of Leibnitz on Pre-established Harmony, compared with his former Doctrines, *Tübingen*, 1822, 8vo.

Doctrine de L[eibnitz] sur la Monadologie, sur Dieu et son Existence, et sur l'âme humain; trad. du Français par J. H. Kohler, *Francf.* 1720, 8vo. Nouv. Ed. par T. H. Huth, *Francf.* 1740, 8vo.

Comparaison de la Metaphysique de Newton et de Leibnitz, par L. Mart. Kahle, *Gött.* 1721 (German). Traduction Fran. *La Haye*, 1747, 8vo.

[1] See Leibn. dans le Journal des Savans, 1695, p. 444 et 445.

359. The Divine Intelligence contemplates an infinitude of *possible* worlds, from among which His wisdom and goodness have selected, and His power created *the best*, i. e. the world in which the greatest number of Realities exist and harmonise with each other. (A system of *Optimism*). Hence it follows that every thing is for the best, considered as a part of the universe with which it is connected, even although in itself it should be imperfect; nor can any thing be other than what it is.[1] Every thing is so constituted as to attain in the highest possible degree its own felicity, and to contribute in the greatest degree possible to the good of the Whole. The existence of Evil is no objection. Leibnitz distinguished Evil into Metaphysical, Physical, and Moral. Metaphysical evil is nothing but the necessary limitation of the nature of finite beings, the consequences of which are physical evil (e. g. pain), and moral (sin). Moral evil has its origin in the power of choice intrusted to Finite beings. Freedom of will is not an Equilibrium or Indifference of inclination, nor yet a determination without a motive; but a free choice of one line of conduct in preference to others no less physically possible; influenced, but without constraint or necessity, by that, among many motives of action, which preponderates. It by no means interferes with this perfect freedom of election that God foresees all human actions, inasmuch as contingent and free-will actions only exclude the hypothesis of absolute, not that of conditional necessity. Every thing in the world is *conditionally necessary;* yet man, not foreseeing the future, is bound to act according to his judgment and reason. By these reasonings Leibnitz wished to oppose the system of Descartes, whose hypothesis of absolute Fate deprived even the Deity of all real influence. God does not absolutely will or ordain either physical or moral evil; but he allows the first to exist as a necessary consequence, and as means to ulterior ends; and permits also the existence of the latter, inasmuch as it is necessarily connected with the best choice that he can make, or, in other words, with the highest degree of perfection possible in the present world: His wisdom and goodness having established a harmony between the systems

[1] Principia, § lv—lx; Théodicée, i. p. 8, 9.

of Nature and Grace; in which consists the Divine Government of the world.

Leibnitz was led (as he tells us in his Preface to the Théodicée) to these speculations on the harmony between Revelation and Reason, in which he moreover takes notice of several theological dogmas, by the doubts and objections of Bayle.

Works to be consulted:

Fr. Ch. Baumeister, Historia de Doctrina de Optimo Mundo, *Gorlitii*, 1741.

Wolfart, Controversiæ de Mundo Optimo, *Jen.* 1745.

[Reinhard] Dissertation qui a remporté le Prix proposé par l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences de Prusse, sur l'Optimisme, avec les Pièces qui ont concouru, *Berlin*, 1755, 4to.

† Collection (in German) of Writings on the Doctrine of Optimism, *Rostock*, 1759, 8vo. See also the work of Werdermann, mentioned § 38. II, *c.*

† Various Writings on Occasion of the Dispute between Platner and Wezel respecting the Théodicée of Leibnitz, *Lips.* 1782, 8vo.

Leibnitii Doctrina de Mundo Optimo sub examen revocatur denuo a Chr. A. Leonh. Creuzer, *Lips.* 1795, 8vo.

Robinet, in his Book on Nature, has published a System analogous to that of Leibnitz, *Amsterd.* 1761—68, 5 vols. 8vo.

Im. Kant, Ueber das Misslingen aller Philos. Versuche einer Théodicée (in seinen kleinen Schriften, 3 Bde.) Betrachtungen über den Optimismus, *Königs.* 1759, 4to.

360. Leibnitz gives us but partial views of his doctrine; not presenting it to us as a whole, but piecemeal. *Practical* philosophy he has touched upon but slightly.[1] For the most part his system is the imperfect result of a great talent for analysis and combination; an acute comparison of the difficulties and differences presented by Philosophy and Theology; embracing a partial and incomplete investigation of the faculty of knowledge. As Locke had sought the foundation of Reality lying at the basis of all knowledge exclusively in the Absolutely Simple falling under the senses, so did he in the Absolutely Simple falling under the

[1] Consult: De Principiis Juris Observationes, 1700. Anonymi Sententia de Tractatu clar. viri Sam. Pufendorfii qui inscribitur De Officiis Hominis et Civis; in a Programma of J. C. Böhmer, 1709, 4to. † On Natural Law according to Leibnitz, see his Preface to Corpus Juris Gentium; and several of his Letters.

understanding; and asserted that it is by Thought that the nature of external things is ascertained (a system of Rationalism). He confounds Logical possibility and actuality with Real; intellectualizes appearances, and overlooks the important part which intuitional and sensational perception must always support in the acquisition of knowledge.[1] If his Idealism had been well founded, it would have established an absolute Determinism incompatible with the free agency of rational beings. Nevertheless, his philosophy, abounding in bold hypotheses and splendid observations, has promoted the cause of metaphysical science, by bringing into circulation a multitude of new ideas; to which the circumstance of his composing for the most part in French has contributed.

† Detailed Plan of a Complete History of Leibnitz, by C. G. LUDOVICI, *Leipz.* 1732, 2 parts, 8vo.

361. Leibnitz had a great number both of adherents and adversaries:[2] the former for a length of time laboriously

[2] See † EM. KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, fifth edit., p. 316, sqq.

[3] BAYLE (for instance), in his Dictionary. LEIBNITZ replied by his Eclaircissemens des Difficultés que M. BAYLE a trouvées dans le Système nouveau de l'Union de l'âme et du corps (Journal des Savans, 1698), and his Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans (1698), p. 329; with Réponse aux Reflexions dans la seconde édition de M. BAYLE, article *Rorarius*, sur le Système de l'Harmonie pré-etablie, dans l'Histoire Critique de la République des Lettres, tom. ii, et Recueil des Diverses Pièces, tom. ii, p. 389. SAM. CLARKE and NEWTON also opposed Leibnitz. We have mentioned above (§ 356) the works which relate to their disputes, etc. The ABBE FOUCHER also wrote an article against his system of pre-established Harmony, in the Journal des Savans, année 1695, p. 638, sqq., to which Leibnitz replied in the same Journal, 1696, p. 255—259: LAMY attacked him in his Connaissance du Système, etc., tom. ii, p. 225, sqq., which was met, on the part of Leibnitz, by Réponse aux Objections que le P. LAMY, Bénédictin, a faites contre le Système de l'Harmonie pré-établie, dans le Journal des Savans, 1709, p. 593. We may add to the number of his opponents all who subsequently declared against the Doctrines of WOLFF, particularly PIERRE DE CROUZAZ (§ 367) in his Critique on Pope's Essay on Man, and in his Réflexions sur l'ouvrage intitulé La Belle Wolfienne, *Lausanne*, 1743, 8vo. VATTEL defended against the last the system of Leibnitz, in his Défense du Système Leibnitien contre les Objections et les Imputations de M. Crouzaz, contenues dans l'Examen de l'Essai sur l'Homme, de Pope, *Leyde*, 1741, 8vo.

employed themselves in fortifying the outworks of their master's system; while the latter directed their attacks rather against the consequences of his philosophy than its principles. The result was an animated conflict, which kept alive the interest of philosophical research, and insensibly introduced the habit of more profound inquiries respecting the fundamental properties of human knowledge.

The system of Leibnitz, though favourably received by many distinguished professors, failed at first to obtain great influence in Germany, from its want of a systematic form. Other obstacles impeded its progress in France and England.

Among his successors we must distinguish *M. G. Hansch*,[1] and *Christian Wolf*, the most renowned advocate of this school, and the first who gave an extensive popularity to the system. He was succeeded by his pupils, *Bilfinger* and *Baumgarten* (§ 370).

Other Contemporary Philosophers.

362. About the same time two learned men of great merit attempted, with different views, a reformation in School-philosophy, still prevalent in Germany. The celebrated physicist and mathematician *E. W. von Tschirnhausen*,[2] who had studied at Leyden, and who had early attached himself to the opinions of Descartes and Spinoza, endeavoured to systematise a theory of philosophical discovery and observation, on the principle of mathematics.

[1] Born near Dantzic, 1683; died at Vienna, 1752.

M. Gottl. Hansch, Principia Philosophiæ. See § 356, bibliogr.

Ars Inveniendi, sive Synopsis Regularum Præcipuarum Artis Inveniendi, etc., 1737 (no place mentioned). Selecta Moralia, *Halæ*, 1720, 4to.

[2] Born at Kieslingswalde in Oberlausitz, 1651; died 1708.

Chr. Walth. Tschirnhausen, Medicina Mentis, sive Artis Inveniendi Præcepta Generalia, *Amstelod.* 1687; *Lips.* 1695—1705—1753, 4to.

A biography of the author was published separately at Görlitz, 1709, 8vo. See Fontenelle, Eloges, p. 166. For an opinion of his philosophical labours, see the Collection of Memoirs of G. G. Fulleborn, Fasc. V, p. 32, where are to be found extracts from his Medicina Mentis.

Christian Thomasius[1] laboured to render philosophy more popular in its character, and to disseminate a knowledge of it in his native language.[2] In Ethics he at first attached himself to the principles of Puffendorf, whom he defended against his assailants; though subsequently he withdrew from him,[3] not so much in respect of his principles as by the distinctions he made between the *Præcepta Justi, Honesti, et Decori;* and by limiting Natural Right to merely negative principles of external conduct. His views in these particulars procured him, in after-time, as much abuse from one set of philosophers as they obtained applause from another.[4] They were maintained in a more exact and

[1] Born at Leipsic, 1655; died at Halle, 1728.

[2] Consult the article on Christian Thomasius, in the Universal Biography of Schröckh.

† Chr. Thomasius, his Life and Works, by H. Luden, *Berlin*, 1805, 8vo.

† G. G. Fulleborn, On the Philosophy of Chr. Thomasius, in Fasc. IV of his Collection of Memoirs, etc.

Chr. Thomasii Introductio in Philosophiam Aulicam, seu primæ lineæ Libri de Prudentia Cogitandi atque Ratiocinandi, *Lips.* 1688, 8vo.; *Hal.* 1702. Introductio in Philosophiam Rationalem in qua omnibus Hominibus Via plana et facilis panditur, sive Syllogistica, Verum, Verisimile et Falsum discernendi, novasque veritates inveniendi, *Lips.* 1601, 8vo.

† Introduction to the Art of Reasoning, *Halle*, 1691, 8vo., (and other editions). † Exercise of the Art of Reasoning, *Halle*, 1710, 8vo. † Essay on the Existence and Nature of the Spirit, etc., *Halle*, 1699—1709, 8vo.

Chr. Thomasii Dissert. de crimine Magiæ, *Hal.* 1701, 4to.

[3] Chr. Thomasii Institutionum Jurisprudentiæ Divinæ libri III, in quibus Fundamenta Juris Nat. secundum hypotheses ill. Pufendorfii perspicue demonstrantur, etc. *Francof. et Lips.* 1688, 4to.; *Hal.* 1717, 4to. *Halle*, 1712, 4to. Fundamenta Juris Naturæ et Gentium, ex sensu communi deducta, *Hal.* 1705—1718, 4to; *Halle*, 1709. Introductio in Philosophiam Moralem cum Praxi, *Hal.* 1706.

† The Art of Living conformably to Reason and Virtue, or, an Introduction to Morality, *Halle*, 1692—1710, 8vo. † On the Cure of Unreasonable Desire, etc., *Halle*, 1696—1704, 8vo.

Fr. Schneider, Philosophia Moralis secundum Principia Thomasiana, *Hal.* 1723.

[4] They were especially attacked by G. E. Schulze, († On the Principles of Civil and Penal Right, *Götting.* 1813, preface, p. 1 and 17): as well as by the celebrated Jurist, Hugo, who calls this attempt to distinguish between Natural Right and Morality—a Moral System intended for the use of Cut-throats (*eine Todtschlagsmoral*).

methodical manner by *Ephraim Gerard*, and still more so by *Jer. Gundling*.[1] The principle of morality which Thomasius assumed was Reasonable Love, differing from unreasonable Self-love; of which, after all, it was a modification. The fruit of this Reasonable Love or Desire, is Happiness or repose of mind, constituting the ultimate object and supreme good of man. His successors (Gerard and Gundling), defined still more broadly the limits between Natural Right and Morality, and treated the former as a system of perfect right and corresponding obligation, having in view a state of nature; at the same time frequently referring to the enactments of *positive* law, especially the Roman, to which a certain degree of authority was still allowed. *Heineccius*, *The Cocceii*, and *Pütter*, have treated Natural Law with these views; their ideas being more fully developed by *Achenwall*;[2] who also turned his attention to National Law. Among the philosophers who adhered to Wolf, must be mentioned the Eclectic *Buddæus*.[3]

IV. *Wolf and his School; his adversaries, and other Contemporary Philosophers.*

Vita, Fata, et Scripta CHR. WOLFII, *Lips. et Breslav.* 1739, 8vo.

† CHR. GOTTSCHED, Historical Eulogium of Christian Baron von Wolf, *Halle*, 1755, 4to.

Life of Wolf, in the Memoirs towards a Biography of Celebrated Men, by BUSCHING, vol. I, p. 3—138.

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[1] Ephr. Gerhard died 1718; he published his Delineatio Juris Naturalis sive de Principiis Justi libri III, quibus Fundamenta Generalia Doctrinæ de Decoro accesserunt, *Jen.* 1742, 8vo.

NIC. JER. GUNDLING, born at Nuremberg 1671; died at Halle 1729; he published Via ad Veritatem Moralem, *Hal.* 1714, 8vo.; Jus Naturæ et Gentium, etc. *Hal.* 1714, 8vo.

On the Rights of Nature and Nations, etc. *Francf. and Leips.*, 1734, 4to. See his Article in the second vol. of SCHRÖCKH, † Biography of Celebrated Literary Characters, etc.

[2] Born at Elbingen, 1686; died 1756.

GOTTFR. ACHENWALL, Jus Naturæ, *Gött.* 1750, seventh edition, cum Præfat. de SELCHOW, 1781, 2 vols. 8vo. Observationes Juris Nat. et Gent. Spec. I—IV, *Götting.* 1754, 4to. Prolegomena Juris Nat. *Gött.* 1758, fifth edition, 1781.

[3] J. F. Budde, born 1697; died 1729.

CHR. WOLFII Dissertat. inauguralis: Philosophia Practica Universalis Methodo Mathematica conscripta, *Lips.* 1701, 4to.

KLUGE, Christian von Wolf, der Philosoph: Ein biographisches Denkmal, 1831.

CHR. WOLF'S Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes, *Halle,* 1710, 8vo. u. öfter. Auch lateinisch. Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, *Frankf. u. Leipz.* 1719, 8vo.; 6te Ausg. 1736. Anmerkungen dazu, *Frankf.* 1724, 1727, 1733, 8vo. Versuche zur Erkenntniss der Natur und Kunst. 3 vols. *Halle,* 1721—23, 8vo. Vernünftige Gedanken von den Wirkungen der Natur, *Halle,* 1723, 8vo. Von den Absichten der natürlichen Dinge, *Frankf.* 1724, 8vo. Von des Menschen Thun und Lassen, *Halle,* 1720. Von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen und dem gemeinen Wesen, *Halle,* 1721, 8vo. Institutiones Juris Naturæ et Gentium, *Hal.* 1750, 8vo.; *Deutsch.* 1754, 8vo. Nachricht von seinen eignen Schriften, die er in Deutscher Sprache in verschiedenen Theilen der Weltweisheit herausgegeben, *Frankf.* 1726, 8vo. Gesammelte kleine philosophische Schriften, *Halle,* 1740, 4 Th. 8vo.

Latin Works: Luculenta Commentatio de Differentia nexus Rerum Sapientis et Fatalis Necessitatis, necnon Systematis H. P. et Hypothesium Spinozæ, 1723. Oratio de Sinarum Philosophia, *Hal.* 1726, 4to. Philosophia Rationalis, sive Logica Methodo Scientifica pertractata, *Francf.* et *Lips.* 1728, 4to.; second edition, 1732. Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia, *ibid.* 1730. Cosmologia Generalis, *ibid.* 1731. Psychologia Empirica, *ibid.* 1732. Psychologia Rationalis, *Francf.* et *Lips.* 1734. Theologia Naturalis, 1736, 1737, 2 vols. 4to. Philosophia Practica Universalis, *ibid.* 1738, 1739, 2 vols. 4to. Jus Naturæ, 1740, 8 vols. 4to. Philosophia Moralis, sive Ethica, *Hal.* 1750, 4 vols. 4to. Philosophia Civilis, sive Politica, fortgesetzt von MICH. CHR. HANOVIUS, *Hal.* 1746, 4 vols. 4to. Jus Gentium, *Hal.* 1750, 4to.

† C. GUNTHER LUDOVICI, Plan of a History of the Wolfian Philosophy, second edition, *Lips.* 1737, 3 parts, 8vo. † Fresh Developments of the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Philosophy, *Leips.* 1730, 8vo. † Collection, etc. of all the Controversial Works published on the subject of the Wolfian Philosophy, *Leips.* 1737, two parts, 8vo.

† G. VOLKMAR HARTMANN, Introduction to the History of the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Philosophy, and the Controversy excited on the subject, by Professor LANGE, *Francf.* and *Lips.* 1737, 8vo.

† A. MEISSNER, Philosophical Lexicon adapted to the System of Chr. Wolf, and collected from his German Writings, *Bayreuth* and *Hof,* 1737, 8vo.

363. *Christian Wolf* was born at Breslau, in 1679, and was formed to become one of the most profound philosophers of the Dogmatic School by the study of the Mathematics, of the Cartesian philosophy, and of the *Medicina*

Mentis of Tschirnhausen. He was by nature possessed of less invention than powers of analysis, and talents for systemization; with considerable powers of *popular* expression. These advantages he employed in the illustration and defence of the Leibnitzian system, with singular success. By his elementary works, in German, he completed the downfall of the Scholastic philosophy in the universities of Germany; to which Thomasius also contributed. He materially improved the habits of thought of his countrymen, by promoting their progress in science, and the cultivation of order, method, and systematic arrangement. In 1707 he became professor of Mathematics at Halle, and after a long controversy with his colleagues (among others with *J. J. Lange* (§ 366), who accused him of Atheism), he was driven from his chair (1723), and retired to Marburg, where he taught as professor of Moral Philosophy. He was honourably recalled to Halle (1740), by Frederick II.; and died there April 9th, 1754; having outlived his reputation.

364. Wolf was the first philosopher who sketched out a complete Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences, and, in a great measure, filled up his outline. He divides *speculative* philosophy into Logic and Metaphysics; of which Metaphysics comprehends Ontology, Rational Psychology (to be distinguished from Empirical), Cosmology and Theology. *Practical* philosophy he subdivides into Universal practical Philosophy, Ethics, Natural Rights and Law, and Politics. These subdivisions of Moral Philosophy, with the addition of Æsthetics, or, the Theory of Taste, are at the present day generally adopted. As for the *matter* of his Philosophy, he found it for the most part supplied by others. He adopted the views of Leibnitz, with the exception of the perspective faculties of the Monades, which he absolutely rejected, and of the Pre-established Harmony, which he confined to the relation of the body and the soul. He may be said to have given a new edition of the Leibnitzian system, under the form of a dogmatical Dualism;[1] and filled up some of the lacunæ it contained, either by the addition of new matter of his own, or a skilful development of his master's views. His chief merit consists in the unity of plan

[1] A Dualism, it will be remembered, implies the recognition of *two* elementary principles.—Ed.

he has preserved, and the consecutiveness of his argumentation, which is the effect of a rigorous application of what is called the mathematical method, and which he declares to be nothing more than an exact adaptation of the laws of Logic. The improvements which Wolf thus brought about, consisted in a more exact arrangement, a clearer definition of conceptions, and greater precision in the *language* of philosophy. The main defects of his system were, an affectation of demonstrating everything, an exclusive attention to the principle of Thought, a neglect of the difference between the material and formal conditions of knowledge, a tendency to regard Philosophy as the science of the Possible, as far as it is possible, and a disposition to exalt *contradiction* into an universal principle of all science. He also committed the error of placing Conceptions and Definitions of names at the head of the sciences. It must be added that he maintained it to be impossible to discriminate between knowledge derived from the reason and that acquired by experience; limited the operations of the mind to the mere perception of representations; and in short, overlooked the characteristics which distinguish Philosophy from the Mathemathics, in respect of Form and Matter. His system led him to the construction of a number of useless and tedious formulæ, which, by the emptiness of their conceptions, and the sweeping nature of their demonstrations, could have no other effect but that of inspiring disgust and contempt for speculative researches in general, and particularly for those of Metaphysics. His theory, like that of Leibnitz, favours the doctrine of Determinism, or moral Fatalism.

365. Wolf chiefly constituted an epoch, especially in practical philosophy, by his solid genius. He laboured to ascertain some fundamental principle from which he might deduce the whole system of Practice, and connect its details with its general theory, which he was the first among modern philosophers to attempt. Such a fundamental principle he believed himself to have discovered in the idea of Perfection, and thought that experiment confirmed his observation. He defined those actions to be *good* which *perfect our condition*, i.e. produce or tend to produce an unison between our condition as it was, as it is, and as it will be; and *evil* those which produce the

contrary effect, or are the causes of a discrepancy and discordancy in our state at different periods. Free actions are hence necessary also, and derive their qualities of evil and good from their consequences and results, and not from an original distinction made by the Divine Will. Virtue is, consequently the aptitude to make perfect our condition. The grand rule of virtue is *Perfice teipsum:* do that which may perfect your own condition, or that of another, and avoid all that can render it imperfect. This is a law of our spiritual Nature, to which even the Atheist is subject, but which is also in harmony with the Divine Will. In the province of Jurisprudence this law takes the form of compulsion (*dürfen*); in Morality it takes that of duty (*sollen*). Reason suggests what will perfect or render imperfect our state, and consequently all moral good is dependent on knowledge, all moral evil the consequence of defective knowledge. The consciousness of our perfection or approximation to perfection, bestows contentment; a state of contentment confers happiness; and the consciousness of a continued and uninterrupted progress towards perfection is the highest good of man.[1] From these principles Wolf deduces the subordinate laws of Morals, of Natural Right (comprehending a general theory of Rights and Duties),[2] and of Polity, with great apparent facility, and much display of detailed information. The unity and consecutiveness of his system gave it a prodigious advantage, to which must be added, the circumstance that he made the Reason the source of knowledge in morality. Its faults were the vagueness of its leading conception, the difficulty of deducing from such a principle the obligations of morality, and the absence of an adequate *motive* for virtuous action; defects which

[1] For WOLF'S Works on Ethics, see § 363; and J. AUG. EBERHARD'S *Sittenlehre*. See § 367, notes.

[2] In this respect he has been followed by most of the writers who have treated of Natural Law. BAUMGARTEN (§ 370) and H. KOHLER alone reduced this subject to the narrow limits to which it had been confined by GUNDLING (§ 362).

The principal authors who have treated the subject with the views of Wolff, are: NETTELBLADT (§ 370), DARJES (§ 368), and the Jurist J. C. F. MEISTER, † Rudiments of Natural Law, *Francf. on Oder*, 1809, 8vo. The Eclectics HŒPFNER (died 1797), and ULRICH (died 1813), differed from this school only on minor questions.

the great abilities of many disciples of his school have not been able to palliate. In reality it is a system of Rationalism only in appearance, and from the want of a complete elucidation of the moral consciousness, ends in one of Eudæmonism (§ 368). Nevertheless, some particular subjects have been treated by members of this school, not unsuccessfully; particularly by *Thom. Abbt.*[1]

ADVERSARIES OF WOLF, AND ECLECTICS.

366. Jealousy of Wolf, in addition to other more justifiable motives, raised up a formidable antagonist to his system in the person of *John Joachim Lange*,[2] who sounded the alarm against it, as a mass of Fatalism and Atheism, destructive alike of religion and government. His strictures presently excited the same apprehensions in other learned men, such as *Dan. Strähler*,[3] *J. Fr. Müller*,[4] etc. and brought about a decree against the publication of Wolf's doctrines in the Universities. The greater part of the adversaries of that philosopher were men of narrow minds and prejudiced opinions; some few were actuated by more laudable motives, the desire of maintaining perfect

[1] Born at Ulm, 1738; died 1766.

Thom. Abbt, Vom Tode für das Vaterland, *Bresl.* 1761, 8vo. Vom Verdienste, *Berl.* 1765, 8vo.

[2] Born at Gardelegen, 1670: professor of Theology at Halle, from 1709 to 1744.

J. Joach. Lange, Causa Dei et Religionis Naturalis adversus Atheismum, etc. *Hal.* 1723, 8vo. Modesta Disquisitio novi Philosophiæ Systematis de Deo, Mundo, et Homine, et præsertim harmonia commercii inter Animam et Corpus præstabilita, *Hal.* 1723, 4to. (The author endeavours to demonstrate the agreement, in this particular, of the doctrines of Spinoza with those of Leibnitz). Placidæ Vindiciæ Modestæ Disquisitionis, *ibid.* Eod.: Bescheidene ausführliche Entdeckung der Falschen und Schädlichen Philosophie, *Halle*, 1724, 4to. Nova Anatome, seu Idea Analytica Systematis Metaphysici Wolfiani, *Francof.* et *Lips.* 1726, 4to.

A Complete Collection of the Works published during the Controversy between Wolf and Lange was printed at Marburg, 1737, 8vo.

[3] Objections to the Rational Thoughts of M. Wolf on God, etc. pt. I, *Halle*, 1723, 8vo., part II, 1724. Wolf replied by his Sure Method in answer to False and Calumnious Imputations, 1723.

[4] † Objections to the Rational Thoughts of Wolf on the Faculties of the Human Intellect, etc., *Giessen*, 1731, 8vo.

freedom of discussion, and hatred of party-spirit; but almost all directed their views only to the consequences of his system without ascending to its principles. A small number examined it with more enlarged views, and acquired a durable reputation, such as *Andreas Rüdiger* (following §), *J. P. de Crouzaz* (the same), and more particularly *Chr. Aug. Crusius* (§ 368), and *J. G. Darjes* (the same). Most of the controversies affected less the general theory of Wolf and Leibnitz than particular doctrines, for instance, the Monadologia; the Pre-established Harmony; Free-will and Determinism. Some fine observations relative to *Method* were occasionally elicited.

367. *Andreas Rüdiger*[1] distinguished himself as an Eclectic of an original character, of great acuteness and learning; detected many imperfections inherent in the system of philosophy then prevalent, and endeavoured to reform it. He repeatedly changed, however, his own views; nor was his mind sufficiently profound to enable him to arrive at a well founded system. He rendered considerable service to Dialectics (though he erred in confounding the province of Logic with that of Metaphysics), and particularly in his elucidation of the doctrine and theory of Probability, which in a great measure had been neglected. His thoughts on the two methods of *sensible* and *intellectual* demonstration (Mathematical and Metaphysical), contain some valuable hints, and the germs of a clear distinction between Mathematics and moral philosophy. He made Feeling and Reality the ultimate foundation of philosophical truth. He maintained the spirituality of the soul, yet supposed it to possess extension, like all other created essences. Elasticity he held to be the characteristic property of Body. He attacked Wolf on the subject of Pre-established Harmony, asserting that it was incompatible with the free-agency of man. As a teacher he had considerable influence.[2]

[1] Born at Rochlitz, 1673: was the pupil of Thomasius (§ 362); and died at Leipzic, 1731.

[2] ANDR. RUDIGERI Disp. de eo, quod omnes Ideæ oriantur a Sensione, *Lipsiæ*, 1704. De Sensu Veri et Falsi, libri IV, *Hal.* 1709, 8vo. second edition, *Lips.* 1722, 4to. Philosophia Synthetica, *Hal.* 1707; second edition, with this title: Institutiones Eruditionis, 1711, 8vo.; third edition, corrected, 1717. Physica Divina, Recta Via, eademque media inter Superstitionem et Atheismum, etc. *Francof. ad M.* 1716.

Jean Pierre de Crouzaz (§ 366) instituted a most complete examination of the system of Wolf.[1] He was an Eclectic, as was *J. F. Buddeus*[2] (§ 362), *J. G. Walch*,[3] *S. C. Hollmann*,[4] with several other learned men of that day. His works contain a rich fund of excellent remarks and judicious opinions.

368. *Chr. Aug. Crusius*, by his acuteness as a reasoner, has deserved the first place among the opponents of Wolf. He was born at Leune near Merseburg, in 1712, and having studied under Rüdiger, became professor of theology and philosophy at Leipsic; where he died in 1775. The dis-

4to. Philosophia Pragmatica, *Lips.* 1723, 8vo. † Opinions of Wolf respecting the Nature of the Soul. etc., with the Objections of Rudiger, 1727, 8vo.

[1] J. P. DE CROUZAZ, Observations Critiques sur l'Abrégé de la Logique de M. Wolf, *Genève*, 1744, 8vo. (cf § 360, note[3]). La Logique, ou Système des Reflexions qui peuvent conduire à la netteté et à l'étendue de nos Connaissances, *Amst.* 1712, 8vo.; third edition, *Amst.* 1725, 4 vols. 12mo. Logicæ Systema, *Genev.* 1724, 11 vols. 8vo. Translated into English under the title of Art of Thinking, 2 vols. 8vo. 1724. De Mente Humana Substantia a corpore distincta et immortali, Dissert. Philosophica Theologica, *Gröning.* 1726, 4to. De l'Esprit Humain, *Bâle*, 1741, 4to. Traité du Beau, *Amsterd.* 1712; second edition, 1724, 2 vols. 12mo. Traité de l'Education des Enfans, *La Haye*, 1722, 2 vols. 12mo.

[2] Born 1667; Died 1729.

JO. FRANC. BUDDEI Elementa Philosophiæ Instrumentalis, sive Institutionum Philosophiæ Eclecticæ, tom. I—III, *Hal.* 1703, 8vo. sixth edition, 1717. Elementa Philos. Theoreticæ, *ibid.* 1703, 8vo. and other editions. Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, *Jen.* 1717. † Thoughts on the Philosophical System of M. Wolf, *Fribourg*, 1724. † A Modest Reply to the Observations of Wolf, *Jena*, 1724, 8vo.; and, † A Modest Proof that the Difficulties proposed by BUDDEUS are well founded. Elementa Philosophiæ Practicæ, 1695, 8vo. and other editions. Selecta Jur. Nat. et Gent. *Hal.* 1704—1717, 8vo.

[3] Born at Meiningen, 1695; died 1775.

G. WALCH. † Introduction to Moral Philosophy, *Leips.* 1729, 8vo. The same in Latin, 1730, 8vo. † Philosophical Dictionary, *Leips.* 1726, and other editions.

[4] Born at Alstettin, 1696; died 1787.

He was one of the earliest antagonists of Wolf, whom he attacked in his Commentatio Philosophica de Harmonia inter Animam et Corpus præstabilita, *Viteb.* 1724, 4to. Institutiones Philosophicæ, 2 vols. *Viteb.* 1727. Paulo uberior in omnem Philosophiam Introductio, tom. I, *Viteb.* 1734, tom. II, III, *Gott.* 1737—1740, 8vo. Philosophia Prima quæ Metaphysica vulgo dicitur, *Gotting.* 1747, 8vo. Diss. de Vera Philosophiæ Notione, *Viteb.* 1728, 4to.

inclination for Wolf's system, which he had imbibed from his preceptor, was confirmed by a sincere attachment to the theological system, and by his practical sense. He endeavoured to discover the true system in unison with sound Reason and Theology, which might correct the errors of Wolf's theory, especially objecting to the abuse of the principle of "a Sufficient Principle or Basis." His mind, however, was not sufficiently profound nor liberal, nor his reflection on the human mind sufficiently comprehensive to enable him to detect and expose the leading errors of the Dogmatism of his day. Consequently he was unable to effect any real reformation, though his views were, in many respects, more correct than those of his contemporaries. He became the author of an ingenious, well-digested, consistent, and harmonious system; but frequently lost himself in capricious hypotheses, and mystical views.[1] According to him, *Philosophy is the sum of rational truths, of which the objects are durable in their nature.* It is distinguished from Mathematics by its Object and Method. It comprehends Logic, Metaphysics, and Practical Philosophy (*Disciplinarphilosophie*). Instead of the principle of Contrariety or Contradiction, which Wolf had adopted as the foundation of his system, he lays down that of *Thinkableness** (*Gedenkbarkeit*) which comprehends, as he asserts, the fundamental principles of Contradiction, Inseparability, and Incompatibility; and assigns as the proximate reason of the certainty of human knowledge, the impulse of which we are conscious, and (as it were) a sort of *internal constraint* and inclination

[1] Christ. Aug. Crusius, Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss, *Leipz.* 1747, 8vo. Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, insofern sie den zufälligen entgegengesetzt werden, *Leipz.* 1745, 8vo. Dissertatio de Usu et Limitibus Rationis sufficientis, *Lips.* 1752. De summis Rationis Principiis, *Lips.* 1752, 8vo. Abhandl. von dem rechten Gebrauche und der Einschränkung des sogenannten Satzes vom zureichenden oder besser determinirenden Gründe, n. A. *Leipz.* 1766, 8vo. Anleitung üb. natürl. Begebenheiten ordentlich. u. vorsichtig nachzudenken, 2 B. *Leipz.* 1774, 8vo.

Justin Elias Wustemann, Einleit. in das Lehrgebäude des Hrn. Dr. Crusius, *Wittenb.* 1751, 8vo.

* The reader will pardon our drawing slightly on the Anglo-Saxon bank, in order to meet the exigencies entailed on us by plunging deeper into the fathomless ocean of German Metaphysics.—Ed.

of the Understanding to accept certain things as truths: referring to the Divine Veracity as the ultimate foundation of all ascertained Truth.

In Logic he sets out from psychological inquiries, attributing to the soul a plurality of faculties. In Metaphysics he limits and restricts the 'Sufficient Principle or Basis' of his adversaries, by distinguishing between the Essential Cause and the Causal (*Existential- und Causalursache*); and by assuming as the principle of Free-agency that of Original Activity; which theory implied that of Indifferentism. He examined with accuracy the idea of Existence, and maintained that Space and Time were Abstracts of Existence; which compelled him to consider them as attributes of God and elementary substances. He rejected the customary proofs of a Divinity, derived from the conception of a Perfect Being, because it was confounding, as he asserted, real with ideal existence; and also that deduced from the contingent objects of the material world; and, instead, attempted to draw one from the Contingency of Substances. He attributed to the Deity a supreme free-agency, infinite and unrestricted; acknowledged Him to be the sole Creator and Governor of the world; asserted His will to be the only law of reasonable beings; and His glory the final cause of the creation. On account of this view of the indifferent Freedom of God and of created beings, he was led to reject the Optimism of Leibnitz. Another Eclectic, very popular in his day, *Joach. J. Darjes*,[1] resembled Crusius in many of his opinions. In practical philosophy he more approximated Wolf.

369. In *Morals*,[2] Crusius drew his conclusions not from

[1] Born at Güstron, 1714; died professor of Moral Philosophy at Frankfort on the Oder, 1791.

Jo. Ge. Darjes, Via ad Veritatem, *Jen.* 1755; 1776, 8vo. (German). Elementa Metaphysicès, *Jen.* 1743-44, 2 vols. 4to. Anmerkungen über einige Sätze der Wolfischen Metaphysik, *Frankf. u. Leipz.* 1748. 4to. Philosophische Nebenstunden, *Jen.* 1749—1752. IV Sammlungen. 8vo. Erste Gründe der Philosophischen Sittenlehre, *Jen.* 1755, 8vo. Institutiones Jurisprudentiæ Universalis, *Jen.* 1745, 8vo.

See Schlichtegroll's Nekrolog. for the year 1792, 2 vols.

[2] Crusius, Anweisung vernünftig zu leben, darinnen nach Erklärung des menschl. Willens die naturl. Pflichten und die allgem. Klugheits-

the conceptions of the intellect, but the suggestions of the will and conscience. He derived the notion of duty from moral necessity or *obligation.* He asserted the free-agency of the human mind (which he contemplated principally in a negative point of view, i. e. as uninfluenced by physical or material laws), and developed the formal conditions of our free-will actions, and the motives of them. The principle of a moral law led him to that of a moral Governor and Legislator, and consequently to the hypothesis which ascribes all moral obligations and laws to the Divine Authority, deducing, as the Schoolmen had done, the principles of Morals from the Will of God. *That which is consistent with the nature of the divine perfections, and accords with the designs of God, is good; and becomes obligatory on all rational beings.* God demands of His rational creation, in the first place, that they should be good; and also wills their happiness as a consequence of virtue.

This system contains many excellent and true remarks, and some well-founded though incomplete distinctions between Necessity and Duty, or Obligation—Happiness and Virtue; but founded as it is upon an external principle of obligation, and without a determinate notion of virtue, it is far from the perfection necessary to the ends of science.

DISSEMINATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF WOLF AND HIS ADHERENTS.

370. In spite of all his opponents and persecutions (especially in the first quarter of the eighteenth century), Wolf had many followers, and became the founder of a School which was long the prevailing one (especially during the second quarter of the eighteenth century), and possessed great influence through the talents of those who espoused it. The Leibnitzo-Wolfian theory was at first defended, enlarged, and applied, in a form decidedly Scholastic. Subsequently, a greater degree of good taste and a more liberal style was

lehren im richtigen Zusammenhange vorgetragen werden, *Leipz.* 1744, 3te Aufl. 1767, 8vo.

adopted by its adherents, after the manner of the French and English writers.[1]

The most celebrated disciples of Wolf were: *G. Bern. Bilfinger*, or more properly *Büllfinger*,[2] *L. Ph. Thummig*,[3] and among the Theologians, the provost *J. G. Reinbeck*,[4] *I. Gottl. Canz*,[5] *J. P. Reusch*,[6] and *G. H. Riebov* or *Ribbov*.[7]

[1] K. Gunther Ludovici, Ausführlicher Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Wolfischen Philosophie. 2te Ausg. *Leipz.* 1737, III Th. 8vo. Neueste Merkwürdigkeiten der Leibnitz-Wolfischen Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1738, 8vo. Sammlung und Auszüge der sämmtlichen Streitschriften wegen der Wolfischen Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1737, II Th. 8vo.

[2] Professor at Tübingen; born 1693, died 1750.

Ge. Bern. Bilfinger, Dilucidationes Philosophicæ de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, et Generalibus Rerum Affectionibus, *Tubing.* 1725, 4to; 1740—1768. Præcepta Logica, curante Chph. Frid. Vellnagell, *Jen.* 1729, 8vo. Cf. Bibliog. § 359. Et: Epistolæ Amœbeæ Bulfingeri et Hollmanni de Harmonia Præstabilita, 1728. De Triplici Rerum Cognitione, Historica, Philosophica, et Mathematica, *Tubing.* 1722, 4to. Commentationes Philosophicæ de Origine et Permissione Mali, præcipue Moralis, *Francf. et Leips.* 1724, 8vo.

[3] Born at Culmbach, 1697; died professor at Cassel, 1728.

Lud. Phil. Thummig, Institutiones Philosophiæ Wolfianæ, *Francof. et Lips.* 1725-26, 8vo., 2 vols. (A brief account of Wolf's system). De Immortalitate Animæ ex intima ejus Natura demonstrata, *Hal.* 1721. De Principio Jur. Nat. Wolfiano, *Cassellis*, 1724. Meletemata varii et rarioris Argumenti in unum volumen collecta.

For an account of his other works, consult Hartmann, † Introduction to the History of the Systems of Leibnitz and Wolf, (mentioned above), p. 1106.

[4] Born at Zelle, 1682; died 1741.

See his † Preface on the Advantages of Philosophy in the study of Theology, prefixed to Considerations on the Sacred Truths contained in the Confession of Augsburg, etc., *Berl. et Leips.* 1731, 4to.

[5] Born at Tubingen, 1690; died 1753.

Isr. Gottl. Canz, Philosophiæ Leibnitzianæ et Wolfianæ Usus in Theologia, *Francof. et Lips.* 1728—1734, 8vo. Disciplinæ Morales omnes, etc., *Lips.* 1739, 8vo. Anthologia, *Tübing.* 1741, 8vo.

[6] Born at Almersbach, 1691; died professor of Theology at Jena, 1757.

Joh. Peter Reusch, Via ad Perfectiones Intellectus Compendiaria, *Isenaci*, 1728, 8vo. Systema Logicum, *Jen.* 1734, 8vo. Systema Metaphysicum antiquiorum atque recentiorum, *Jen.* 1735, 8vo.

[7] Born near Götting., 1724; died 1774.

† Riebovius, Expansion of the Ideas of M. Wolf, respecting the Deity, etc., *Francf. et Leips.* 1726; and Dissertatio de Anima Brutorum, (added to his edition of Rorarius), *Helmst.* 1729, 8vo.

To these must be added the Jurists *J. A. F. von Ickstadt*,[1] *John G. Heineccius* (born at Eisenberg, 1680; died a professor at Halle, 1741), *J. Ulr. von Cramer*,[2] and *Dan. Nettelbladt*,[3] *J. J. Schiersmidt*;[4] but especially *J. H. Winckler*,[5] *J. Chph. Gottsched*,[6] *J. A. Ernesti*,[7] *Fr. Ch. Baumeister*,[8] *Martin Knutzen*[9] (the three last distinguished themselves by useful elementary works); and, above all, *Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten*.[10] The last greatly distinguished himself by a skilful analysis of our conceptions, by several new hints, and by the first attempt yet made at a system of Æsthetics (or

[1] Born 1702; died 1776.

De Ickstadt, Elementa Juris Gentium, *Wirceb.* 1740, 4to. Opuscula Juridica, *Ingolst. et Aug. Vindel.*, 1747, 2 vols. 4to.

[2] Born at Ulm, 1706; died 1776.

Jo. Ulrici Cramer, Usus Philosophiæ Wolfianæ in Jure, *Marb.* Specimina XIII, 1740, 4to. Opuscula, *Marb.* 1742, 4 vols. 4to.

[3] Born at Rostock, 1719; died 1791.

Dan. Nettelbladt, Systema Elementare Universæ Jurisprudentiæ Naturalis usui Jurisprudentiæ positivæ accommodatum, *Hal.* 1749; fifth edition, 1785, 8vo.

[4] Died professor of Law at Erlangen, 1778.

[5] Born at Leipsic, 1703; died 1772.

J. H. Winckler, Institutiones Philos. Wolfianæ, etc., usibus Academicis accommodatæ, *Lips.* 1735, 8vo.

[6] Born near Königsberg, 1700; died 1776.

J. Chph. Gottsched, † First Principles of all Philosophy, etc., *Leips.* 1734, 2 vols. 8vo.; second edition, 1735—36.

[7] Born at Tennstädt, 1701; died 1781.

[8] Born 1708; died at Görlitz, 1785.

Fr. Chr. Baumeister, Philos. Definitiva, hoc est, Definitiones Philosophicæ ex Systemate libri Baronis a Wolf, in unum collectæ, *Viteb.* 1735, 8vo,; 1762.

[9] Died 1751.

Mart. Knutzen, Elementa Philosophiæ Rationalis, sive Logica, *Regiomont.* 1771, 8vo.

On the Immateriality of the Soul, *Francf.* 1744, 8vo.

Systema Causarum Efficientium, *Lips.* 1745, 8vo.

[10] Born at Berlin, 1714; died at Frankfort on the Oder, 1762.

Alex. Gottl. Baumgarten, Philosophia Generalis, edidit cum Dissert. præmiali de Dubitatione et Certitudine, J. Chr. Forster, *Hal.* 1770, 8vo. Metaphysica, *Hal.* 1732, 8vo. Ethica Philosophica, *Hal.* 1740, 8vo. Jus Naturæ, *Hal.* 1765, 8vo. De Nonnullis ad Poëma pertinentibus, *Hal.* 1735, 4to. Æsthetica, *Francof. ad Viadrim.* 1750—58, 2 vols. 8vo.; second edition, *Francf.* 1759.

Consult G. Fr. Meier, † Life of Baumgarten, *Halle*, 1763, 8vo.

the principles of Taste). He described philosophy as the science of properties, which can be known by other means than that of Faith. *G. Fr. Meier*,[1] a disciple of the former, commented on the treatises of his master, and enlarged on certain questions.

371. Gradually (about the middle of the eighteenth century) this school lost much of its credit, and the peculiar and pedantic formalities of the Wolfians were turned into ridicule.[2] Metaphysics, too, sank in the public esteem; and the minds of men became directed more to the variety and multiplicity of objects to which a principle may be applied, and less to the investigation of a simple principle itself: to the extension of the limits of philosophy, rather than to the consolidation of that which was already acquired. The empiricism of Locke daily gained ground, and in consequence of this and of the prevailing spirit of the age, and a renewed taste for the *history* of philosophy, a syncretical, eclectic, and popular spirit began to prevail, more adapted to pursuits of elegance and popular utility, than to the abstract research of remote principles.

[1] Died at Halle, 1777.

Sam. Gotth. Lange, Leben C. F. Meier's, *Halle*, 1778, 8vo.

Ge. Fr. Meier, Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst, *Halle*, 1756, 8vo. Metaphysik, *Halle*, 1756, 4 Bde, 8vo. Beweis, dass die menschliche Seele ewig lebt. 2te Aufl., *Halle*, 1754, 8vo. Vertheidigung desselben, *Halle*, 1763. Beweis, dass keine Materie denken könne. Beweis der vorherbestimmten Uebereinstimmung, *Halle*, 1743, 8vo. Theoretische Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen, *Halle*, 1744. Versuch eines neuen Lehrgebäudes von d. Seelen der Thiere, *Halle*, 1756, 8vo. Gedanken von dem Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode; Beurtheilung des abermaligen Versuchs einer Theodicee; Gedanken von der Religion. Anfangsgründe der schönen Wissenschaften, *Halle*, 1748; 2te Aufl. 1754, III Th. 8vo. Philosophische Sittenlehre, *Halle*, 1753—1761; 5 Th. 8vo. Betrachtung über die natürliche Anlage zur Tugend und zum Laster, *Halle*, 1776, 8vo. Recht der Natur, *Halle*, 1767, 8vo. Versuch von der Nothwendigkeit einer nähern Offenbarung, *Halle*, 1747, 8vo. Untersuchung verschiedner Materien aus der Weltweisheit, *Halle*, 1768—1771, 4 Th. 8vo.

[2] The French spirit of *persiflage* contributed much to this effect. Witness the *Candide* of Voltaire, first published 1757.

See, A Complete Collection of the Controversial Writings published in the course of the Dispute between Maupertuis and Samuel König, *Leips.* 1758, 8vo.

EMPIRICAL MYSTICISM.

Swedenborg.

Emanuel Swedenborg, a Biography; by J. J. G. WILKINSON, *Lond.* 1849.

EMERSON'S Representative Men (containing Swedenborg the Mystic). H. G. Bohn, *Lond.* 1849.

TAFEL, Sammlung von Urkunden betreffend das Leben und der Character Eman. Swedenborg's, *Tubingen.*

CLOWES, Letters to an M.P. on Swedenborg.

HINDMARSH, Vindication of the Character of Swedenborg, 12mo.

ANDESKADAREN SWEDENBORG, *Stockholm*, 1851.

SVENSKT, Biographiskt Lexicon, öfver namnkunnige Svenske, mäu Article 'Emanuel Swedenborg.'

See also part II of DR. KAHL'S work: Nya Kyrkan, *Lund.* 1852, containing much new information on Swedenborg.

372. About this time there appeared a man, whose merits were overlooked by the contemporary and succeeding generations, but who has assumed a loftier stature and mightier proportions as years have rolled on, and distance has enabled us more justly to estimate his altitude. *Emanuel Swedenborg* occupies a prominent position among the master-minds of humanity. Sprung from an eminent Swedish family, he was born at Stockholm in 1688, and passed a considerable part of his life tranquilly in London, where he closed a long and happy career in 1772. In his earlier years he devoted himself with ardour to the physical sciences, and explored them with a keen spirit of research, anticipating many subsequent inquiries. A tendency to spirituality may be traced even in his earlier scientific works, though it was reserved for his later years to develop his gift of Seership. On attaining his fifty-seventh year (A. D. 1745), he threw aside material researches, and dived into the mysteries of the spiritual world, which he has reported with a clearness, dignity, and consistency that have seldom if ever been emulated. It is not our province or purpose to decide the question of his Seership, but we may be permitted to remark that to all impartial and reflecting minds his historical appearance presents a problem that still awaits solution. The smile of incredulity begins to die upon the lips of the conscientious sceptic, and the opprobrious terms 'dreamer' and 'madman' are yielding to

the more courteous epithet of Mystic. In vain will you ransack the archives of his family or personal history for a trace of insanity. Equally fruitless will be your endeavour to trace any symptoms of incoherence or raving in his methodical pages. If he must needs be mad, there is a rare method in his madness; and if the world insists on his being a visionary, it must admit that his visions are something anomalous in their systematic and mathematical form. But we have yet to learn that visionaries and dreamers can write a cool business-like style, and pen dry and well-digested folios; nor is it a common thing to find a madman deficient in sallies of imagination, and remarkable for strong common sense. Such is the problem and anomaly presented by this remarkable man, whose gift of seership is attested by such characters as Kant and the sister of the great Frederic.[1] The solution we leave to the skill of the gentle reader, as it does not fall within our province.

His Philosophy.

Swedenborg's principal philosophical and theological works are:

Swedenborgii Opera philosophica et mineralia, *Dresd.* 1734, 3 vols. folio.

Œconomia Regni Animalis, 2 vols. 4to. *Lond.* 1740–41; *Amst.* 1742.

Regnum animale, anatomice, physice, et philosophice perlustratum, *Hag. Com.* 1744–5, 3 vols. 4to. The same, translated, with remarks, &c., by J. J. G. Wilkinson, 2 vols. 8vo.

Arcana Cœlestia quæ in Genesi et Exodo sunt detecta, *Lond.* 1749–56, 8 vols. 4to.

De nova Hierosolyma et ejus doctrina cœlesti, 4to. *Lond.* 1758.

Doctrina novæ Hierosolymæ de Domino, *Lond.* 1758; *Amst.* 1763-4.

Apocalypsis Revelata, *Amst.* 1766.

Vera Religio Christiana, seu universalis theologia, *Amst.* 1771, 4to.; *Lond.* 1780.

Most of his works have been translated into English, and published by or under the patronage of the Swedenborgian Society.

373. Swedenborg's Philosophy, as developed in his scientific as well as theological works, may be characterized as a very decided system of Empirical Realism, distinguished for an almost diaphanic introvision into the human heart, for consummate simplicity, and consistency. He regards the

[1] See the account of Swedenborg's vision of the Fire of Stockholm, as recorded by Em. Kant; and that of his disclosures to the Queen of Sweden respecting her deceased brother. Emanuel Swedenborg: a Biography; by J. J. G. Wilkinson, 8vo. p. 121, 126, and 158.

science of Correspondence as the Key of Knowledge, a Divine Philosophy unlocking the treasures of the Spiritual as well as Natural worlds, and sending Thought at a bound from the Zoophyte to the Seraphim. The material world is the *ultimate* and pedestal of the universe, filled with various creations, corresponding to others in the higher-ascending Spheres of the Universe. Thus Nature is in truth a Revelation and a Divine Book, whose letters, the Groves, Hills, and Rivers, the Firmament and the Lamps of Heaven, are hieroglyphic representatives of corresponding spiritual Realities.

The doctrine of *Degrees* forms a pendant to the science of Correspondence in Swedenborg's Philosophy. *Degrees*, which he classes in two series, i. e., Continuous and Discrete, carry the mind by the Patriarch's Ladder, from Earth to Heaven; and, scaling the Empyrean, conduct us from 0 to the Throne of God. The *Continuous Degrees* are evident and familiar to all, whereof an obvious example is presented in the ascending series of organic vitality, from the plant to Man.* *Discrete Degrees* constitute a series of a different description. They are the same things mirrored or re-echoed on different platforms through the medium of Correspondencies. Thus God is the Sun of the Spiritual World, whose Heat and Light are Love and Wisdom.

The Psychological Analysis of Swedenborg is remarkable for its agreement with the conscience and experience of all who reflect on what transpires in the chambers of their own heart. His remarks, indeed, are alarmingly searching, and seem to proceed from one who united to a profound knowledge of mankind, a natural kind of clairvoyance that penetrated into the inmost recesses of men's thoughts and motives. His philosophy savours much more of Life than of the Lamp. He divides the Mind into Will and Understanding; the seats of the Affections and of Thought. It is the former that constitutes the character; man being what his loves are, according to the elevation or depression of his affections, a little lower than the Angels, or crawling worm-like in the dust. Man, regarded as a psycho-physiological being, consists of three parts: 1st, The Spirit, which is essentially *the man;* 2nd, Its inner garment, or spiritual body, identical with *the Soul* of St. Paul's Epistles, and

which constitutes the medium of union between the Spirit; and 3rdly, its outer garment or material body. The latter is woven around it by the Spirit through the law of Correspondences. Hence a perfect analogy exists between the mental faculties and the bodily organs.

Death, according to Swedenborg, is nothing more than the casting off an outer skin, or the shelling of the mature and ripened spirit within.

The mind may be again subdivided into three parts: 1st, The inmost or Celestial-Spiritual principle, by which man communicates directly with God, angels, and heaven. 2nd, The Rational and Internal, which constitutes the intellectual and scientific principle; and the External, natural, or sensuous, which brings man into connection with the material world. The metaphysical reader will easily trace an analogy between Swedenborg's Celestial-Spiritual, Rational, and Sensuous principles, and the Intuitive Reason, the Logical Understanding, and the Sensational Perception (*Anschauung*) of Transcendental Philosophy. There is, however, one broad distinction between them: Swedenborg's Celestial-Spiritual Principle grasps an objectively-real and substantial world of Spirits; and his Sensuous Principle grapples with the solid reality of an objective world of matter, whilst the Transcendentalist, both in his Intuition and his Sensation, hobbles in a world of subjective ideas and representations, that hold his mind in a strait-waistcoat.

On an impartial review of his system, it will be found to be characterized by that best of wisdom, which consists in its adaptation to the normal understanding, and its agreement with the most cherished instincts of the human heart.

Swedenborg's Position as a Psychological Phenomenon.

374. It is refreshing, in the eleventh hour of the eighteenth century, the age of Atheism, Libertinism, Freemasonry, and Rosicrucianism, to meet a man who united a healthy, plain, and practical view of Life, Man, and Nature, with the sublimest, and at the same time time, the most scientific handling and treatment of things spiritual and eternal.

In the eyes of an impartial and a discriminating posterity, Emanuel Swedenborg will obtain an elevated rank in the

illustrious brotherhood of the luminaries of the Church. A certain family likeness may be traced between all the members of this memorable group.

Benedict, St. Francis, and *Loyola*, were a union of contradictions; themselves living paradoxes. The first a burning Calabrian rhapsodist,[1] could descend from the sublimest extacies and the most rapturous trances, to draw up a legislative code, whose propriety, expediency, and sound practical sense, have astonished the world for above one thousand years.

St. Francis of Assisi[2] was another instance of the blending of superior diplomatic acuteness with a grasp of Faith that revealed to his glowing vision those things that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. The Franciscan Order still remains as a monument of the man, who was as wise as a serpent, and as harmless as a dove; and its history attests the giant arm that raised it.

Loyola,[3] whose merits none can dispute, notwithstanding the sins of his Order, coupled the extreme of ascetic humiliations and apostolic devotion with a dry business-like style,* and a deliberate shrewdness in his knowledge of mankind, and in the reading of the human heart.[4] Similarly, Swedenborg, when treating of the sublimest realities, proceeds with the coolness and imperturbable deliberation of a man entering items in his ledger.

As previously observed, however, the revelation and commentaries of Swedenborg do not fall exactly within our province. Nevertheless, since his philosophical writings are considerably influenced and modified by his theology, we must consider the latter in order to estimate the former. On a general survey of his works it appears that he must

[1] See Sir J. STEPHEN'S Article on the French Benedictines; and History of the Benedictine Order.

[2] See the Article on St. Francis, in Sir J. STEPHEN'S Ecclesiastical Biography.

[3] See the Article of Sir J. STEPHEN'S on the Founders of Jesuitism; and ISAAC TAYLOR'S Ignatius Loyola, or Jesuitism in its Rudiments.

* Lord Chesterfield and Voltaire call him a madman. Thus one man's meat is another man's poison. Irving was said to look on one side of his face like an angel, and on the other like a devil.—ED.

[4] See LOYOLA'S Spiritual Exercises.

be classed with Empirists, Supernaturalists, and perhaps with Mystics. Let not, however, the latter term be taken as a condemnation. Since the diffusion of Kantian and other Rationalisms, there has been an evident tendency to pronounce Supernaturalism identical with Mysticism; and Mysticism, hallucination. The impartiality and dignity of history require us to abstain from attaching a stigma to any honest and enlightened phase of thought and feeling, whether positive or negative.

EMPIRICAL SCEPTICISM.

I. *Scepticism of Hume.*

375. The spirit of Empiricism continued to retain its predominant influence in England. *David Hartley*,[1] the physician, whose religious and moral character bore a considerable resemblance to that of Bonnet (§ 378), pursued the inquiries of Locke relative to the soul, on principles exclusively materialist. The Association of Ideas he made the foundation of all intellectual energy; and derived it from certain vibrations of the nerves. He allowed to man only a subordinate degree of free-will, asserting that the Deity is the original cause of all the operations of Nature, and that mankind are nothing more than his instruments, employed with reference to the final end of the Universe. The morality or immorality of actions is determined by their tendency to produce happiness or misery. Presently a much more acute genius pursued the path marked out by Locke, till he arrived at a more complete and decided Scepticism. The idealism of Berkeley (§ 349), which had never been popular, instead of checking, as its author had hoped, the spirit of Scepticism, contributed to encourage it. This was what *David Hume* did not fail to remark. He was born at Edinburgh in 1711, and early forsook the study of law for that of history and philosophy, to which he devoted the remainder

[1] Born at Illingworth, 1704; died at Bath, 1757.

DAVID HARTLEY, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations; in two parts, *Lond.* 1749, 2 vols. 8vo. Theory of Human Mind, with Essays, by JOS. PRIESTLEY, *Lond.* 1775, 8vo.

of his life.[1] With a deeply penetrating genius, he investigated the nature of Man as a cognizant and acting being, from the point of view of Locke's Empiricism. This led him, by consequent thinking, to the sceptical result that there is no such thing as ascertained *objective* philosophical knowledge: that our views are limited to the phenomena of Consciousness,—the representations we are conscious of,—and the *subjective* relations of the latter. And in these investigations of Hume, philosophical scepticism stands forth with a power, depth, and logical consistency, such as had never before appeared; recommended, moreover, by great correctness, clearness, and elegance of diction. Our Representations, according to Hume, are to be divided into Impressions (Emotions) or Conceptions and Ideas; the last are copies of the former, and differ from them only inasmuch as they are less forcible and vivid. All the objects of reason are either relations of Conceptions (for instance, the elements of Mathematics), or facts and matters of

[1] The Life of David Hume, written by himself, *Lond.* 1777, 12mo. Supplement to the same, by ADAM SMITH, 1789.

A Letter to Ad. Smith, on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend D. Hume; by one of the people called Christians, *Oxford*, 1777.

Apology for the Life and Writings of D. Hume, etc., *Lond.* 1777.

Curious Particulars and Genuine Anecdotes respecting the late Lord Chesterfield and D. Hume, etc., *Lond.* 1788.

H. D. HUME, Treatise of Human Nature, etc., *Lond.* 1738, 2 vols. 8vo.; 1739, 2 vols. 4to.

Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, 5 vols. 8vo. *Edinb.* 1742—1748. Vol. I contains Moral, &c.; vol. II, Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding; vol. III, Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals; vol. IV, Political Discourses; vol. V, Natural History of Religion, of the Passions, of Tragedy, of Taste. These five volumes have frequently been reprinted in 2 vols. 8vo.; latest edition, *Edinb.* 1817.

Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul, 12mo. *Lond.* 1783; 8vo. 1789.

Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, 2nd edition, *Lond.* 1779, 8vo. (On this subject consult JACOBI, † David Hume, or, An Essay on Faith, Idealism, and Realism, *Breslau*, 1787, 8vo.)

Account of the Life and Writings of D. Hume, by T. E. RITCHIE, 8vo. *Lond.* 1807.

Hume: in Lord BROUGHAM'S Lives of Men of Letters, vol. I, *Lond.* 1845.

Life and Correspondence of D. Hume, by J. H. BURTON, 2 vols. 8vo. *Edinb.* 1846.

Hume's Philosophical Works, 4 vols. 8vo. *Edinb.* 1827.

experience. Our conviction of the reality of any fact is founded on Sensation, Reflection, and an estimate of the relations of cause and effect. Our acquaintance with the laws of Causality does not come to us by any *à priori* principles, but simply by experience. We expect from similar causes similar consequences; and the principle of this anticipation is to be sought in the *habitude* of the connection of certain phenomena, and the Association of our Representations. There exists, therefore, no certain knowledge independent of experience, nor any Metaphysical science, properly so called. After all, Experience does not possess any such demonstrative evidence as do the Mathematics: but is based upon a certain instinct, which may prove deceptive. We find that instinct contradicts the conclusions of philosophy with respect to the ideas of Space, Time, and Causality; and consequently we are compelled to doubt the evidence of Experience in these particulars: unless we give the preference to Natural Instinct over philosophical Scepticism. Geometry and Arithmetic are objects of abstract Science: Criticism (Æsthetics) and Morality are objects of Sensation, and *in no respect form part of the province of the understanding.* In Morals, Hume asserted that merit consists in the utility or agreeableness (utile et dulce) of man's character and qualities, as relating to himself or others: he allowed that Reason, as the faculty of reflection, had considerable weight in the formation of a moral judgment, but denied that it was sufficient of itself to pronounce a sentence of moral approbation or disapprobation. Consequently he was led to make the Moral Sense, which he compared with Taste, the *primum mobile* of moral action. This Sense consists in a sentiment of human happiness and misery. His theory was calculated to support that of an original Moral Sense.

As for the question whether Self-love or Benevolence preponderate in the human mind, he leaves it unanswered.

The deeply penetrating Scepticism of Hume was originally directed against the conclusions only of Speculative Philosophy, but in fact would destroy the essential of all knowledge. He directed, however, his objections principally against the Existence of the Deity, His Providence; against the Reality of Miracles, and the Immortality of the Soul:

and proved that all these doctrines were unsupported by any evident principles begetting perfect conviction.*

His life and character were estimable. He died, August 25th, 1776, with perfect serenity and even gaiety.

OPPONENTS OF HUME, AND OTHER PHILOSOPHERS OF THE ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH SCHOOLS.

376. The Scepticism of Hume acquired of course the greatest notoriety, attacking as it did the foundations of religion as well as the objects of experience. Many antagonists of his doctrines undertook to refute them; but, instead of striking at the root of his sceptical objections, and demonstrating their fallacy, they contented themselves with weakly appealing to *Common Sense*, or a natural instinct, which was just what Hume desired. Among his opponents we must reckon in the first place three Scotchmen; *Thomas Reid*,[1] a sincere inquirer after Truth, who maintained indeed the existence of certain principles of knowledge independent of experience, but considered philosophy as the science of the human mind, which must be founded on the principles of Common Sense, regarding the latter as a species of Intellectual Instinct.

The eloquent *James Beattie*,[2] espoused the same cause with greater ardour, but with less of a philosophic spirit, and laboured to vindicate the truths attacked by the Scep-

* Modern Science, Transcendentalism, and the Philosophy of Intuition, demolish at once the unnatural fabric of Hume's scepticism.—ED.

[1] Born 1704; became a professor at Glasgow; and died 1726.

THOMAS REID, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principle of Common Sense, third edition, *Lond.* 1796, 8vo. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, *Edinb.* 1785, 4to. Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, *Lond.* 1819, 3 vols. 8vo. Complete Works, with Preface and Notes, by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, 8vo. *Edinb.* 1846.

[2] Born 1735; professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, and afterwards at Aberdeen. Died 1803.

Account of the Life of James Beattie, by ALEX. BOWER, *Lond.* 1804.

JAMES BEATTIE, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, *Edinb.* 1770; fifth edition. *Lond.* 1774. Theory of Language, *Lond.* 1788, 8vo. Dissertations Moral and Critical, *Lond.* 1783, 4to. Elements of the Science of Morals, tom. I, *Edinb.* 1790; tom. II, 1793.

tics; admitting the principle of a Moral Sense. He was the author also of some elegant treatises on Æsthetics.

Lastly, *James Oswald* (flourished about 1769), a Scotch ecclesiastic, exalted the principal of Common Sense[1] into the supreme canon of all truth, and the ultimate rule in all inquiries.

These authors have demonstrated the mischievousness of speculation when it would reduce all our convictions to demonstration; but have not avoided a contrary fault, that of making the Reason inert and passive.

377. The celebrated natural philosopher, *Joseph Priestley*,[2] criticised at the same time both Hume and his antagonists. He may be said to have been more successful with the latter, whose *instinctive principles* he justly styled *qualitates occultæ*. In opposition to Hume he alleged a proof of the existence of the Divinity, which was untenable.[3] He was a rank Determinist; and, consistently with his principles, controverted, as Hartley had done, the doctrine of free-agency, and endeavoured to establish a system of materiality of the soul.[4] Next came *Edward Search* (his real name was

[1] JAMES OSWALD, Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion, *Edinb.* 1766—1772, 2 vols. 8vo.

[2] Born at Fieldhead, 1733; died 1804.

[3] Jos. PRIESTLEY, An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind; Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to the Common Sense, *Lond.* 1774, 8vo. Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, containing an Examination of the Principal Objections to the Doctrines of Natural Religion, and especially those contained in the writings of Mr. Hume, *Bath*, 1780, Part I, II. Additional Letters, 1781—87; and: A Continuation of the Letters, *Northumberland-town* (U. S.) 1794, 8vo.

The Life of Jos. Priestly, with Critical Observations on his Works, and Extracts from his Writings illustrative of his Character, Principles, etc., by J. CARRY, *Lond.* 1804, 8vo.

[4] Jos. PRIESTLEY, Disquitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, etc. *Lond.* 1777, 8vo.

Three Dissertations on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, *Lond.* 1778, 8vo.

The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated, etc., *Lond.* 1777, 8vo.

Letters on Materialism and Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, by PRIESTLEY, *Lond.* 1776, 8vo. The last called forth answers from PALMER and BRYANT; and more particularly the work of RICHARD PRICE, entitled: Letters on Materialism, and Philosophical Necessity, *Lond.* 1778, 8vo.

Abraham Tucker[1]), who, in questions of Morals, referred everything to personal expediency. On the other hand, *Richard Price*,[2] in opposition to Empiricism, which would derive all our cognitions from Sensation, maintained that the Understanding or the faculty of thought is essentially distinct from the sensual system, and the source of peculiar representations not to be confounded with those which originate in the senses. He investigated with acuteness and ability many important questions relative to Morals, and controverted the doctrine of a Moral Sense, as irreconcileable with the unalterable character of fundamental moral conceptions, which, as well as those of Substance and Cause, he maintained to be eternal and original principles of the intellect itself, independent of the Divine Will. He has admirably illustrated the differences existing between Morality and Sensation, Virtue and Happiness; at the same time that he points out the intimate connection existing between the two last.[3] On the other hand the theory of a moral sense found a defender in *Henry Home*,[4] distinguished for his critical works on Æsthetics; and in *Adam Ferguson*,[5]

Auszüge aus Dr. Priestley's Schriften über die Nothwendigkeit des Willens, und über die Vibrationem der Gehirnnerven, als die materiellen Ursachen des Empfindens und Denkens, nebst Betrachtungen über diese Gegenstände und einer Vergleichung der Vibrationshypothese, mit Hrn. Dr. Gall's Schädellehre. *Altona*, 1806, 8vo.

[1] Ed. Search, Light of Nature pursued, 7 vols. 8vo. *Lond.* 1768—78. New edition, with Life, by Sir John Mildmay, 7 vols. 8vo. 1805. Reprinted in 2 vols. 8vo. Bohn, 1848. Abridged by Wm. Hazlitt, 8vo. 1807. Free-will, Fore-knowledge, and Fate, *Lond.* 1763, 8vo.

[2] Born at Tynton, 1723; died 1791.

[3] Price, Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, particularly those respecting the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, Relation to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-Matter, and Sanctions, *Lond.* 1758, 8vo.; third edition, *Lond.* 1787, 8vo.

[4] Born at Edinburgh: became Lord Kaimes in 1752; died 1782.

Henry Home, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, *Edinb.* 1751, 8vo. Historical Law, 1759, 8vo. The Principles of Equity, 1760, fol. Elements of Criticism, *Lond.* 1762, 3 vols. 8vo.; third edition, *Edinb.* 1765, 3 vols. 8vo. Sketches on the History of Man, *Lond.* 1774, 2 vols. 4to. The two latter works have been frequently reprinted.

[5] Born in the Highlands of Scotland, 1724; died 1816.

Ad. Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, *Lond.* 1769, 8vo. Principles of Moral and Political Science, *Edinb.* 1793, 2 vols. 4to. Essay on Civil Society, *Edinb.* 1766, 4to.

who made virtue consist in the progressive developement of the powers of the soul in its advance towards spiritual perfection. *Adam Smith*,[1] a friend of Hume's, and principally celebrated for his classical work on the Wealth of Nations, the text book of Political Science, maintained that Morality can only consist in actions which are of a sort to merit universal approbation; and consequently made Sympathy the principle of Morality. By means of this faculty we put ourselves in the situation of the agent whose conduct we are considering, and then pass an impartial sentence, uninfluenced by subjective considerations, on the *propriety* or *impropriety* of his conduct. From such judgments, repeatedly formed, are deduced, according to Smith, general rules for our own conduct. The sum of his morality is this: "So act that other men may *sympathise* with you."

Thomas Payne,[2] one of the founders of the independence of the United States, astonished even the English by his ultra-democratic principles and views.

In connection with the metaphysical labours of the British writers, we ought to mention Essays on the principles of Taste by *Alison*, *Gerard*, and *Burke*; as well as their inquiries on Language, and the History of Mankind. *Sir William Jones* distinguished himself greatly in this province.[3]

II. *French Empirical School.*

† History of the French Revolution; or the Commencement, Progress, and Effects of the (so-called) New Philosophy of that country, III Parts, *Leips.* 1827-28, 8vo.

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[1] Born at Kirkaldy 1723; died 1790.

AD. SMITH, Theory of Moral Sentiments, sixth edition, *Lond.* 1790, 2 vols. 8vo., frequently reprinted in 1 vol. Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, *Lond.* 1776; second edition, 1777, 2 vols. 4to.; edited by W. PLAYFAIR, 3 vols. 8vo. 1805; edited by D. BUCHANAN, 4 vols. 8vo. *Edinb.* 1814; edited by MCCULLOCH, 4 vols. 8vo. *Edin.* 1828; reprinted in 1 vol. 1838. Essays on Philosophical Subjects, etc., to which is prefixed an account of the life and writings of the author, by DUGALD STEWART, *Lond.* 1795, 8vo.

[2] Born in Norfolk, 1737; died in America, 1809.

Common Sense, *Philadelphia*, 1776, 8vo. Rights of Man: being an Answer to Mr. Burke's attack on the French Revolution, parts I, II, seventh edition, 1791-92. The Age of Reason, being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology, parts I, II, *Lond.* 1794.

[3] SIR WILLIAM JONES'S works, with his Life, by LORD TEIGNMOUTH, 9 vols. 4to. *Lond.* 1799—1804; or 13 vols. 8vo. 1807.

378. Philosophizing in England constantly pursued the path of experience, and endeavoured to advance the interests of science, sometimes with acute and profound, at other times with narrow and superficial views; religion being throughout the principal object to which its inquiries were directed. The same tendency prevailed in France also, modified however by the character of the French nation, as well as by the influence still possessed by the clergy in checking freedom of thought. The metaphysics of Descartes and Malebranche had fallen into oblivion, Gassendi and Newton having taken their place; though a still more numerous party devoted themselves to the principles of Locke. Montesquieu,[1] who investigated the Laws of Nations with the genius of a true philosopher, and the mathematician and naturalist *P. L. Moreau de Maupertuis*,[2] pursued the empirical method without calling in question the fundamental principles of Religion. The influence of the philosopher of Ferney, *François Marie Arouet de Voltaire*,[3] was more extensive and pernicious. He assigned the casting-vote in philosophy to the common popular Understanding and to Wit. To him may be added *Jean Jacques Rousseau*, who combined with him in greatly diminishing the reverence for everything positive in religion and the state, by their attacks on ecclesiastical and political despotism. *Ch. Batteux*,[4] may be considered the first Frenchman who

[1] CHARLES SECONDAT, Baron de Montesquieu; born in the Château de la Brède, near Bordeaux, 1689; died 1755.

De l'Esprit des Lois, 1748; (numerous editions). Œuvres, *Lond.* 1759, 3 vols. 4to; 5 vols. 8vo. (several other editions). Œuvres Posthumes, 1798, 8vo.

[2] Born at St. Malo, 1691; died at Bâle, 1759.

Essai de Philosophie Morale, *Lond.* 1750, 8vo. Essai de Cosmologie. *Berl.* 1750, 8vo. Œuvres, *Lyons*, 1756, 4 vols. 8vo.

[3] FRANÇOIS MARIE AROUET DE VOLTAIRE, born 1694, died 1778. See his Life by CONDORCET, and since by ANCILLON, Mélanges de Littérature et de Philosophie.

Lettres Philosophiques, par VOLTAIRE [burnt by the executioner]. Candide, ou l'Optimisme.

Œuvres de Voltaire, 45 vols. 4to. *Genève*, 1768, *et suiv.* Nouvelle édition, par BEAUMARCHAIS, 70 vols. 8vo. *Kehl*, 1784–89. Edit. de BEUCHOT, 72 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1829—1834, &c.

[4] Born at Allendhuy, 1713; died 1780.

Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même Principe, *Paris*, 1746, (several editions). Cours de Belles-Lettres, ou Principes de la Littérature, *Paris*, 1747—50, (many editions).

proposed a theory of the fine arts, likewise based on empirical principles. *Etienne Bonnot de Condillac*,[1] the model of French Philosophy till very recently, laboured to bring to perfection the system of Empiricism, and to trace all the representations of the mind of Man, since the Fall, to Sensation, or the faculty of feeling, by means of the principle of the transformation and modification of sensations. The cultivation of Language, which he derived from the involuntary tones of feeling, i. e. of pleasure and pain, he asserted to be the medium of improvement to Science. He affected to establish all knowledge according to mathematical strictness, by reducing each particular science to its most simple expression, or in other words, to an identical proposition. It may be remarked that he confounds in his theory the principles of Empirical and Speculative philosophy, and approximates the Atomic Theory of Gassendi, by enumerating among original facts that of the existence of bodies; (see the theory of Gassendi, § 323). *Charles Bonnet*[2] also rendered considerable service to psychology. He was an admirable observer of Nature, with a mind habitually religious. *He* also derived all our representations from Sensation, by means of certain fibres and their vibrations; distinguishing the mind from the body, but allowing it to possess nothing of its own but a twofold

[1] Born at Grenoble, 1716; died 1780.

Cours d'Etude du Prince de Parme, par M. l'Abbé de CONDILLAC, *Paris*, 1776, 16 vols. 8vo.

Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines, *Amsterd.* 1746, 2 vols. 12mo.

Traité des Sensations, *Lond.* 1754, 2 vols. 12mo.

Traité des Animaux, *Amsterd.* 1755, 2 vols. 12mo.

Œuvres Philosophiques, *Paris*, 1795, 6 vols. 12mo. (several other editions).

[2] Born at Geneva, 1720; died 1793.

(CH. DE BONNET), Essai de Psychologie, ou considerations sur les opérations de l'âme, sur l'habitude et sur l'education, *Lond.* 1755, 8vo.

Essai Analytique sur les Facultés de l'âme, *Copenh.* 1759—60, third edit. 1775.

La Palingénésie Philosophique, ou Idées sur l'état passé et sur l'état futur des êtres vivans, *Genève*, 1769, 2 vols. 8vo.

Œuvres d'Histoire Naturelle et de Philosophie, *Neufchâtel*, 1779; second edition, 1783, 8 vols 4to.

Mémoires pour servir a l'Histoire de la Vie et des Œuvres de M. Ch. Bonnet, par J. TREMBLEY, *Berne*, 1794, 8vo.

capacity of Feeling and Impulsion. He denied the doctrine of Innate Ideas; deduced all representations from Sensation, and was consequently led to maintain that the soul can effect nothing but through the agency of the body; which is the source of all the modifications of which the other is susceptible. In this manner he approached Materialism, and admitted the existence of an affinity between the soul of men and of other animals. Other writers followed up the consequences deducible from the Empirical system with greater consistency and boldness; founding a decided system of Atheism, Materialism, and Absolute Determinism in all questions affecting the materiality and mortality of the Soul, and Morals. Of this number was *La Mettrie*,[1] a man of reprobate character, who endeavoured to account for all the operations of the mind on principles merely mechanical. *Helvetius*[2] in like manner derived all its phenomena from sensational perception, and pronounced the notion of infinitude to be simply negative. To these must be added the authors of the famous Système de la

[1] JUL. OFFROY DE LA METTRIE, born at St. Malo, 1709; died at Berlin, 1751.

Œuvres Philosophiques de M. de la Mettrie, *Lond.* (*Berl.*), 1751, 2 vols. 8vo.; *Amst.* 1753—64, 2 vols. 8vo. Histoire Naturelle de l'âme, *La Haye*, (*Paris*), 8vo.; [this work, by order of the Parliament, was burnt by the hands of the executioner]. Traité de la vie heureuse de Sénèque, *Potsdam*, 1748. L'Ecole de la Volupté (*id.* sous le titre de l'Art de Jouir), 1750. L'Homme Machine, *Leyden*, 1748, 12mo. L'Homme Plante, *Potsdam*, 1748, 8vo.

In answer to these works were published: L'Homme plus que Machine, par ELIE LUZAC, *Lond.* (*Leid.*), 1748, second edition, *Gotting.* 1755, 12mo. De Machina et Anima Humana prorsus a se invicem distinctis Commentatio, auct. BALTH. LUD. TRALLES, *Bresl.* 1749, 8vo. GODOFRID. PLOUCQUET, Dissert. de Materialismo, *Tubing.* 1750, cum Supplemento et Confutatione libelli: L'Homme Machine, *ibid.* 1751, 4to.

[2] CLAUDE ADRIAN HELVETIUS, born at Paris, 1715; died 1771.

De l'Esprit, *Paris*, 1758, 4to.; 2 vols. 8vo. De l'Homme, de ses Facultés et de son Education, *Lond.* (*Amsterd.*), 1772, 2 vols. 8vo. Les Progrès de la Raison dans la Recherche du Vrai, *Lond.* 1775, 8vo. Œuvres complètes, *Amsterd.* 1776, 5 vols. 12mo.; *Deux-Ponts*, 1784, 7 vols. 8vo.; *Paris*, 1794, 5 vols. 8vo.; 1796, 10 vols. 12mo.

Eloge de M. Helvétius, (*Genève*), 1774, 8vo. Essai sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de M. Helvétius (par Duclos?), en avant de son Poème didactique, intitulé: Le Bonheur, *Lond.* (*Amsterd.*), 1773, 8vo.; and in his Œuvres complètes.

Nature, *La Grange*, or the *Baron D'Holbach*,[1] and *Robinet*.[2] We must attribute principally to the influence of the French Encyclopedists the popularity which was enjoyed by a species of philosophizing which consisted in explaining away all that is incomprehensible by unfounded materialistic hypotheses,[3] as well as by arguments from analogy pushed to an extravagant length. To this must be added, the pretension of making science of every kind popular and accessible to all; and the habit of ridiculing as pedantic all serious and profound philosophical inquiries.

379. The men who at this period were dignified in France with the title of philosophers, through their shallowness and frivolity laid the foundation of that untenable enlightenment which confounds rational man with Nature, and deifies the material world; pronouncing the belief in a God to be superfluous or problematical, and rejecting all *positive* or revealed religion as the device of priestcraft. The universal corruption of the aristocracy, and the puerility of a ceremonial form of worship, procured for such opinions a ready acceptance. With views like these, the Encyclopedists

[1] PAUL H. D. BARON VON HOLBACH, died 1789.

Système de la Nature, ou des Lois du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral, par feu M. MIRABAUD, [LA GRANGE? LE BARON D'HOLBACH?] *Lond.* 1770, 2 vols. 8vo.

In reply see: BERGIER, Examen du Matérialisme, ou Réfutation du Système de la Nature, *Paris*, 1771, 2 vols. 8vo. DE CASTILLON, Observations sur le Livre intitulé; Système de la Nature, *Berl.* 1771, 8vo. Réflexions Philosophiques sur le Syst. de la Nat., par M. HOLLAND (GEORG. JONATH.) *Paris*, 1722, 2 vols. 8vo.; *Neufchâtel*, 1773. [VOLTAIRE], Réponse au Système de la Nature, *Genève*, 1772; et Encyclopédie, artic. "Dieu." Le Vrai Sens du Système de la Nature (par HELVETIUS), ouvrage posthume; (this work is made up of extracts). † F. X. V. MANGOLD, A Calm Refutation of Materialism, in answer to the author of the System of Nature, *Augsb.* 1803, 8vo.

[2] Jean Baptiste Robinet; born at Rennes, 1723.

ROBINET, Considérations Philos. de la Gradation Naturelle des formes de l'être, ou les Essais de la Nature, qui apprend à faire l'Homme, *Amstd.* 1767, 2 vols. 8vo. Parallèle de la Condition et des Facultés de l'Homme avec celles des autres Animaux, trad. de l'Angl. *Bouillon*, 1769, 12mo. See Bibliog. § 360.

[3] On French Empiricism, consult W. R. BODMER, Le Vulgaire et les Métaphysiciens, ou Doutes et Vues critiques sur l'Ecole Empirique, *Paris*, 1802, 8vo.

See the work of MM. BARANTE and JAY, On the French Literature of the XVIII Century.

emulated Voltaire and Helvetius in this work, particularly *Diderot*[1] and *D'Alembert*.[2] Others (like Rousseau), whose views were not altogether so objectionable, did more harm than good by a mass of well-meant but paradoxical declamations. In *practical* philosophy, the prevailing Empiricism favoured the opinion, that the little Morality they chose to require ought to be founded on empirical Psychology. From Self-love they deduced a system of Self-expediency, at variance with the essential characteristics of morality. In this manner Helvetius attempted to deduce all meritorious actions from interested motives, and allowed them to be meritorious only so far as they contributed to the well-being of some particular society of men.[3] Others inconsistently attempted to ally the maxims of a better system of morality to exclusive Self-love; for instance, *Mably*[4] and *Rousseau*, who had the talent for declaiming well about virtues,[5] and

[1] DENIS DIDEROT, born at Langres, 1713; died 1784.

Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts, et des Métiers, par une Société de Gens de Lettres; mis en ordre et publié par M. DIDEROT. *Paris*, 1751—1763, 27 tom. folio pour le texte, 6 vols. de planches. Séconde édition, 1783—1800, 63 livraisons. 4to.

Vues Philosophiques, ou Protestations et Déclarations sur les Principaux Objets des Connaissance de l'Homme; nouv. éd. *Berlin*, 1755, 12mo. (par PREMONTVAL.)

DIDEROT, Pensées Philosophiques. *La Haye*, 1746, 12mo. (a work directed against Christianity, and burned by the hands of the executioner). Lettre sur les Aveugles, à l'usage de ceux qui voient, *Paris*, 1749. Pensées sur l'Interprétation de la Nature, *Paris*, 1754, et 1759, 12mo. Œuvres Philosophiques, 6 vols. *Amsterd.* 1772. Œuvres complètes, *Lond.* 1773, 5 vols.

See the Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de feu M. DIDEROT, by his daughter, MAD. DE VAUDEUIL, in the periodical of SCHELLING, entitled: *Zeitschrift für Deutsche*, Fasc. I, 1813.

[2] JEAN LE ROND D'ALEMBERT, born at Paris, 1717; died 1783.

Mélanges de Littérature, d'Histoire, et de Philosophie, de Mons. D'ALEMBERT, *Paris*, 1752, 5 vols. 12mo.; 1770, 5 vols. 8vo.

CONDORCET, Eloge de M. d'Alembert, 1783.

[3] In his work De l'Esprit, mentioned above. Among other replies to this work see: CHR. WILH. FRANCH. WALCH, De Consensu Virtutis Moralis et Politicæ contra Helvetium, *Gotting.* 1759.

[4] Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, born at Grenoble, 1709; died 1785.

[5] Born at Geneva, 1712; died 1778.

J. J. ROUSSEAU, Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondemens de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes, *Amsterd.* 1775, 8vo. Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne, *Amsterd.* 1764, part II, 8vo. Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique, *Amsterd.* 1762, 12mo. Emile, ou de

who, with *Robinet*,[1] admitted the existence of a moral sense. The daring and short-sighted speculations of Rousseau respecting Nature, Education, and Polity are sufficiently known, as well as the pernicious results to which they conducted. To this second description of French moralists Diderot also belongs.[2]

It may be remarked that after the publication of Montesquieu's splendid work on Law, a great degree of attention was excited in France by the subject of Legislation, which was treated by their writers with unrivalled versatility, but also with extravagant tendencies. Abundance of theories on this subject, as well as on the Laws of Government and Nations, appeared, professing to discuss those points with a view to the principles of Philosophy.[3]

III. *German Electics.*

380. The following authors belonging to the school of Wolf, opposed themselves in part to the French philosophy. *Herm. Sam. Reimarus*,[4] a Naturalist and Theologian, who

l'Education, *Amsterd.* 1762, 8vo. Œuvres complètes, *Genève*, 1782, 17 vols.

[1] In the work mentioned above, § 360. See also: Vue Philosophique de la Gradation Naturelle des formes d'être, ou les Essais de la Nature qui apprend à faire un Homme, *Amsterd.* 1767, 2 vols. 8vo.

[2] Principes de la Philosophie Morale, ou Essai sur le Mérite et la Vertu, 1745. See § 379 (note).

[3] We may particularise Gasp. de Real, born at Sisteron, 1682; died 1752. Traité complet de la Science du Gouvernement, *Paris*, 1762—64, 8 vols. 4to. Mably, De la Législation, ou Principes des Lois, *Amsterd.* 1776, 2 vols. 8vo. Doutes proposés aux Economistes sur l'Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés, *Paris*, 1766, 12mo. Œuvres, *Paris*, 1793, 12 vols. 8vo.; and also: l'Ecole des Physiocrates, ou Economistes. Quesnay, born 1697; died 1774. Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés Politiques; Mirabeau the father, Condorcet, Mirabeau the elder, and Emm. Sieyes.

Burlamaqui (Jean-Jacq., born 1694; died 1748), Principes du Droit Naturel. Emmeric de Vattel, born 1714; died 1767. Droit des Gens (after Wolf). *Lond.* 1757, 2 vols. 4to.

[4] Born at Hamburgh, 1694; died a professor at the Gymnasium, 1765.

Herm. Sam. Reimarus, † Theory of Reason, or the Method of employing Reason aright in the investigation of Truth, *Hamburgh* and *Kiel*, 1756, fifth edition, 1790, 8vo. † The Principal Truths of Natural Religion, *Hamburgh*, 1754. The fifth edition contains also

united perspicuity to depth in his works on Logic, Natural Theology (in which he developed and extended the physico-theological proof), and the instinct of brutes; *Gottfried Ploucquet*,[1] an acute thinker, who simplified Logic, discovered a logical *calculus*, and laboured to illustrate the principal points of the doctrine of Monadologia. *J. H. Lambert*,[2] a distinguished Mathematician, Natural and Mental philosopher, and a friend of Kant, who had attained the conviction that Wolf's method in Mathematics required essential alterations. He applied the principles of his favourite science to the more exact demonstration of metaphysical problems.

the † Dissertation of J. A. Reimarus, on the Existence of God and the Human Soul, 1781, 8vo.; sixth edition, 1791. † Considerations on the Instinct of Brutes, 1762, 8vo. fifth edition, with the notes of J. A. Reimarus, 1798.

[1] Born 1716; became professor at Tübingen; died 1790.

G. Ploucquet (see preceding sect. and § 358). Methodus tractandi Infinita in metaphysicis, *Tübing.* 1748, 4to. Methodus tam demonstrandi directe omnes Syllogismorum Species quam vitia formæ detegendi ope unius regulæ, *Tübing.* 1763, 8vo. Principia de Substantiis et Phænomenis; accedit Methodus calculandi in Logicis ab ipso inventa, cui præmittitur Comment. de Arte Characteristica Universali, *Francof. et Lips.* 1753, 8vo.; second edition, 1764, 8vo. Fundamenta Philosophiæ Speculativæ, *Tübing.* 1759, 8vo.; *ibid.* 1782, 8vo. Institutiones Philosophiæ Theoreticæ, *ibid.* 1772. Dernière édit., intit.: Expositiones Philos. Theor., *Stuttg.* 1782, 8vo. Elementa Philos. Contemplativæ, sive de Scientia Ratiocinandi, Notionibus disciplinarum Fundamentalibus, etc. *Stuttg.* 1778, 8vo. Solutio Problematis Lugdunensis qua ex una hac Propositione concessa: Existit aliquid existentia entis realissimi cum suis attributis eruitur, *Tübing.* 1758, 4to. Commentationes, Philos. Selectiones, etc. recognitæ, *Ultraj. ad Rhenum*, 1781, 4to. Variæ Questiones Metaphysicæ cum subjunctis responsionibus, *Tübing.* 1782, 4to.

† Collection of writings referring to the Logical Calculus of Professor Ploucquet, with fresh additions, published by A. F. Böck, *Francf.* and *Leips.* 1766. Republished since.

[2] Born at Mühlhausen, in Sundgau; died at Berlin, 1777. J. H. Lambert, † New Organon, or Thoughts on the Right Method of determining the Characters of Truth, etc. *Leips.* 1764, 2 vols. 8vo. † Treatises on Logic and Moral Philosophy (edited by J. Bernouilli), vol. I, *Dessau*, 1782, 8vo. † Introduction to the Architectonic Science, etc. *Riga*, 1771, 2 vols. 8vo. † Cosmological Letters on the Formation of the World, etc. *Augsb.* 1771, 8vo. Correspondence of Kant and Lambert, in Kant's Miscell. Works.

381. The scepticism of Hume only began to excite a sensation in Germany, when men had become in a manner weary of long and profound investigations, of which they had seen so many unsuccessful instances; and had tacitly adopted the conviction that Truth is not to be attained by any single system, but, like a ray of light, is refracted and dispersed through many. In the place, therefore, of profound and fundamental research succeeded a species of Eclecticism,[1] which contented itself with adopting whatever had an appearance of probability to recommend it, more especially if it seemed likely to prove of popular utility. *J. G. Sulzer*,[2] a clear-sighted and talented inquirer, who united powers of observation to those of speculation, hesitated between the views of Wolf's school and those of the British metaphysicians, and in his investigations respecting the fine arts, which have done him honour, made it his object to discover a *moral* principle to account for their influence. Yet he conferred some service on Æsthetics. He also directed the attention of his countrymen to the speculations of Hume. Hitherto Eclecticism had proved a species of rampart against the overwhelming influence of particular systems; but at the epoch of which we are speaking it was nothing but a consequence of the doubt and uncertainty which embarrassed the reason of men. Empiricism had overpowered and stifled metaphysical inquiry, aided by the influence of French manners and literature, which found a powerful patron in Frederic the Great.[3] Such a state of

[1] See BEAUSOBRE, Le Pyrrhonisme Raisonable, *Berl.* 1755, 8vo.

[2] Born at Winterthur, 1720; died a professor at Berlin, 1779.

J. G. SULZER, Moral. Betrachtungen über die Werke der Natur, herausg. von SACK, *Berl.* 1741, 8vo. Vorübungen zur Erweckung der Aufmersamkeit und des Nachdenkens, *Berl.* 1777, 3 Th. 8vo. Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste, *Leipz.* 1771—74, 2 B.; letzte Ausg. ebend. 1792—94, 4 B. Verm. Philos. Schriften, *Leipz.* 1773—85; 3te Aufl. 1800. Mit einer Biogr. Vorrede von v. Blankenburg, 2 B. 8vo. Particularly: Ueber den Ursprung der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen, *Leipz.* 1773, 8vo.

FORMEY, Eloge de M. Sulzer, *Berl.* 1779, 8vo. H. C. HIRZEL, An Gleim über Sulzer, den Weltweisen, 2 Th., *Zurich*, 1780, 8vo. Lebensbeschreibung, von ihm selbst aufgesetzt, *Berl.* 1809, 8vo.

[3] On the philosophy of Frederic the Great consult FULLEBORN'S Collect. Fasc. VII.

things gave birth to the system of *J. B. Basedow*,[1] who nevertheless endeavoured to combine solidity of argument with popular utility—and proposed felicity, the sentiment of approbation, and analogy, as principles of Truth—at the same time that he admitted in certain cases the obligation of belief, as a species of probable supernatural knowledge. Then came the system of the Jewish philosopher *Moses Mendelssohn*,[2] who endeavoured to unite elegance to perspicuity in his speculations on the principles of Taste and Psychology. Next, the Naturalism of *G. S. Steinbart*,[3] and the Essays of *J. A. Eberhard*,[4] a dexterous inquirer, who

[1] Born at Hamburgh, 1723; died 1790.

Joh. Bernh. Basedow's Philalethie, oder neue Anssichten in die Wahrheit und Religion der Vernunft bis in die Gränzen der Offenbarung, *Altona*, 1764, 2 Th. 8vo. Theoretisches System der gesunden Vernunft, *Altona*, 1765, 8vo. Prakt. Philos. fur alle Stände, *Dessau*, 1777, 2 vols. 8vo. See Schlichtegroll's Nekrol. 1790, 2 vols.

[2] Born at Dessau, 1729; died 1786.

Steinheim, Moses Mendelssohn und seine Schule, 1840.

Moses Mendelssohn, Abh. über die Evidenz in den Metaph. WW. *Berl.* 1764, 4to.; 2te Aufl. 1786. Phædon, oder über die Unsterblichk. der Seele, *Berl.* 1767, 8vo.; 6te Aufl. herausg. von Dr. Friedlander, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo. Morgenstunden, oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes, *Berl.* 1785. 2te Aufl. 1786, 2 B 8vo. Briefe über die Empfindungen, *Berl.* 1755, 8vo. Philosophische Schriften, *Berl.* 1761; 3te Ausg. 1777; 2 B. 8vo. Kleine Philos. Schriften mit einer Skizze seines Lebens von Jenisch (herausgegeben von Müchler), *Berl.* 1789, 8vo.

Leben und Meinungen Mendelssohns nebst dem Geiste seiner Schriften, *Hamb.* 1787, 8vo.

[3] Born at Züllichau, 1729; died 1809.

Gotthelf Sam. Steinbart's System der reinen Philosophie, oder Glückseligkeitslehre des Christenthums, *Züllichau*, 1778; 4te Aufl. 1794. Philos. Unterhaltung zur weitern Aufklärung der Glückseligkeitslehre, Heft I—III, *Züllichau*, 1782—86, 8vo. Gemeinnutzige Anleitung zum regelmässigen Selbstdenken, 3te Aufl. 1793, 8vo.

[4] Born at Halberstadt, 1738; died a professor at Halle, 1809.

Jo. Aug. Eberhard, Allgem. Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens, *Berl.* 1776—86, 8vo. Neue Apologie des Sokrates, *Berl.* 1772—88. Von dem Begriffe der Philos. und ihren Theilem, *Berl.* 1778, 8vo. Kurzer Abriss der Metaphysik, *Halle*, 1794, 8vo. Vorbereitung zur Natürlichen Theologie, *Halle*, 1781, 8vo. Sittenlehre der Vernunft, *Berl.* 1781—86, 8vo. Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften, *Halle*, 1783; 3te Aufl. 1790, 8vo. Handbuch der Æsthetik für gebildete Leser, 4 Th. *Halle*, 1803, sqq.; 2te Aufl. 1807, ff. 8vo. Geist des Urchristenthums, *Berl.* 1807, 8vo. Versuch einer Allge-

had the merit of making an able attempt to revive the principles of Leibnitz, and distinguished himself in the *application* of philosophy. *E. Platner*[1] also inclined to the ideas of Leibnitz, but with a more sceptical turn of mind and greater acuteness; and added some valuable inquiries into Anthropology and Physiology. The tendency to a system of mere Eudæmonism which had been remarked in Wolf's theory, betrayed itself in the modified form it assumed under the hands of Platner: according to whom happiness, or well-being, is the end of each and all living beings, and *good* is that which agrees with the happiness of individuals, and of all; Virtue being free-will directed towards the attainment of what is truly good.

Christian Garve[2] made morality consist in the fulfilment of those laws which are obligatory on mankind at large, in all their various relations: such are the several principles of Virtue, Propriety, Benevolence, and Order. The revision of Philosophy, by *Chph. Meiners*,[3] belongs to this period; and the controversy between *J. C. Lossius*,[4] and the more

meinen Deutschen Synonymik, 6 Th. *Halle*, 1795; 2te Aufl. 1820. Fortgesetzt von Maass (XI—XII B). Vermischte Schriften, *Halle*, 1784, 8vo. Neueste vermischte Schriften, *Halle*, 1788, 8vo. Philosophisches Magazin, *Halle*, 1788—92; 4 Bde. 8vo. Philosophisches Archiv, 2 Bde. 1792—95, 8vo. See Nicolai, Gedächtnisschrift auf J. A. Eberhard, *Berl.* 1810, 8vo.

[1] Born at Leipsic, 1744; died there, professor of Medicine and Philosophy, 1818.

E. Platner, Philosoph. Aphorismen, *Leipzig*, 1776—82, 2 Th. 8vo.; neue umgearbeitete Aufl. 1793—1800. Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise, *Leipz.* 1772, 8vo. Neue Anthropologie, 1 B. *Leipz.* 1790, 8vo. Gespräche über den Atheismus, *Leipz.* 1781, 8vo. Lehrbuch der Logik und Metaphysik, *Leipz.* 1795, 8vo. For his life and character see the Memoir published by his son in the Literary Journal of Jena, No. 38, 1819. [2] Born at Breslau, 1742; died, 1798.

Chr. Garve, Abh. über die Verbindung der Moral und der Politik, *Bresl.* 1768. Betrachtungen über de allgem. Grundsätze der Sittenlehre, *Bresl.* 1798, 8vo. Versuche über verschiedne Gegenstände der Moral, etc., 2te Aufl. 1821, 8vo. Ueber das Daseyn Gottes, *Bresl.* 1802.

[3] Born 1747; died 1810.

Chph. Meiners, Revision der Philosophie, 1 Th. *Gött. u. Gotha*, 1772, 8vo. Abriss der Psychologie, 1773. Grundriss der Seelenlehre, *Leipz.* 1786. Untersuchungen über die Denk- und Willenskräfte, *Gotting.* 1806, 2 Th. 8vo. Verm. Philos. Schriften, *Leipz.* 1775—76, 3 Th. 8vo., with several other works on Psychology and Ethics.

[4] Joh. Christ. Lossius, Physische Ursachen des Wahren, *Gotha*,

profoundly thinking *J. N. Tetens*,[1] on the question whether Truth be or be not *objective*. The former derived the highest law of Thought from certain vibrations of the nervous system. To these we must add the popular Manuals of *J. H. Feder*,[2] and *J. A. H. Ulrich* (§ 356, note).

Nevertheless, we may observe that the German nation always displayed its characteristic depth of research, and a regard for the sacred interests of mankind. Of this the pious *C. F. Gellert*[3] is a sufficient proof; whose writings and lectures equally contributed to preserve a sense of religion and moral duty among his contemporaries.

382. In the place of Metaphysics, in Germany as in Great Britain, a species of empirical Psychology had acquired astonishing credit and influence. *Tetens* (mentioned in preceding section), particularly distinguished himself, by prosecuting the inquiries of Locke respecting the origin of knowledge, with great acuteness of intellect, and without any taint of materialism. He prosecuted investigations into the fundamental faculties of the soul; made it his object to

1775, 8vo. Unterricht der gesunden Vernunft, *Gotha*, 1777, 2 Th. 8vo. Neues philos. allgem. Reallexicon, *Erf.* 1803—7, 4 B. 8vo.

[1] Born at Tettenbüll, 1736; died 1805.

Joh. Nic. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung, *Leips.* 1776—77, 2 B. 8vo. Gedanken über einige Ursachen, warum in der Metaphysik nur wenige ausgemachte Wahrheiten sind, *Bützow* u. *Wismar*, 1760, 8vo. Ueber die allgem. speculative Philosophie, *Bützow*, 1775, 8vo. (anonym.)

[2] Born, 1740; died a Privy-Councillor of Justice at Hanover, 1821.

Joh. Ge. Heinr. Feder's Institutiones Log. et Metaph. *Fcf.* 1777. Grundriss der philos. WW. *Coburg*, 1767, und G. A. Tittel's Erläuterungen dazu, 1785, 8vo. Grundsätze der Logik und Metaphysik, *Götting.* 1794, 8vo. Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen, dessen Naturtriebe, Veränderungen, etc., *Gotting.* und *Lemgo*, 1799—93, 4 Th. 8vo.; 2te Aufl. 1783, sqq. with several other works. Ueber das moral. Gefuhl, *Copenh.* 1792, 8vo. J. G. H. Feder's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze (Autobiographie, von seinem Sohn herausgegeben). *Leipzig*, 1825, 8vo.

[3] Born at Haynichen, 1715; died professor of moral philosophy at Leipsic, 1769.

Chr. Frchgott Gellert, Discours sur la Nature, et l'étendue et l'utilité de la Morale, *Berl.* 1764, 8vo. Moral. Vorlesungen, herausg. von A. Schlegel und Heyer, 2 B., *Leipz.* 1770, 8vo. Chr. Garve, Ammerkungen über Gellerts Moral, seine Schriften überh. und seinen Charakter, *Leipz.* 1770, 8vo. Gellerts sämmtl. Schriften, *Leipz.* 1769—70, 7 Th. 8vo.

substantiate the proofs of an *objective* Truth, and to refute the scepticism of Hume; and thus eventually fell into the same path which was pursued by Kant. He attracted, however, little attention in his day. We may here place the anthropological researches of *C. F. Irwing*,[1] *J. H. Campe*,[2] *Dietr. Tiedemann*,[3] *Platner*, *Garve* (see preceding section), *C. Ph. Moritz*,[4] *J. J. Engel*,[5] *Fr. Joach. Eschenburg*,[6] of the able critic *J. G. E. Lessing*,[7] and the theologian *J. G. Von Herder*,[8] a man of comprehensive mind, besides many other writers on Æsthetics, some of whom followed the principles promulgated in Great Britain (by Hutcheson, Gerard, Hume, Home, Burke, etc.); while others adopted the French

[1] Born at Berlin, 1728; died 1801.

Carl Franz v. Irwing, Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen, *Berl.* 1778, 4 Th. 8vo.

[2] Born at Teersen in Brunswick, 1746; died, 1818.

Empfindungs- und Erkenntnisskraft der menschl. Seele, 1776, 8vo. Ueber Empfindung und Empfindelei, *Hamb.* 1779. Sammlung einiger Erziehungsschriften, *Hamb.* 1777, 2 Th. 8vo. Theophron, *Hamb.* 1783, *Braunschw*, 1790, u. öfter.

[3] Born 1749; died a professor at Marburg, 1806.

Untersuchungen über die Menschen. *Leips.* 1777—78, 3 Th. 8vo. Handbuch der Psychologie, herausgegeben von Wachler, *Leips.* 1804, 8vo.

[4] Born at Hameln, 1757; died, 1793. Aussichten zu einer Experimentalseelenlehre, 1782, 8vo. Magaz. zur Erfahrungsseelenlehre, 10 Th. 1793—95; und Selbstcharakteristik in Anton Reiser, 1785—90. Abh. über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen, *Braunschw.* 1788, 8vo. Grundlinien zu einer vollständ. Theorie der schönen Kunste (besides several other works).

[5] Born at Parchim, 1741; died, 1802. Besides several treatises on Æsthetics; Der Philosoph fur die Welt, *Leipz.* 1775—77, 2 Th. 8vo.; neue Ausg. 1801, sqq.; and in his works, *Berl.* 1801, sqq. 6 B.

[6] Born at Hamburg, 1743; died, 1820. Entwurf einer Theorie und Litteratur des schönen Wissenschaften, *Berl.* 1713, 8vo. 4te Aufl. 1817, 8vo.

[7] Born at Kamenz, 1729; died, 1781. Various Essays on Æsthetics and Criticism, and: Die Erziehung d. Menschengeschlechts. Sämmtl. Schriften, *Berl.* 1771—91. 30 B. 8vo.

[8] Born at Morungen, 1744; died at Weimar, 1803. The author of various works on Phil., Hist., and the Fine Arts, particularly: Ideen zur Philos. der Gesch. der Menschheit (translated into English, under the title of Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, by T. Churchill, 4to. *Lond.* 1800, reprinted 2 vols. 8vo. 1803); Preisschrift über den Ursprung der Sprache seit, 1772—89. Adrastea; Kalligone; Terpsichore, etc.

theories, particularly that of Batteux, (see section 378); and others again attempted paths of their own. The influence of Philosophy became more perceptible; not only as affecting the sciences immediately connected with it, such as the Mathematics, Physics, Natural History, and Medicine; but as operating on certain subordinate branches of science, to that time neglected; such as Education (treated after Rousseau by *Basedow*, *Campe*, *Reswitz*); the theory of Language (by *Herder* after *Harris*[1] and *Monboddo*); and the History of Mankind (zealously investigated by *Meiners*, *Isaac Iselin*,[2] and *Herder*. The last attacked the jejune system of the pretended discovery prevalent in his time, seconded by his ingenious contemporary *J. G. Hamann*,[3] as well as by *Jacobi* (of whom presently), and by *Matthias Claudius* (the messenger of Wandsbeck). Among these, *C. Th. Ant. Maria Von Dalberg* also deserves a place.[4]

Psycho-Physiology of Mesmer.

383. We must now notice a man and a movement that have already exercised an important influence on the united sciences of psycho-physiology.

Frederic Anthony Mesmer was born at Weiler, near Stein on the Rhine, in the year 1734. He was educated for the medical profession, which he prosecuted at Vienna; where, in making some experiments connected with natural magnetism, he discovered, or rather re-discovered, the existence

[1] Born at Salisbury, 1702; died, 1750.

[2] Born at Bâle, 1728; died, 1782. Versuch uber die Geschichte der Menschheit, 1764, 8vo.

[3] Born at Königsberg; died at Munster, 1788.

Hamann's Schriften, herausg. von Fr. Roth, 1—8 B., *Berl.* 1821, 8vo. (reviewed by Hegel in the Jahrbücher der wiss. Kritik, 1829). For his correspondence with Jacobi, see the works of the latter. See also the Sibylline Leaves of the Magician of the North, published by D. Fr. Cramer, *Leipz.* 1819, 8vo.

[4] Elector, Arch-Chancellor, and then Grand-Duke of Frankfort, and subsequently Archbishop of Ratisbon; born 1744; died 1817.

Betrachtungen über des Universum, *Erf.* 1776, 7te Aufl. 1821. Vom Verhaltniss zwischen Moral and Staatkunst, *Erf.* 1786, 4to. Gedanken von der Bestimmung des moral. Werths, *Erf.* 1787, 4to. Grundsätze der Æsthetik, *ebend.* 1721, 4to. Vom Bewussteyn als allgem. Grunde der Weltweisheit, *ebend.* 1793, 8vo. u. a.

of a new force, which is at present a problem among the learned. Some, like Mesmer, have regarded it as a universally diffused power, similar to Attraction and Electricity, permeating and acting on all organized and unorganized bodies. Others have viewed it simply as a nervous fluid, which is the agent in producing the phenomena of natural and artificial somnambulism. Lastly, there exists a party who attribute all the phenomena in question to the power of the mind acting directly on the organization. This view seems somewhat countenanced by the recent discovery of new branches of the science, which have been styled Neuro-Hypnology and Electro-Biology.

On the subjects of Neuro-Hypnology, see BRAID'S Book, recently published, and Dr. DARLING'S Electro-Biology, 8vo. *Lond.* 1852.

English Works on Mesmerism.

The Rev. C. H. TOWNSHEND'S Facts in Mesmerism, 8vo. *London*, 1844.

Dr. GREGORY'S Letters to a Candid Enquirer on Animal Magnetism, 12mo. 1851.

The Rev. GEORGE SANDBY'S Mesmerism and its Opponents, 2nd edit. 12mo., *Lond.* 1848.

The ZOIST, a Journal of Cerebral Physiology and Mesmerism, published quarterly.

HADDOCK'S Somnolism and Psycheism, 1849.

I. C. COLQUHOUN'S History of Magic, Witchcraft, and Animal Magnetism, 2 vols. *London*, 1852.

Dr. ASHBURNER, Facts in Clairvoyance, 8vo. *London*, 1848.

Early Magnetism in its Higher Relations to Humanity; as veiled in the Poets and Prophets. By Θυος Μαθος, 8vo. *Lond.* 1846.

REICHENBACH (Baron) on Magnetism, Electricity, Heat, Light, Crystallization, and the Chemical Affinities in their Relations to Vital Powers; with Notes, &c. by Jo. ASHBURNER, M.D., 8vo.

Dr. ESDAILE, Mesmerism in India, and its application to Surgery, 12mo. 1849.

Isis Revelata, by I. C. COLQUHOUN; 2 vols., *Lond.* 1836.

Dr. MAYO'S Letters on the Truths contained in popular Superstitions.

French Works on Mesmerism.

SALVERTE, Des Sciences Occultes; ou Essai sur la Magie, les Prodiges, et les Miracles, 8vo., second edition, *Paris*, 1843.

BRIERRE DE BOISMONT, Des Hallucinations, ou Histoire Raisonnée des Apparitions, des Visions, des Songes, de l'Extase, du Magnetisme, et du Somnambulisme, 8vo. *Paris*, 1845.

CHARDEL, Essai de Psychologie-Physiologique, ou explication des Relations de l'Ame avec le Corps; seconde edition, 8vo. *Paris*, 1838.

CHARDEL, Esquisse de la Nature Humaine expliquée par le Magnetisme Animal, 8vo. *Paris*, 1826.

D'HENIN DE CUVILLIERS, Exposition critique du système et de la doctrine mystique des Magnetistes, 8vo. *Paris*, 1822.

German Works on Mesmerism.

Archiv für den thierischen Magnetismus von Professor KEISER, 8 vols. *Jena.*

DR. PASSAVANT, Untersuchungen über den Lebenmagnetismus und das Hellsehen, *Frankf.* 1821.

DR. JOS. ENNEMOSER, Der Magnetismus im Verhaltnisse mit der Natur und der Religion, 1 vol. 8vo. 184 . History of Magic (will shortly appear in Bohn's Scientific Library).

"The Hermes."

Dr. Ennemoser's Geschichte der Magie, 1844, 8vo. (a translation of which will appear in Bohn's Scientific Library).

Le Sphinx: Nouvelles Archives du Magnetisme Animal, et principalement de la vie nocturne, par KIESER, 2 parts, 1825–26.

Memoire sur la Découverte du Magnetisme Animal, par M. MESMER, *Paris*, 1779.

MESMER, System der Wechselwirkungen, Theorie, und Anwendung des thierischen Magnetismus, als die allgemeine Heilkunde zur Erhaltung des Menschen; herausgegeben von WOLFAHRT, 2 vols. 8vo. *Berlin*, 1814.

The following is a list of some of the most important recent works that have appeared in Germany in connection with the Philosophy of *Animal Magnetism*, and the revolution that it is effecting in Psychology.

Jos. ENNEMOSER, Die Geist des Menschen in der Natur.

Jos. ENNEMOSER, Histor.-psycholog. Untersuchung über das Wesen der menschlichen Seele, überhaupt und über die Beseelung des Kindes insbesond, *Bonn.*

E. SIMON'S Alt und neuere Geschichte des Glaubens an dem Hereinragen einer Geisterwelt in der unsrigen; in Beziehung auf ein Fortdauer der Seele nach dem Tode, an Engel, Mittelgeister, Gespenster, Vorboten, und Teufel; besonders aus den Meinungen nicht Christlichen Völker gezogen, *Heilbronn.*

FR. VON BAADER, On the Incompetence of our present Philosophy for the elucidation of Apparitions in the Night Side of Nature: extracts from a letter to Just. Kerner, *Stuttg.*

CP. AD. ESCHENMAYER'S Mysteries of the Inner Life elucidated by the History of the Seeress of Prevorst, especially in connection with recent criticisms, *Tübingen.*

JUNG STILLING'S Pneumatologie.

MAGIKON, Archiv. für Beobachtungen aus dem Gebiete der Geisterkunde und des magnetischen und magischen Lebens, 3 Hefte, *Stuttg.*

In France, BARON MASSIAS published some interesting observations on Somnambulism in his Traité de Philosophie psycho-physiologique. (These observations have been translated by the editor of this work).

Various Foreign Works on Animal Magnetism.

Bibliothèque du Magnetisme Animal.

Histoire du Somnambulisme dans tous les siècles et chez tous les peuples, par A. GAUTHIER, 2 vols. 8vo. *Par.* 1842.

DR. BERTRAND, Traité du Somnambulisme.

COUNT DELEUZE, Histoire Critique du Magnetisme Animal, 8vo. *Paris*, 1819 (besides his other works).

RICARD, Traité théorique et pratique du Magnetisme Animal, 8vo. *Paris*, 1841.

Archives du Magnetisme Animal, publiés par M. LE BARON D'HENIN DE CUVILLIERS, 8 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1820-23.

The Processes and Principles of Magnetism, 2 vols. 8vo. 1819. By M. DE LAUSANNE.

ETTMULLER, WEICHART, UNZER, VAN SWIETEN, DE HAEN, SAUVAGES DE LA CROIX, T. FRANK, DARWIN, PETETIN, PUYSEGUR, GEORGET, GMELIN, HEINECKEN, RENARD, REDEM, NASSE, NEES, VON ESENBECK, and DR. BACKER (of *Gröningen*), have published valuable works on Mesmerism.

CHARPIGNON, Physiologie, Médecine, et Métaphysique du Magnetisme, 8vo. 1848.

DUPOTET, Cours du Magnetisme Animal, seconde edition, 8vo. *Paris*, 1840.

KLUGE, Versuch einer Darstellung des animalisch. Magnetismus.

LILLBOPP, Die Wunder des Christenthums und deren Verhältniss zum thierischen Magnetismus, mit Berucksichtigung der neuesten Wunderheilungen nach Römisch-Katholischen Principien, *Mainz*, 1822.

VERATI, Sulla Storia Teoria e Practica del Magnetismo Animale, e sopra varj altri Temi, relativi al medesimo; Trattato critico, 4 vols. 8vo. *Firenze*, 1846.

DR. HUFELAND, On Sympathy.

DR. BRANDIS, Ueber psychische Heilmittal und Magnetismus. *Copenhagen*, 1818.

WIENHOLT published, in 1787, a small work: Beytrag zu den Enfahrungen über den thierischen Magnetismus.

WIENHOLT, Heilkraft des thierischen Magnetismus, nach eigenen Beobachtungen, 3 vols. 8vo. 1802-5.

M. GEORGET, Physiologie du Système Nerveux.

DR. TESTE, A Practical Manual of Animal Magnetism. Translated from the second edition by D. SPILLAN, 1 vol. 12mo. 1843, *Lond.*

DR. TESTE, Le Magnetisme Animal expliqué, ou Leçons Analytiques sur la Nature Essentielle du Magnetisme, sur son Effet, son Histoire, ses Applications, les divers Méthodes de Pratique, &c., 8vo. *Paris*, 1845.

For Mesmerism in India and China, see ATHANASIUS KIRCHER: Magnes Universalis and Mundus Magneticus. For Mesmerism in Egypt, see PROSPER ALPINUS, De Medicina Egyptorum, lib. 4, c. 15.

For the effects of Animal Magnetism on Animals, see the tract of DR. WILSON, of Middlesex Hospital, 1845.

384. Mesmer's theory may be briefly described as follows: He believed in the universal diffusion of a fluid forming a medium of mutual influence between the heavenly bodies, the earth, and animated bodies, and represented it as extremely subtile and elastic, and susceptible of flux and reflux. He maintained that the human body has properties and poles analogous to the magnet. The virtues of animal magnetism may be propagated and transported to a distance without any visible medium; it can heal nervous diseases immediately and others mediately. The fluid is universal, but all animated bodies are not equally susceptible of it; and in this fluid nature presents us with a universal means of healing mankind. *Professor Eschenmayer* admits the existence of an organic ether, spread everywhere, and much more subtile than light. With this view he connects his mystical and spiritual Metaphysics. *Dr. Passavant* shews the intimate and important relation between the science and the sublimest sentiments of religion. *Kieser* has started some ingenious and original views in connection with the elementary principles and forces of nature, in elucidating the phenomena of Animal Magnetism. *Dr. Bertrand* attributes the latter to psychical causes, and *Baron Massias* to an electro-nervous fluid.

Dr. J. Ennemoser has endeavoured to trace the connection and distinction of the highest degrees of Mesmerism and Miracles, and the difference between Ecstacy and Inspiration (§§ 265—6 of his "Magnetismus"); and *Baron Reichenbach* has also opened a new field of inquiry by the discovery of the Odylic Force.

Mesmer, meeting with opposition at Vienna, removed to Paris, where his system was readily received and extensively adopted. After his retirement to Switzerland (at Merseburg), where he died in 1815, at the mature age of eighty-one, the science was promoted and vigorously prosecuted by many enlightened champions in France and Germany, till the crash of the Revolution and the iron arm of Napoleon arrested all extensive propagation of scientific truths, save those connected with strategy.

Whatever may be our opinion of Mesmer's Theory, the importance of his discovery in a practical point of view is now placed beyond cavil. The facts and phenomena of

Mesmerism, like all other valuable new discoveries, after meeting with determined hostility from conservative minds in general and the orthodox part of the faculty in particular, have now been established on a foundation that cannot be shaken, and throw a new and important light on psychology and physiology.

The mantle of Mesmer descended on the shoulders of the *Marquis of Puysegur*, a French nobleman of the old régime, who was a principal means in propagating and advancing the interests of the science. He was supported and succeeded by *Count Deleuze*, a man of philosophical mind and benevolent heart, and by *Barons Dupotet* and *Massias*, a psychologist of some merit; as also by *Drs. Bertrand*, *Georget*, and *Rostan*. In Germany it has found numerous and eminent adherents, especially *Dr. Ennemoser* and *Professors Eschenmayer* and *Kieser*; and in England it has found able champions in *Dr. Elliotson*, *Mr. Townsend*, *Dr. Gregory*, and *Mr. Colquhoun*.

The science is at present too much in embryo for us to compass its scope, breadth, or depth; but many of its discoveries appear destined to throw much light on Psychology, Physiology, and ultimately on Ontology, and Theology. The phenomena of ecstacy, clairvoyance, prevision, thought-reading, mental travelling, &c., which it has elicited, will probably give us a much greater insight into the subjects of Life, Death, Sleep, Spirit, and Matter.

Mesmeric science, like most others, has encountered violent opposition from sceptics and bigots, but is now satisfactorily identified with ancient Magic. Modern discovery has traced it in all climates and ages; and to it must probably be referred the Temple-sleep of the Egyptians, the Oracles and Divination of the Greeks, the Roman Sybils, the Brahminical Jogis, the Shamanism of the Mongolian races, and the Sorcery of the Laplanders, &c. It should also in justice be observed, that Mesmer was undoubtedly anticipated in his discovery of Animal Magnetism, as a science, by numerous eminent men, some of whom have been already enumerated. Among the ancient writers who have treated of the subject we must particularly notice Hippocrates,[1] Plutarch,[2] Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus.

[1] Hippocrates, De Insomniis. [2] Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride.

Since the revival of letters it has been investigated and explained by Pomponatius,[1] Ficinus, Paracelsus,[2] Baptist van Helmont,[3] Maxwell,[4] and others.

Besides these authors, *Gassner*,[5] a German Roman Catholic priest, created a great sensation towards the beginning of the last century, by his very numerous and almost miraculous cures.[6]

It seems, however, to be established that Mesmer did not borrow his discovery from his predecessors; and that he was the first who gave it an extensive publicity.

Our space will not suffer us to enter more fully into this interesting field of inquiry; but it may be advisable, before taking leave of the subject, to add, that it comes to us recommended by the adhesion of some of the first scientific men of the day. Among these we may enumerate, *M. Agassiz*, *Baron Humboldt*, *Baron Reichenbach*, *Sir David Brewster*, *Professor Olbers* the astronomer, *Cloquet* the French anatomist, *Dr. Mayo*, *Dr. Elliotson*, *Dr. Gregory*, *Dugald Stewart*[7] of Edinburgh, &c.

Retrospective.

385. A review of the progress of philosophy during the period we have been considering will convince us that it had gained more in the apparent extent than the real value of its dominion. It is true that the different branches of philosophical science had acquired a rich mine of fresh materials, and two new studies, those of the theory of Taste and

[1] Pomponatius, De Incantationibus.

[2] Paracelsus says, "I maintain, from what I have experienced, that such a deep secret lies hid in Magnetism as renders it impossible to make any great progress in the knowledge and cure of diseases without an acquaintance with its principles." Opera omnia, *Gen.* 1658, vol. I, p. 634.

[3] For Van Helmont's views on the subject, see COLQUHOUN'S Isis Revelata; two Dissertations by DELEUZE in the Bibliothèque du Magnetisme Animal, tom. I, p. 45, and tom. II, p. 198, *Paris*, 1817. Besides, Van Helmont's own works (see § 329).

[4] DR. WILLIAM MAXWELL, De Medicina Magnetica, *Franc.* 1679.

[5] Born at Pludentz, in Swabia, in 1727.

[6] See an interesting account of Gassner by Professor ESCHENMAYER, in the German Archives of Animal Magnetism, vol. 8.

[7] Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. III, pp. 221-222.

the Science of Animal Magnetism, had been laid open: the *application* of Philosophy to particular subjects, (for instance those of education and the political sciences), had been enlarged, and the influence of Philosophy had come to be recognized throughout the whole circle of human knowledge. On the other hand, little progress had been made in the improvement of a scientific *Method*. The questions respecting the true character of Philosophy, its Form, and its End, were scarcely stirred at all: the conflicting opinions with regard to the origin of knowledge had not been exhausted; and notwithstanding the recourse which had been had to the different methods of Observation, Reflection, and Demonstration, the fundamental conditions of their application and their limits had scarcely been discussed. Everywhere prevailed Incertitude, Doubt, and Dissension, respecting the most important questions; with a barren and superficial Dogmatism. The combatants on every side had laid aside their arms rather from indifference and disgust for intellectual speculation, than because any one predominant and satisfactory solution of the points at issue had established peace. All the philosophical sciences stood in need of more accurate limitations and more completely scientific forms, in consequence of the want of *Principles*; which the reformation Psychology had pretended to effect was inadequate to supply.[1]

386. In Practical philosophy also might be observed a conflict between the opposite tendencies of Empiricism and Rationalism; in which the former had obviously obtained the advantage. The claims of the Intuitive Reason had not indeed been altogether rejected, but had seldom been fairly and freely discussed; the Intuition being perpetually confounded with *Reflection*, and treated as the handmaid of sensation; and not as an independent and practical faculty or power. Some inquirers (e. g. Geulinx and Rich. Price) had detected the two grand defects of most systems of Morality then received: 1st. That they either set out with self-love as their principle, or terminated in it as their end; producing nothing but a series of maxims more or less subservient to the mere attainment of Happiness by the exercise

[1] MEINERS, Revision de Philosophie. See p. 387, note 3.

of Prudence. 2ndly, That they did not recognise the Reason as the first legislating principle of free-agency.

No lasting reform was however brought about by these observations.

The Ethics of the day accordingly amounted to little more than a selection of what appeared to be the best and most rational views, an an Eclectic plan, and with views altogether *subjective* and personal; consisting in deductions from the principles of Self-love and Sympathy. Free-will—the first requisite of a sound system of Ethics—occasioned considerable perplexities to the supporters of such theories; since either they contemplated a free-will purely psychological, or laboured to solve the problem on metaphysical grounds, and thereby inclined to Determinism; or maintained a blind and unprincipled free-agency, against which theoretical reason revolted. In proportion as the disputants became more and more sensible of the difficulties belonging to this question, they were tempted to desert the prosecution of such inquiries altogether, and to adopt in their stead the easier task of rendering Philosophy *popular*—and *superficial*.

To this subject belong:

De Prémontval, Pensées sur la Liberté, *Berl.* 1754, 8vo. Le Diogène de D'Alembert, ou Diogène décent. Pensées libres sur l'Homme et sur les Principaux Objets des Connaissances de l'Homme. Nouv. éd. *Berl.* 1755, 12mo. Vues Philosophiques. *Berl.* 1757; 2 tom 8vo. Du Hazard sous l'Empire de la Providence, *Berl.* 1755, 8vo.

Versuche einer Anleitung zu einer Sittenlehre für alle Menschen (von Schulz), *Berl.* 1783—87, 4 Th. 8vo.

Jo. Aug. Henr. Ulrich, Eleutheriologie, oder über Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit, *Jen.* 1788, 8vo.

SECOND PERIOD.

FROM KANT TO OUR OWN TIMES.

IMPROVEMENT EFFECTED IN PHILOSOPHY BY MEANS OF THE CRITICAL METHOD.

I. GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

387. The history of German Philosophy from Kant to the present time has been admirably and copiously illustrated in various German and English works. The student may now obtain a clear and concise picture of this remarkable phase in the development of the human mind, from the pen of some of the most eminent thinkers and writers of the day. The historical and eclectic tendency of modern philosophy has naturally contributed to give greater importance to works treating of the history of philosophy, and the depth and acuteness of German metaphysics since the time of Kant, have naturally led men to explore and illustrate its variations with precision and minuteness.

The student is here presented with the most important works that have appeared on this portion of the history of philosophy.

ERDMANN, Die Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant, 1 Th. 1848.

MICHELET, Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland, von Kant bis Hegel. 1 und 2 Bd. 1837, f. g.

BIEDERMANN, Die deutsche Philosophie von Kant bis auf unsere Zeit, 2 Bde, 1842. f. g.

ULRICI, Geschichte und Kritik der Principien der neuern Philosophie, 1845.

H. M. CHALIBÆUS, Historische Entwickelung der spekulativen Philo-

sophie von Kant bis Hegel, 4th ed. enlarged, *Dresden* und *Leipzig*, 1848.

An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the nineteenth century, by J. D. Morell, A.M., 2nd edit. 1848.

A History of the Philosophy of Mind, by Robert Blakey, d. 2, 1848.

K. G. Hansius, Materialien zur Geschichte der kritischen Philosophie; nebst eine historische Einleitung zur Geschichte der Kantischen Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1793.

E. Sigm. Mirbt, Kant und seine Nachfolger; oder Geschichte der neuern Deutschen Philos. *Jena*, 1841.

K. Rosenkranz, Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie, *Leipzig*, 1840.

Amand Saintes, Histoire de la vie et de la philosophie de Kant, *Paris* et *Hamburg*, 1844.

J. G. Mussmann, Im. Kant: eine Gedächtnissrede, *Halle*, 1822.

F. Ed. Bencke, Kant und die philosophische Aufgabe unserer Zeit; eine Jubeldenkschrift an die Kritik der reinen Venunft, *Berl.* 1832.

A. *Critical Idealism of Kant.*

Memoirs, etc. of Kant:

Ludw. Ernst. Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Kant's, *Königsb.* 1805, 8vo. Reinhold Bernard Jachmann, Im. Kant, geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund, *Königsb.* 1805, 8vo. C. A. Ch. Wasianski, Im. Kant, in seinen letzten Lebensjahren, *Königsb.* 1804, 8vo. Biographie Im. Kant's, *Leipz.* 1804, 4 Th. 8vo. J. Ch. A. Grohmann, Dem Andenken Kant's, *Berl.* 1804, 8vo. Fr. Bouterwek, Imm. Kant: ein Denkmal, *Hamb.* 1804, 8vo. F. Th. Rink, Ansichten aus Kant's Leben, *Königsb.* 1805, 8vo. Kant's Gedachtnissfeier, *Königsb.* 1811, 8vo. Biographie Kant's, von Schubert, 1842.

388. A reformation in Philosophy had now become necessary. It was effected by a philosopher of the first order, who had qualified himself to correct the principal defects of the former systems by a long and ardent, but secret study of all the branches of the subject. His appearance at that time was the more opportune, because already several men of talent (*Lessing*, *Winkelmann*, *Hamann*, *Herder*, *Göthe*, and others) had excited by their various compositions a great degree of intellectual activity, and created a capacity for the reception of new ideas on Science and the Arts. *Emmanuel Kant* was born at Königsberg, the 22nd of April, 1724; became a professor in the same city, and died February 12th, 1804. He may be styled a second Socrates, having created a new philosophy, which, by

investigating the origin and limits of human knowledge,* revived the spirit of research, extended it, taught it its present position, and directed it to the true path of Science, through the cultivation of Self-knowledge. For the accomplishment of this task he was qualified by uncommon talents, studiously cultivated, and enriched by extensive reading. His piety and virtue set bounds to an exclusive spirit of speculation, and imparted to his works the character of their author. A profound love of truth and a pure moral sentiment became the principles of his philosophy, to which he added the qualities of originality, solidity, and sagacity, in an eminent degree. The revolution which he was thus enabled to effect was astonishing. It is true that it was not brought about without many impediments, but its consequences have been immense, and the whole course of philosophy has been modified by its influence.

For the works of Kant see below, § 393.

389. Being awakened by the Scepticism of Hume (§ 375), he was led to remark the very striking difference in the result of thinking in Philosophy and in Mathematics; and to speculate upon the causes of this difference. Metaphysics justly claimed his regard; but he was led to believe that as yet the very threshold of the science had only been touched. The consideration and examination of the different philosophical systems, and particularly of the superficial Dogmatism of Wolf, led him to question whether, antecedently to any attempt at dogmatizing in philosophy, it might not be necessary to investigate the *possibility* of philosophical knowledge; and he concluded that to this end an inquiry into the different sources of knowledge and a critical examination of their origin and employment were necessary: in which respect he proposed to complete the task undertaken by Locke. He laid down in the first place that Philosophy and Mathematics are, in their origin, *rational* or *intuitive* sciences. Rational Cognitions are distinguished from Empirical by the qualities of *necessity* and *universality*. On the possibility of such cognitions depends

* Hence called the Critical method, or that of investigation and examination.—Ed.

that of the philosophical sciences. These are either synthetic or analytic: the latter of which methods is dependent on the first. What then is the principle of synthetical *à priori* knowledge in contradistinction to empirical; which is founded on perception? The existence of *à priori* knowledge is deducible from Mathematics, as well as from the testimony of common knowledge or cognition; and it is to such knowledge that the aim of Reason and Metaphysics is chiefly directed. A science, therefore, which may investigate with strictness the possibility of such knowledge, and the principles of its employment and application, is necessary for the direction of the human mind, and of the highest practical utility. Kant pursued this course of inquiry, tracing a broad line of distinction between the provinces of Philosophy and the Mathematics, and investigating more completely than had yet been done the faculty of knowledge. He remarked that synthetical *à priori* knowledge imparts a *formal* character to knowledge in general, and can only be grounded in the laws of the special and individual faculties working together in the production of cognitions. He then proceeds to analyse the particulars of our knowledge, and discriminates between its elementary parts so often confounded in practice, with a view to ascertain the true nature of each species: the characteristics of necessity and universality which belong to *à priori* knowledge, being his leading principles.

390. The faculty of theoretical knowledge is composed of Sensibility and Understanding, Receptivity and Spontaneousness. The *material* part of Sensibility consists in the feelings which belong to it; the *formal* conditions are space and time. Space and Time have no reality except in our conception of them, but may be said to exist *à priori*, as *conditions* of our perceptions. The understanding combines, in the form of notions or conceptions, and judgments, the materials supplied by the sensitive faculties. The laws according to which the understanding acts, independently of experience (or rather, regulating experience), are the (four) categories. These, with the conditions of sensational perception (viz. Space and Time), make up the *forms* and *elements* of pure Intellect. The forms of sensibility and intellect are what determine and define; the material given

by the senses is the thing to be determined: the former are independent of the appearing objects. The grand conclusion of the Critical System of Kant is this, that no object can be known to us except in proportion as it is apprehended by our perceptions, and definable by our faculties for cognition; consequently, we know nothing *per se*, but only by appearances. In this consists his Critical Idealism (being founded on a critical examination of the faculties of cognition), or, as it is otherwise termed, his *transcendental* Idealism. In consequence of these distinctions, it follows that our knowledge of real objects is limited by experience; and that *à priori* knowledge contemplates only their *formal* conditions, or their *possibility*. It is only under such limitations that synthetical *à priori* knowledge is possible; and within these boundaries Metaphysics must be confined. Connected with the above is the acute distinction established by him between Thought and Cognition,* (the neglect of which has been a fertile source of error)—between the objects apprehended and our representations of them; as well as the line drawn between Reason and Understanding, in a Logical and a Transcendental point of view. Theoretical reason, considered as the art of ratiocination, labours to attain a perception of absolute unity, and to produce a connected system, by means of *Ideas*, which are the forms of the reason's activity. A cognition is not attainable by the means of Ideas, since they have no suitable object within the province of Experience; although Reason is perpetually labouring after a complete knowledge of God, the world, the immortality and free-agency of the soul; and although the whole artillery of Metaphysics has been constantly directed towards these points. True philosophical reason will not presume to make any *constitutive* use of such ideas, for it is betrayed thereby into the labyrinth of *apparent* knowledge and a maze of contradictions. This he proceeds to evince by a critical examination of the proofs adduced of the substantiality and immortality of the soul—the termination and commencement of the world (with the contrary suppositions)—the divisibility or indivisibility

* Hence we are enabled completely to separate Logic from Metaphysics.—Ed.

of substances—the necessity or contingency of Causation and Being in the present world—and the existence of God. Reason cannot *demonstrate* the existence of the objects of these ideas, which are imperceptible to the senses; nor, on the other hand, can it prove the contrary. All that is permitted to theoretical reason is a *moderating* power in the employment of our ideas, for the ultimate extension of real knowledge.

391. Reason, however, is not merely theoretical, but also practical, having the effect of limiting our absolute Free-will by the ideas of Duty and Right. An examination of our notions of Duty and of well-regulated Will (in which, by the common reason of mankind, consists the essence of moral worth), leads him to recognise the existence of practical *à priori* cognitions; which define not *what is*, but *what ought to be*. Practical reason is *autonomic* or self-legislating—simply defining the formal character of the Will, and presupposing free-agency as a necessary condition. The Moral Law stands forth in opposition to an empirically determined free-will, as a categorical Imperative (absolute Ought), occupying the very summit of practical Philosophy. This categorical Imperative, as the universal director of all rational volition, prescribes *universal conformity to the law* with strict necessity, and determines thereby the absolute and ultimate end and spring of action, which is not a pathological feeling, but respect for the Law. Virtue, therefore, consists in obedience to the dictation of Duty, or the moral constraint imposed by the legislative power of Reason; or, in other words, in the submission of our impulses and inclinations to Reason. Morality is not Happiness, though it implies a rational title to it, and makes us worthy of being happy. It is universal and necessary consistently with free-will. The ideas of Free-will, Immortality, and a Divinity, derive their certainty from the practical laws of Ethics. This conviction, however, is no theoretical science, but a practical rational belief (Moral-Theology). By such a definition of the *Summum Bonum* and ultimate end of rational existence, we are enabled to perceive with clearness the harmony which exists between the intellectual and sensual nature of man; between Theoretical and Practical Reason.

Civil or juridical law is distinguished from moral, inas-

much as the former legislates only with respect to external actions, and provides for the freedom of all by limiting and defining that of individuals. The description of Right which results is of a coercive character, and demands the protection of the State; which itself is fundamentally a legal institution, and based upon contracts.

392. Theoretical knowledge (founded on the conception of Nature), and Practical (founded on that of Free-agency), form two distinct spheres, as it were, of the same whole, and differ altogether in their principles. The faculty of *Judgment* interposes between these two powers and their objects—Nature and Free-will, (which are united by an inexplicable link in the mind of man); and speculates on their mutual accordance. It does not add anything to objective knowledge, but enables us to reflect on Nature as a whole, by means of a peculiar principle, that of Proportionateness of the means to the end; which is not objective but purely subjective. The Judgment therefore makes the particular subordinate to the universal; and operates partly by means of classification, partly by reflection. The latter process (that of reflection) affixes to Nature the conception of an Understanding, conformably with a subjective law, prescribing the unlimited diffusion of the employment of the Understanding; and the confirmation of its principle in its application is united with an intellectual satisfaction. In this manner arises the æsthetical consideration of Nature with a view to the principles of formal proportionateness; the pleasure derived from the Beautiful and Sublime, and the *teleological*[1] observation of Nature according to the principle of material and internal proportion. The consideration of organic objects in nature, of which we cannot think except according to the principle of an internal adaptation, although we can explain nothing by such a principle, leads us to the anticipation of a certain end and aim proposed in the world by a supersensuous spirit, which elevates practical cognition to certainty. (*Physico-Ethico-Theology*, or *Teleology*.)

393. *Works of Kant.* His grand enterprise was his Critical examination of our faculties of knowledge on the prin-

[1] *Teleology* denotes the consideration of final causes.

ciples of a Transcendental Philosophy, *i.e.* of a theory which deduces, from an examination of the faculties of the human mind, certain established principles as the conditions of its operations; giving to all these speculations a systematic form. Of this great design Kant has completed some parts, with his characteristic originality, acuteness, and depth of thought: for instance, the Metaphysical system of Nature, in which he has shown himself the precursor of the Dynamic Philosophy, inasmuch as he maintains that Matter fills Space in virtue of impulsive forces (those of Expansion and Attraction). To this he added his Moral Metaphysics, or Theory of Right and Virtue: as well as separate dissertations on Religious Anthropology, Education, and other important subjects, which contain many admirable and profound observations.

Kant's earlier works are:

Gedanken von der wahren Schatzung der lebendigen Kräfte, *Königsb.* 1746, 8vo. Principiorum Metaphysicor. nova dilucidatio, *ibid.* 1755, 4to. Betrachtungen über den Optimismus, *Königsb.* 1759, 4to. Monadologia Physica, Spec. I, *ibid.* 1756. 4to. Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweish. einzuführen, *Königsb.* 1763, 8vo. Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes; *ebend.* 1763; zuletzt 1794, 8vo. Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier Syllog. Figuren, *ebend.* 1763; *Frankf.* und *Leipz.* 1797. Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, *Königsb.* 1764, 8vo.; *Riga,* 1771. Träume eines Geistersehers, *Riga,* 1766, 8vo.; 1769. Allgem. Naturgesch. und Theorie des Himmels, etc. 4te Aufl. *Zeitz.* 1808, 8vo. De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis, *Regiomont.* 1770, 4to.; (a work in which he gives the first hint of the plan of his great Critical undertaking). The above, with several other treatises, are collected in KANT'S Kleinen Schriften, *Königsb.* und *Leipz.* 1727, III Bde. 8vo. Verm. Schriften, achte und vollst. Ausg. (herausg. von TIEFTRUNK), *Halle,* 1799—1807, IV Bde. 8vo. Sammlung einiger bisher unbekannt gebliebenen Schriften von Im. Kant (herausg. von RINK), *Königsb.* 1800, 8vo.

Kant's principal works are:

Kritik der reinen Vernuft, *Riga,* 1781, 6te Aufl.; *Leipz.* 1818, 8vo: (of this an English translation has been made by HAYWARD, 8vo. *Lond.* 1838 and 1848; and a careful translation is now preparing for Bohn's Standard Library, and will be published in October 1852). Kritik der praktischen Vernuft, *Riga,* 1788; 5te Aufl. *Leipz.* 1818, 8vo. Kritik der Urtheilskraft, *Berl.* 1790; 3te Aufl. 1799, 8vo. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, etc. *Riga,* 1783, 8vo. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, *Riga,* 1785, 8vo.; 4te Aufl. 1797. (Metaphysics of Ethics, translated by SEMPLE, 8vo. *Edinb.*

1836.) Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, *Riga*, 1786, 8vo.; 3te Aufl. 1800. Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll, *Königsb.* 1792, 8vo. Die Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft, *Königsb.* 1793, 8vo.; 2te verm. Aufl. 1794. (Theory of Religion, translated by SEMPLE, 8vo. *Edinb.* 1840). Zum ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwurf, *Königsb.* 1795, 1796, 8vo. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, *Königsb.* 1799, 8vo.; 2te Aufl. 1803, 8vo. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, *Königsb.* 1797, 8vo.; 2te Aufl. 1803. (Both are contained under the title of Metaphysik der Sitten.) Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, *Königsb.* 1798; 3te Aufl. 1821, 8vo. Der Streit der Facultäten, *Königsb.* 1798, 8vo. His complete works, edited by ROSENKRANTZ and SCHUBERT, 12 vols. 8vo. *Leips.* 1838–40. Some of his works were translated into Latin by BORN, 4 vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1796–98.

Works by other writers illustrative of Kant's principles:

† The Logic of Kant, a Manual for the Academical Classes, by G. B. JAHSCHE, *Königsb.* 1809, 8vo. (published from the papers of the students). Kant's Logic, by RICHARDSON, 8vo. *Lond.* 1818. † Education, published by RINK, *ibid.* 1803, 8vo. † Lectures on Religious Philosophy, *Leips.* 1817, 8vo. (published from the papers of the students). † Lectures on Metaphysics, (published by the Editor of the Religious Philosophy, etc., POLITZ), *Erfurdt*, 1821, 8vo.

394. With regard to the general character of the Critical system of Kant, we may observe that it confined itself to a contemplation of the phenomena of Consciousness; and attempted to ascertain, by analysis, not of our conceptions, but of the faculties of the soul, certain invariable and necessary principles of knowledge; proceeding to define their usage, and to form an estimate of them collectively, with reference to their *formal* character: in which investigation the distinctions and definitions of those faculties adopted by the school of Wolf, were presumed to be valid. It exalted the human mind, by making it the centre of its system; but at the same time confined and restricted it by means of the consequences deduced. It discouraged also the spirit of Dogmatical Speculation, and the ambition of demonstrating all things by means of mere intellectual ideas, making the faculties for acquiring knowledge the measure of things capable of being known, and assigning the pre-eminence to Practical Reason rather than to Speculative, in virtue of its end, viz. Wisdom; which is the highest that reason can aspire to; because to act virtuously is an universal and unlimited, but to acquire knowledge only a conditional, duty.

It had the effect of mitigating the dogmatical and speculative tendencies of the mind, and the extravagant attempt to prove everything by means of conceptions of the Understanding: it proscribed Mysticism, and circumscribed the provinces of Science and Belief. It taught men to discriminate and appreciate the grounds, the tendency, the defects, and partial views, as well as the excellencies of other systems; at the same time that it embodied a lively principle for awakening and strengthening the interest attaching to genuine philosophical research. It afforded to philosophy a firm and steady centre of action in the unchangeable nature of the human mind. In general, in may be observed that the theory of Kant *constructed* little; and rather tended to destroy the the structures of an empty Dogmatism of the Understanding, and prepare, by means of self-knowledge, the way for a better state of philosophical science; seeking in Reason itself the principles on which to distinguish the several parts of philosophy.

On the other hand, it has been urged against this system: that it overlooks and mistakes the nature of Rational Ideas; because its author, without even examining into the claims of both, attributes to experience a preponderance over the opposite principle, making demonstration the sole evidence of knowledge; that it makes a distinction between speculative and practical reason, and that it dislocates (as it were), by its subdivisions, the faculties of the human mind. To this must be added (it is objected) a certain *Formalism*, which betrays itself even in his practical system; and in consequence of which the student is led to regard things principally in a subjective point of view; that is, with a reference to the laws and forms of human activity: from which, to extreme Idealism, is an easy step.

The following works contain criticisms on Kant's theory:

D. JENISCH, Ueber den Grund und Werth der Entdeckungen des Hrn. Prof. Kant, *Berl.* 1790, 8vo. JOH. NEEB, Ueber Kant's Verdienste um das Interesse der Philosophirenden Vernunft, 2te Aufl. *Frankft. a. M.* 1795, 8vo. GLO. BJ. GERLACH, Philosophie, Gesetzgebung, und Aesthetik, in ihrem jetzigen Verhältniss zur sittlichen und ästhetischen Bildung der Deutschen: eine Priesschrift, *Posen*, 1804, 8vo. FLUGGE'S Versuch einer historisch-kritischen Darstellung des Einflusses der Kantischen Philosophie auf Religion und Theologie. 2 Thle. *Hannov.*

1796, 1798, 8vo. TR. BEN. AGAP. LEO, Krito, oder über den wohlthätigen Einfluss der kritischen Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1806, 8vo. STÆUDLIN, Abh. uber den Werth der Krit. Phil. in s. Beitr. zur Phil. und Gesch. der Rel. 2, 4, und 5te Th. *Gött.* 1797–98-99. See also, BOUTERWECK, Imm. Kant: ein Denkmal. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER'S Appendix to his work, mentioned § 428, containing a Critique of Kant's theory. BUSSE, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft von Im. Kant in ihren Grunden widerlegt, *Dresd.* 1828.

Earliest Adversaries of Kant's System.

See [K. G. HAUSIUS] Materialien zur Gesch. der Krit. Philosophie, nebst einer Histor. Einleitung zur Gesch. der Kantischen Philosophie, III Sammlungen, *Leipz.* 1793, 2 Bde. 8vo.

C. L. REINHOLD, Ueber die bisherigen Schicksale der Kantischen Philosophie, *Jena*, 1789, 8vo.

395. The first of Kant's great works produced, at its appearance, little sensation. When at last it began to attract attention, it excited a great sensation, and many questions with regard to its end and character. The very language in which it was couched, containing a set of phrases and terms entirely new, was an obstacle to its progress, and, no less than its contents, revolted the minds of most of the learned countrymen of its author. A great variety of mistakes were necessarily committed with respect to it. Some pronounced it superficial, and gave it credit for nothing more than an *appearance* of originality. Others, admitting it to be original, declared it to be dangerous and pernicious; inasmuch as it set forth a system of Idealism, which would annihilate the *objective reality* of knowledge, destroy all rational belief in God and the immortality of the soul, and consequently was adverse to all that man holds most sacred. Several eminent men became in various ways adversaries to the new system, of whom we may particularise: *Mendelssohn*;[1] *Hamann*[2] and *Jacobi* (§ 415);

[1] M. MENDELSSOHN'S Morgenstunden. 2 Bd. *Berl.* 1785, 8vo; (see § 381). Prufung der Mendelssohn'schen Morgenstunden, oder aller speculativen Beweise fur das Daseyn Gottes, in Vorlesungen von L. H. JAKOB. Nebst einer Abhandl. von KANT, *Leipz.* 1786, 8vo.

[2] HAMANN: In his Letters to JACOBI—JACOBI'S Works, I und IV B. JACOBI, Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, die Vernunft zu Verstände zu bringen, etc. in Reinhold's Beiträgen zur leichten Uebersicht, etc., III, 1.

Eberhard;[1] *Feder*[2] (§ 381); *Ad. Weishaupt*;[3] *J. F. Flatt*;[4] *G. A. Tittel*;[5] *S. Reimarus* (§ 380); *D. Tiedemann*[6] (§ 382); *Platner* (§ 381); *Chr. Garve*;[7] *Meiners*;[8] *G. E. Schulze* (§ 418); *J. C. Schwab*;[9] *Herder*;[10] *H. G. von Gerstenberg*;[11] *F. Baader*,[12] and others.[13]

[1] J. A. EBERHARD: In the Philosophical Journals published by him (see 368, note[2]).

[2] J. G. H. FEDER, Ueber Raum und Zeit zur Prüfung der Kant. Philosophie, *Götting.* 1787, 8vo. Philos. Biblioth. von Feder und Meiners, 1 Bd. *Gött.* 1788, 8vo.

[3] AD. WEISHAUPT, Ueber die Gründe und Gewissheit der menschlichen Erkenntniss. Zur Prüfung der Kant'schen Kritik der reinen Vernunft, *Nürnb.* 1788, 8vo. Ueber Materialismus und Idealismus: ein Philosophisches Fragment, *Nürnb.* 1787; 2te Aufl. 1788, 8vo. Ueber die Kantischen Anschauungen und Erscheinungen, *ebend.* 1788, 8vo. Zweifel über die Kantischen Begriffe von Raum und Zeit, *ebend.* 1788, 8vo. He also wrote: Ueber Wahrheit und sittliche Vollkommenheit, *Regensb.* 3 Bände, 1793-97, 8vo. SCHAUMANN and BORN replied to him and to Feder.

[4] J. F. FLATT'S Fragmentarische Beiträge zur Bestimmung und Deduction des Begriffs und Grundsatzes der Causalität, und zur Grundlegung der natürl. Theologie, *Leipzig*, 1788, 8vo. See § 396, note. Also: Briefe über den moral. Erkenntnissgrund der Religion in Beziehung auf die Kantische Philosophie, *Tübing.* 1789, 8vo.

[5] GLO. A. TITTEL, Kantische Denkformen od. Kategorieen, *Frankf. a. M.* 1788, 8vo. Ueber Hrn. Kant's Moralreform, *Frankf. und Leipz.* 1788, 8vo.

[6] DIETR. TIEDEMANN, Theätet, oder über das menschliche Wissen, ein Beitrag zur Vernunftkritik, *Frankf a. M.* 1794, 8vo.

In answer to this, J. CH. F. DIETZ, Antitheätet, *Rost. und Leipz.* 1798, 8vo. D. TIEDEMANN'S Idealistische Briefe, *Marb.* 1798, 8vo. Beantwortung derselben von DIEZ, *Gotha*, 1801, 8vo.; und eine Abh. Tiedemann's in den Hessischen Beiträgen, III St.

[7] GARVE, in Der Uebersetzung der Ethik des Aristoteles, 1 B. nebst einer Abh. über die verschiedenen Principe der Sittenlehre von Aristoteles bis auf Kant, *Bresl.* 1798, 8vo. On the other side: J. CHR. FR. DIETZ, Ueber Philosophie, philosophische Streitigkeiten, Kriticismus und Wissenschaftslehre, nebst einer Prüfung der Garve'schen Beurtheilung des kritischen Systems, *Gotha*, 1800, 8vo.

[8] See MEINERS, Allgemeine Geschichte der Ethik, *Götting.* 1800, 2 Th. 8vo.

[9] J. C. SCHWAB, Vergleichung des Kantischen Moralprinzips mit dem Leibnitz-Wolfischen, *Berl.* 1800, 8vo. Ueber die Wahrheit der Kantischen Philosophie und die Wahrheitslehre der A. L. Z. in Jena in Anschung der Philosophie, *Berlin*, 1803, 8vo. He composed also: Von den dunkeln Vorstellungen, etc. *Stuttg.* 1813, 8vo.

The system was also attacked by many violent and passionate declaimers, such as *Stattler*[1]; and in several of the universities the authorities forbade that it should be taught.

Partisans of Kant's Critical System.

396. In spite of these inherent difficulties and external assaults, the Critical Philosophy continued to gain ground in Germany; and began to exercise considerable influence over the character of the other sciences. Several men of talent declared in its favour; supporting it by writings intended either to defend or illustrate it, and rendering service not only to Kant, but to the cause of philosophy at large.

Among these we may enumerate *J. Schulz*;[2] *C. C. E. Schmid*[3]; *Car. Leon. Reinhold*,[4] (see below, § 398); *Solomon*

[10] JOH. GOTTFR. HERDER'S Verstand und Erfahrung, eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, *Leipz.* 1799, 2 Bd. 8vo. Kalligone, *Leipz.* 1800, 3 Th. 8vo.

In answer to this: KIESEWETTER'S Prüfung der Herder'schen Metakritik. *Berl.* 1709, 2 Bd. 8vo.

[11] [H. W. VON GERSTENBERG], Die Theorie der Kategoricen entwickelt und erläutert, *Altona*, 1795, 8vo. Sendschreiben an CARL VON VILLERS das gemeinschaftl. Prinzip der theor. und prakt. Philos. betreffend, *Altona*, 1821, 8vo. Vgl. mit einem kleinen Aufsatz über Ursache in dem Intellbl. der Allgem. Litt. Zeitung. St. 54, 1823.

[12] FR. BAADER, Absolute Blindheit der von Kant deducirten prakt. Vernunft an Fr. H. Jakobi, 1797. Beiträge zur Elementarphilosophie, ein Gegenstück zu Kant's met. Anfangsgründe der Naturw. *Hamb.* 1797, 8vo.

[13] See various treatises by BRASTERBERGER, MAASS, BORNUTRAGER, PEZOLDI, BREYER, etc.

[1] Antikant, *Munich*, 1788, 2 vols. 8vo.: and a work on the same subject by REUSS, *Würzburg.* 1789, 8vo., with this title: Soll man auf katholischen Universitäten Kant's Philosophie studiren?

[2] JOH. SCHULZ, Erläuterungen über des Hrn. Prof. Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, *Königbs.* 1785, 8vo. u. 1791. Desselben Prüfung der Kantischen Kritik der reinen Vernunft. *ibid.* 1789—92; 2 Bd. 8vo.

[3] CARL CHR. EBRH. SCHMID, Kritik der reinen Vernunft in Grundrisse, *Jena*, 1786, 8vo.; 3te Aufl. *Jena*, 1794. Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften, *Jena*, 1788, 8vo.; 4te Aufl. 1798, 8vo.

[4] REINHOLD'S Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie (see the German Mercury, 1785—87), *Leipz.* 1790; 2 Bde. 8vo.

ROSENKRANZ, Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie, 1840,

Maimon;[1] *C. H. Heydenreich*;[2] *J. Sigismund Beck*;[3] *Sam. Alb. Mellin*;[4] *Laz. Ben David*;[5] *J. C. F. Dietz*;[6] *Fr. W. D.* and *Ch. G. Snell*;[7] *J. C. G. Schaumann*;[8] and many others, such as *Born, Abicht, Phiseldeck, Neeb, Jakob, Tieftrunk, Kiesewetter, Bouterwek, Krug, Fries*, etc. These formed a numerous school of Kantians, which necessarily comprehended also a large number of disciples of inferior parts, and blindly devoted to the system of their master.

It cannot be denied that the rapid progress which the system soon began to make contributed greatly to awaken a new and vigorous spirit of research. Men of superior parts began to apply the principles it developed to the more

[1] SAL. MAIMON'S Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie, *Berl.* 1790, 8vo.

[2] HEYDENREICH'S Originalideen über die interessantesten Gegenstände der Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1793—96, 5 B. 8vo. See several other works by the same author, e. g. an Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, published at *Leips.* 1793. [3] See § 399.

[4] G. S. A. MELLIN'S Marginalien und Register zu Kant's Kritik des Erkenntnissvermögens, *Jena*, 1794—95, 2 Th. 8vo. Kunstsprache der krit. Philos. alphabet. geordnet, *Jena*, 1798, 8vo.; anhang, 1800, 8vo. (also: Marginalien und Register zu Kant's met. Ansfangsgr. der Rechtslehre). Encyklopädisches Wörterbuch der krit. Philosophie, *Züllichau und Leipz.* 1797—1803, 6 B. 8vo. etc.

[5] LAZ. BEN DAVID'S Vorlesungen über die Kritik der reinen Vern. *Wien*, 1795; 2te Aufl. 1802. Ueber die Kritik der Urtheilskraft, *ebend.* 1796. Vorles. über die Kritik der prakt. Vernunft, nebst einer Rede über den Zweck der krit. Philos. *ebend.* 1796, 8vo. Vorlesungen ü. die metaph. Anfangsgründe der Naturwiss. *ebend.* 1798. Preisschr. über den Ursprung uns. Erkenntniss, *Berl.* 1802, 8vo. Versuch einer Rechtslehre, *Berl.* 1802.

[6] See the preceding §. He also wrote: Der Philosoph und die Philos. aus dem wahren Gesichtspuncte und mit Hinsicht auf die heut. Streitigkeiten, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo.; und, Ueber Wissen, Glauben, Mystik und Skepticismus, *Lübeck*, 1809, 8vo.

[7] F. W. D. SNELL, Darstellung und Erläuterung der Kant. Kritik der Urtheilskr. *Mannh.* 1791—92. 2 Th. 8. Menon, oder Versuch in Gesprächen die vornehmsten Puncte aus der Kritik der prakt. Vern. zu erläutern, *ibid.* 1789, 8vo.; 2te Aufl. 1796, 8vo. Several Manuals, e. g. Lehrb. für den ersten Unterr. in d. Philos. 2 Th. 7te verb. Aufl. 1821; mit CH. W. SNELL, Handb. der Philos. für Liebhaber, *Giessen*, 1802, 8vo.; mit C. CH. E. SCHMID, Das philos. Journal. *Giessen*, 1793—95, 5 Bd. 8vo.

[8] SCHAUMANN, Ueber die transcendentale Aesthetik: ein krit. Versuch nebst ein Schreiben an Feder über das transcend. Idealismus, *Leipz.* 1789, 8vo. (a work principally directed against Feder).

accurate and systematic cultivation of the different departments of science, and especially to purposes of a more comprehensive study of Method. Logic was treated successfully by *S. Maimon*;[1] *Hoffbauer*; *Maas*; *Kiesewetter*; *Krug*; *Fries*; etc. Metaphysics by *Jakob*;[2] *Schmid*; and *Krug*. Ethics by *Schmid*;[3] *Jakob*; *Tieftrunk*, *Hoffbauer*,

[1] Sol. Maimon, Versuch einer neuen Logik, oder Theorie des Denkens, etc. *Berl.* 1794, 8vo. Hoffbauer's Analytik der Urtheile und Schlüsse, *Halle*, 1792, 8vo. Anfangsgründe der Logik. *Halle*, 1794; 2te Aufl. mit einer psychologischen Vorbereitung vermehrt, *ebend.* 1810, 8vo. Ueber die Analysis in der Philosophie, nebst Abhandlungen verwandten Inhalts, *Halle*, 1810. 8vo. Versuch über die schwerste und leichteste Anwendung der Analysis in den philos. Wissenschaften, eine gekrönte Preisschrift mit Zusätzen, *Leipz.* 1810, 8vo. Jakob's Grundriss der allgem. Logik, und krit. Anfangsgründe der allgemeinen Metaphysik, *Halle*, 1788, 8vo.; 4te Aufl. 1800, 8vo. Maas, Grundr. der Logik, *Halle*, 1793, 8vo.; 4te Aufl. 1823. C. Chr. Ehr. Schmid's Grundriss der Logik, *Jena*, 1797, 8vo. Tieftrunk's Grundriss der Logik, *Halle*, 1801, 8vo. Die Denklehre in reindeutschen Gewande u. s. w., nebst einigen Aufsätzen von Kant, *Halle* und *Leipz.* 1825, 8vo. Die angewandte Denklehre u. s. w. *ebend.* 1827, 8vo. Kiesewetter's Grundriss einer allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen, begleitet mit einer weitern Auseinandersetzung, *Berl.* 1791, f. 2 Th.; 2te Aufl. 1802 und 1806. Also: Logik zum Gebrauch für Schulen, *ebend.* 1797; and, Die wichtigsten Sätze der Vernunftlehre für Nichtstudirende, *Hamb.* 1806, 8vo. Fr. W. D. Snell, Erste Grundlinien der Logik. 3te Aufl. *Giessen*, 1828, 8vo.

(On the other side): Carl Chr. Flatt, Fragmentarische Bemerkungen gegen den Kantischen und Kiesewetterischen Grundriss der reinen allgem. Logik, *Tübing.* 1802, 8vo.

[2] Jakob's Prüfung der Mendelsohnischen Morgenstunden, nebst einer Abh. von Kant, *Leipz.* 1786, 8vo. Beweis für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus dem Begriffe der Pflicht, *Züllichau*, 1790-94—1800, 8vo. Ueber den moralischen Beweis für das Daseyn Gottes, *Liebau*, 1791, 8vo.; 2te verm. Aufl. 1798.

Carl Chr. Ehr. Schmid's Grundriss der Metaphysik, *Jena*, 1799, 8vo. The works of Krug and Fries are mentioned below, §§ 421–22.

[3] C. Chr. Erh. Schmid's Versuch einer Moralphilosophie, *Jena*, 1790, 8vo.; 4te Aufl. 1802, 1803; 2 Bd. 8vo. Grundriss der Moralphilosophie, *Jena*, 1793; 2te Aufl. 1800, 8vo. Adiaphora: philos. theol. und hist. Untersucht, *Jena*, 1809, 8vo. Kiesewetter, Ueber den ersten Grundsatz der Moralphilosophie, nebst einer Abhandlung über die Freiheit, von Jakob, *Halle*, 1788; 2te Aufl. *Berl.* 1790—91, 2 Th. 8vo. Jacob's philosophische Sittenlehre, *Halle*, 1794, 8vo. Grundsätze der Weisheit und des menschl. Lebens, *Halle*, 1800, 8vo. Ueber das moral. Gefühl, *Halle*, 1788, 8vo. Tieftrunk's philosoph.

Heydenreich, *Stäudlin*, *Krug*, *Fries*, *Kunhardt*, etc. The philosophical principle of Law and Right,[1] by *Hufeland*,

Untersuchungen über die Tugendlehre, *Halle*, 1798—1805, 2 Bd. 8vo. Grundriss der Sittenlehre, *Halle*, 1803, 2 Th. (Tugend- und Rechtslehre), 8vo. HOFFBAUER'S Untersuchungen ü. die wichtigsten Gegenstände der Moralphilosophie, insbes. die Sittenlehre und Moraltheologie, 1 Th. *Dortm.* 1799, 8vo. Anfangsgründe der Moralphilosophie und insbes. der Sittenlehre, nebst einer allgemeinen Gesch. derselben, *Halle*, 1798, 8vo. HEYDENREICH'S Propädeutik der Moralphilosophie, nach Grundsätzen der reinen Vernunft, *Leipz.* 1794, 3 Th. 8vo. Ueber Freiheit und Determinismus, und ihre Vereinigung, *Erlang.* 1793, 8vo.; und mehrere Schriften zur populären Moral. K. F. STÆUDLIN, Grundriss der Tugend- und Religionslehre, *Göttng.* 1800, 8vo. GE. HENRICI, Versuch über den ersten Grundsatz der Sittenlehre, 1 Th. *Leipz.* 1799, 8vo. LEONH. CREUZER'S Skeptische Betrachtungen über die Freiheit des Willens, *Giessen*, 1793, 8vo.

G. HUFELAND, Versuch über den Grundsatz des Naturrechts, *Leipz.* 1785, 8vo. Lehrsätze des Naturrechts, *Jena*, 1790; 2te Aufl. 1795, 8vo. HEYDENREICH, System der Natur, nach krit. Prinzipien, *Leipz.* 1794—95, 2 Th. 8vo. Grundsätze der natürl. Staatsrechts, nebst einem Anhang Staatsrechtl. Abhandlungen, *Leipz.* 1795, 2 Th. 8vo. Versuch über die Heiligkeit des Staats und die Moralität der Revolutionen, *Leipz.* 1794, 8vo. BUHLE, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, *Gött.* 1781, 8vo. Ideen zur Rechtswissenschaft, Moral und Politik, I Samml. *Gött.* 1799, 8vo. He also wrote: Entwurf einer Transcendental-philosophie, *Gött.* 1798, 8vo. Ueber Ursprung und Leben des Menschengeschlechts, und das künftige Leben nach dem Tode, *Brauns.* 1821, 8vo. K. CHR. E. SCHMID'S Grundriss des Naturrechts, für Vorles. *Jena* und *Leipz.* 1795, 8vo. JAKOB'S Philosoph. Rechtslehre, *Halle*, 1795; 2te Aufl. 1802, 8vo. Auszug, *ebend.* 1796, 8vo. Anti-Machiavel, *Halle*, 1794 und 1796, 8vo. MAAS, Ueber Recht und Verbindlichkeiten, *Halle*, 1794, 8vo. Untersuchungen über die wichtigsten Gegenstände des Naturrechts, *Halle*, 1790, 8vo. Grundriss des Naturrechts, *Leipz.* 1808, 8vo. HOFFBAUER'S Naturrecht, aus dem Begriffe des Rechts entwickelt, *Halle*, 1793; 3te Aufl. 1804, 8vo. Untersuchungen über die wichtigsten Gegenstände des Naturrechts, *ebend.* 1793, 8vo. Allgem. Staatsrecht u. s. w. *Halle*, 1797, 8vo. Dass allgem. Naturrecht, und die Moral in ihrer gegenseit Abhängigkeit, etc. *Halle*, 1816, 8vo. TH. SCHMALZ, Recht der Natur, 1 Th. *Königsb.* 1792; 2te Aufl. 1795, 8vo. 2 Th. Natürl. Staatsrecht, 1794; 2te Aufl. 1795. Das natürl. Familien- und Kirchenricht, *ebend.* 1795, 8vo. Erklärung der Rechte des Menschen und Bürgers, etc. *ebend.* 1798, 8vo. Handbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, *ebend.* 1807, 8vo. P. J. ANSELM FEUERBACH, Kritik des natürl. Rechts, *Altona*, 1796, 8vo. Ueber die einzig möglichen Beweisgründe gegen das Daseyn und die Gültigkeit der Natürl. Rechte, *Leipz.* und *Gera*, 1795, 8vo. Anti-Hobbes, I Th. *Erf.* 1798, 8vo. K. SAL. ZACHARIA, Anfangsgr. des

Heydenreich, *Buhle*, *Jakob*, *Maas*, *Hoffbauer*, *Schmalz*, *Fries*, *Feuerbach*, *Sol. Zacharie*, *Pölitz*, *Gros*, etc. The science of Religion, considered as a part of Practical philosophy,[1] was ably treated by *Heydenreich*, *Schmid*, *Jakob*, *Tieftrunk*, *Krug*, etc. The theory of the Fine Arts (or Æsthetics)[2] was discussed by *Heydenreich*, *Heusinger*, and *Delbrück*, and the poet *Schiller* (in his prose writings), whose free spirit soon shook off the shackles of the School-philosophy.

philosoph. Privatrechts, *Leipz.* 1804, 8vo. Anfangsgr. des philosoph. Criminalrechts, *ebend.* 1805, 8vo. Vierzig Bücher vom Staate, 2 Bd. *Stuttg.* und *Tüb.* 1820, 8vo. K. H. L. Pölitz, Die Staatswissenschaften im Lichte unserer Zeit, 4 Bd. *Leipz.* 1823, u. f. C. H. Gros, Lehrbuch der Philos. Rechtswissenschaft, *Tübing.* 1802; 3te Aufl. 1815, 8vo. J. Chr. Gottl. Schaumann, Wissenschaftl. Naturrecht, *Halle*, 1792, 8vo. Kritische Abhandlungen zur philos. Rechtslehre, *Halle*, 1795, 8vo. Versuch eines neuen Systems des Natürl. Rechts, *ebend.* 1796, 8vo. G. Henrici, Ideen zu einer wissenschaftlicher Begründung der Rechtslehre, oder über den Begriff und die letzten Gründe des Rechts, etc. *Hannov.* 1809—10, 2 Th. 8vo.; 2te verm. Aufl. 1822, 8vo. J. A. Bruckner, Essai sur la Nature et l'Origine des Droits, *Lips.* 1810, 8vo.

[1] Heydenreich, Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der Natürl. Religion, *Leipz.* 1790—91, 2 Bd. 8vo. Grundsätze der moral. Gotteslehre, *Leipz.* 1793, 8vo. Briefe über den Atheismus, *ebend.* 1797, 8vo. C. Chr. E. Schmid's Philosophische Dogmatik, *Jena*, 1796, 8vo. Jakob's Allgemeine Religion, 1797, 8vo. s. oben. Tieftrunk's Versuch einer neuen Theorie der Religionsphilosophie, *Leipz.* 1797, 8vo. Hoffbauer's Untersuchungen über die wichtigsten Gegenstände der natürl. Religion, *Halle*, 1795, 8vo. J. E. Parrow, Grundriss der Vernunftreligion, *Berl.* 1790, 8vo. Geo. Chr. Muller, Entwurf einer philos. Religionslehre, 1 Th. *Halle*, 1797, 8vo. Many critiques on the Religious Philosophy of Kant appeared from the pens of Ratze, Storr, Jachmann, G. E. Schulze, and Schelling.

[2] Heydenreich's System der Æsthetik, 1 Th. (unfinished) *Leipz.* 1790, 8vo. Æsthet. Wörterbuch, 4 Th. *Leipz.* 1793, ff. J. H. Glieb. Heusinger's Handbuch der Æsthetik, *Gotha*, 1797, 2 B. 8vo. L. Ben David, Beitrag zur Kritik des Geschmacks, *Wien*, 1797. Versuch einer Geschmackslehre, *Berl.* 1799, 8vo. F. Delbruck, Das Schöne, *Berl.* 1800, 8vo. F. W. D. Snell, Versuch einer Æsthetik für Liebhaber, 2te Aufl. *Giessen*, 1828.

[3] J. Ith, Anthropologie, 1794, 8vo. C. Chr. E. Schmid, Empirische Psychologie, 1 Th. *Jena*, 1791; 2te Aufl. 1796, 8vo. Psychologische Magaz. seit 1796; Anthropolog. Journal, 1803. Jakob's Grundriss der Erfahrungsseelenlehre, *Halle*, 1791; 4te Aufl. 1810, 8vo. Grundriss des emp. Psych. *Leipz.* 1814; und, Erläuterung der Grundrisses, *ebend.* Hoffbauer's Naturlehre der Seele, in Briefen, *Halle*, 1796, 8vo. Untersuchungen über die Krankheiten der Seele, *Halle*, 1802,

Psychology[3] by *Schmid, Jakob, Snell,* etc. Education[1] by *Heusinger, Miemeyer, Schwartz,* etc.

All these authors (most of them professors in the German Universities) contributed in a greater or less degree to illustrate or extend the system of their master. The most remote branches of philosophy were influenced by the central action and impulse which had been communicated by Kant; and even his adversaries ended by doing him justice. It is true that in France[2] and in England[3] his system could

3 Th. 8vo. Psychologie in ihrer Hauptanwendung auf die Rechtspflege, *Halle,* 1808, 8vo. Der Grundriss vor. s. Logik, und besonders, *Halle,* 2te Aufl. 1810. KIESEWETTER, Kurzer Abriss der Erfahrungsseelenlehre, *Berl.* 1806, 8vo.; 2te Aufl. 1814. Fassl. Darstellung der Erfahrungsseelenlehre, *Hamb.* 1806, 8vo. F. W. D. SNELL, Empir. Psychol. *Giessen,* 1802; 2te Aufl. 1810. MAASS, s. oben. s. 29. Litt. Versuch über die Gefühle, bes. über den Affecten. 2 Th. *Halle* und *Leipz.* 1811—12, 8vo.

JOH. HEINR. GLIEB. HEUSINGER'S Versuch eines Lehrbuchs der Erziehungskunst, *Leipz.* 1795, 8vo. A. H. NIEMEYER'S Grundsätze der Erziehung, *Halle,* 1796, 8vo.; 6te Aufl. 3 B. 1810, 8vo. Leitfaden der Pädagogik und Didaktik, *Halle,* 1803, 8vo. FRIEDR. HEINR. CAR. SCHWARZ, Lehrbuch des Pädagogik und Didaktik, *Heidelb.* 1807–8. Erziehungslehre, *Leipz.* 1802–4, 3 B. 8vo. J. LUD. EWALD, Vorlesungen über die Erziehungslehre, 3 Th. *Mannh.* 1808, 8vo.

[2] Philosophie de Kant, ou Principes Fondamentaux de la Philosophie Transcendentale, par CHARLES VILLIERS, *Metz,* 1801, 2 vols. 8vo. See the Critical Journal of SCHELLING and HEGEL, vol. 1, No. 3, p. 6, sqq.

See also several essays in the Spectateur du Nord, *Hamb.* 1798–9.

Essai d'une Exposition succincte de la Critique de la Raison pure de M. Kant, par M. KINKER, traduit du Hollandois par J. LE FR. *Amsterd.* 1801, 8vo. De la Metaphysique de Kant, ou Observations sur un ouvrage intitulé, Essai d'une Exposition, etc., par le Citoyen DESTUTT-TRACY, in the Mémoires de l'Institut Nat. Scienc. Moral., tom. IV.

Philosophie Critique découverte par Kant fondée sur le dernier principe du Savoir, par J. HOEHNE, *Paris,* 1802, 8vo.

[3] NITSCH, General and Introductory View of Kant's Principles concerning Man, the World, and the Deity, *Lond.* 1796, 8vo.

The Principles of Critical Philosophy, selected from the works of Emm. Kant, and expounded by JAMES SIG. BECK. Translated from the German, *Lond.* and *Edinb.* 1797, 8vo.

WILLICH'S Elements of the Critical Philosophy, *Lond.* 1798, 8vo.

WIRGMAN (THOMAS), Principles of the Kantesian Philosophy, 8vo. Science of Philosophy (on Kantian Principles), 4to.; and two Essays on Kant in the Encyclopædia Londinensis.

COLERIDGE, Table Talk: The Friend; &c.

scarcely obtain a hearing, in spite of the zealous labours of some of its admirers; but in Holland and the North of Europe it had greater success.

We may consider as unavoidable consequences of the popularity it acquired, the number of abuses to which it gave birth, such as an unmeaning use of formularies, a blind devotion to one single system, and a contempt for all experimental knowledge.

B. *Philosophy subsequent to Kant.*

397. The triumph of Critical philosophy was of short duration. It opposed too many factions, and counteracted too many views and pretensions, to obtain an easy victory. The various misapprehensions to which it gave birth, raised suspicions of the correctness of the principles it contained, as well as of the propriety of the method by which they were developed. Some asserted that the theory was sufficiently refuted by Common Sense, because it amounted to nothing more than a system of mere Idealism, and destroyed the very reality of all external nature. Others went only half as far in their objections, alleging that Kant had thrust out *real existence* by one door, to let it in by another. His system was judged to be incomplete in this respect also, that by subdividing the different mental principles of Knowledge,[2] it placed them side by side, as co-ordinate with one another, instead of making them subordinate to one supreme principle (§ 389). Many of its opponents objected to it, that instead of weakening the cause of Scepticism, it con-

[1] PAUL VAN HEMERT, Beginsels der Kantiansche Wysgeerte, *Amstd.* 1796, 8vo. Magazyn voor de Critische Wysbegeerte en de Geschiedenis van dezelve, *Amsterd.* 1798, 8vo. Epistolæ ad Dan. Wyttenbachium, *Amsterd.* 1809, 8vo. (DAN. WYTTENBACH, in answer to HEMERT) Φιλομαθείας τὰ σποράδα—Miscellaneæ Doctrinæ, lib. I, II, *Amsterd.* 1809, 8vo.

J. KINKER, Essai d'une Introduction, etc. (see p. 416, note 2).

F. H. HEUMANN, Principes Moraux de la Philosophie Critique developpés et appliqués à une Legislation externe fondée sur la Justice, la Liberté, et l'Egalité naturelle, *Amstd.* 1799, 8vo.

VAN BOSCH, Ethica Philosophiæ Criticæ.

[2] Such as the principles of Thought and Knowledge; a principle of Speculative Science, and a principle of Practical Reason.

tributed to fortify it; while some of its partisans brought discredit on their cause by misapplying its formularies, or by their extravagant expectations of its success.[1] Besides, the views developed, particularly the distinction established between Knowledge and Science, were too new to be at once generally adopted or apprehended, and too repugnant to the natural tendency to speculation, for the understanding at once to submit to their discipline. The consequence was, that the Critical system itself gave occasion to a variety of attempts, partly to re-establish the old dogmatical theories[2] —partly to exalt the new philosophy itself to the highest grade of Science, to constitute it a complete system of knowledge (of which Kant had only pointed out the method), supposing it to have attained to the region of the Absolute and Perfect, in which Being and Science become identical, and all the contradictions of the terms of Reflection disappear. A variety of fresh systems made their appearance, by which man hoped to attain to a knowledge of the Absolute; some by the way of contemplation—some by thought —some by science—others, again, by belief. It was natural that Scepticism also should revive in exact proportion as attempts at demonstrative science began to characterise the new philosophy.

The consequence was, that from this School itself proceeded fresh essays both of Dogmatism and Scepticism.

C. L. Reinhold.

REINHOLD, Karl Leonhard Reinhold's Leben und literarisches Werken, nebst Auswahl von Briefen desselben.[3]

An Account of his Doctrines, etc.; by his pupil, E. DUBOC, *Hamb.* 1828, 8vo.

398. The leader in these controversies was *C. L. Reinhold*, who was born at Vienna, 1758, and subsequently became a professor at Jena and Kiel; where he died, 1823.

Having by laborious study made himself thoroughly

[1] For instance: † A Preliminary Exposition of the Principles of a General System of ——— Posts ! ! ! *Götting.* 1801.

[2] For instance: the Empiricism of SELLE (*Berlin*, 1788, 8vo.), the Rationalism of EBERHARDT, and the Eclecticism of FEDER.

[3] Containing several letters of Kant and his contemporaries.

acquainted with the spirit of the Critical system, and cultivated his own talent for analysis, he convinced himself that he had discovered in them a principle of perpetual harmony among men of inquisitive minds, and a panacea for the evils of mortality.[1] His hope being disappointed by the innumerable misapprehensions which prevailed with regard to it, he laboured to discover for it some internal evidence, in corroboration of the argumentative proof it possessed already. He believed himself to have detected such a principle by the observation, that although Kant had investigated fully the faculties for acquiring knowledge, he had not examined the phenomena and representations of Consciousness, which are the ultimate source of all knowledge, and necessarily modify and define it. He also complained that the Critical system was not sufficiently scientific; and, in particular, wanted a common principle influencing all its parts, and a theory founded on such a principle, which might supply the elements of Logic, Metaphysics, and the Criticism of Reason. To this end he proposed the principle of *Consciousness*. In Consciousness we may distinguish between two relative terms, the Object represented (or the material coming from without), and the Subject which represents. By investigating the notion of representation and its modifications of unity and multiplicity, Reinhold endeavoured to ascertain the fixed and peculiar properties of the faculties of cognition and representation, as well as the results of a critical examination of the rational faculties. This theory[2] of the faculty of representation had the appearance of giving to Critical Philosophy

[1] See the letters of Kant mentioned § 398, bibliogr.

[2] It was styled the Theory of the Faculties of Mental Conception.

Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschl. Vorstellungsvermögens, *Prag.* u. *Jena*, 1789, 8vo.; u. 1795. Ueber die bisherigen Schicksale der Kant'schen Philosophie, *Jena*, 1789, 8vo. Ueber das Fundament des philos. Wissens. *Jena*, 1791, 8vo. Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophie, I u. II B. *Jena*, 1790, 1794, 8vo. Auswahl vermischter Schriften, 2 Thle. *Jena*, 1796, 8vo. Preisschrift über die Frage: welche Fortschritte hat die Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolff gemacht (together with other prize compositions of SCHWAB and ABICHT), *Berlin*, 1796, 8vo. Verhandlungen über ein Einverständniss in den Grundsätzen der sittlichen Angelegenheit aus dem Gesichtspuncte des gemeinen und gesunden Verstandes, I Bd. *Lübeck*, 1798, 8vo.

what it wanted in unity and harmony; at the same time that it seemed to render it more intelligible by reflecting a light upon its principles as well as its consequences. But these appearances were illusory: the theory was not without merit and utility, but it could not answer all the intentions of the author. It was assailed, however, at the same time by Dogmatic and Sceptical antagonists (*Flat*, *Heydenreich*, *Beck*, etc.[1]), but particularly by the author of *Ænesidemus*.[2] In consequence of these attacks, Reinhold himself became sceptical as to the validity of his own system, which he endeavoured to improve, partly by modifying the terms he had employed, and partly by strengthening its weak points. He ended, however, by renouncing it altogether, and adopted first the theory of *Fichte*,[3] and afterwards that of *Bardili*.[4] This genuine lover of Truth turned, in his latter days, his

[1] See the following section.

[2] [Gottlob Ernst. Schulze], Ænesidemus: oder über die Fundamente der von dem Hrn. Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik, *Helmst.* 1792, 8vo.

In reply to Ænesidemus: J. H. Abicht's Hermias, oder Auflösung der die gültige Elementarphilos. betreffenden Ænesidemischen Zweifel, *Erlang.* 1794, 8vo. J. C. C. Visbeck's Hauptmomente der Reinholdischen Elementarphilos. in Beziehung auf die Einwendungen des Ænesidemus, *Leipz.* 1794, 8vo. Darstellung der Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe, nebst dem Versuche einer Widerlegung der Hauptmomente der Einwendungen des Ænesidemus gegen die Reinholdische Elementarphilos, *Frkf. am M.* 1795. 8vo. (by Beck.)

In reply to Reinhold's theory: Einzig möglicher Standpunct, von welchem die krit. Philosophie beurtheilt werden soll, *Riga*, 1796, 8vo. Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling; von Jac. Fries, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo.

[3] Sendschreiben an Lavater und Fichte über den Glauben an Gott, *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo. Ueber die Paradoxieen der neuesten Philos. *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo.

[4] Beiträge zur leichten Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philos, beim Anfange des XIX Jahrh. *Hamburg.* 1801—3. 3 Hefte, 8vo. More recently: Anleitung zur Kenntniss und Beurtheilung der Philos. in ihren sämmtl. Lehrgebäuden, *Wien*, 1805, 8vo. (Anonym:) Versuch einer Auflösung der etc. Aufgabe, die Natur der Analysis und der analyt. Methode in der Philos. genau anzugeben und zu untersuchen, etc., *Münch.* 1805, 8vo.

Bardili's und K. Lh. Reinhold's Briefwechsel über das Wesen der Philos. und das Unwesen der Speculation, herausg. von Reinhold, *Münch.* 1804, 8vo.

attention to the critical examination of Language, as the source of all the misunderstandings which have arisen in Philosophy (conducting his researches with an especial regard to cases of Synonymy), with the hope of effecting that harmony among philosophical inquirers which was constantly his object. He endeavoured to elucidate the equivocal expressions and inconsistencies of the customary formal Logic, which he maintained to be the essential cause of the reproach so long incurred by Philosophy, that it was incompetent to make good its pretensions to the character of a Science.[1] He endeavoured also, by a new theory of the faculties of human knowledge on scientific principles,[2] to bring an end to the inquiries he had started in his former attempt.

His son *E. Reinhold* (professor of Philosophy at Jena), follows the steps of his father in his inquiries respecting the relations and connection between Logic and Language.[3]

399. *J. Sigismund Beck* (first professor at Halle, afterwards at Rostock), an acute disciple of Kant, endeavoured to recommend the Critical system by an abridgment of it, and by making the Critical point of view the point of view also of original representation; but his ideas were confused and his method bad, and he injured the cause which he sought to support, by drawing his conclusions without any previous analysis of the faculties of cognition on which they were founded. He also prepared the way for

[1] Anfangsgründe der Erkenntiss der Wahrheit in einer Fibel, *Kiel*, 1808. 8vo. Rüge einer merkwürdigen Sprachverwirrung unter den Weltweisen, *Weimar*, 1809, 8vo. Grundlegung einer Synonmik für den allgemein. Sprachgebrauch in den philos. Wissenschaften, *Kiel*, 1812, 8vo. Dans menschl. Erkenntnissvermögen aus dem Gesichtspuncte des durch die Wortsprache vermittelten Zusammenhangs zwischen der Sinnlichkeit und dem Denkvermögen, *ebend.* 1816, 8vo.

[2] Die alte Frage: Was ist die Wahrheit bei der erneuerten Streitigkeiten über die göttlich. Offenbarung und die menschl. Vernunft in nähere Erwägung gezogen? *Altona*, 1820, 8vo. (See particularly the concluding observation, § 62).

(On the other side:) Was ist Warheit? eine Abhandl. veranl. durch die Frage des etc., Reinhold, von dem Grafen H. W. A. von Kalkreuth, *Breslau*, 1821, 8vo.

[3] Ern. Reinhold, Versuch einer Begründung und neuern Darstellung der log. Formen, *Leipz.* 1819, 8vo. He also wrote: Grundzüge eines Systems der Erkenntnisslehre und Denklehre, *Schleswig*, 1822, 8vo.

the most absolute transcendental Idealism, by making everything depend upon the oneness of the understanding or original representation; deriving our very notions of Space and Time directly from that and from the conception of Dimension, and abolishing the broad distinction which subsists between Intuitional and Sensational Perception and Thought.

JAC. SIGISM. BECK, Erläuternder Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften des Prof. Kant. *Riga*, 1793—94, I und II B. Vol. III is directed against REINHOLD, with this title: Einzig möglicher Standpunct, aus welchem die kritische Philosophie beurtheilt werden muss, *Riga*, 1796, II Bde. 8vo. Grundriss der kritischen Philosophie, *Halle*, 1796, 8vo. Propädeutik zu jedem wissench. Studio, *ebend.* 1796. Commentar über Kant's Metaphisik der Sitten, I Th. 1798, 8vo. BECK subsequently put forth: Grundsätze d. Gesetzgebung, 1806. Ein Lehrbuch der Logik, *Rost.* u. *Schwerin*, 1820, 8vo.; and Lehrb. des Naturrechts, *Jen.* 1820, 8vo.

Fichte's Doctrine of Science.

For the bibliography see below, § 405.

400. The philosophical labours of *J. G. Fichte* greatly exceeded the various attempts succeeding the diffusion of Kant's system.

He was born May 19, 1762, at Rammenau, in Upper Lusatia (Ober-Lausitz), and, after having studied at the school of Pforta and at the universities of Jena and Leipsic, passed several years in Switzerland and Prussia; and in 1793 became professor of Philosophy at Jena; resigned his office in 1799, and retired to Berlin: in 1805 filled a professorial chair at Erlangen, and afterwards in the university of Berlin; where he died, 1814. Fichte made it his object to constitute the Critical philosophy a science, founded on the most exact principles,[1] with the hope of precluding all future errors and misapprehensions, and of annihilating Scepticism; the cause of which was defended, among others, by *Schulze* and *Sol. Maimon.* Encouraged by the success which his "Essay towards a Criticism of Revelation in general," obtained,[2] and by the example of Reinhold's theory of the perceptive

[1] † Idea of the Doctrine of Science: Prof. p. 5. † General Principles of the Doctrine of Science. p 12.

[2] *Königsb.* 1792: second edition, 1793.

faculties, he gave full scope to his original and independent genius, which, with a firmness approaching obstinacy, led him constantly to maintain and boldly to profess the conclusions to which he had once arrived. His object was to find a system which might illustrate by a single principle, the material and formal properties of all science; might establish the unity of plan which the Critical system had failed to maintain, and solve that most difficult of all problems regarding the connection between our conceptions and their objects. Such was the origin of his Scientific Theory,[1] which supposes that neither Consciousness nor the objects to which it refers,—neither the material nor formal parts of knowledge,—are to be considered as data; but are the results of an operation of the *Ego*, and are collected by means of Reflection. Fichte does not, like Kant, begin by an analysis of our faculties for acquiring knowledge,—of practical reason and judgment; nor yet, as Reinhold had done, by assuming a primitive *fact*,—that of Consciousness; but supposes an original act of the subject (the *Ego*), from which he derives the very construction of Consciousness itself.

The method he pursues is as follows. He begins by investigating the conception of *Science*. It is a system of Knowledge determined by a higher principle, which expresses the contents and form of science. The Doctrine of Science is the science that demonstrates the possibility and validity of Science, the solidity of the principles on which it is founded as regards the form and contents, and consequently the connection of all human science. Inasmuch as this Theory or Doctrine of Science is the highest of all scientific systems, it must be dependent on a peculiar principle, not deducible from that or any other science. The Theory of Science is independent of all others,—of itself valid and possible, and *is, because it is*. The Doctrine of Science implies also a System connected with it; and contrariwise, the fact of a System implies that of a Theory, and of a first and absolute principle; the circle of argumentation being complete and inevitable. There are, however, in general, three Principles of Science: 1, one absolute and unconditional as regards contents and form; 2, a principle unconditional in

[1] *Wissenschaftslehre.*

form, but conditional in its contents; 3, a principle unconditional in contents, but conditional in form. A Theory of Science is Philosophy, which has for its object the necessary process of the human mind in the freedom of activity. When the energies of our minds have been determined to any particular pursuit, (such as Logic, Geometry, etc.), they become the objects of a Special Science; the determination to such particular pursuits being a contingent direction imparted to free action, and consequently incomplete. On the other hand the Theory of Science is alone complete in itself, and forms a perfect whole. The objects it contemplates are, agreeably to what has been stated, the original operations of the human mind (the *What*), which take place according to a certain determinate method and form (the *How*). These become the objects of Consciousness by means of the faculty of Reflection, whose office it is to abstract and disengage the element of Consciousness in all things. In this way we attain to Absolute Unity, which comprehends all cognitions and their principles; in other words, to the pure *Ego*. Reflection and Abstraction are subject to certain laws of Logic, which are absolute postulates of the Theory or Doctrine of Science.

401. First principle, A = A. X represents the systematic dependency of the whole. A and X being supposed to exist in the *Ego*, may be signified by this formulary, *Ego sum Ego*. This is the self-evident principle of Philosophy and Science in general (Principle of the Accord of the unconditional Postulate); expressing the necessary form and substance of Self-consciousness. In virtue of this principle we form judgments; to judge being an act and operation of the *Ego*. The *Ego* then establishes, absolutely and independently, its own existence; being at once the agent and the result of activity: in which consists the essence of Consciousness. The first operation of the *Ego* is that of Reflection on itself, which is occasioned by a postulated impediment opposed to its hitherto unrestrained activity. The *Ego* places itself in the position of the subject, inasmuch as it opposes itself as subject to the obstacle contemplated. The *second* principle (involved in the former), is this—that the *Ego* is not the *Non-Ego* (Principle of Opposition). There remains yet a *third* principle, condi-

tional as far as relates to its form; but not as respects its value postulated by an axiom of the Reason. To exemplify this, an action of the *Ego* is required, which may illustrate the opposition of the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego* in the *Ego*, without destroying the *Ego*. Reality and Negation can be associated only by means of limitations. Limitation then is the third principle postulated. Limitation again leads us on to Divisibility. Everything divisible is a *quantity*. Consequently in the *Ego* there must be granted a divisible quantity, and therefore the *Ego* contains something which may be supposed to exist or not to exist without detracting from the real existence of the *Ego*. Hence we arrive at the distinction of a separable and an absolute *Ego*. The *Ego* places a divisible *Non-Ego* in opposition to the divisible *Ego* (Fundamental principle of the Basis). Both of them have their existence in the absolute *Ego*, being respectively determinable by a reference to that. Hence are derived the two following propositions: 1. The *Ego* implies a limitation of its extent by means of the *Non-Ego*, which circumscribes its absolute and otherwise unlimited influence. 2. In like manner the *Ego* determines and defines the *Non-Ego*. The reality of the one circumscribes that of the other. On this point turn all the disputes between Idealism and Realism; and it is by a reference to this that they must be adjusted. The grand problem which speculative philosophy would endeavour to solve, is the accomplishment of such a reconciliation, and a satisfactory explanation of the connection between our representations and the objects to which they refer. The first of the two propositions above stated is necessary to be admitted, because without the opposition we have described there would be no such thing as Consciousness—without an *object* there could be no *subject*. The *Ego* cannot be said to exist except as modified by the *Non-Ego*. But *vice versâ*, without a subject there can be no object: the *Ego* must also be admitted to exist as determining the *Non-Ego*: the one fact implying a passion or suffering,—the other an action of the *Ego*. Our representation of things out of us, is a mode of acting of the *Ego*, whereby it transfers to the *Non-Ego* a real existence abstracted from itself. By such an operation of the mind the *Non-Ego* assumes the character of something real as respects the

Ego, inasmuch as the *Ego* transfers to it a portion of its own reality. Allowing that external objects impress the Representing Subject, yet this is nothing more than the opposition of those objects as the *Non-Ego* to our own *Ego* (limiting thereby the latter); the agent continuing to be ourselves and not things. From what has been stated, may be deduced: 1st. The reciprocity existing between the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego*. The action and passion of the *Ego* are one and the same thing, as relates to the *Non-Ego*. 2ndly. The operations of the *Ego* tend to show that the *ideal* and *real* principles, on which all comprehensibility of the circumstance that we know things out of us depends, form one and the same ground in the activity of the *Ego*. The explanation is to be sought in the fact that we contemplate the *Ego* as active, and the *Non-Ego* as passive; or *vice versâ*. By such an hypothesis the discordant claims of Realism and Idealism are reconciled, and the true theory of philosophical science developed.

From such principles the transcendental theory of the faculty of mental representation infers the following conclusions. 1. Mental representation (*Vorstellung*) can only take place in virtue of a reciprocal relation existing between the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego*. 2. The direction of the *Ego* to the *Non-Ego* is opposed to that of the *Non-Ego* to the *Ego*. In such cases the *Ego* balances, as it were, between two contrary influences. Such hesitation is the effect of the imagination, which equally represents the passive and active operations of the *Ego;* or, in other words, conveys them to the Consciousness. 3. Such a state of hesitation implies the act of perceiving in general (*Anschauen*), in which it is difficult to separate the percipient Subject from the Object perceived. It is not Reflection (the tendency of which is inwards), but activity directed towards external objects,—Production. 4. From the act of perceiving results Perception, properly so called, which is the effect of the Understanding. 5. Judgment, in the next place, weighs the objects presented to it by the understanding, and defines their mutual relations. 6. The perception of the absolute spontaneousness of the *Ego* is the cognition of Reason and the basis of all Science.

Practical Application of the Scientific Theory.

402. Two facts have been up to this point required as postulates to support the above system: the reciprocal action of the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego;* and the occurrence of an obstacle to the *Ego*, which restricts its hitherto unlimited energies, and gives birth to the *Non-Ego*. Now as the existence of the *Ego* itself (involving that of the *Non-Ego*), is dependent on this very circumstance, the whole system would fall for want of a foundation, if we could not deduce from the *Ego* itself the principle of such an obstacle. This can be effected only by practical, not by theoretical philosophy. The Doctrine of Science in its practical application has for its object the absolute practical *Ego*, which, by defining the *Non-Ego*, becomes the principle of the obstacle alluded to, and of the limitation of the activity of the *Ego*. Such an *Ego* is free, unlimited, and independent—the only true Reality; while on the other hand the *Ego*, considered as Intelligence determined by the *Non-Ego*, is finite and limited. In virtue of its unlimited activity, the *Ego* commences by circumscribing itself. This it does as a determining faculty, which implies the existence of something else determinable by it. Consequently, the *Ego* possesses by implication the power of determining that which is determinable,—in other words, of determining the *Non-Ego*, which is *objective* activity, and the result of pure Activity. The absolute *Ego* possesses an unlimited activity, and a perpetual tendency to become the cause of something else. With such an impulse, the *Ego* commences an unlimited career, but without attaining its object or becoming a Cause. In consequence of not accomplishing this end its energies are repulsed and reflected upon itself (Reflection). In virtue of its inherent activity and its inability to attain the end first proposed, the *Ego* now opposes a counter-movement to its first impulse. Hence arises the obstacle alluded to, or the *Non-Ego*. The *Non-Ego* being once established, the *Ego* assumes with reference to it the characteristics of practical, definitive, and causal. The *Non-Ego* also re-acts on the *Ego*, determining to a certain extent the *Ego*, and opposing a counterpoise to its influence. In this manner the *Non-Ego* also becomes a cause with reference to

the *Ego*. Feeling consists in perceiving the limitation of the free activity of the free *Ego*. It is thus we arrive at the reciprocal opposition existing between the *Ego* and the external World; the former in one respect assuming the character of something connected with, and dependent on, the World (considered as Intelligence), but in another (as Practical), continuing free and independent of the same. In this manner, by establishing the existence of the *Ego*, we establish that of the World, and by establishing the existence of the external World, we establish that of the *Ego*. Consequently, the World can possess reality only for an *Ego*, in an *Ego* and by an *Ego*. The leading proposition of the theory is this: that the *Ego* is absolute Activity: that all which exists out of the *Ego* is produced by the *Ego* by means of *position*, *opposition*, and *limitation*. The *Ego* is the *subject-object;* and thus Transcendental Idealism is boldly introduced.

On certain Branches of Philosophy treated by Fichte.

403. The author of the Doctrine of Science attempted to remodel on its principles some of the philosophical sciences, such as Ethics and Natural Law. His disquisitions respecting both contain many original and glorious thoughts by the side of an equal number of paradoxical opinions, with an appearance of logical deduction and systematic connection, resting on no solid basis, though managed with great ability.

Ethics. Having by his Idealism annihilated the objective reality of the sensible world, and left nothing in its place but a system of mere images, he tries to establish, by means of *Conscience*, a belief in the reality of a sensible world, as also in an intelligible world, independent of the former; and to demonstrate the possibility of referring our practical tendency to an attainable end through deeds. He sets out with the conception of free-will, that is, of unrestrained independent free-agency, which is the tendency of the *Ego*, and on which the thought of personality is founded. Consequently, the principle of practical Morality is the necessary conviction of Intelligence, that its freedom must be determined by the notion of complete free-agency; or, in common language, that Conscience must be obeyed

without limitation.[1] It determines the shall (*das Sollen*) or the principle of Duty. Virtue consists in a perfect conformity and unison with self. Natural Law and Right, which Fichte was the first to treat as quite independent of Moral Right, instructs us as to the relations, in respect of Right, and the reciprocal actions of free-agents, and deduces them from self-consciousness, of which they are necessary conditions. Man cannot conceive himself to be a rational being except inasmuch as he attributes to himself a free activity; nor can he suppose himself possessed of this, without extending the same to other beings, to all appearance like himself. Consequently, he conceives himself to be placed in certain relations of Right with regard to the latter, which induce him to regard his personal liberty as circumscribed by that of others. Fichte denies the existence of an Original Right, regarding it as a fiction created to meet the exigencies of Science. All Right has reference to some community, and derives its very existence from such a state. Rational beings are consequently intended to become at once members of society (*Ephorate*, in the state; and *Protection of Commerce*, in states). A state is the realisation of Right as contemplated by Reason. In his later account of political Right, Fichte considers the realisation of the kingdom of God upon earth as the ideal of a state based on the principles of Reason; in other words, a Theocracy, founded on the revelation of God in humanity. It may be observed in general, that his leading maxim is to make everything subordinate to the conception of Reason; and on this principle he founded his plan for an universal national system of education, and a permanent school or college of learned men.

The *Religious Philosophy* of Fichte has attracted the greatest attention. He represents the Deity as the immediate moral order of the world, an idea to which the *Ego* attains in consequence of feeling itself restricted in the exer-

[1] In FICHTE'S Anweisung zum seligen Leben, § 133, sqq. this view of morality is made superior to that presented by the principle of positive and imperative Legislation, at the same time that he makes it subordinate to those of Religion and Science. According to his theory the only true life is the life in God, which gives birth to a higher principle of morality, lays open to us a new world, and creates it.

cise of its free-agency by the conception of obligation. The *Ego* labours to realise this duty, and consequently to recognise a moral creation in the midst of the world without, which it has itself produced: in this manner it approximates the Deity, and attains to the life which proceeds from God. In this moral order of the world felicity is the result of moral worth. This felicity is not to be confounded with happiness; which does not and cannot exist: a doctrine which prohibits all reference to the latter as a final end. It is not necessary to think of the Deity as something distinct from the moral world just described, notwithstanding our proneness to conceive of Him as a separate being, and the author of that creation: 1st. Because we cannot attribute to the Divinity the qualities of Intelligence or Personality, without making Him a finite being, like to ourselves. 2ndly. It is a species of profanation to conceive of the Deity as a separate essence, since such an conception implies the existence of a *sensible* being limited by Space and Time. 3rdly. We cannot impute to Him even existence without confounding him with sensible natures. 4thly. No satisfactory explanation has yet been given of the manner in which the creation of the world could be operated by God. 5thly. The idea and expectation of happiness is a delusion; and when we form our notions of the Deity in accordance with such imaginations, we do but worship the idol of our own passions—the Prince of this world.

Views of this nature, developed in a paradoxical form, though coupled with a depth of moral feeling, procured for their author the charge of being a sort of atheist, and procured for Fichte some troubles and persecutions which he did not entirely deserve. He lived, however, to renounce his earlier doctrines.

Remarks on the Doctrine of Science, at large.

404. The system of Fichte is distinguished by a perfect unity and remarkable logical accuracy. It solves many difficulties, but at the same time gives occasion to many new ones, and was exposed to the following objections. By the Kantists it was urged that, 1st. Fichte had proposed

for solution a grand philosophical problem, without previously inquiring whether it was capable of being solved. He pretends to explain everything, but attempts this only by means of a seeming transcendental deduction, and is constantly driven back to gratuitous assertions and cyclical arguments. 2ndly. The principles laid down are the laws of Logic, which can never enable us to attain to an accurate knowledge of the nature and properties of any cognizable subject or object. These laws are forms of thought, devoid in themselves of all substance. It is only by a forced application that they are invested with the semblance of entity, particularly in the case of principle the first (§ 401), by the substitution of the *Ego* to an indeterminate object. The defect of these false realizations is cleverly concealed by the logical artifice of all these positions, oppositions, and compositions, which only present, after all, the appearance of a real cognition, instead of the real knowledge to which they aspire. The non-Kantians objected: 1st. That this system converts the *Ego* into an absolute and independent essence, annihilating the existence of external Nature, its independent reality, and its conformity to the laws of Reason. 2ndly. It is inconsistent with itself. The *Ego* at first is represented as nothing but infinite activity, opposing to itself as a limitation the *Non-Ego*, and thereby producing all things —space included. But in the first place; what is it which compels the *Ego*, as yet unlimited and unrestrained, to circumscribe itself by the position of the *Non-Ego?*—"Because otherwise it could not attain to a knowledge of objects." But what necessity can be shown for its aiming at the knowledge of objects, being itself infinite and unlimited? The pretended principle of the Activity of the *Ego*, in virtue of which it establishes an *objective* world, is a primordial fact, of which we have no perception in the empirical consciousness, and which can only be ascertained by an intellectual perception (*Anschauung*), and is therefore a *postulate* arbitrarily, and, as it were, surreptitiously assumed for the purposes of the theory. Fichte confounds the operations of transcendental imagination in the construction of geometrical figures with the creation of determinate objects, without stopping to explain how the multiplicity of external objects and their various properties can possibly be affected

by the construction of Form in Space. The postulate of an obstacle encountered by the infinite activity of the *Ego*, which throws it back upon itself, and creates a consciousness of the necessity attaching to certain mental representations, is not to be accounted for either by the nature of the *Ego* or the *Non-Ego*. In short, instead of one mystery, this theory would establish another still more incomprehensible, all the time pretending to explain the former by the latter, and ending with an admission that its own principle of explanation is incomprehensible. Accordingly, in the most recent statement of his theory, the author is compelled to assert (in order to account for the feeling of *necessity* attached to certain mental representations, arising from their relation to an object), that the *Ego* is restricted in the exercise of its energies by certain determinate limits, although he had described it as Infinite Activity or an Absolute Doing (*Thun*). These limits or restrictions he proceeds to call incomprehensible and inexplicable, which nevertheless were precisely the object at which his Scientific Theory of Philosophy was levelled. His Idealism, therefore, is an example of speculation carried to the extremest limit, and ending in the destruction of itself—after having first annihilated all science and free-agency.

Compare this transcendental Idealism with the supernatural Idealism of Berkeley, and the Realism of Spinoza.

405. Fichte himself endeavoured to accommodate his theory to the opinions of others by subjecting it to various modifications,[1] particularly with reference to the agreement

[1] FICHTE'S Works. On the Theory of Science at large: Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, *Weimar*, 1794, 8vo. Zweite verb. und verm. Aufl. *Jena*, 1798, 8vo. Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, *Weimar*, 1794, 8vo.; 2te Aufl. 1802, 8vo. Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, *Jena* und *Leipz.* 1795, 8vo.; 2te verb. Aufl. *ebend.* 1802, Grundlage, etc., und Grundriss, neue unveränderte Aufl. *Tüb.* 1802. Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, und zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (in dem Philosophischen Journal, herausgeg. von NIETHAMMER und FICHTE, 1797. St. I. S. 1 f., St. IV. S. 310, S. V. S. 1 f. und VI). Antwortschreiben an K. L. REINHOLD auf dessen Beitrag zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange des XIX Jahrhunderts, *Tüb.* 1801, 8vo. Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publicum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie, etc., *Berlin*, 1801, 8vo. Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinsten

he pretended to have established between it and the Critical method; as also with regard to the means of detecting in Consciousness the original activity of the *Ego*. At first he attempted this on the laws of Thought, but subsequently had recourse to Intellectual Perception; (in his *Sonnenklarer Bericht*, mentioned p. 432, note). The most remarkable difference, however, between the earlier and later editions of the Theory of Science, is this: that the first was composed on the principles of Idealism, the latter on those of Realism. The former sets out with asserting the unlimited and independent activity of the *Ego;* the latter by maintaining the absolute *Esse* of the Deity, as the only true reality—the only pure and self-existing life—of whom the world and consciousness are but the image and impress; treating objective nature as nothing more than a limitation of Divine Life. The philosophical system of Schelling appears to have contributed, no less than the religious sentiment, to effect this change.

The Doctrine of Science excited a prodigious deal of attention and gained a great number of partisans: among others, *F. K. Forberg*, (see the catalogue of Fichte's works, below); *F. J. Niethammer*, (born 1766); *C. L. Reinhold* (see § 398); *Schelling* (see following §); *J. B. Schad* (§ 412), after-

Umrisse dargestellt, *Berlin*, 1810, 8vo. Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Vorlesungen gehalten, etc., zu *Berlin*, 1810—11; *Stuttg.* und *Tüb.* 1817, 8vo.

On Religious Philosophy in particular: Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (anonym.) 2te verm. und verb. Aufl. *Konigsb.* 1793, 8vo. Ueber den Grund unsers Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung (Philosoph. Journal, VIII B. (1798), 1 St. Fr. K. Forberg's Entwickelung des Begriffs der Religion ebendaselbst.) Appellation an das Publicum über die ihm beigemessenen atheistischen Aeusserungen, *Jena* und *Leipz.* 1799, 8vo. Der Herausgeber des Philosophischen Journals gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, *Jena*, 1799, 8vo. (Forberg's Apologie seines angeblichen Atheismus, *Gotha*, 1799, 8vo.) Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre, etc. *Berl.* 1806, 8vo. The way to the Blessed Life, or the Doctrine of Religion, translated by William Smith, *London*, 1849.

Ethical and other writings: Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, *Jena*, 1794, 8vo. System der Sittenlehre, *Jena* und *Leipz.* 1798, 8vo. Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die Französische Revolution, 1793, 8vo. Grundlage des Naturrechts, *Jena*, 1796—97, II Theile, 8vo. Ueber die Bestimmung des Menschen,

wards a disciple of Schelling; *Abicht* (§ 414); *Mehmel*, and others.[1]

It also encountered many sturdy antagonists and severe critics, especially among the Kantists.[2] The end of it has

Berl. 1800, 8vo. The Vocation of Man, translated by W. SMITH, 8vo. *London*, 1849. Der geschlossene Handelsstaat: ein philosoph. Entwurf als Anhang zur Rechtsl. *Tüb.* 1800, 8vo. Vorlesungen über das Wesen des Gelehrten, *Berl.* 1806, 8vo. The Nature of the Scholar, and its Manifestations, translated by W. SMITH, second edition, 8vo. *London*, 1849. Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, *Berl.* 1806, 8vo. The Characteristics of the Present Age, translated by W. SMITH, 8vo. *London*, 1849. Reden an die Deutsche Nation, *Berl.* 1808, 8vo. Die Vorlesungen über den Begriff des wahrhaften Kriegs, *ebend.* 1813, 8vo. Die Staatslehre, oder über das Verhältniss des Urstaats zum Vernunftreiche in Vorträgen, etc., aus dem Nachlasse herausgeg. *Berl.* 1820, 8vo. Fichte's Sämmtliche Werke (complete works), 11 vols. 8vo. *Berlin*, 1845, &c.

[1] Works illustrative of those of Fichte: Philosophisches Journal, herausgegeben von NIETHAMMER, *Neustrel* und *Jena*, 1795–96, 4 B.; mit FICHTE, 1797—1800, V—X B.

FR. W. JOS. SCHELLING, Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissensschaftslehre in dem Philos. Journal von FICHTE und NIETHAMMER, 1796 und 1797; and in SCHELLING'S Philos. Schriften, 1 Band.

JOH. BAPT. SCHAD, Grundriss der Wissenschaftslehre, *Jena*, 1800, 8vo. Gemeinfassliche Darstellung des Fichteschen Systemes und der daraus hervorgehenden Religionstheorie, *Erfurt*, 1799—1801, III B. 8vo. Geist der Philosophie unserer Zeit, *Jena*, 1800, 8vo. Absolute Harmonie des Fichteschen Systems mit der Religion, *Erfurt*, 1802, 8vo. Transcendentale Logik, *Jena*, 1801, 8vo.

G. E. A. MEHMEL, Lehrbuch der Sittenlehre, *Erlang.* 1811. Reine Rechtslehre, *ebend.* 1815, 8vo. At an earlier date: Versuch einer vollst. analyt. Denklehre, 1803, and Ueber das Verhältniss der Philos. zur Religion, 1805, 8vo. u. a.

[2] Criticisms of Fichte's theory:

Stimme eines Arktikers über Fichte und sein Verfahren gegen die Kantianer (von K. T. RINK), 1799, 8vo.

Vom Verhältniss des Idealismus zur Religion: oder, Ist die neueste Philosophie auf dem Wege zum Atheismus? 1799, 8vo.

Freimüthige Gedanken über Fichte's Appellation gegen die Anklage des Atheismus und deren Veranlassung, *Gotha*, 1799, 8vo.

J. H. GL. HEUSINGER, Ueber das Idealistisch-Atheistische System des Hrn. Prof. Fichte, *Dresden* und *Gotha*, 1799, 8vo.

K. L. REINHOLD, Sendschreiben an Lavater und Fichte über den Glauben an Gott, *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo.

F. H. Jacobi an Fichte, *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo.

W. TH. KRUG, Briefe über die Wissenschaftslehre, *Leipz.* 1800, 8vo.

been the same with that of all other exclusive theories; and in spite of its imposing tone of authority, which would elevate speculation at the expense of experimental knowledge (which it affects to contemn), it has failed to acquire an ascendency in matters of philosophy. At the same time, it must be confessed that in its day it had great influence over the minds of Fichte's contemporaries; and by the sort of eloquence which characterized his compositions, has promoted in many men a strong tendency to anti-sensuous pursuits and investigations.

Schelling's Theory of Absolute Identity.

406. Fichte had attempted to construct a system of knowledge on the principles of Idealism, in respect both of Form and Matter; but Schelling carried speculation a step farther, and instead of the *Ego*, the Subject-Object, placed at the head of his system the absolute Itself, or the *Original Ego* (*das Ur-Ich*), and proposed to solve, on philosophical principles, the highest problem which Reason can contemplate—the nature of Absolute Being, and the manner in which all finite beings are derived from it. *F. W. J. von Schelling*[1] is unquestionably an original thinker, superior to Fichte for the vivacity of his imagination, the poetical character of his genius, and the extent of his acquirements; more particularly in the history

GOTTLOB CHR. FR. FISCHHABER, Ueber das Princip und die Hauptprobleme des Fichteschen Systems, nebst einem Entwurf zu einer neuen Auflösung derselben, *Carlsruhe*, 1801, 8vo.

C. CHR. EHR. SCHMID'S Ausführliche Kritik des Buchs: Die Bestimmung des Menschen, in Schmid's Aufsätzen Philosophischen und Theologischen inhalts, *Jena*, 1802, 8vo.

CH. F. BÖHME, Commentar über und gegen den ersten Grundsatz der wissenschaftlichen Lehre, *Altenb.* 1802, 8vo.

JAC. FRIES; Reinhold, Fichte, und Schelling, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo.

FR. WILH. JOS. SCHELLING, Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre, *Tübingen*, 1806, 8vo.

H. L. EGIDIUS, Johann Gottlieb Fichte; In DULLER'S Männern des Volks, 1847, IV Band, 1ste Lieferung.

BAYER, Zu Fichte's Gedächtniss, 1835.

[1] An Aulic councillor, and at the present time a professor at Munich; born at Leonberg in Würtemberg, Jan. 27, 1775.

of ancient philosophy, in antiquities, and natural history. Having studied at Tübingen the systems of Kant, Reinhold, and Ænesidemus (Schulze), he accused the former of failing to deduce his conclusions from the first axioms of science, and desiderated a common principle which might embrace alike the Speculative and Practical department of knowledge;[1] objecting also to the use made of what was called the Moral Proof.[2] Fichte's theory made a strong impression on his youthful and ardent temper, more inclined to adopt with readiness the imagination of the infinite and creative activity of the human mind, than disposed to a painful examination of the forms and laws by which that activity is circumscribed. With such views the young scholar resorted to Jena, where he formed a close intimacy with Fichte, and defended his theory against the partisans or the adversaries of Kant; without, however, adopting all its dogmata. Gradually he dissented more and more from the system of his master, in proportion as he became more and more sensible of its exclusive character.

407. Fichte had deduced all his system from the operations of the *Ego* in what may be termed a *progressive* method; but without offering any proof for his leading assertion that the Subjective produces and creates the Objective; the latter never producing the Subjective. This process may be reversed and the argument conducted from Objective Nature to the *Ego;* and if a due reference be not made to the Critical system, the one method is no less admissible than the other. Spinoza had already produced a system of Dogmatism carried to the highest possible point, and ending in an objective Realism; and by such considerations Schelling was led to form the idea of two opposite and parallel philosophical Sciences—the *Transcendental Philosophy*, and the *Philosophy of Nature*, to the special

[1] With these views he composed his first work: Ueber die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philos. überhaupt, *Tübing.* 1795; and, Vom *Ich* als princip der Philos.; oder, über das Unbedingte in der menschlichen Wissenschaft, *ibid.* 1805, 8vo. (see his Philos. Works, vol. I.)

[2] See his † Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism; first published in the Journal of Niethammer, 1796, and since incorporated in his works.

ROSENKRANZ, Schelling: Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität zu Königsberg, 1843.

treatment of which, especially the latter, he devoted various works. The former begins with the consideration of the *Ego*, and derives from that the Objective, the Multifarious, the Necessary,—in short—the system of Nature. The latter sets out with the contemplation of Nature, and deduces therefrom the *Ego*, the Unrestricted, and the Simple. The tendency of both is to illustrate, by their mutual relations, the powers of Nature and the Soul, considered as identical.

The principle which they have in common is this; The laws of Nature must exist within us as the laws of Consciousness; and, *vice versâ*, the laws of Consciousness are found to exist in objective nature as the laws of Nature. It is to be observed, however, that the first of these two Sciences cannot investigate to the end the inexhaustible variety of external Nature; nor can the *second* attain to a perception of the Simple and Absolute. It is impossible to explain to ourselves by the ordinary processes of the understanding, how out of Unity arises Multiplicity, and out of Multiplicity—Unity (the last combining the twofold characters of Unity and Multiplicity); both become lost in the Infinite, which is common to both. There must consequently be a still higher Philosophy which serves as a common link to the two others which are equally dependent on it, and which both unite in it. In this manner Schelling founded his system on the *Original Identity* of that which knows and that which is known, and was led to conclude the absolute identity of the Subjective and Objective, or the Indifference of the Differing; in which consists the essence of the Absolute:—that is, the Deity. The Absolute is recognized by an *absolute* act of cognition, in which the Subjective and Objective concur, implicitly and indistinctly; in other words, by Intellectual Perception. Consequently Schelling opposes Absolute Cognition or Knowledge, obtained through the medium of the Ideas, to inferior or empirical knowledge, the result of Reflection by means of the conceptions of the understanding. The last description of knowledge is directed to things conditional, individual, and divisible, which are associated by a process of the understanding. The former contemplates the Absolute, which is independent and unconditional, and is apprehended

by means of the Ideas. This is Science properly so called, and develops itself (agreeably to its nature) as Unity, in an organic whole, in which the Subjective and Objective are indivisible and identical: a divine Science, embracing the highest sphere of Nature; the only Science worthy of our serious regard, or of the name of Philosophy.

In this manner the system of Schelling proposes to attain to a knowledge of the essences and forms of all things, by means of Ideas of the Reason or Intuition, and asserts that *to be* and *to know* are identical (whence its appellation of the system of Absolute Identity (*Identitätslehre*). It is a transcendental and, according to Schelling, absolute system of Idealism, which would derive all knowledge, not from the partial principle of the *Ego*, but from one still higher—the Absolute; comprehending not only the *Ego*, but Nature also. It proposes to attain to a knowledge of the latter by means of Ideas[1] (Philosophy of Nature, Construction of Nature *à priori*), and labours to establish a perpetual parallelism or analogy between the laws of Nature and those of Intelligence. In short, it is Idealism and Realism carried forward to a loftier platform, that of the Absolute.

408. The Absolute is neither infinite nor finite; neither *Esse* (*Seyn*) nor cognition (*Erkennen*); neither Subject nor Object; but that wherein all opposition of Subject and Object, Knowledge and Existence, Spirit and Nature, Ideal and Real, together with all other differences and distinctions, are absorbed and disappear, leaving an indissoluble and equal union of cognition and *Esse*. This Absolute Identity of Ideal and Real, and Absolute Indifference of the Differing (of Unity and Plurality), is the Unity which comprehends the Universe.[2] Absolute Identity *exists;* and out of its limits nothing really exists, and, consequently, nothing is finite which exists *per se*. All that *is*, is Absolute Identity or a development of its essence. This development takes place in conformity with certain correlative Oppositions of terms, which are derived from Absolute Identity as the *poles* or *sides* of the same object, with a preponderance to the Ideal or Real; and become identified by the law of

[1] The Philosophy of Nature, or the Construction of Nature *à priori*.

[2] See Considerations on various Philosophical Principles, and particularly that of Schelling, in Fischhaber's Archiv. für Philos. I Heft.

Totality; the principle of their development being that of *Identity in Triplicity.* Such identity is sometimes styled a division of the Absolute; sometimes a spontaneous revelation of the same; sometimes a falling-off of the Ideas from the Deity. By such a revelation Absolute Knowledge is made possible to us; Reason itself (as far as it is Absolute) being the identification of the Ideal and Real. The characteristic *form* of the Absolute is absolute knowledge, in which Identity and Unity assume the character of Duality (A — A). The leading propositions of this theory consequently are: 1. That there exists but *one* identical nature; and that merely a quantitive (not a qualitive) difference exists between objects, *quoad essentiam*, resulting from the preponderance of the Objective or Subjective—the Ideal or Real. The Finite has only an apparent existence, inasmuch as it is the product of merely relative Reflection. 2. The One Absolute Nature reveals Itself in the eternal generation of existing things, which on their part constitute the *forms* of the first. Consequently each individual Being is a revelation of Absolute Being, in a determinate form. Nothing can exist which does not participate in the Divine Being. Consequently the Natural world is not *dead*, but animated and divine, no less than the Ideal. 3. This revelation of the Absolute takes place in conformity with certain correlative Oppositions which characterise different gradations of development, with a preponderance of the Real or the Ideal; and which consequently are nothing more than so many expressions of Absolute Identity. Science investigates these Oppositions, and presents a picture of the Universe, by deducing the Ideas of objects from the original contemplation of the Absolute, on the principle of Identity in Triplicity (called by Schelling the process of Construction), in conformity with the creative process observable in Nature itself. This Ideal construction is what we call Philosophy (the Science of Ideas); the highest effort of which is the discovery of a *relative form* amid the multifariousness of external Nature, and the recognition, in this relative form, of *Absolute Identity.*

The scheme of such *Construction* is as follows:

I. The Absolute—The Universe in its original form—The Deity: manifested in

II. Nature (the Absolute in its secondary form),

As Relative and Real————As Relative and Ideal;

According to the following gradations:

Weight—Matter	Truth—Science
Light—Motion	Goodness—Religion
Organic Structure—Life	Beauty—Art.

Above these gradations (technically named *Potenzen* by Schelling), and independent of them, are arranged:

Man (as a Microcosm)	The State
The System of the World (The external Universe)	History.

409. Schelling believed himself to have discovered in Ideas the essence of all things and their necessary forms; following the process of Intuitive Perception. He affected to amend the system of Kant, who had only recognised the existence of a knowledge of the world of *appearance*, and allowed nothing more than belief for things existing *per se;* and thought he had refuted Fichte, who represents the *Ego* as the only true Being, and all Nature as a dead and lifeless non-existence, incapable of any other characteristics than those belonging to a negation or limitation of the *Ego*. Feeling confident that he had originated an ideal construction of the universe, not as it appears to us but as it really exists, he unfolded his views with great ability, without conforming himself to the subdivisions of Philosophy usually observed, and made a skilful use of his acquaintance with the theories of Plato, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza. After having published several statements of his theory at large, he applied himself especially to one branch of it—the application of its principles to real existence or the Philosophy of Nature, considered as the living principle which produces all things by subdivision of itself, according to the law of Duality. Of the Ideal Department of his system he treated only some separate questions: in his later writings, on Free-will and the Origin of Evil, the Nature of God, etc.[1] On the subject of *Morals* he delivers

[1] In his Philosophy and Religion; in his Essay on Free-will; in the Letter to Eschenmayer with reference to this treatise; and (*en passant*) in his controversies with Fichte and Jacobi.

himself as follows: The knowledge of God is the first principle of all Morality. The existence of God necessarily implies that of a moral world. Virtue is a state of the soul in which it conforms itself not to an external law, but an internal necessity of its own nature. Morality is also Happiness. Happiness is not an accidental consequence of Virtue, but Virtue itself. The essence of Morality is the tendency of the soul to unite itself to God as the centre of all things. Social life, regulated according to the Divine example with reference to Morality and Religion—Art and Science—is what we denominate a community, or The State. It is a harmony of necessity and free-will, with an external organization. History, as a whole, is a revelation of the Deity, progressively developed. In his treatise on Free-will, Schelling went on to make a distinction between the Deity (simply so considered, or the Absolute), and the Deity *as existing*, or *revealing himself*, proceeding from a principle of existence contained in the Deity (Nature in the Godhead), and thus attaining the condition of a complete *Esse*, and assuming the character of personality (*Deus implicitus explicitus:* see the following section). Every production of Nature contains in itself a double principle, viz., an obscure and a luminous one, which to a certain extent are identical. In man these constitute Selfhood, which is spirit and will, which have the power of separating themselves from the Universal Will that sways all Nature, by virtue of individual free-will. The consequence of this opposition of Individual to Universal Will, is the origin of evil; which becomes real only by virtue of such opposition. Schelling has treated the subject of Beauty merely with a reference to Art, defining it to be the Infinite represented in a finite shape, and describing Art as a pourtraying of the Ideas, and a revelation of God to the human mind. This theory must be regarded as incomplete (according to Schelling's own confession, Phil. Schr. 1 B.); its scientific development, as a whole, being conveyed to us only in a brief fragment.[1]

[1] In the Zeitschrift für speculative Physik, 2 B. 2 Heft, s. 114, sqq. His works (besides those already mentioned § 405). Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, als Einleitung in das Stud. dieser W. 1 Th. *Leipz.* 1797, 8vo. Zweite durchaus verb. und verm. Aufl. *Landshut*, 1803. Von der Weltseele: eine Hypothese der höhern Physik zur

Tennemann's Criticism on the above System.

410. The theory of Schelling is remarkable for the originality of the views it contains, the magnitude of the problems it would solve, the consistency of its plan, and the vast circle of its application. It binds together by one single Idea all the essences of Nature, removing the limits which had been assigned by Kant to the dominion of Science, and asserting the possibility not only of a subjective representation, but of an objective and scientific cognition —of a certain and determinate Science (*Wissen*) of God and Divine things, by virtue of the identity between the human mind and the essence of all Being. It embraces the whole circle of philosophical speculation, removing, as it does, the distinction between empirical and rational knowledge; and

Erklärung des allgem. Organismus, nebst einer Abhandl. über das Verhältniss des Idealen und Realen in der Natur, oder Entwickelung der ersten Grundsätze der Naturphilosophie aus den Principien der Schwere und des Lichts, *Hamb.* 1798, 3vo.; 3te Auflage, 1809. The last treatise printed separately, *Hamb.* 1805, and *Landshut*, 1807. Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, *Jena*, 1799, 8vo. Einleitung zu seinem Entwurfe eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, oder, über den Begriff der speculative Physik, etc., *ebend.* 1799, 8vo. System des transcendentalen Idealismus, *Tüb.* 1800, 8vo. Zeitschrift für die speculative Physik, 1 und 2 B. *Jena*, 1800—3, 8vo. Neue Zeitschrift, u. s. w. *Tüb.* 1803. Krit. Journal der Phil. herausg. von SCHELLING und HEGEL, 2 B. *Tüb.* 1802—3, 8vo. Bruno; oder über das göttl. und naturl. Princip der Dinge: ein Gespräch, *Berl.* 1802, 8vo. neue Aufl. *ib.* 1842. Vorlesungen über die Methode des akad. Studiums, *Stuttg.* u. *Tüb.* 1803, 8vo. 2te unveränd. Aufl. 1815. Philosophie und Religion. *Tüb.* 1804. Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre, *Tüb.* 1806, 8vo. Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft (darin Aphorismen zur Einl. in die Naturphilos. 1 B. 1 Heft.) *Tüb.* 1806. Philosophische Schriften, 1 B. *Landshut*, 1809, 8vo.; (containing also his Rede über das Verhältniss der bildenden Künste zu der Natur, 1807, gehalten; und die Abhandlung: Philosophische Untersuchungen uber das Wesen der menschl. Freiheit, und die damit zusammenhängengen Gegenstände.) SCHELLING'S Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen des Hrn. F. H. JACOBI, und der ihm in derselben gemachten Beschuldigung eines absichtlich, täuschenden, Luge-redenden Atheismus. *Tüb.* 1812, 8vo. Allgemeine Zeitschrift von und für Deutsche, III Hefte; (containing Schelling's answer to a writing of ESCHENMAYER, über die Abh. von der Freiheit.) Ueber die Gottheiten von Samothrace, *Stuttg.* u. *Tüb.* 1815, 8vo.

its principles are made applicable to all the sciences. It has the appearance, however, of being, 1st. As relates to Practical Science, very confined and embarrassed; nor can we discover how, in such a system of Absolute Identity, there can be room for *practical necessity*, or, in other words, the obligation of duty.[1] The theory is characterised by a blind sort of Natural Necessity and Determinism:—God reveals himself of necessity.* All History, and all the mutations of the world are but the modifications of his *Esse*.[2] 2ndly. Independently of this partial view of Nature, the system is deficient in the solidity of its principles. It is not shown in what manner the human mind can elevate itself to the intellectual perception described; the principles, therefore, laid down, are mere suppositions. *Thought* without a *Thinking Subject* is nothing better than an abstract idea. Absolute Identity is inconceivable independent of Relative Identity. Without the latter, the former is reduced to a mere nonentity. It cannot be shown that Absolute Identity constitutes the essence of all beings: Objective Reality depends upon a confusion of the nature of Thought with the nature of things. To pretend that a pure abstraction like this is real, and constitutes the essence of all things, is a mere unfounded hypothesis, the proof advanced by Schelling being altogether untenable:[3] to support which he has recourse to a mere play of words ("Identity of Identity and Non-Identity")—to contradiction—("The bond of Unity and Plurality—the Copula—the Absolute in the Absolute—the Divine in the Divine, etc."), and to a multitude of vague and indefinite terms. 3rdly. This theory has only the *appearance* of a scientific system. The attempt to deduce the Finite from the Infinite and Absolute, and the Particular from the Universal, by means of a real demonstration (construction), has proved abortive.[4] The author maintains that a Finite and Infinite,

[1] See SCHELLING, Philos. u. Relig. s. 53 u. f. Philos. Schriften, s. 413.

* Tennemann's criticism of Schelling, from the Kantian point of view, will probably appear too severe. Hegel has more successfully indicated the weak points of the Philosophy of Identity.—ED.

[2] Darstellung des wahr. Verh. s. 66.

[3] Zeitschr. § 7. Darstellung der Verh. s. 50.

[4] See Zeitschrift für speculative Physik, 2 B. II Hft. s. 18; Bruno, s. 81—131; Philos. und Rel. s. 35.

a Real and Ideal, have co-existed from the beginning of things, in an indissoluble union; but anon he is obliged to suppose a separation between them, by virtue of his hypothesis of Absolute Identity. The same is the case with regard to self-revelation. The only answer he affords to the question, Why the Deity should reveal himself?—is a simple assertion that so it *must* be.[1] Occasionally he has recourse to Plato's mythical hypothesis of a Fall of the Ideas from the Absolute;[2] concerning which it may be queried how any thing can fall from the Absolute, which by hypothesis embraces and contains all things? Occasionally he labours to demonstrate that nothing exists besides Unity, the Copula, and the Absolute:[3] whence, then, are derived finite knowledge, having reference to Space and Time; and the Categories? All that gives to his argument the appearance of successful demonstration is, that he has substituted for the vague idea of the Absolute certain fictions of the Imagination, and notions borrowed from experience.

4thly. Can any one presume to believe that the inscrutable nature of the Godhead is contained in the idea of Absolute Identity? His Natural Philosophy conveys to us no knowledge of God, and the little it reveals appears opposed to Religion.[4] It becomes a system of Pantheism by identifying the Deity with Nature,[5] and makes the Deity himself subject to superior laws, supposing him obliged to reveal himself, and making the Divinity, as Intelligence, proceed, within the compass of Time, from non-intelligent principles —Nature in the Deity, and Chaos. The Deity is supposed to render passive a certain portion of his nature with which before he energised; and to enable us to conceive of him as a personal being, we are obliged to suppose the existence in him of Nature as a negative essence.[6] God is represented not only as a Divine Being, but as Life. Now Life presupposes a certain destiny, and implies passive affections and a gradual development; and to such limitations we are taught

[1] As a fact morally necessary: Abhandlung über die Freiheit, s. 492.
[2] Relig. u. Philos. s. 35.
[3] Darstellung, s. 62.
[4] See the close of the following section.
[5] Schelling has endeavoured to repel this charge (Philos. u. Relig. s. 52., Schr. s. 402 ff.)
[6] Pages 96, 87.

to believe that the Deity has voluntarily submitted himself.[1] The whole theory is nothing better than an ingenious fiction, which, by offering the appearance of a solution of all difficulties, and by its pretended Construction of Nature, proved generally attractive; as well as by removing all idea of constraint or Moral Obligation, by suggesting a variety of new ideas, and by appearing to throw open a wide perspective to the views of Science. As for the *manner* of Schelling, we are called upon to remark, besides the faults of a vague and indeterminate mode of expression already noticed, the employment of certain mythical and metaphorical terms, after the manner of Plato, which increase the difficulties belonging to his system.

411. Subsequently to Schelling's earlier labours, he spent many years in comparative inactivity, chiefly at Munich, where he confined himself to casual publications and lectures, that scarcely sufficed to maintain his previous reputation. The principal works that he wrote at this time were his *Lectures on the Method of Academic Study* (1803), *Philosophy and Religion*, and sundry prefaces to works of a philosophical character. On his appointment as Professor of Philosophy at Berlin, in 1841, he delivered a course of lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation, in which Schelling describes his present position as a Positive Philosophy, or Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation. The only impression of these lectures that has appeared, is that which was published by Paulus at Heidelberg in 1844; and as it is not recognised by the author, it cannot be regarded as an authentic source of his latest philosophy. It is generally understood that Schelling was far from exhibiting the acuteness of his youth in his last lectures, in which he attempted to supplant the Hegelian system; and he soon relinquished the arduous task, for which he was no longer qualified.

Partisans and Adversaries of the System of Schelling.

412. The enthusiasm which this system excited may be explained by a reference to the character of the theory itself, and of the times in which it appeared. A considerable school of disciples was formed among the moral philo-

[1] Abhandlung über die Freiheit, s. 483, Phil. Schr.

sophers, theologians, philologists, physicists, and naturalists of the day; who professed to investigate anew their several sciences on the principles of the system of Absolute Identity, and aspired to complete that system by fresh discoveries. The views of Schelling had a more especial influence on the sciences of Natural History, Mythology, History, and the theory of Taste. The two *Schlegels*[1] at one time contributed to extend its reputation by their labours in the last department. Others of this school were less commendable; and a dizzy spirit of exaggeration seemed to possess its professors, which led them to accept as the highest efforts of wisdom the most extravagant and fantastical conceptions; and, by allying itself to superstition and enthusiasm, seemed to restore the days of Neo-platonism.

To this school belonged the Naturalists *H. Steffens*,[2] *J. Görres*[3], *the Chevalier F. von Baader*[4], *L. Oken*[5], *J. P.*

[1] *Frederic* and *William Augustus*. The first was many years Professor at Bonn, where he distinguished himself by his valuable researches into the literary treasures of the Hindoos, and his studies in the Romance language. He became a Catholic at a later date, and engaged in conflict with rationalistic philosophy in general, and has published several valuable and important works. viz.: Philosophy of Life (15 Lectures), 8vo. *Vienna*, 1828. Translated (with his Philosophy of Language), Bohn, 1847. Philosophy of History (18 Lectures), 2 v. 8vo. *Vienna*, 1828. Translated into English by J. B. Robertson, in Bohn's Library, 1848. Æsthetic Works, translated by J. Millington, Bohn's Standard Library, 1849. Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, translated by Dr. Black and J. Morrison, Bohn, 1846.

Augustus William Schlegel was chiefly noted for his labours in connection with Dramatic Art; and especially for the admirable translation of Shakespeare that he executed in connection with Tieck.

The complete works of Frederick Schlegel have lately been published in 19 vols. 8vo. *Vienna* and *Bonn*, 1846; and the works of Augustus William, in 12 vols. *Leips.* 1846.

[2] Born at Stavanger in Norway, 1773; a professor at Breslau.

H. Steffens, Grundzüge der philos. Naturwissenschaft, *Berl.* 1806, 8vo., with his other treatises on the Natural Sciences: Ueber die Idee der Universitäten, *Berl.* 1809, 8vo. Caricaturen des Heiligsten, *Leipz.* 1819—21, 2 Bde. u. a. Anthropologie, *Bresl.* 1822, 2 Bde. Von der falschen Theologie und dem wahren Glauben, *Bresl.* 1824, 8vo.

[3] Professor at Munich.

Görres, Aphorismen über die Kunst, etc. *Coblentz*, 1804, 8vo. Aphorismen über Organomie, *ebend.* 1804, und *Francf.* 1803, 1 Th. Exposition der Physiologie, *Coblentz*, 1805. Glauben und Wissen, *Münch.* 1805. Mythengeschichte, etc.

V. Troxler,[1] *K. J. Windischmann*,[2] *G. H. Schubert*,[3] *F. J. Schelvers*,[4] (all of whom, with the exception of Oken, inclined

[4] Of the University of Munich.

Fr. Baader, Beiträge zur Elementarphysiologie, *Hamb.* 1797, 8vo. Ueber das Pythagor. Quadrat in den Natur, oder die vier Weltgegenden, *Tub.* 1799, u. a. KJ. Schriften in den Beiträgen zur dynam. Physik. *Berl.* 1809. später: Begründung der Ethik durch die Physik, *Munch.* 1813. Ueber den Blitz als Vater des Lichts an H. Jung, 1815. Abhandlungen über die Extase; Analogie des Erkenntniss und des Zeugungsvermögens; Ueber die Freiheit der Intelligenz: eine Rede, *Munch.* Ueber die Vierzahl des Lebens. *Berl.* 1819, 8vo. Sätze aus der Bildungs- und Begründungslehre des Lebens, *Berl.* 1820, 8vo. Fermenta Cognitionis, I—III Heft. *Berl.* 1822—23. (The first treats of the origin of good and evil in men). Ueber die Vierzahl des Lebens, *Berl.* 1819, 8vo. Proben religiöser Philosophie älterer Zeit, *Leipz.* 1825. 8vo. Vorlesungen über rel. Philos. im Gegensatz der irreligiösen älterer und neuerer Zeit, *Munch.* 1827, 8vo.

[3] Professor at Munich.

L. Oken's Uebersicht des Grundrisses des Systems der Naturphilosophie, und der damit entstehenden Theorie der Sinne, *Francf. a. M.* (1802) 8vo. Abriss des Systems der Biologie, *Gött.* 1805. Ueber die Zeugung, *Hamb.* 1805. Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie, *Jena*, 1809, sqq. 3 B. 8vo. n. Aufl. 1829. Lehrbuch der Naturgeschichte, 1 und 3 Th. *Leipz.* 1813, und *Isis*.

[1] A Swiss physician.

Troxler's Versuche in der organ. Physik, *Jena*, 1804. 8vo. Ueber das Leben und sein Problem, *Gött.* 1807. Elemente der Biosophie, *Leipz.* 1808. Blicke in das Wesen des Menschen, *Aarau*, 1812; 8vo. Philosophische Rechtslehre der Natur und des Gesetzes, etc. *Zürich*, 1820. 8vo. Naturlehre des menschlichen Erkennens, oder Metaphysik, *Aarau*, 1828, 8vo.

[2] A professor at Bonn.

K. J. Windischmann's Ideen zur Physik, I B. *Würz.* und *Bamb.* 1805, 8vo. Vergl. Darstellung des Begriffs der Physik; in Schelling's neuer Zeitschr. für spec. Phys. 1 B. I Heft. 1802. Ueber die Selbstvernichtung der Zeit, *Heidelb.* 1807, u. a.

[3] A professor at Munich.

Schubert's Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenchaft, *Dresd.* 1808, 8vo; neue Aufl. 1817. Ahndungen einer allg. Geschichte des Lebens, *Leipz.* 3 Th. 1806—20, 8vo. Symbolik des Traums, etc. *Bamb.* 1814; 2te Aufl. 1821. Altes and Neues aus dem Gebiet der innern Seelenkunde, *Leipz.* 1816, 8vo. Die Urwelt und die Fixsterne, *Dresd.* 1822, 8vo.

[4] A professor at Heidelberg.

Schelvers, Elementarlehre der organ. Natur: 1 Th. Organomie, *Gött.* 1800. Philosophie der Medicin, *Frcf.* 1809, 8vo. Ueber das Geheimniss des Lebens, 1814, 8vo. Von den sieben Formen des Lebens, *Frcf. a. M.* 1817, 8vo.

to the principle of Faith), *K. E. Schelling*,[1] *P. F. von Walther*,[2] *J. Weber*,[3] *W. Nasse*,[4] *D. G. Kieser*, *Blasche*,[5] etc. To these must be added the moral philosophers *F. Ast*,[6] *K. W. F. Solger*,[7] (possessing more originality than the rest); *E. A. Eschenmayer*, and *J. J. Wagner*,[8] (the two last eventually became opposed to Schelling); and *Hegel*[9] (§ 424), who, as well as *Krause*, seceded in the end from the tenets of his master. The doctrines of Schelling were expressly taught by *J. B. Schad*[10] (§ 405); *G. M. Klein* (the most

[1] K. E. SCHELLING, Ueber das Leben und seine Erscheinung, *Landshut*, 1806, 8vo.

[2] WALTHER, Ueber Geburt, Daseyn, und Tod, *Nürnb.* 1807. Ueber den Egoismus in der Natur *ebend.* 1807, u. a. Sp. Physiologie des Menschen, etc. *Landshut*, 1807—8, 8vo.

[3] WEBER'S Metaphysik des Sinnl. und Uebersinnl. *Lands.* 1801, 8vo. Lehrbuch der Naturwissenschaft, *Landshut*, 1803—4. Philos., Rel., und Christenthum im Bünde, *München*, 1808—11, VII Hfte. Wissenschaft der materiellen Natur, oder Dynamik der Materie, *München*, 1821, u. a.

[4] NASSE, Ueber Naturphilosophie, *Freyberg*, 1809, 8vo. Zeitschrift für psych. Ärzte, *Leipz.* seit 1818.

[5] BLASCHE, Ueber das Wichtigste, was in der Naturphilos. seit 1801 ist geleistet worden, in der Zeitschr. Isis, herausgeg. VON OKEN, IX St. Jahrg. 1819. Dessen Vertheidigung des naturphil. Systems in der Isis, 1826; 5 Heft, (gegen die Einwürfe im Hermes, XXIV, von Bachmann). In Schellingscher Ansicht ist auch dessen Theodicee, unter d. Titel: Das Böse im Einklange mit der Weltordung, *Leipz.* 1827, 8vo. abgefasst.

[6] AST'S Grundlinien der Philosophie, *Landshut*, 1807; n. A. 1809. System der Kunstlehre, oder Lehr- und Handbuch der Ästhetik, etc., *Leipz.* 1805, 2te Aufl. Grundriss der Ästhetik, *Landshut*, 1807, und Auszug: Grundlinien der Ästhetik, *ebend.* 1813, 8vo. Geschichte der Philos. s. S. 23.

[7] SOLGER, Philos. Gespräche: erste Sammlung, *Berl.* 1817, 8vo. ERWIN, Vier Gespräche über das Schöne und die Kunst, *Berl.* 1815, II Thle. 8vo. Nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel; herausg. von L. TIECK und FR. VON RAUMER, *Leipz.* 1826, II B. 8vo.

Solger's Philosophie, dargestellt von REINHOLDT SCHMIDT, 1841.

[8] Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo. Von der Natur der Dinge, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo. System der Idealphilosophie, *Leipz.* 1804, 8vo. His other works will be mentioned below, § 423.

[9] See his Differenz des Fichteschen und Schelling'schen Systems in Beziehung auf Reinhold's Beiträge, etc., *Jena*, 1801, 8vo.; and the Critical Journal published conjointly with Schelling.

[10] System der Natur- und Transcendental philosophie, in Verbindung dargestellt, *Landsh.* 1803—4, II Thle. 8vo. His later publications

faithful expositor of the system)[1]; and reduced to a course of philosophy by *Ign. Thanner*,[2] and *Th. A. Rixner*.[3] By *Zimmer*[4] and *Buchner*[5] the theory was applied to the principles of Religion and Ethics; and by *Bachmann*[6] and *Nüsslein*[7] to Æsthetics. The former of these ended by adopting other opinions.

Among the *adversaries* of the system were several distinguished partisans of the theory of Kant, as well as the

are: Institutiones Philosophiæ Universæ, etc., scripsit JOH. SCHAD, P. I. Logicam complectens, *Charkow*, 1812. Institutiones Juris Nat. *ibid.* 1814, 8vo.

[1] A professor at Würzburg. KLEIN, Beiträge zum Studium der Philosophie als Wissenschaft des All. nebst einer vollst. und fassl. Darstellung ihrer Hauptmomente, *Würzb.* 1805, 8vo. Verstandeslehre, *Bamb.* 1810. Versuch, die Ethik als Wissenschaft zu begründen, etc., *Rudolst.* 1811. Darstellung der Philos. Religions- und Sittenlehre, *Bamb.* und *Würzb.* 1818, 8vo.

[2] A professor at Salzburg. THANNER'S Versuch einer möglichst fachslichen Darstellung der absoluten Indentitätslehre, etc., *München*, 1810, 8vo. Handbuch der Vorbereitung und Einl. zum selbst. wissenschaftl. Stud. bes. der Philosophie. Erster formaler Theil: die Denklehre, *München*, 1807. Zweiter mat. Theil: die Metaphysik, 1808, 8vo. Also, Lehrbuch der theoretische Philosophie nach den Grundsätzen der absoluten Identitätslehre für akad. Vorles. I Th., Logik.; II Th., Metaphysik (auch mit dem Titel: Logische, Metaphys. Aphorismen, etc.), *Salzb.* 1811—12, 8vo. Lehr- und Handbuch der prakt. Philos. für akad. Vorles. I Th. Allgem. prakt. Philos. und Naturrecht, *ebend.* 1811, 8vo.

[3] A professor at Amberg. RIXNER, Aphorismen aus der Philos. als Leitfaden, *Landshut*, 1809, 8vo. umgearbeitet: Aphorismen der gesammten Philos. zum Gebr. seiner Vorles. III Bdchen, *Sulzbach*, 1818, ff. 8vo.

[4] ZIMMER'S Philos. Religionslehre, I Th. Lehre von der Idee des Absoluten, *Landshut*, 1805, 8vo. Philos. Untersuchung über den allg. Verfall des menschl. Geschlechts, *ebend.* 1809, 8vo.

[5] BUCHNER, Ueber Erkenntniss und Philos., *Landshut*, 1806. Grundsätze der Ethik, 1808, 8vo. Das Wesen der Religion, *Dillingen*, 1805, 8vo. Zweite Aufl., *Landsh.* 1809.

[6] A professor at Jena. BACHMANN: Die Kunstwissenschaft in ihrem allg. Umrisse dargestellt für akad. Vorles. *Jena*, 1811, 8vo. Ueber Philos. und Kunst, *Jena* u. *Leipz.* 1812, 8vo. (see bibl. §§ 1, 41). Von der Verwandtschaft der Physik und psychol. Preisschrift. *Utrecht* u. *Leipz.* 1821. System der Logik, *Leipz.* 1829, 8vo.

[7] NUSSLEIN'S Lehrb. der Kunstwissenschaft, *Landshut*, 1819, 8vo. Grundlinien der allg. Psychologie, etc., *Mainz*, 1821, 8vo. Der Logik, *Bamb.* 1824, 8vo.

authors of certain new doctrines; such as *Herbart*, *Bouterwek*, and *Jacobi*, whom we shall have occasion to mention below. The religious opinions of Schelling were especially attacked by the theologians; who appear, however, to have often understood them but imperfectly. Others (for instance *Daub*) endeavoured to apply them to Religion.

Other Systems.

413. *Fr. Bouterwek*,[1] an acute reasoner who had originally embraced and even given a new exposition of the theory of Kant, abjured the tenets of his master from a conviction that they were not proof against Scepticism, and professed himself dissatisfied with the partial character of Fichte's Idealism. He maintained that Science demands the Absolute, without which no knowledge nor even thought is possible, inasmuch as something real,—a Being, or *Esse*, —the Absolute,—is pre-supposed in all demonstration, (this Absolute is the unknown X, which, according to Kant, lies at the bottom of all appearances). Accordingly he endeavoured to demonstrate in his 'Apodiktik' the inefficiency of former philosophical systems, alleging that they had attempted to arrive at cognition and conviction only by means of mental conceptions and certain formularies, without ever arriving at real and living Science. His leading principles were, that all Thought and Sensation are founded on some real ground and *Esse*—the Absolute; which itself is dependent on nothing else. Such an *Esse* is not discoverable by *Thought*, inasmuch as Thought pre-supposes its existence, as something superior to itself. Consequently, we are driven to conclude either that all Being is imaginary and all Thought without foundation, or that there exists an *absolute* faculty of cognition, which neither *feels* nor *thinks*, constituting the fundamental principle of Reason itself, and by virtue of which all Being is demonstrable. Subsequently Bouterwek retracted this doctrine, and adopted a new universal theory of Truth and Science, leading to a moderate system of Transcendental Rationalism, by means of the principle of the *Faith of Reason in itself*. He defined the end of philosophy to be the solution of the enigma of nature and man, by distinguishing between the appearances

[1] Born 1766, at Goslar; died a professor at Göttingen, 1828.

and the realities of objects, as far as it is attainable by unassisted human reason. This must be effected by a system of demonstration (*Apodiktik*), to which empirical Psychology and Logic (in the popular sense of the term) can contribute only the premises. This theory, like that of Jacobi (§ 415), supposes all merely logical thought to be *mediate*. All *immediate* knowledge (without which all *discursive* notions assume the character of *mediate*, and consequently become nugatory) is dependent on the original connection existing between the powers of Thought and the Internal Sense in the *Virtuality* of Spiritual life—in the oneness of the active powers of our nature, whether subjective or objective. Reason has confidence in herself so far as she is *pure* Reason, and has confidence in truth so far as she recognises therein (by virtue of the connection just mentioned) her own independent energy; and discovers in this energy the germ of conceptions, by means of which she can elevate herself above sensible impressions to the contemplation of the original principle of all Existence and Thought (the idea of the Absolute). Consequently Truth, in the metaphysical sense of the word, (or the agreement of our thoughts with the supersensuous essences of things, and their necessary connection with the first principle of all Thought and *Esse*),—can be cognized by reason *immediately*. Metaphysics (in connection with which comes religious philosophy founded on religious sentiment) complete the scientific development of this idea by instructing us *how far* a knowledge of the nature of things is possible to the human mind. Philosophical Ethics and Natural Law are connected with the theoretical department of Philosophy by means of Universal Practical Philosophy.

The subject of Natural Right forms a special chapter in philosophical Ethics, in which Right is treated as a reasonable title, in virtue of which man, as a moral being, lays claim to all the external conditions appertaining to him, in all things relating to virtue and justice.

Bouterwek also laboured to establish a system of Æsthetics on psychological principles, and independent, to a certain extent, of Philosophy.

Fr. Bouterwek, Aphorismen, den Freunden der Vernunftkritik nach Kant's Lehre vorgelegt, *Gött.* 1793, 8vo. Paulus Septimius: oder

die letzten Geheimnisse des Eleusin. Priesters. (Philos. Roman), *Halle*, 1795, II Thle. 8vo. Idee einer allgmeinen Apodiktik, etc. *Gött.* 1799, II Th. 8vo. Anfangsgründe der speculativen Philosophie, *Gött.* 1800, 8vo. Die Epochen der Vernunft nach der Idee der Apodiktik, *Gött.* 1802, 8vo. Anleitung zur Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, *Gött.* 1803, 8vo. Neues Museum der Philosophie und Literatur, herausgegeben von F. Bouterwek, *Gött.* 1803. Immanuel Kant: ein Denkmal, *Hamburg*, 1805. Dialogen, Erste Sämmlung. *Halle*, 1798. Funf kosmopolitanische Briefe, *Berl.* 1794. Kleine Schriften philosophischen, æsthetischen und literarischen inhalts, *Gött.* 1818. Briefe an Theokles (über Seelengrösse) *Berlin*, 1792. Æsthetik, *Leipz.* 1806, II Th.; 3te Aufl. 1824, 8vo. Ideen zur Metaphysik des Schönen; in vier Abhandl. *ebend.* 1807, 8vo. Praktische Aphorismen; Grundsätze zu einem neuen Systeme der moral. Wissenschaften, *Leipz.* 1808. Lehrbuch der Philos. Vorkentnisse (Allgemeine Einl., Psychologie und Logik enthaltend; sollte an die Stelle der angeführten Anfangsgründe treten.) *Gött.* 1810, 8vo.; 2te Ausg. 1820, 8vo. Lehrb. der Philos. Wissenschaften, nach einem neuem Systeme entworfen, II Thle. *Gött.* 1813, 8vo. 2te verm. und verb. Auflage, *ebend.* 1820, 8vo. (the part relating to religious philosophy being entirely re-written). Religion der Vernunft, etc., *ebend.* 1824, 8vo.

414. *C. G. Bardili*[1] endeavoured to make The Absolute the basis of all philosophy on a new principle. He believed himself to have detected such an one in Thought, and sought to constitute Logic the source of real cognition; elevating it to the rank of Metaphysics. Hobbes, and the physician Leidenfrost (in his *Confessio*, 1793), had already represented Thought as calculation, but Bardili was the first to imagine that he could discover in Thought *per se* (contemplated under its *formal* character), a real existence; nay, even the essence of the Deity. The nature of Thought is such, that while it continues always the same it is capable of infinite repetition and multiplication. It is A *quatenus* A, in A :—*Identity*. Thought as Thought is neither Subject nor Object, nor the relation of the one to the other; but their common elementary principle, in which the conceptions and judgments of the mind have their origin, being at the same time an *infinitivus determinans* and a *determinatum*. This principle of Thought, however, *determines* nothing until applied to something else, that is, to Matter; which is a necessary postulate of the system. The characteristics of Thought, as Thought, are Unity in Plurality:

[1] Born at Blaubeuern, 1761; died at Stuttgard, 1808.

—Identity. The characteristics of Matter are Diversity and Multiplicity. Thought, the First and Absolute principle, is not determined by Matter; but *vice versâ*, the latter by it. The application of Thought to Matter brings with it a judgment in the thing thought; 1. as something real apprehended by the mind (B—Reality). 2. as a mere conception of the mind (B—Possibility). The agreement of Thought with Matter constitutes Reality, which is only a more express determination of the Possible. Thus, in the conception of every object, pure possibility and reality perform the functions of arithmetical *factors*. God is pure possibility repeating itself in every thing and determining every thought, the first foundation of all truth, and consequently also of logic.

Bardili styled his obscure and empty abstraction a *Primary Logic*, and announced its pretensions with considerable ostentation, but without much success.[1] The system of Rational Realism it was designed to support was no less unsuccessful, notwithstanding the subtle analysis of Reinhold (§ 398.) About the same time many systematic essays appeared, which were either too eccentric and obscure, or too shallow to answer the demands of science. Of this number was the *Archimetria* of the ingenious Swede, *Th. Thorild*,[2] which

[1] Bardili's Grundriss der ersten Logik, gereinigt von den Irrthumern der bisherig. Logik, besonders der Kantischen, *Stuttg.* 1800, 8vo. Philosophische Elementarlehre, I Heft. *Landsh.* 1802; II Heft, 1806, 8vo. Beiträge zur Beurtheilung des gegenwärtigen Zuständes der Vernunftlehre, *Landsh.* 2 vols. 8vo. 1802—1806.

At an earlier period Bardili had distinguished himself as an acute thinker by his Epochen der vorzuglichten philosophischen Begriffe, I Th. *Halle*, 1788, 8vo. Sophylus: oder Sittlichkeit und Natur, als Fundament der Weltweisheit, *ebend.* 1794. Allgemeine praktische Philosophie, *ebend.* 1795. Ueber die Gesetze der Ideenassociation, *ebend.* 1796, and, Ueber den Ursprung des Begriffs von der Willensfreiheit (gegen Forberg), *Stuttg.* 1796. Briefe über den Ursprung der Metaphysik (anonym.) *Altona*, 1798, 8vo.

[2] Died a professor at Greifswald, 1808. Maximum, sive Archimetria. *Berol.* 1799, 8vo. He defines it as, *Generalis critica Tanti et Totius:* the foundation of knowledge he finds in the necessity of thus thinking. There are only true objects; all error and all difference of cognition consists in the quantum (*Wieviel*). His Philosophisches Glaubensbekentniss appears to have been suppressed by authority. His complete works were published at *Upsala*, 8vo. 1819.

refers everything to the theory of Magnitudes, containing many eccentric ideas, afterwards developed by others; and the 'Epicritique' of *F. Berg*,[1] who assumes Logical Will as the key to the nature of all Reality; and lastly, the 'Altogether-practical Philosophy,' of *Rückert*[2] and *Weiss*[3] (§ 416). The labours of *J. H. Abicht*[4] are not more deserving of specification; consisting in a compilation of the works of others, in which nothing but the phrascology is his own.

PHILOSOPHY OF SENTIMENT AND BELIEF.

Jacobi's Theory of Belief.

415. A friend of Hamann (§ 395), *E. H. Jacobi*,[5] advanced a theory totally at variance with the Critical and Dogmatical systems which then divided the philosophical world, and allied to the more noble kind of mysticism. He possessed a profound and religious mind, with lively and genial powers of expression and a sincere hatred of the empty formularies of system-makers. The last principle he carried so far as almost to show himself an enemy of philosophical reason itself, from a conviction that a consistent dogmatical theory, like that of Spinoza, which admitted no truth without demonstration, could conduct only to Determinism and Pantheism; while the Critical theory, by its prejudice in favour of demonstrative and mediate knowledge, was led to reject all cognitions of supersensuous objects, without being able to establish their reality by means of practical rational belief.

[1] Berg, Epikritik der Philosophie, *Arnstadt* u. *Rudolst.* 1805.

[2] Jos. Rückert, der Realismus, oder Grundzuge zu einer durchaus praktischen Philos. *Leipz.* 1801.

[3] Chr. Weiss, Winke uber eine durchaus prakt. Philos. *ebend.* 1801. Lehrbuch der Logik, *ebend.* 1801, 8vo.

[4] Abicht's Revidirende Kritik der Speculativen Vernunft, *Altenb.* 1799—1801, II Th. 8vo. System der Elementarphilosophie, oder verständige Naturlehre des Erkentniss- Gefühls und d. Willenskraft, *Erlang.* 1798, 8vo. Psychol. Anthropol. I Abth. *Erl.* 1831. Encyklopädie der Philos. *Frkf.* 1804, 8vo. Verbesserte Logik, oder Wahrheitswissenschaft, *Fürth.* 1802, 8vo.

[5] Born at Dusseldorf, 1743; became in 1804 president of the Academy of Munich, and died 1819.

He was thus led to found all philosophical knowledge on Belief; which he describes as an instinct of reason,—a sort of knowledge produced by an immediate feeling of the mind,—a direct apprehension without proof of the True and Supersensuous; drawing at the same time a clear distinction between such belief and that which is *positive*. All knowledge gives us only a secondhand conviction. The external world is revealed to us by means of the external senses; but objects inperceptible to the senses, such as the Deity, Providence, Free-will, Immortality, and Morality, are revealed to us by an *internal sense*, the organ of Truth; which assumed at a later date the title of Reason, as being the faculty adapted for the apprehension of Truth. This twofold revelation (of the material and the immaterial worlds) awakens man to self-consciousness, with a feeling of his superiority to external Nature, or a sense of Free-will.[1] Man cognizes God and Freedom immediately through the reason. In the same manner Jacobi would found the principles of Morality on Sentiment. Reason, as the faculty of the Ideas, which reveal themselves to the Internal Sense, supplies philosophy with its materials: the Understanding, or the faculty of logical conceptions, gives these a form. It is thus that he has expressed himself in his later works. He admits the great merit of Kant in destroying the vain labour of theorists, and establishing a pure system of practical philosophy, but differs from him by asserting that not only practical but also theoretical cognitions, relative to real but supersensuous objects, are immediate; and alleges that the Critical system annihilates not only rational but also sensational apprehension (*Wahrnehmung*). At the same time he maintains the impossibility of any genuine philosophical Science. Jacobi at first expressed himself somewhat obscurely on this principle of an internal revelation and consequent belief, the corner-stone of his system. In consequence of this obscurity arose a multitude of objections and misapprehensions, which were also provoked by his neglecting to discriminate accurately between Reason and Understanding; and by the opposition between his theistical theory of Belief and Sensation and the systems of his contemporaries; as

[1] J. G. Reiche, Rationis qua Fr. H. Jacobi e libertatis notione Dei existentiam evincit, Expositio et Censura, p. I. *Götting.* 1821, 8vo.

well as the want of systematic arrangement it betrayed. We must not however be blind to the indirect services which he has rendered to the cause of philosophy in Germany.

For Jacobi's writings on Spinoza, in answer to Mendelssohn, see above, § 338 (bibl.)

His other works are:

Of David Hume and of Faith; or Idealism and Realism, *Breslau*, 1787, 8vo., new ed. *Ulm*, 1795. Letter to Fichte, *Hamburg*, 1799, 8vo. On the undertaking of Criticism to convert Reason into Understanding, in the 3rd number of the Memoirs of REINHOLD on the state of philosophy in the 19th century, *Hamburg*, 1801—3. Some letters against Schelling, published in consequence of the book of Kœppen, entitled: The doctrine of Schelling; or, what is in the end the philosophy of the Absolute Nothing? 1807, 8vo. Of Divine Things, 8vo. *Leipz.* 1811. See above, the work of Schelling in reply to the latter. See also the articles of FREDERIC SCHLEGEL, in his German Museum, 1812—13.

Complete Works. These contain, besides the works above indicated, the celebrated philosophical romances of Jacobi, 5 vols.; the 4th is divided into 3 parts, 8vo. *Leipzig*, 1812—22. The 2nd volume contains an interesting introduction to his philosophy, and the 4th his correspondence with Hamann, published by FRED. ROTH.

On Jacobi, see Schlegel's Characteristiken und Kritiken, tom. 1.

JACOBI, nach seinem Leben, Lehren, und Wirken, dargestellt von SCHLICHTIGROLL, WEILLER, und THIERSCH, 1819.

New Developments of the Philosophy of Sentiment.

416. The doctrine of Jacobi found numerous adherents, especially among men accustomed to raise faith and sentiment above the other faculties of the soul. But the vagueness that we have already pointed out in this philosophy, in connection with the relations that exist between the understanding and the reason, appears to have given rise to a kind of schism amongst those who devoted themselves to its development. Some of them considered ideas as revelations of the Deity, through the medium of perception, and they attributed these ideas to reason, as to their special faculty; they maintained moreover that notions play a completely negative part in connection with ideas: that is to say, that ideas could neither be reached, conceived, nor expressed by means of notions; that they manifest themselves in sentiment alone; and lastly that belief precedes and exceeds all

knowledge. Others conceded more to notions; and made philosophy to consist in the oneness of the reason and of the understanding; a oneness that, according to them, would derive its substance from reason, and its form from the understanding. This last opinion was adopted by Jacobi himself, but only in his later years. Amongst the advocates of the former of these doctrines must be included *Frederic Kœppen*, a professor at Landshut, and afterwards at Erlangen, a spiritual writer, and the author of an excellent digest of the system of this school. To the second party belong the labours of *James Salat*. Kœppen, a friend and disciple of Jacobi, starts from the idea of Freedom. According to him, liberty is a power that determines itself, and takes its start from itself; it is consequently a primary cause, the substratum of all existence; in a word, *Being*, properly so called. But at the same time, Freedom is perfectly inconceivable to the understanding; nay, its very possibility cannot be clearly perceived, or its reality demonstrated: it is a fact of knowledge and of activity, perceived immediately, intuitively. Necessity is an order established by liberty. An unlimited, an absolute liberty, is the Divine Being. Reason is the faculty that is cognizant of liberty. The nature of human Individuality consists in the relation between the exterior and the interior. By this relation, liberty is limited in man. Every philosophy is consequently *dualistic*. It is this dualism that causes the eternal and unavoidable contradiction of the science. It would follow, moreover, from this, strictly speaking, that philosophy is impossible; and that scientific pretension, properly so called, is always destined to rebound for ever vainly on itself. The writings of Kœppen, like those of Jacobi, whatever may be our judgment of the substance of their doctrine, must be classed among the works that have exerted a salutary influence on the philosophy of our times, in as far as they combat the authority of scholastic philosophy and blind dogmatism; and that we find in them a lively development of numerous ideas, some of which are original, and others borrowed from Platonism.[1] We must also place in

[1] FRED. KŒPPEN, Of Revelation considered in relation with the philosophy of Kant and of Fichte, *Hamburg*, 1797, 2nd edit. 1804. The Art of Living, *Hamburg*, 1801. The doctrine of Schelling, &c. (see

this school *Gaetan de Weiller*,[1] a friend of Jacobi, a Bavarian secret councillor, secretary of the Academy of Sciences, and director of the public schools of Munich, who died in 1826, as well as *Christian Weiss*,[2] a school and regency councillor at Merseburg, whose psychological researches are deserving of notice.

Progress of the School of Jacobi.

J. SALAT, On the Spirit of Philosophy, 8vo. *Munich*, 1803. Reason and Understanding, 2 parts, 8vo. *Tübingen*, 1808. On the Causes of the cooling of Minds in Germany concerning Philosophy, *Landshut*, 1810. On a bright hope that appears in favour of Philosophy, *ibid.* Moral Philosophy, *ibid.* 1810; 2nd edit. revised, 2 vols. *Landshut*, 1813–14. The Philosophy of Religion, 8vo. *ibid.* 1811. Explication of some important points of Philosophy, with observations on the new discussion between Jacobi, Schelling, and Fred. Schlegel, 8vo. *Landshut*, 1812. On the connection of History and Philosophy in general Jurisprudence, *Sulzbach*, 1817. Sketch of Philosophy and of Religion, 8vo. *Sulzbach*, 1819. Socrates; or, On the new opposition between Christianity and Philosophy, 8vo. *ibid.* 1820. The general principles of universal Philosophy, considered from the ground of the amelio-

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§ 406). Various works, 1806. On the End of Philosophy, *Munich*, 1807—8. Guide to Logic, *Landshut*, 1809. Sketch of Natural Right, *ibid.* 1809. Digest of the nature of Philosophy, *Nuremberg*, 1810. (Against this work there appeared a work from the pen of FRED. SCHAFBERGER, entitled: Criticism of the work called, Digest, &c., with a theory proposed by the author, *Nuremberg*, 1813, 8vo. Philosophy of Christianism, 2 parts, *Leipz.* 1813—15. Political Science, according to the principles of Plato, *ibid.* 1819. Letters to a Friend on books and the world, 2 vols. *ibid.* 1820—23.

[1] WEILLER, (see §§ 37 and 397 for several of his works) Introduction to a free examination of philosophy, *Munich*, 1804, 8vo. Understanding and Reason, *ibid.* 1806. Ideas towards the history of the development of Religious Faith, 3 vols. *Munich*, 1808—14. Of Virtue, as the first of arts; a development of some points of moral philosophy, and of high psychology. Fundamental Observations on Psychology, *ibid.* 1817, 8vo. Academic [Dissertation] on morality considered as a dynamic, *Munich*, 1821, 4to. Little Writings, &c. *ibid.* 1822—26. At a previous epoch Weiller had written: Of Humanity in its present and future state, *ibid.* 1799. Essay on a plan of knowledge for youth, *ibid.* 1800. Essay on a complete system of the Art of Education, *ibid.* 1802—5, 8vo., 2 parts.

[2] CHRIST. WEISS: Of the living God, and of the ways by which man can arrive at Him, 8vo. *Leipz.* 1812. He had previously published: Researches on the nature and activity of the Human Soul.

ration of the human race, 8vo. *Munich*, 1820. Manual of Psychology, *ibid.* Moral Science, first or second branch of Philosophy, 3rd edit. partly improved, *ibid.* 1821. The Philosophy of Religion, second or third branch of Philosophy, 2nd edit. entirely improved, *ibid.* 1821. Essays on Supernaturalism and Mysticism, 8vo. *Sulzb.* 1823. Manual of Morality, 8vo. *Munich*, 1824. Elements of Religious Philosophy, *Sulzbach*, 1819. Elements of Moral Philosophy, of General Philosophy, of Psychological Anthropology, *Munich*, 1827.

The following works have been published in opposition to some of his doctrines: On the art of coining words and creating an illusion: a supplement to the Philosophical Writings of M. SALAT, and especially to his *Socrates, Amberg*, 1821. In reply to this satire there appeared: New reflexions on the art, etç. dedicated to M. Salat, 8vo. 1821.

417. *James Salat*, born in 1766, at Abbtsgemünd, professor of philosophy at Landshut, in his half didactic, half polemical works, makes the *internal revelation* of divine things the basis of his philosophy. The Objective, according to this philosopher, appears at first as the object of philosophy, afterwards as the natural disposition of men for philosophy. This natural disposition develops itself in such a manner as to bring on the revelation of divine things, which itself precedes all subjective activity. In consequence of this revelation, the soul seizes hold of and recognises divine things; only this cognition is not a logical act, but a realization of these same divine things, taking place in the depths of our soul, and having its starting-point in the will.

After that divine things are conceived, the next object is, to understand them and to render them intelligible. The Understanding steps in here, supported on philosophy. Metaphysics are nothing but philosophy considered scientifically; Logic, Anthropology, and even the criticism of the faculty of cognition, only constitute a propædeutic. In the same way that man may be regarded under three aspects, philosophy also is divided into three branches: moral philosophy, the philosophy of natural law, and the philosophy of religion. *Frederic A. Ancillon*, councillor of the Secret Legation at Berlin, and *Ch. Aug. Clodius*, professor at Leipsic, approximate in their ideas to Jacobi, without, however, belonging to his school.

Anti-dogmatism of Schulze.

418. *Ernest Schulze*, an Aulic councillor and professor at Göttingen, born in 1761, at Heldrungen in Thuringia, proved with great sagacity the insufficiency of the theory of Reinhold (§ 398) concerning the faculty of representation; and in the same way that Jacobi had formerly opposed his *Doctrine of Faith* to systematic philosophy, in like manner Schulze opposed his criticism of theoretic philosophy to this same philosophy, with the view of destroying the illusions of an imaginary knowledge, and to favour, on a more extended plan than that of Kant, the knowledge of reason in itself, by discovering the essential error of every philosophy. From his various researches, Schulze came to the conclusion that the origin of human knowledge cannot be an object of knowledge; that every philosophy that proposes to make known this origin is impossible; that all the statements given forth by the different schools on the origin of our knowledge are only empty and fantastic conceptions; lastly, that we must confine our curiosity to the examination of the elements of our cognitions, of their distinction, and of the laws that determine the relation of our conviction with the different kinds of our knowledge (Critique, p. 258, part I). These are the fundamental pursuits of the scepticism of Schulze, or, as he styled it, his *Anti-dogmatism*, which is based on a natural and necessary disposition of the human mind. This scepticism acknowledged, therefore, the facts of Consciousness, and even maintained that it belonged to the constitution of human nature to acknowledge Consciousness to be what it is, and to act in accordance with it.

As a deduction from ulterior observations, Schulze ends by narrowing more and more the limits of his scepticism. Thus, whilst denying the possibility of certain criteria of truth, or of the agreement of our cognitions with their objects, he granted to the human mind the faculty of discerning what relates to the disposition of our faculty of cognition in general, and of distinguishing it from all that is only individual (Enc., § 17). Later, being convinced of the insufficiency of scepticism, he devoted himself to the

research of the origin of certitude, of the development and of the limits of human knowledge, in conformity with the exact rules of natural observation (Psychological Anthropology, 3rd edit.). His actual ideas approach considerably the doctrines of Jacobi, and agree with those of the philosophers who acknowledge Plato as their head, distinguish Reason from the Understanding, and see in Reason the source of supersensuous knowledge, and the means of arriving at the solution of the real problems of philosophy.

It is according to different phases of sentiment, that faculty which distinguishes man from the lower animals, that Schulze divides philosophy into four principal branches, namely, 1st. Theoretical Philosophy, or Metaphysics, embracing the development of the religious feeling; 2nd. Practical Philosophy, comprising Ethics, Polity, and the Morality of nations, embracing the moral feeling (for he does not admit, like Bouterwek, a special natural law, see § 413, note); 3rd. Logic, in the acceptation of the ancients, embracing the intellectual feeling; and finally, Æsthetics, embracing the feeling of the beautiful. He regards modern logic (formal logic) as well as empirical psychology, as nothing more than the propædeutics or initiatory preparation of philosophy.

GOTTLIEB ERNEST SCHULZE, Some Observations on the religious philosophy of Kant, *Kiel*, 1795. On the highest aim in the study of Philosophy, *Leipz.* 1789. Elements of the Philosophical Sciences, 1788-90, 2 vols. 8vo. Œnesidemus (see § 406). Criticism of Theoretical Philosophy, *Hamb.* 1801, 2 vols. 8vo. The principal motives of Scepticism in relation to human knowledge, in the Museum of BOUTERWEK, vol. III, 2nd number. Principles of General Logic, *Helmstadt*, 1802; 4th edit. corrected, 1822. Guide to find the principles of Civil Law and of Penal Law, *Gött.* 1813.

A controversial article appeared against the scepticism of Schulze, entitled: The relation of Scepticism to Philosophy, &c. in the Critical Journal of SCHELLING and of HEGEL, tom. I.

Schulze published, moreover: An Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences; for the use of his students, *Gött.* 1814; 3rd edit. 8vo. 1824. In it will be found a complete exposition of the doctrine of the author. Physical Anthropology, *Gött.* 8vo. 1816; 2nd edit. 1819; 3rd edit. 1826. Philosophical Morality, 8vo. *Gott.* 1817.

Herbart.

419. Besides Bouterwek and Schulze, *John Frederic Herbart*, born at Oldenburg, professor at Königsberg, and particularly excited by Fichte, has developed peculiar opinions opposed to the greater part of the existing systems, and which he has succinctly consigned to posterity in several treatises under a polemical form. He wishes philosophy to abandon the psychological direction which has been erroneously praised in modern times. According to him, to attempt to measure the limits of the faculty of cognition, and to criticise metaphysics, is to have the strange illusion of thinking that the faculty of cognition is more easy to understand than the object itself with which metaphysics concerns itself: this illusion is so much the greater, since all the conceptions by means of which we represent to ourselves the faculty of cognition, proceed from a metaphysical source. The psychological premises on which the criticism is based are for the most part obtained surreptitiously. Philosophy is an elaboration of conceptions, called forth by the collection of observations relating to these same conceptions. Its method is the *method of relations;* that is to say, a method that consists in seeking for the ideas necessary to complete an order of thoughts: it starts from the supposition of contradictions in a given object—contradictions that push you on to a higher degree in thought. The elaboration of conceptions consists sometimes in their elucidation and explication; hence logic freed from all psychological mixture: at other times, it consists in cutting off, in connecting, and completing—hence metaphysics; when the author sometimes returns to the doctrine of the Eleatæ. Psychology, Natural Philosophy, and Religious Philosophy, are in his eyes parts of applied metaphysics. The science of ideas, united to a judgment competent to approve or condemn, is Æsthetics, which, applied to a given object, is distributed in a series of doctrines, among which that which bears the charaeter of necessity, has received the name of the doctrine of duties and of virtue (Practical Philosophy). In these different parties, the author develops views that are peculiar to him, and which evidence a great sagacity, but which often become obscure on account of their brevity,

and require meditation; as for instance, his theory of the destruction and preservation of Natures, in his speculative psychology founded on mathematics, and his theory of representations considered as forces. It is proper to notice his criticism of the principles at present dominant in psychology, his critique of Kant's doctrine of free-will, and his own determinative or necessarian doctrine (in the sense of Leibnitz) on the same subject.

HERBART: General Pœdagogik, &c. *Gött.* 1806; and other works on Pœdagogik; such as: the Idea of the A B C of Pestalozzi, developed in relation to the study of scientific theories, *Gött.* 1802, 2nd edit. 1804. On the method of Pestalozzi, &c. *Bremen*, 1804. On Philosophical Study, *Gött.* 1807. Treatise on general practical Philosophy, 8vo., *Gött.* 1808. The principal questions, of Metaphysics, 8vo. *Gött.* 1808. Articles on speculative philosophy, in the Philosophical Archives of Königsberg, *Königsb.* 1811—12. Observations on the causes that oppose an agreement between philosophers on the first principles of practical philosophy; a dissertation contained in the posthumous philosophical works of Christ. James Krause, 8vo. *Königsberg*, 1812. Theoriâ de attractione elementorum: Principia metaphysica, § I, II, 8vo. *Regiom.* 1812. Manual, serving as an Introduction to philosophy. *Königs.* 1813: 2nd edit. considerably enlarged, *ibid.* 1821; 4th edit. 1837. Manual of Psychology, *Königsberg* and *Leipzig*, 1816; 2nd edit. 1834. On Evil, 8vo. *Königsb.* 1819. De Attentionis mensura, causisque primariis; Psychologiæ Principia statica et mechanica exemplo illustraturus, &c. 4to. *Regiom.* 1822. On the possibility and necessity of applying mathematics to psychology, 8vo. *Königsb.* Psychology scientifically treated, and founded on experience, metaphysics, and mathematics, 2nd part, 8vo. *Heidelb.* 1824. General Metaphysics, 1st part, *Königsberg*, 1828. Short Encyclopædia of Philosophy, *Halle*, 1831, 2nd edit. 1841. Analysis of Right and Morals. *Götting.* 1836. Commentatio de Realismo Naturali, qualem propos. T. E. SCHULZIUS, *Gött.* 1837. De Principio Logico exclusi medii inter contradictoria non negligendo Commentatio, *Bonn*, 1840. Psychological Researches, *Gött.* 1839—40.

Comparison of the system of Fichte with that of Professor Herbart. by HERM. WILLM. DE KEYSERLINGK, 8vo. *Königsberg*, 1817.

To the school of Herbart belongs ERNEST STIEDENROTH, author of Theory of Science considered especially in its relation with Scepticism, 8vo. *Gött.* 1819. Psychology, 2 parts, *Königsb.* 1824—25.

Schleiermacher.

420. *Frederic Schleiermacher*, professor of theology, and preacher, first at Halle and afterwards at Berlin, was born at Breslau in 1768, and contributed greatly, by his addresses

and writings, to a more liberal culture of philosophy in general, and especially of moral and religious philosophy. Religion, according to him, attends to the same object as metaphysics and moral science; they only differ as regards the form; their common object is the universe and the relation of man to this same universe. The essence of philosophy consists neither in thought nor in action; it consists in the union of Feeling with Perception. Hence arises a living perception, which cannot take place without our perceiving the Divinity in ourselves as the eternal unity of the universe, which alone in its turn brings God into the consciousness of man. Religion consists in representing all the events of this world as the acts of God; in loving the Being (*Weltgeist*) who presides over the universe; in contemplating His operation with delight. Such is the end of Religion. But it is necessary for man to find humanity in order to contemplate the world, and to rise to religion; and the only way by which he can rightly find it is in love and through love. To be united, though the finite, with the infinite; to be eternal for a moment; is the immortality imparted by religion. But religion necessarily appears always under some definite form; accordingly Schleiermacher rejects what is called *natural* religion. In his later works, he maintains that piety considered in itself is neither an acquired knowledge nor a praxis; piety is a particular direction and determination of feeling: in fine, the sublimest degree of feeling. By *feeling*, he implies the immediate consciousness, inasmuch as it falls within the category of time and appears under opposite forms, more or less marked, composing the agreeable and disagreeable. Feeling gives us, moreover, the consciousness of our dependence on a God, which constitutes the elevated element of all religions.

Schleiermacher exerted a still greater influence on the progress of philosophy by his *Critique of Morality*, a work displaying a true platonic power of dialectics. He points out in this work, with a great display of talent, the defects of the various doctrines of morals from Plato to Kant and Fichte. He proceeds to show indirectly the conditions of Ethics, as a science, both in connection with its highest principle, and in connection with a perfect development of the whole

system. He effects his object in such a masterly style, that it would be impossible to treat of Ethics in a complete and fundamental manner without observing the rules that he lays down. Schleiermacher insists especially on the following point: that the notions of duty, of virtue, and of the good or end of this life are equally essential to morality. Finally Schleiermacher has deserved well of posterity, by various special treatises on history and philosophy.

FRED. SCHLEIERMACHER, Discourses on Religion, addressed to his enlightened cotemporaries (at first anonymous), *Berlin*, 1799; 3rd edit. enlarged, 8vo. 1821. Monologues: a new year's gift, 3rd edit. 8vo. *Berlin*, 1822. The Christmas Festival: a Christmas gift. *Berlin*, 1846. The Christian Faith explained in its totality, according to the principles of the evangelical church. 2 vols. 8vo. *Berlin*, 1821. The Principles of a Criticism of the different systems of morality hitherto published, 8vo. *Berlin*, 1803. Memoir on the scientific notion of virtue; in the collection of the Royal Academy of Berlin, 4to. 1820. Critical Essay on Luke, translated by Rev. E. THIRLWALL, 8vo. *Lond.* 1825. And many other philosophical and theological works, which are collected in Schleiermacher's Sämmtliche Werke (complete works), in three divisions: Theological, Sermons, and Philosophical, 28 vols. 8vo. *Berlin*, 1843—51. We have alluded elsewhere to his translation of Plato, and to the important introductions that accompany each dialogue (§ 128).

OF THE SYSTEMS THAT TEND TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICISM.

Krug.

421. It was the object of other philosophers to rectify and develope some of the views previously pointed out. Amongst these we may remark *William Traugott Krug*, born at Wittenberg, professor in the first instance at Leipsic, and subsequently at Königsberg; and *James Frederic Fries*, born at Barby, professor at Heidelberg, and afterwards professor as well as Aulic councillor, at Jena.

These philosophers contributed especially to the development of criticism; one by representing philosophy under the systematic form of transcendental synthetism; the other by endeavouring to supplant the critique of Kant by a *new critique* of *pure reason*. According to Krug, the act of philosophizing is thought entering into itself, to know and

understand itself, and by this means to be at peace with itself. This is the reason why, in philosophy, the cognizant subject is identical with the object cognized. *Fundamental philosophy*, which precedes every system of philosophy, has for its object the discovery of philosophical knowledge. The following are its principal points: 1st, In relation with the starting-point, or first principle of knowledge: the *Ego* is the real principle, inasmuch as it takes itself as the object of its knowledge (the philosophizing subject). It is from it that proceed, as from an active principle, the *ideal principles*, which are essentially different from the real principles; or in other words, the material and formal principles of philosophical knowledge. The material principles are the facts of Consciousness grasped in conceptions, which are all comprehended in the proposition: *I am an agent*. The formal principles (determining the form of knowledge) are the laws of my activity; they are as multifarious as activity itself: the first of these laws is: *Seek for harmony in thy activity*. 2nd. How far ought these researches to be carried? (the absolute limit of philosophy). The Consciousness is a synthesis of being, or *Esse*, and knowing,* or *Science*, (*das Seyn und das Wissen*) in the *Ego*. Every consciousness is thus circumstanced, which implies that being and knowing are united in us *à priori*. This transcendental synthesis is therefore the original and inappreciable fact which forms the absolute limit of philosophizing. Since being and knowing (*Seyn und Wissen*) united together in the Consciousness, cannot be deduced the one from the other, their union is completely primitive. The system of such a philosophy is called *transcendental synthetism*. 3rd. What are the different forms of activity? The primitive activity of the *Ego* is either immanent (speculative), or transitory (practical). Sensibility, intelligence, and reason are its different potencies. Philosophy, regarded as the science of the primitive legislation of the human mind in all its activity; is therefore divided into a speculative part and a practical part. The first is subdivided into formal doctrine (Logic) and into material doctrine, (Metaphysics and Æsthetics), inasmuch as the first regards

* The great subtlety of the German mind and tongue make it almost impossible to give a fair notion of their metaphysics in English without the invention of a new vocabulary.—Ed.

the matter of thought *per se*, and the latter (Æsthetics) considers it in relation with sentiment. The latter is likewise subdivided into formal doctrine (the science of right and law) and into material doctrine (morals and religion). Each of these considers the legislation of the human mind under a different aspect. Such are the points that Krug endeavoured to develope in several of his writings with no common precision and clearness.

Several of his works have been already pointed out. We shall, moreover, mention the following: Project of a New Organum of Philosophy, 8vo. *Meissen*, 1801. On method in Philosophy and on Philosophical Systems, 8vo. *ibid.* 1802. Fundamental Philosophy, *Züllichau*, and *Freistadt*, 1803; 2nd edit. corrected, 1819; 3rd edit. 1828 (this is his principal work). System of Theoretical Philosophy: 1st part, The Theory of Thought: 2nd part, The Theory of Knowledge, or Metaphysics: 3rd part, The Theory of Taste, or Æsthetics, *Konigsb.* 1806–10; 2nd edit. corrected, 1819–23; 3rd edit. 1825. A System of Practical Philosophy: 1st part, The Theory of Right: 2nd edit. 1830, 8vo.; 2nd part, The Theory of Virtue, 2nd edit. 1838, 8vo.: 3rd part, The Theory of Religion, *ibid.* 1817–19 (published also in separate parts). Aphorisms of the Philosophy of Right, 1 vol. *Leipz.* 1800, a work afterwards continued under this title: Dissertations on Natural Right, *Leipz.* 1811. Manual of Philosophy, 3 vols. 8vo. *Leipz.* 1820–21; 2nd edit. corrected, *ibid.* 1822, 8vo.; 3rd edit. 1828. Principles of a new theory of Sentiment and Sensibility: an Anthropological Essay, 8vo. 1823. Dicæopolitik: or a new Restoration of the Political Sciences by means of the Law of Right, *Leipz.* 8vo. 1824. Pisteology, &c. 1825. The Jurisprudence of the Church, &c. 1826. A general Dictionary of the Philosophical Sciences, with their literature and their history, 4 vols. 8vo. *Leipz.* 1827. The following works of the same author belong to an earlier period: Letters on the perfectibility of Revealed Religion (anonymous), *Jena*, 1795–96. Lectures on the influence of Philosophy on the morality, religion, and the well-being of humanity; with a dissertation on the Idea and the parts of Philosophy, *ibid.* 1796, 8vo. Lectures on the proper character of Practical Philosophy, *ibid.* Little Philosophical Writings, *ibid.* On Conviction: on its different kinds, and different degrees, *ibid.* 1797 (anonymous). Fragments and Recollections of my Philosophical Life (2 collections), 8vo. *Berlin*, 1803–1; besides many other publications.

Fries.

422. *Fries* lays stress, like Kant, on the necessity of criticising the faculty of cognition. He maintains that a reform of philosophy may be compassed by means of a philosophical anthropology. He finds two fundamental

faults with Kant: 1st. The vicious logical arrangement of his doctrine, by which he makes the value of his categories to depend on transcendental proofs, and that of his ideas on moral proofs, instead of rising, without any proof, to the immediate knowledge of reason. On this point Fries approaches the views of Jacobi. 2nd. The confounding of psychological ideas with philosophy, properly so called, and not properly distinguishing the aids that psychology furnishes to metaphysics from metaphysics themselves. He regarded the life and independence of Kant's practical philosophy as the most beautiful part of his system. Fries maintains that he has remedied the errors of Kant, and that he has placed the *doctrine of belief*, which is the focus of all philosophical conviction, on a solid basis. And he asserts that he has effected this by means of researches carried on in the spirit of Kant himself. Fries, as well as Kant, makes the limits of science his starting-point; hence he arrives at pure faith of reason in that which is eternal, a faith that is strengthened by presentiment, (*Ahnung*). Knowledge, or science, is only concerned with sensuous phenomena; the true essence of things is the object of faith; we are led by feeling, to anticipate, even amidst appearances, the value of belief, which is the offspring of the limitation itself of knowledge. Here again, in placing feeling and presentiment (*Ahnung*) above science, Fries approaches the doctrine of Jacobi. His labours in connection with philosophical anthropology, which he regards as the fundamental science of all philosophy, are of great interest. They contain particular theories on spiritual life, and particularly on the three fundamental faculties of the mind—Cognition, Feeling (*Gemüth*, the faculty of being interested), and the Faculty of Action, which is supposed to precede the two former. Afterwards follow his theories on the three degrees of development—*sense*, *habit*, *understanding* (as the power of self-command and self-formation); on the degrees of thought, qualitative and quantitative abstractions of the imagination, mathematical intuition, attention, the difference between the understanding and the reason, etc. His *anthropological logic* contains also some excellent views on the subject of reasoning, method, and system. He regards practical philosophy as the theory of the value and end of human life and

of the world, or the theory of human wisdom. It is there that you find the last goal of all philosophical research; it is divided into a *moral theory* and a *religious theory* (Theory of the final goal of the universe). The former may be also subdivided into *general ethics*, or *theory of the value and end of human actions*, *theory of virtue*, and *theory of the state*. The statements and the style of Fries are frequently deficient in the accuracy and clearness that might be desired.[1]

Frederic Calker,[2] professor at Bonn, presented the ideas of Fries under a more systematic form, and with a terminology peculiar to himself. According to him, philosophy is the

[1] (JAMES) FRIES. Besides several works that have been already indicated, several articles in the *Studien*, a periodical collection. published by DAUB and CREUZER, and several works relating to mathematics, to the natural sciences, and to politics, he also published: A System of Philosophy considered as an evident (?) science, 8vo. *Leipz.* 1804. The Philosophical Theory of Jurisprudence, and Criticism of every positive Legislation, 8vo. *Jena*, 1804. Science, Faith, and Presentiment, *Jena*, 1805. New Critique of Reason, *Heidelberg*, 1807, 3 vols. 8vo.; 2nd edit. 1828—1831. A System of Logic, *ibid.* 1811; 2nd edit. 1819, 8vo. 3rd edit. 1837. General views of Political Law, 1816. Defence of my theory of a Sensuous Intuition against the attacks of Dr. Ernest Reinhold, 18mo. *Jena*, 1819, in relation to an article on his system of Logic, in the Literary Journal of Jena, No. CIV, 1819. Reinhold replied in the following work: Correction of some mistakes on the part of M. Fries in his Defence, &c., against my attacks, 8vo. *Leipz.* 1820. Manual of Universal Morality, 8vo. *ibid.* 1818. A Manual of Anthropological Psychology, &c. 2 vols. 8vo. *Jena*, 1820–21. 2nd edit. 1831—39, 2 vols. The Philosophy of Nature treated mathematically, according to the Philosophic Method: an Essay, &c. 8vo. *Heidelberg*, 1822. Julius and Evagoras, or the Beauty of the Soul: a philosophical romance, 2 vols. *ibid.* 1822. The Theories of Love, Faith, and Hope; or, Principles of the theory of Virtue, and of the theory of Faith, 8vo. *ibid.* 1823. The Polemical Works of Fries, 1 vol. containing, with additions, the work on Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling (pointed out in the § 405), 8vo. *Halle*, 1824. A System of Metaphysics; a Manual for the use of Schools, 8vo. *Heidelberg*, 1824. Polity, or Philosophical Doctrine of the State, 1848. Handbook of Practical Philosophy: 1st part, Ethics, *Heidelberg*, 1818; 2nd part, Handbook of Religious Philosophy and Philosophical Æsthetics, *Heidelberg*, 1832, 8vo.

[2] FRED. CALKER, On the Signification of Philosophy, *Berlin*, 1818. Theory of the primitive laws of the True, of the Good, and of the Beautiful, 8vo. 1820. Propædeutik of Philosophy, No. I, containing the Methodology of Philosophy, *Bonn*, 1820. No. II, the System of Philosophy in the form of tables, *ibid.* 1820. Logic and Dialectics; with a sketch of the history of this Science, 8vo. *Bonn*, 1822.

science of *the knowledge of the internal world;* psychology, logic, and metaphysics (the theory of the primitive laws of the true, the good, and the beautiful), form parts of this science.

De Wette, professor at Bâle, endeavoured to apply the ideas of Fries to theology.

Views springing from the Doctrine of Identity. Eschenmayer; Wagner; Krause.

423. *C. A. Eschenmayer*, a professor at Tübingen, was a man more conspicuous for activity of imagination and strength of feeling than for acuteness of mind. Departing in some measure from the doctrine of Schelling, he placed the limits of speculation at the portals of Faith, whereof the Divinity is the object. He represents the last step of philosophy (the attainment of the conception, or the potency, of the infinite and eternal) as the first step towards the *negation of philosophy*. (Faith, the potency of the sovereign good). He reproaches Schelling with not having recognized this province situated beyond the limits of speculation and of the absolute. All that is intelligible and explicable belongs to science; but the unintelligible and the inexplicable is the property of religion. In this manner Eschenmayer endeavoured to establish a doctrine of religious mysticism very different from the doctrine of Schelling. It is, however, easy to detect the influence of the philosophy of nature in his psychology, where he makes use of mathematical forms. But in opposition to Schelling, he regarded it as the elementary science of all philosophy, and he strove to reconcile the various philosophical sciences with it.

Jac. Wagner, a professor at Würtzburg, and a man of spiritual mind, taught, in opposition to Schelling, that it is impossible to have a scientific knowledge of the absolute, since the absolute cannot be attained by any predicate of cognition or of *Esse*. Consequently, the absolute ought to be presupposed and admitted in the first instance. Every edifice of thought ought to rise from the idea of the divinity as its foundation; but care must be taken not to apply any structural idea to that of the Divinity. The world is the living form of the absolute; it is creative Nature, under the form of extension, and

cognizant Spirit under the form of intensity; and over all presides the Soul of the World—the Deity. At a later date he maintained that philosophy should become fused into mathematics; that it ought to be a science founded on religion, capable of being considered in universal history, and in the natural sciences. It ought to hold the equilibrium between the ideal and the real, and it ought to be organically constituted by the law of the world contained in mathematics. This law of the world is the type under which God reveals himself, physically, as well as morally. The basis of this type is presented by Unity, which developes itself under opposite forms; and it is itself the foundation of all the phenomena that exist in space and time, and the *doctrine of numbers and of figures* may be derived from it.

Wagner endeavours to prove, in his mathematical philosophy, that the law of the universe, and consequently the pure type of ideas, is found in mathematics, and that it is on this type that philosophy raises its structures. This law of the universe determines the four momentums of every thing that admits of development, such as history, human life—in short, every natural phenomenon; these four momentums are: the primitive unity, the unity which receives another unity by opposition (*duplicity*), and unity restored. It was according to this method, which will remind the reader of the essays of Raymond Lulli and Bruno, that Wagner framed his doctrine respecting the State and Education.

Charles Chr. Frederic Krause was born at Eisenach (1781), attended Fichte's and Schelling's lectures at Jena (1802–4), where he delivered lectures himself, as *privat Docent*, on Logic, Natural Law, Mathematics, and Natural Philosophy. He delivered a course of lectures at Berlin in 1813, and afterwards settled at Munich, where he died in 1832. He unfolded a peculiar system in a variety of publications, which, though incomplete, yet contain a great number of ingenious and original ideas. His religious doctrine is especially removed from that of Schelling. He lays down as his fundamental principle, the view that the primitive Being is placed eternally above nature and reason, which are the two secondary spheres of the universe; but at the same time the primitive Being penetrates and permeates essentially the two secondary spheres. Such is, according to

Krause, the fundamental type of every development, and especially of philosophy, which is divided into universal philosophy (Ontology), rational philosophy, natural philosophy, and synthetical philosophy. Mathematics constitute, in his estimation, an inferior division of philosophy.

C. A. ESCHENMAYER, Philosophy in its state of transition to non-philosophy, *Erlangen*, 1803. Schelling replied to this work in his Philosophy and Religion; see above (§ 409), The Hermit and the Stranger: a dialogue on holiness and on history, *Erlang.* 1805. Introduction to the right understanding of Nature and of History, 8vo., *Erl.* 1806. Eschenmayer to Schelling, on his article concerning the Free-will of man, with the answer of Schelling, in the general Journal of the Germans, &c., Vol. I, sect. 1, No. 38. Psychology divided into three parts, Empirical, Pure, and Applied, 8vo. *Stuttgardt* and *Tübingen*, 1817; 2nd edit., 1822, *ibid.* Philosophy of Religion: part I, Rationalism, *Tüb.* 1818; part II, Mysticism, *ibid.* 1822; part III, Supernaturalism, 1824. A System of moral philosophy, *Stuttg.* and *Tübingen*, 1818. Normal Law (Natural Law), 8vo. *ibid.* 1819. Mysteries of the Inner Life, *Tübingen*, 1830. The Hegelian Principle of Religion compared with the Christian, *Tübingen*, 1834, 8vo.

JAC. WAGNER, A System of Ideal Philosophy, see § 412. Programme on the Nature of Philosophy, 8vo. *Bamberg*, 1804. Journal of Science and Art, 1st No. *Leipz.* 1805. Of Philosophy and Physic, *Würtzburg*, 1805. Theodicee, 8vo. *Bamb.* 1810. Sketch of Political Science, 8vo., *Leipz.* 1805. Mathematical Philosophy, *Erlangen*, 1811. (For a more elementary digest of this system, see BUCHWALD'S Principles of the Theory of Quantities in relation with space and time, 8vo. *Erlang.* 1818). The State, 8vo. *Würtzburg*, 1815. Religion, Science, Art, and the State, considered in their reciprocal relations 8vo. *Erl.* 1818. The Sciences enlightened: an article published in the *Isis* of OKEN, XI, 1820. A system of Instruction, or Methodology of the studies in schools, 8vo. *Aarau*, 1821. The doctrine contained in this work had been previously indicated in a work by the same author, entitled: Ideas for a universal Mythology of the old world, *Frankfort*, 1803, whereof the criticism may be seen in the *Isis* of OKEN, St. IX, 1818, St. I, 1820, and especially in St. IV, 1821.

CH. CHRIST. FRED. KRAUSE, Dissertatio de Philosophiæ et Matheseos notione et earum intima conjunctione, *Jena*, 1802. Sketch of Historical Logic, *ibid.* 1803. Sketch of Natural Law, &c. part I, *ibid.* 1803. Sketch of a philosophical system of Mathematics, *ibid.* 1804. Introduction to the Manual of Arithmetic, published at *Dresden* in 1812, in conjunction with FISHER'S Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature; (the same work, entitled: Plan of the system of Philosophy, part I, *ibid.* 1804. The two following works give the best notion of the system of Krause; System of Morals, vol. I, containing: The Scientific Bases of Morals, *Leips.* 1810 (incomplete). Primitive Picture of Humanity, *Dresden*, 1811; 2nd edit., 1819, 8vo. Journal

of the life of Humanity, 4to. *ibid.* 1811. Oratio de Scientia humana, 8vo. *Berlin*, 1814. Sketch of the system of Philosophy, part I, *Gött.* 1825. Sketch of the System of Logic, 2nd edit. 1828. *ibid.* Sketch of the System of the philosophy of Law, 1828, *ibid.* Lectures on the system of Philosophy, *ibid.* Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Science, 1829.

Krause's Posthumous MSS. were published in four subdivisions, 1834–48.

Hegel.

424. *George William Frederic Hegel* was born at Stuttgardt in 1770, and filled the professor's chair at Jena, Nuremberg, Heidelberg, and finally at Berlin. (See § 412). He rejected the Intellectual Intuition of the philosophy of Nature, and studied to make philosophy an intelligible science and knowledge by means of dialectics. He called philosophy the Science of Reason, because it is the idea and consciousness of all *Esse* in its necessary development. It is his principle to include all particular principles in it. Now as the Idea is reason identical with itself, and as, in order to be cognizant of itself, or in other words, as, in order to be self-existing (*für sich seyn*), it places itself in opposition to itself, so as to appear something else, without, however, ceasing to be one and the same thing; in this case Philosophy becomes divided: 1st. Into Logic considered as the science of the Idea in and for itself. 2nd. Into the Philosophy of Nature considered as the science of the Idea, representing itself externally (Reason thrown out in Nature). 3rd. Its third division is that of the Philosophy of Mind, expressing the return of the Idea within itself, after having thrown itself without externally. All Logic, according to Hegel, presents three momentums: 1. The abstract or intelligible momentum, which seizes the object in its most distinct and determinate features, and distinguishes it with precision. 2. The dialectic or negative rational momentum, consists in the annihilation of the determinations of objects, and their transition to the opposite determinations. 3. The speculative momentum perceives the unity of the determinations in their opposition. Such is the method which philosophy ought to follow, and which is frequently styled by Hegel the immanent movement, the spontaneous development of the conception. Logic is essentially Speculative Philosophy,

because it considers the determinations of thought in and for itself, consequently of concrete and pure thoughts, or in other words, the conceptions, with the significations of the self-subsisting foundation of all. The primary element of Logic consists in the oneness of the subjective and objective; this oneness is the absolute science to which the mind rises as to its absolute truth, and is found in the truth, that *pure Esse is pure conception in itself; and that pure conception alone is true Esse.* The absolute idealism of Hegel has considerable affinity with Schelling's doctrine of Identity on this point, but it shows a complete departure from it in the method. With Hegel, Logic usurps the place of what had been previously styled Metaphysics and Critique of pure Reason.

The first, and perhaps the most suggestive, of Hegel's works, his Phenomenology of the Mind, contains a history of the progressive development of the Consciousness. Instinctive or common knowledge only regards the object, without considering itself. But the Consciousness contains, besides the former, also a perception of itself, and embraces, according to Hegel, three stages in its progress—Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and Reason. The first represents the Object standing in opposition to the *Ego*, the second the *Ego* itself, and the third, accidents attaching to the *Ego*, i. e. Thoughts. This phenomenology constituted at first a sort of introduction to pure science, whereas later it came to form a part of his doctrine of the mind. Pure Science or Logic is divided, 1st, into the Logic of *Esse* or being (*das Seyn*); 2nd, into the Logic of qualified nature (*das Wesen*); 3rd, into Logic of the conception or of the idea. The two first constitute the objective logic; and the last division the subjective logic, containing the substance of vulgar logic. Hegel treated as fully of the philosophy of right and of art, as of the metaphysical part of his system. According to his view, the *essential* in man is Thought; but thought is not a general abstraction, opposed to the particular abstraction; on the contrary, it embraces the particular within itself (concrete generality). Thought does not remain merely internal and subjective, but it determines and renders itself objective through the medium of the will (practical mind). To will and to know are two inseparable things; and the

free-will of man consists in the faculty of appropriating and of rendering the objective world his own, and also in obeying the innate laws of the universe, because he wills it. Hegel places the existence of right in the fact that every existence in general is the existence of a free-will. Right is usually confounded with morality, or with duty placed in opposition to inclination. There exists, however, a higher morality raised above this, which bids us act according to truly rational ends, and which ought to constitute the true nature of man. We find the objective development of this higher morality in the State and in History.

As regards the connexion existing between thought and reality, Hegel has laid down this memorable proposition: *That which is rational is real, and that which is real is rational* (there is no empty abstract vacuum beyond). It is important here to distinguish, in the temporary and transitory appearance, the substance that is immanent, and the eternity which is present. Hegel proceeds to make an application of this idea to political science, by attempting to grasp and represent the state as a rational whole, instead of constructing a new one. He develops his method with great sagacity, but the form in which he dresses it is so arid and dry, that it is extremely difficult to understand. Such are the leading features of Hegel's system, which exerted for a considerable time an almost sovereign sway over the philosophical public in Germany, and which, in a modified form, may still be regarded as the orthodox metaphysics of modern Germany, notwithstanding the numerous and vigorous attempts that have been made to supersede it.*

The Hegelian School.

425. Soon after Hegel commenced the publication of *The Journal for Scientific Criticism* (1817), the Hegelian philosophy began to show its power. This magazine was at first exclusively devoted to the external propagation of Hegelianism, and it added daily to the number of prose-

* It is scarcely possible to do common justice to such a complicated system as Hegel's in a compendium like the present.—ED.

For Hegel's works, see next section and page.

lytes. Subsequently to Hegel's death its spirit became more tolerant, and suffered departures from the strict letter of the master, until it sank gradually to an ordinary review, and died a natural death, in 1847, from want of sympathy in the public. Immediately after the death of Hegel his orthodox school of followers effected the publication of all his works, an undertaking which he himself had desired. Amongst these may be enumerated his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, of Nature, and of History, and also his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The editors of his various works were *Marheineke*, *Johann Schulze*, *Gans*, *Von Henning*, *Hotho*, *Förster*, and *Michelet;* to these must be added *Rosenkranz*, who appeared at a later date as the biographer of Hegel.*

Hegel had enounced the proposition: that a party can only maintain its supremacy by separating into two parties, for which reason the division that arises in a party, though apparently a misfortune, is in reality an advantage. This principle was exemplified in the Hegelian school, where disputes arose concerning the Person of God, the Immortality of the Soul, and the Person of Christ, which terminated in the division of the great school into two camps. *Daumer*, *Weisse*, *Göschel*, *Rosenkranz*, *Schaller*, and others, attempted to connect the theistic idea of God with the common notion of the Divinity contained in the Hegelian philosophy, and to prove the former from the latter; whilst *Blasche*, *Michelet*, *Strauss*, and others, maintained that the pantheistic idea of God was the only true result of the Hegelian principle, and represented God as the universal substance or the Eternal Universe, which becomes first absolutely conscious of itself in humanity. *Göschel*, *Heinrichs*, *Rosenkranz*, *Schaller*, and others, attempted moreover to justify the ecclesiastical idea of Christ, as specifically the only God-Man, on philosophical grounds, whereas *Blasche*, *Conradi*, *Michelet*, *Strauss*, and others, maintained that the unity of the Divinity and of Humanity was not realized in one individual, but in the whole of humanity, so that the latter in reality is the God-Man. Finally, *Göschel*, the younger *Fichte*, *Weisse*, and others, sought to demonstrate

* G. W. F. Hegel's Werke, durch einer Verein von Freunden des Verewigten, &c. 18 vols. 8vo. *Berlin*, 1834—45.

the idea of a personal immortality from the Hegelian philosophy, whilst *Bluesche, Conradi, Daumer, Michelet* and others, understand the idea of immortality as the eternally present quality of the spirit, and maintained that the eternity of the spirit as such, consisted in the extinction of the individual.

For the rest, the influence of the Hegelian philosophy has extended to all the sciences, since they have all been reconstructed from the basis of that philosophy, and in some degree have been completely reformed and changed by it, notwithstanding the great resistance it encountered in a one-sided Empiricism and the prejudices of custom. Whilst the orthodox adherents of Hegel, the so-called Old Hegelians, or Hegelians *of the right*, flocked around the 'Journal for Philosophy and speculative Theology,' founded by the younger Fichte, in 1837, the review entitled the 'Halle Journal for German Science and Art,' founded in 1838, by Ruge and Eschenmayer, became the organ of the Young Hegelian school. This journal was conducted by Ruge alone, since 1840, under the title of the 'German Journal for Science and Art,' and became the advocate of the religious and political reforms proposed by the New Hegelian party, developing latterly so radical a tendency that it became obnoxious to the government about 1843, and was suppressed by the interference of the police. The 'Journal of the Present,' edited at Tübingen, by Schwegler, since 1843, as well as the 'Journal of speculative Philosophy,' edited by Noack, at Worms, since 1846, perished together with Fichte's periodical in the political troubles of 1848, after the two former journals had defended the cause of free science against every dogmatically stationary system of German spiritual life, with virile power and enthusiasm.

Strauss and Feuerbach.

426. The influence of the Hegelian philosophy has been especially felt in theology; and amongst those who particularly laboured in this province we may notice *Daub*, at Heidelberg; *Marheincke*, at Berlin; *Rosenkranz*, at Königsberg; *Conradi*, at Derheim (in Rhenish Hesse); *Erdmann*, at Halle; *Vatke*, at Berlin; *Zeller*, at Tübingen; and others

who more or less contributed in giving this colouring to the contemporary theology of protestant Germany. At length, there appeared, in 1837, a pupil and countryman of Hegel, *David Frederic Strauss*,[1] who sought to emancipate the genuine kernel of Hegel's religious doctrine from all foreign elements and orthodox additions. It was with this view that he published, first his 'Critique of the Gospel History,' and afterwards his 'Dogmatik,' in which he attempted to develope what he represented as the true spirit of the Hegelian philosophy, and to stand forth as a true and genuine Hegelian himself. It was *Louis Feuerbach*,[2] however, who carried the consequences of Hegel's position to their ultimate results; but in doing so he has exceeded the very position which he himself at first assumed, when he was led to make the statement that the being of man is the highest object of philosophy, and that all speculation is mere vanity, which attempts to transcend nature and humanity. He has introduced this view into the province of religion, in his 'Nature of Christianity' (1841), and has represented religion as the relation of man to himself—to his own being. At the same time, he describes this relation to his own being as if it were to another being, inasmuch as man can reduplicate his personality, and represent himself as God.

[1] D. F. STRAUSS, Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, 4th edit. 8vo. *Tübing.* 1840. Leichtfassliche Bearbeitung desselben, 8vo. *Winterthur*, 1843. Streitschriften zur Vertheidigung meiner Schrift, über das Leben Jesu, 8vo. *Tübingen*, 1837. Die Christliche Glaubenslehre, in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung, und im Kampf mit der modernen Wissenschaft, 2 vols. 8vo. *Tübingen*, 1840. Charakteristiken und Kritiken, 8vo. 1844. Zwei friedliche Blätter. Der Romantiker auf dem Throne der Cæsars; oder, Julian der Abtrünnige, 8vo. *Mannheim*, 1848. Der politische und der theologische Liberalismus, 8vo. *Halle*, 1848. Sechs theolog.-politische Volksreden, 8vo. 1848.

[2] L. FEUERBACH'S Sämmtliche Werke, vols. I—VII, 8vo. 1846-49. Vol. I. Erläuterungen zum Wesen des Christenthums. Vol. II. Philosophische Kritiken und Grundsätze. Vol. III. Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit. Vol. IV. Geschichte der philosophie von Bacon bis Spinoza. Vol. V. Darstellung und Kritik der Leibnitzschen Philosophie. Vol. VI. Pierre Bayle. Vol. VII. Das Wesen des Christenthums. Das Wesen der Religion, 2nd edit. 8vo. *Leipz.* 1849. Das Wesen des Glaubens im Sinne Luther's, 8vo. 1844. See also. J. P. LANGE'S Kritische Beleuchtung von L. Feuerbach's Wesen des Christenthums, 12mo. *Heidelberg*, 1850.

The only true and genuine province of religion, regarded from the ground of Feuerbach's theory, is the being of humanity: man has his highest being, his God in himself—in his very nature, or rather in that of his race. The Atonement, which is the general tendency of religion, is in reality a natural atonement; another man is from his very position the mediator between my own individuality and the holy idea of the race. Whosoever rises to the love of the race, he is a *Christ*,—nay, he is Christ himself; immediately that the consciousness of the race, as a race, arises in you, the ecclesiastical Christ disappears, without our losing his real being on that account. Thus, in Feuerbach's eyes, man and nature, which belongs to the complete and true being of man, are the real sum and substance of religion. We are indebted to *Rüge* for having more accurately explained and more elaborately developed this religion of humanity: this writer has ably unveiled this phase of modern religion in his treatise entitled 'The Religion of our Times.'

ATTEMPT TO FOUND A NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Schopenhauer, Reiff, and Planck.

427. The present tendencies of philosophy in Germany have struck out branches in two directions. They belong either partially to the school of Herbart and Krause, or have outgrown the orthodox Hegelian principle, from which they have departed, either by following up this principle in all its theoretical and practical consequences and applying it as a critique to all objects presented to it, or by giving Hegelianism a leaning to Schelling's last position, and cramping Hegel's position into a union with historical Christianity, thus bringing about a christianized Hegelianism. No really fruitful advance of philosophy to a higher platform can be traced in these groping efforts.

The entire development of philosophy in Germany, beginning with Kant and closing with Hegel, revolves and resides in the idea of the Consciousness. Kant had said; "Our cognition is on the one hand limited by Sensuousness, *i. e.*

by the perception of something objective and real without us, which presents us with the raw material for cognition to work upon. On the other hand it is limited by the forms of Consciousness originally indwelling in our mind; whilst the very material of thought presented to us through the Senses is not a thing in itself, or reality as such, but only the same reflected in the mirror of our Consciousness." Fichte likewise pronounced this thing in itself as a subjective, though at the same time a necessary stage of our thinking; or, in his language, as the *Not-I* thrown out by the *I* (*Ego*) or thinking process, previous to all Consciousness.

Schelling led back the problem to the question: how the Objective without us could become a Subjective within us; or how the Real could become the Ideal, that is, the thing known? He grasped the Absolute as the original union of Thought and Being (*Denken und Seyn*), of Consciousness and Existence, which absolute Identity he endeavoured to place in a process of Self-development and Self-realization. Hegel completed this attempt of a real system of the Self-development of the Absolute in the dialectics of thinking, which should at the same time contain all Being (*Seyn*) in itself. The principle of the Hegelian philosophy is Thought (*das Denken*), which thinks in the form of the Conception or according to dialectics, and which thus, as a rational Thinking (*Denken*), generates the whole contents of knowledge from itself, and develops it in a systematic form as Science. This thinking of the philosopher is at the same time absolute Thinking, in so far as it has become raised in man, by the process of its phenomenological development, to its truth, i. e., to the consciousness of the identity of its Being with that of the Absolute. The philosopher's thought is moreover proved to be absolute Thought by reproducing this process in the Individual and by rising to the Self-Consciousness of the Absolute.

It was undoubtedly a merit in Hegel to have modelled perspicuously and distinctly, into a perfectly fashioned system, this idea of philosophy, as a development of thought in the form of a necessity in thinking, and of systematic dependence. Yet we find in Hegel the want of a real demonstration that Being and Thinking, Existence and Consciousness, are really identical. Their identity was only

maintained, but never proved, by Hegel. The Hegelian system, instead of really reconciling Being and Thinking, the real and the ideal, and developing this reconciliation as a system, is nothing more than the repetition of a one-sided idealism. According to it the real itself must be thought, and the development of the world must be represented as that of thought; that is to say, all *Esse* or Being, all Reality, is resolved into Consciousness. Thus the Consciousness is grasped as the principle of philosophy, and the movement of the world is attached to the development of Consciousness from the shadowy dream of instinctive life up to the noon-day height of self-conscious Thought.

Notwithstanding the sublime and imposing character of this spiritual Idealism, it shows itself to be onesided, and incapable of completely and solidly penetrating the reality of the universe; and there are still shadowy and obscure remains and relics in the development of the Consciousness which do not appear in Hegel's idealism. An attempt has been lately made in opposition to it, of elevating the Will instead of Consciousness to be the principle of philosophy, and of regarding the development of Will instead of that of the Consciousness, as the Nature (*Wesen*) and Soul of the Universe. The adherents of the latter view have endeavoured to introduce this principle into all the sciences, representing the Will as the fundamental substratum (*Grundwesen*) of the Universe, which developes itself on the different platforms of Nature, Spirit, and History. The thinker who first struck out into this new path, thereby pioneering the future road for philosophy, was *Arthur Schopenhauer*. He was born at Dantzic about 1790, and is the son of the banker named Schopenhauer, and of the celebrated authoress, Johanna Schopenhauer, whose maiden name was Trosina. This lady resided, after the death of her husband, in 1806, first at Weimar, and afterwards at Frankfort and Jena, where she died in 1838. The son, who was a countryman of Kant, and had attended Fichte's lectures, has published several works at Berlin, since 1813, amongst which a book entitled 'The World regarded as Will and Conception' (1818) displayed the genius of an original thinker. Founding his system on the thought that the act of Will from which the world has

arisen, is our own, Schopenhauer sought to build up his philosophy, without having actually completed it as a system of real Idealism, which should fulfil the object that he proposed, namely that of concentrating the reality of all Existence and the root of universal Nature, in the Will, and of showing the latter to be the heart and focus of the world.

Starting from the critique of the Hegelian system, *Reiff* of Tübingen has based upon Schopenhauer's foundation, a new system which converts the Nature (*Wesen*) of the *Ego*, or the pure *Ego*, into the principle of philosophy; and elevates the System of the Will's tendencies or phases (*Willensbestimmungen*) to the rank of the fundamental Science of Philosophy.

The System of the Will's phases, according to Reiff, contains the development of the world: those elements which are intimately associated with every one's Consciousness, and which constitute his inmost being, his strength and his weakness, his weal and his woe, are world-creating and world-moving forces. These are not to be sought for above; we have only to look within in order to find them. A young countryman of Reiff's, named *Planck*, has become associated with him and his views, at Tübingen, and has endeavoured, in his work entitled 'The Age,'[1] (2 vols. 1850—51) to erect the reconciliation of Idealism and Realism, begun by Reiff, into a complete system of Real-Idealism. However, these new efforts of philosophy belong to the present, and have not yet passed into history. It is sufficient for us to have discovered from the preceding sketch that the present position of philosophy in Germany is that which converts the Will, instead of the Consciousness, into the absolute productive principle of the world, and which regards all reality in nature, spirit, and history, as a manifestation of Will. It is the present object of the philosophical mind to pave the way to a new era by the introduction of this principle (whose first proposition is the following: *I will; therefore I am*): *The oneness of thinking and being is the Will.* The adherents of this new school anticipate that the future philosophy of Germany, by be-

[1] K. Ch. Planck, Die Weltalter. Vol. I, System des reinen Idealismus, 1850. Vol. II, Das Reich des Idealismus, 1851. Die Genesis des Judenthums, 8vo. 1843.

coming the Metaphysics of the Will, will attain the crown and summit of human wisdom.

OTHER RECENT SYSTEMS.

I. *Germany.*

428. Besides the authors specified in the last section, we must briefly signalize among the recent German systematic essays contemporary and subsequent to Hegel, the 'Architectonic' of *Fred. Christoph. Weise*, professor at Heidelberg; the essays of *William Kern*, of *John, Baron Sinclair*, of *Charles Louis Vorpahl*, who maintains that Being is derived from Birth. We have also to notice the doctrine of Identity modified by *Adalbert Kayssler*, professor at Breslau, deceased in 1822; considerations on man, resembling in some degree the ideas of Jacobi and of Schelling, by *David Theod. Aug. Suabedissen*, professor at Marburg; the popular observations of *C. F. G. Grävel* and *F. Linkmaier;* the interesting sketches of *Berger*, which approach in some measure the ideas of Hegel; and the principles of a philosophy of nature, by *Tieftrunck*. One of the most remarkable of the later German metaphysicians is *Fred. Edward Beneke*, who approximates the Scotch school in many of his views, being a decided realist, and endeavouring to arrive at ontological results through the medium of psychological analysis. To the above writers we must add *Herm. Wil. Ern. de Keyserlingk*, privat-docent at Berlin, who published a system of perceptive (*Anschauung's*) philosophy; besides numerous other authors, who have contributed to the advancement of special branches of philosophy by different publications. Amongst these must be classed *Gottlob Will. Gerlach*, professor at Halle; *H. C. W. Sigwart*, professor at Tübingen; *Joseph Hilldebrand*, professor at Giessen, and previously at Heidelberg. The theological discussions which have lately occurred, on the connection between Reason and Revelation, and between the Free-will of man and Divine Grace, have not been devoid of interest in a philosophical point of view; and some have imagined that they could solve these problems by means of mysticism. A tendency has quite recently appeared among the German philosophers towards a psychological and an-

thropological direction, in preference to pure speculation. Several writers of eminence have combined this psychological tendency with works on the history of philosophy, such as *Brandis*, *Ritter*, *Reinhold jun.*, etc.; whilst the diversity and conflict of speculative opinions naturally and necessarily led the mind to a more searching examination of the different positions taken up during various epochs in the development of the science. Before closing our sketch of the modern German school of philosophy, we have still to notice another of its phases, which has been quite recently developed, chiefly through the influence of *Will. von Humboldt*.[1] We allude to the attempt to bring philology to bear upon philosophy, and to explain many of its problems from the structure of language. This view has met with considerable success and able advocates, and has combated with some advantage the Hegelian doctrine, which is naturally regarded by the adherents of the science of Languages as a play of words (*Wortenspiel*). The last best work on the dispute between Hegelianism and this new school of philological philosophy, is a book of *H. Steinthal*, entitled 'Die Sprachwissenschaft W. von Humboldt's und die Hegel'sche Philosophie,' 8vo. *Berlin*, 1848.[2]

[1] Born at Berlin in 1767, died 1835.

[2] Much valuable information on the present position and future prospects of the philosophy of the present day, will be found in J. D. MORELL'S Lectures on the Philosophical Tendencies of the age, *London* and *Edinburgh*, 1848.

F. E. BENEKE has published: System der Logik als Kunstlehre des Denkens, 2 parts, 8vo. *Berlin*, 1842. System der Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie, 8vo. *ibid.* 1839. Grundlinien des natürlichen Systemes der praktischen Philosophie, 3 vols. 8vo. *ibid.* 1837–41. Die Philosophie in ihrem Verhaltniss zur Erfahrung, 8vo. *ibid.* 1833. Pragmatische Psychologie, oder Seelenlehre in der Anwendung auf das Leben, 2 vols. 8vo. *ibid.* 1850. Experimental Psychology: elements of this science considered as the basis of all science, 8vo. *Berlin*, 1820. Theory of Knowledge according to the consciousness of Pure Reason, 8vo. *Jena*, 1820. De Veris Philosophiæ Initiis, 8vo. 1820. Foundations of a Physique of Morals to serve as an appendix to the work of Kant, entitled: Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals.

Phrenology.

429. We have still to notice a system of psycho-physiology which took its rise in Germany about the commencement of the present century; but, meeting with no great favour at home, passed into other lands, where it has met with a more ready and friendly welcome.

Dr. Joseph Francis Gall, born at Tiefenbrunn, in Suabia (some say in France), A.D. 1757,[1] was led by his studies in cerebral anatomy and in connection with the nervous system, to the conclusion that the brain is not only the organ of the mind, but that it is moreover composed of compartments corresponding to the mental faculties. Dr. Gall was regarded as a materialist, though many of his disciples have been decided immaterialists; and he became early associated with his colleague, *Dr. Spurzheim*, a native of Longwich, near Treves.* Having met with little encouragement in Germany they removed to Paris, where the new science was received with open arms.

Dr. Gall remained the latter part of his life in France, where he prosecuted his inquiries and promulgated his system with zeal and perseverance. He died in 1828. Dr. Spurzheim became the apostle of the new science in other and remoter lands, having held forth the doctrine of Craniology, before numerous and attentive audiences, in England and America, where he died in 1832.

Various additions have been made to the original system of Gall by subsequent disciples, of whom the most eminent in England have been *George Combe*[2] and *Dr. Elliotson*,[3]

[1] GALL'S Neue Physiologie des Gehirns, und Physiologie des menschlichen Geistes. Also, under the title of Vollständige Geisteskunde. German transl. 6 vols. *Nürnberg*, 1st ed. 1829; 2nd ed. 1833, 8vo. The work was published in French under the title of Organologie: sur l'Origine des qualités morales et des facultés intellectuelles de l'homme, 6 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1825. F. G. Gall's Works, translated by W. LEWIS, in 6 vols. *Boston*, 1835.

Gall and Spurzheim published together, Anatomie et Physiologie du Système nerveux au général, et du Cerveau en particulier. *Paris*, 1818—19, 4 vols. fol. Physiognomical System of Doctors Gall and Spurzheim, by Dr. J. E. SPURZHEIM, 2nd edit. *Lond.* 1815.

* Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, born 1776; died 1832.

[2] System of Phrenology, 2 vols. 8vo. Moral Philosophy, 12mo. 1840.

[3] The Zoist, a Journal of Cerebral Science and Mesmerism. Physiology, 1 vol. 8vo.

the former an immaterialist, the latter a materialist. The science has met with formidable antagonists, especially in the Transcendental philosophers,[1] nevertheless it appears, on the whole, to have gradually gained ground, slowly but steadily, especially in America.

Phrenology, according to the latest and most approved classification, divides the brain, and therefore the mind (to which it corresponds), into two orders of Faculties.

Order I, containing the *Feelings*, comprises the posterior lobe of the brain, and is divided into two genera, the first consisting of the Propensities, the second of the Sentiments.

Genus 1, or *Propensities*, nine in number, consists of, 1, Amativeness; 2, Philoprogenitiveness: 3, Concentrativeness; 4, Adhesiveness; 5, Combativeness: 6, Destructiveness; 7, Secretiveness; 8, Acquisitiveness; 9, Constructiveness.

Genus 2, or *Sentiments*, twelve in number, consists of, 10, Self-Esteem; 11, Love of Approbation; 12, Cautiousness; 13, Benevolence; 14, Veneration; 15, Firmness; Conscientiousness; 17, Hope; 18, Wonder; 19, Ideality; 20, Wit; 21, Imitation.

Order II comprises the *Intellectual Faculties*, and is placed in the anterior lobe. It contains four genera.

Genus I consists of the *External Senses*, Touch, Taste, Smell, Hearing, Sight.

Genus 2 contains the *Knowing Faculties*, which perceive the *existence* and *qualities* of external objects: 22, Individuality; 23, Form: 24, Size; 25, Weight; 26, Colouring.

Genus 3. *Knowing Faculties* which perceive the *relations* of external objects: 27, Locality; 28, Number; 29, Order; 30, Eventuality; 31, Time; 32, Tune; 33, Language.

Genus 4. *Reflecting Faculties*. 34, Comparison; 35, Causality.

The organs are supposed to be double; each faculty having two, lying in corresponding situations in the hemispheres of the brain.

Such is the phrenological system of empirical psychology, which has derived powerful corroboration from the examination of countless skulls, and the phenomena of

[1] See some clever criticisms on Phrenology in Dr. G. Moore's Power of the Soul over the Body. J. D. Morell's History of Modern Philosophy in the 19th century, vol. I, pp. 412–28. Also Dr. Carpenter's Human Physiology.

phreno-mesmerism, but which has also been assailed by the formidable weapons of satire and syllogism.

On an impartial survey of the theory, it appears to contain the outline of truth mixed with errors in detail. The great primary divisions and organic classification appear sound, but the minuter analysis of the functions of the brain is in many cases gratuitous and illusory. It seems probable, however, that ultimately the researches of phrenology are destined to throw much light on the compound constitution of man.

The theory of the facial angle, discovered by *Camper*,[1] and carried out by *Blumenbach*[2] and *Prichard*,[3] as well as *Lavater's* System of Physiognomy,[4] have both an intimate connection with Phrenology, which some authors have thought not to have been unknown to the Greeks.

II. *England.*

430. During the period now under consideration, the other nations of Europe have only left feeble traces of a genuine and original spirit in philosophy. In England, the principles of Locke have continued to preserve considerable influence, though several philosophers have lately arisen who have opposed its materialistic tendency, and have thrown the door wide for the admission of Rationalism. Amongst the partizans of Locke and the Inductive school, we must specially notice *John Stuart Mill*,[5] an acute thinker,

[1] P. CAMPER, Ueber den naturlichen Unterschied der Gesichtzüge in Menschen verschiedener Gegenden, &c., herausgegeben von dessen Sohne, A. D. CAMPER, *Berl.* 1792.

[2] J. F. BLUMENBACH'S Institutions of Physiology, translated by Dr. ELLIOTSON, 2nd edit. *Lond.* 1818 (several recent editions). Blumenbach's Manual of Comparative Anatomy, translated by LAWRENCE, 8vo. *Lond.* 1828, and reprinted.

[3] Natural History of Man, by JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, M.D. *Lond.* 1 vol. 8vo. 1842.

[4] Physiognomik: vervollständigste neue Auflage, *Wien*, 1829.

[5] JOHN STUART MILL, Elements of Logic. A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 2 vols. 8vo. 1843. Principles of Political Economy, 8vo. Essays on unsettled questions of Political Economy, 8vo. 1844.

and an elegant writer, who has shown a decided bias towards Hume's doctrine of Causation. One of the most recent advocates of the empirical school in England, is a philosopher named *J. J. G. Wilkinson*,[1] who, though his mind is coloured with the peculiar theology and philosophy of Swedenborg, has shown his freedom from all sectarian bias, and a most comprehensive grasp of thought. His introduction to his translation of Swedenborg's Animal Economy is a masterpiece of reasoning and composition, and displays a truly Baconian power of thought and dignity of style. Mr. Wilkinson's last work contains the outlines of a new and highly ingenious philosophy of mind, deduced from the analogy of the bodily organs, and represented with no common acuteness of wit, fertility of imagination, and grace of composition. It may, perhaps, be justly objected to Mr. Wilkinson's writings, that they are too rich in imagery, and too subtle in thought, to come within the comprehension of the generality of minds. His works have, however, obtained considerable popularity in America.

To the list of recent English philosophical writers of the Empirical school may be added the names of *Sir William Drummond*,[2] *Thomas Hope*,[3] and *Charles Bray*;[4] and a writer of some eminence, advocating a rationalistic system of spiritualism, has lately appeared in the person of *Professor F. Newman*,[5] of the London University.

431. Amongst the opponents of the Sensationalist and Necessarian doctrines emanating from the school of Locke, we must class *Dr. Whewell*,[6] professor at Cambridge, who was recently engaged in an interesting controversy with

[1] The Animal Kingdom, by Emanuel Swedenborg, translated, with an Introduction, by JOHN JAMES GARTH WILKINSON. The Human Body and its Connexion with Man, 1 vol. 8vo. 1851. Science for all: an oration, &c.

[2] Died 1828, at Rome.

Academical Questions, 1805, 4to.; and On the Origin of several Empires, States, and Cities, 3 vols. 8vo.

[3] Essay on the Origin and Prospects of Man, 3 vols. 8vo. *Lond.* 1831.

[4] The Philosophy of Necessity.

[5] The Soul, her sorrows and her aspirations, 1 vol. post 8vo. 1848. Phases of Faith, 1 vol. post 8vo. 1850.

[6] Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 2 vols. 8vo. *London*, 1847. Elements of Morality.

Mr. Mill on the idea of Causation, which Dr. Whewell maintains not to be derived from experience. The professor styles himself a Conceptionalist; and his theory respecting the origin and source of our intellectual notions may be described as a compound of German and Scotch speculation.

432. The Scotch school has, during the present century, displayed a considerable departure from, and even hostility to, the Empirical doctrine. Amongst its chief ornaments and supporters we may cite *Thomas Brown*,[1] professor at Edinburgh, who exhibited some leaning towards the Empirical school of Hume, in his notion of Power, which he pronounces to be only that of immediate, invariable antecedence. Brown resolved all our faculties and powers into indications of 'states of mind,' and maintains that they cannot be cognizant of the real objects of our perceptions, and yet that they are all that we can ever really know of the mind itself. Brown has followed the analogy of physiological analysis in his psychological researches, which are entitled to consideration and attention, but are liable to numerous and serious defects, especially on the score of obscurity and onesidedness. His style is elegant and chaste, and will generally secure the admiration of his readers.

Dugald Stewart,[2] born at Edinburgh in 1753, deceased 1828, was one of the last pupils of the Scotch school which was led, by starting from the Empirical position, to a more searching study of the faculty of Cognition. He makes his philosophy of the mind to depend on the facts of consciousness. The last and most eminent expression of the Scotch school is represented by *Sir William Hamilton*, late professor at

[1] Born 1778; died 1820.

T. Brown, On Cause and Effect, 1804, third edition (almost re-written), 1818. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 4 vols. 8vo. *Edinb.* 1820; reprinted in one volume, 1821.

[2] Stewart, Philosophy of the action and moral powers of Man, 2 vols. 8vo. 1828. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 3 vols. 4to. *Lond.* 1792–1827. The first two volumes have been frequently reprinted, but not the third. Philosophical Essays, 4to. *Edinburgh*, 1810, reprinted in 8vo. 1816, and since. Outlines of Moral Philosophy, *Edinburgh*, 1818, 8vo. Preliminary Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy, 4to. (written for the Encyclopædia Britannica).

Edinburgh, who in his analogies and criticism of his predecessors, especially in connection with the idea of perception, has shown their errors and defects in a masterly way, and has given admission to many views evidently derived from contemporary philosophy in Germany and France.

Coleridge. Morell.

433. German philosophy has been gradually exerting an increasing influence on thinking minds in England since the beginning of this century. As a nation, it is true the English are more addicted to commercial than to metaphysical speculation, and in philosophy they have always shown a greater leaning to the practical than to the theoretical part, witness the ethical labours of *Sir James Mackintosh*,[1] and the prevalence and diffusion of Gall's system of phrenology. It may be remarked in general that the prevailing tendency of the English philosophers in the present century has been to study those branches of philosophy only which bear upon politics and natural science. In fact, the term philosophy was till lately chiefly understood as implying those branches, in England. It is not improbable that a feeling of national self-sufficiency was a barrier against any foreign importations. Several writers have, however, endeavoured to do justice to the merits of Kant; and *S. T. Coleridge*[2] was early imbued with the spirit of German philosophy, which appears in his prose writings, and which he endeavoured to infuse into his countrymen. Kant and Fichte were his favourite authors, and he transplanted many of their terms into the English tongue. Yet Coleridge was no systematic writer, but a metaphysical dilettante. It was reserved for a more recent writer, *John Daniel Morell*,[3] to introduce German philosophy to the people of England in a systematic form. Though deeply imbued

[1] Sir James Mackintosh's Works, 3 vols. 1846 (born 1765, died 1832).

[2] Born 1772; died 1834. Table Talk. The Friend, 3 vols.

[3] Cousin-german of the editor. His principal works are, A Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the 19th century, 1846, 2 vols. 8vo. The Philosophical Tendencies of the Age, 8vo. *London*, 1848. The Philosophy of Religion, 8vo. 1849.

with the spirit of modern German Metaphysics, he is not the slave of any system, and has distinctly pronounced against finality in this science, which he describes as one of progressive development. Mr. Morell, though he cannot be classed with any particular school, has exhibited a greater approximation to the Eclecticism of Victor Cousin than to any other system. His works display a union of depth and clearness, which have ensured their popularity. He has clearly and systematically developed the distinction between Intuitional Reason and Understanding, and defined the legitimate functions and limits of these faculties.[1]

Before we dismiss the English philosophy of the present century, we must not omit the name of *Thomas Carlyle*, a man who, though no systematic philosopher, has probably done more to spiritualize philosophy, in England, than any other modern writer.[2]

III. *France.*

PHILIP DAMIRON, Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en France au 19me siècle, 8vo. *Paris*, 2me edit. 1828.

434. After Condillac, the French remained subject to the sway of Empiricism. The psychological method of Condillac, Atomistic Physiology, and Ideology, were the limits of French philosophy: a popular and witty style constituted its form, the agreeable and the useful its object; finally, a philosophy, applied to life, and often accompanied by vanity and frivolity, was the aim of all knowledge.

A new version of Theosophy, from the pen of the ingenious mystic, *Louis Claude Saint Martin* (born at Amboise

[1] Two or three works have recently appeared in England treating of philosophico-religious questions in a decidedly sceptical spirit. Among these the most remarkable are: The Nemesis of Faith, by J. A. FROUDE. The Creed of Christendom: its foundations and superstructure, by W. R. GREG, and Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature, by H. G. ATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU, a book of a decidedly atheistic spirit, which has occasioned its general condemnation by the press and people of England.

[2] CARLYLE'S Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, 4 vols. 8vo. 1839. Sartor Resartus, 2nd edit. post 8vo. *Lond.* 1841. Heroes and Hero-Worship, 3rd edit. *Lond.* post 8vo. 1846. Past and Present, 8vo. 1st edit. *Lond.* 1843.

in 1713, deceased in 1804), the translator of Jacob Böhm, and a partizan of the sect of *Martinez Pasqualis*, did not suit the French mind. On the other hand, the craniology of Gall and Spurzheim met with a favourable reception in France.

Amongst the French philosophers of the period in question who adhered to the system of Condillac, we must notice *J. M. Degerando*,[1] *P. J. G. Cabanis*, *Count Destutt-Tracy*, noted for his ideology, *P. Laromiguière*,[2] *Azais*,[3] *Garat*, and *Volney*. In opposition to the sensuous philosophy there arose, about this time, a theological school, to which belong the names of *Joseph de Maistre*,[4] *Lamennais*,[5] *Bonald*,[6] *Ballanche*,[7] and others.

Since the death of *Charles Villers*, who recommended the study of the Kantian philosophy to his countrymen, the

[1] DEGERANDO, Des Signes et de l'Art de penser, 4 vols. Histoire comparée de Philosophie, 8 vols. Du Perfectionnement moral, 2 vols. De la Bienfaisance publique, 4 vols. De l'éducation des Sourds-muets de naissance, 2 vols.

[2] LAROMIGUIERE, Leçons de Philosophie, 2 vols. *Paris*, 1815 (born 1756).

[3] AZAIS, Précis du Système Universel, 1 vol. L'Explication universelle, 4 vols. Cours de philosophie générale, 8 vols. *Paris*.

[4] Born 1753; died 1821.

[5] LAMENNAIS, Essai sur l'indifference en matière de religion, avec Défense, etc. 4 vols. Esquisse d'une philosophie, 5 vols. Discussions critiques et Pensées diverses sur la religion et la philosophie, 1 vol. Amschaspands et Darvands. Mélanges religieux et philosophiques. Paroles d'un Croyant. Le Livre du Peuple. Politique à l'usage du peuple, 2 vols. De l'Esclavage moderne. Questions philosophiques et politiques, 2 vols. De la Religion. Du Passé et de l'Avenir du peuple. Servitude Volontaire,

[6] BONALD, Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social, ou du Pouvoir, du Ministre, et du Sujet dans la société, 1 vol. Du Divorce considéré au 19me siècle, relativement à l'état domestique et à l'état publique de la société, 1 vol. Legislation primitive, considerée dans les derniers temps par les seuls lumières de la Raison; suivie de plusieurs Traités et Discours politiques, 3 vols. Pensées diverses et opinions politiques, 2 vols. Recherches Philosophiques sur des premiers objets des connaissances morales, 2 vols. Mélanges littéraires, politiques et philosophiques, 2 vols. Demonstrations philosophiques du principe constitutif de la société, &c. 1 vol. Théorie du Pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile, demontrée par le raisonnement et par l'histoire, 3 vols.

[7] BALLANCHE, Œuvres complètes, contenant les Essais de Palingénésie Sociale. Antigone, l'homme sans nom, 4 vols. *Paris*.

French have made several attempts to approach the German philosophy, and to give up the sensationalism of Condillac. *Victor Cousin*[1] (editor of Descartes, of Proclus, and of Abelard, and translator of Plato), is a disciple of Royer Collard, and has familiarized himself with the most recent researches of German philosophy. He has founded a new school in France, taking as his fundamental principle *the meditative interrogation of the Consciousness:* he is at the head of those eminent men who have the most contributed to diffuse a new Spiritualism, which has encountered a lively opposition in the old school of Empiricism. To the same epoch belong the names of *Maine de Biran*,[2] *Royer Collard*,[3] *Berard*,[4] *Virey*,[5] and *Jouffroy*[6] a philosopher distinguished by clearness of thought and elegance of style, who has presented his countrymen with admirable translations of Dugald Stewart and Browne. *Keratry*,[7] *Baron Massias*,[8]

[1] Born 1792.

VICTOR COUSIN, Cours de Philosophie, professé a la Faculté des Lettres de 1816 à 1820, 1840, 1841. Cours de l'histoire de la Philosophie, 1841. Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie. Histoire de la Philosophie du 18me siècle. Fragments philosophiques. Philosophie ancienne et scholastique. Manuel de l'histoire de la Philosophie, traduit de l'Allemand de Tennemann, 1839. Des Pensées de Pascal, etc., 1843. Leçons de philosophie sur Kant, 1842. De la Metaphysique d'Aristote, etc. 1838. Cours de Philosophie, professé pendant l'année 1818, etc. Fragments Littéraires.

[2] MAINE DE BIRAN, Œuvres philosophiques, 3 vols. edited by COUSIN, *Paris*, 1841 (born 1766; died 1824).

[3] ROYER COLLARD, Fragmens (born 1753).

[4] F. BERARD, Doctrine des rapports du Physique et du Moral, pour servir de fondement à la Physiologie intellectuelle et à la Metaphysique, *Paris*, 1823.

[5] VIREY, De la Puissance vitale, *Paris*, 1823.

[6] Born 1796.

JOUFFROY, Cours de Droit naturel. Mélanges philosophiques. Nouveaux Mélanges de Philosophie. Cours Æsthetique.

[7] KERATRY, Examen philosophique des considerations sur le sentiment du Sublime et du Beau, dans le rapport des charactères, des temperamens, des sexes, des climats, et des religions, 1 vol. Inductions morales et philosophiques, 1 vol.

[8] BARON MASSIAS, Rapport de la Nature à l'Homme, 5 vols. 1821. Problème de l'Esprit, 1825. Traité de philosophie psycho-physiologique, 1830. Théorie du Beau et du Sublime. Examens des Fragmens de Royer Collard, et des Principes de la philosophie Ecossaise.

J. H. Droz,[1] and *Bonstetten*, a Swiss, must also be added to the list of modern French philosophers. *Claude François Le Joyaud* and *J. A. Fr. Alix* rose above atomistic physics in their application of philosophy to the natural sciences.

A modern French philosopher, named *Auguste Comte*,[2] has made himself notorious by carrying out sensationalism to its extremest form, which leads him to reject all metaphysics as impossible, and to maintain that positive science is the only possible channel for obtaining knowledge. According to Comte, all kinds of knowledge pass through three stages: 1st. The supernatural; 2nd. The metaphysical; 3rd. The positive. His system, which is remarkable for ingenuity, establishes atheism as a *material* basis, and excludes all researches beyond the facts of our senses, as futile and useless, since it is impossible for man to penetrate into the essence of things. A considerable analogy may be traced between Hume's and Comte's systems, especially as regards Cause and Effect, which both regard only in the light of a relation.

SOCIALISTIC MYSTICS.

Fourier.

435. A new school of Socialistic philosophers has arisen in France within the present century, whose writings have exerted a powerful influence over the mind and destiny of their countrymen, and of the whole civilized world. The principal founders and authorities of this school are *St. Simon*, *Fourier*, *Leroux*, and *Proudhon;* of whom the three former may be described as mystical, and the latter as sceptical Socialists. The most remarkable and original amongst these systems are those of *Charles Fourier*, and *Pierre Leroux*. Charles Fourier was born at Besançon in 1772,[3] and followed, during the greater part of his life, different branches of the mercantile profession. He published his

[1] J. H. Droz, Essai sur l'Art d'être heureux. De la philosophie Morale; ou des differents systèmes sur la science de la Vie. Application de la Morale Politique.

[2] His principal work is, Cours de philosophie positive, 6 vols. 1842.

[3] Died in 1837.

first work in 1808,[1] and since then has published various treatises and articles[2] in a Journal called the *Phalanstère*, which advocated his principles. As a thinker he is remarkable for the originality, eccentricity, and depth of his views. His writings exhibit a gorgeous wealth of imagination, coupled with an almost unparalleled logical acuteness. He is equally efficient in destroying and constructing; and one is at a loss which to admire most, the power with which he attacks existing systems, or the ingenuity which he displays in substituting another. His philosophy may be divided into Science and Praxis, or his Psychological and Ontological Theory and its application in his Societary System. The first comprises what he styles Passional Attraction, the last its application to society in Industrial Association. His psychology is confined to an analysis of the affections, from which he infers that the Newtonian principle of attraction is equally applicable to the social and mental worlds; and that society should be moulded in accordance with the diversity and intensity of individual attractions.[3] Unity in Diversity and Harmony in Contrast, is what he professes to achieve in his new Social System. This principle of passional attraction is regarded by Fourier as his grand discovery, which had been culpably neglected and overlooked by past philosophers. On the whole his system is eminently deserving of a careful study, though hostile to some of our notions of ethical propriety; in which respect he approximates Plato and other philosophers of antiquity. Among his chief merits we may enumerate his Law of Series and his Potential Scale of Human Characters; and among his defects may be indicated his exaggerated partiality in favour of analogies and particular numbers.

[1] Théorie des Quatre Mouvements, 1st edit. 1808.

Théorie de l'Unité universelle, 2nd edit. 4 vols. 8vo. Le Nouveau Monde industriel et sociétaire, 2nd edit. 1 vol. 8vo. La Fausse Industrie, 2 vols. pet. in 8vo. Articles in the *Phalange* (monthly review), 1845-46, 1847-48, and 1849. Quackeries of the sects of St. Simon and Owen.

[3] CH. FOURIER'S Passions of the Human Soul, 2 vols. 8vo. 1851. which has been translated by the editor of the present volume.

Pierre Leroux.

436. *Leroux*[1] may be classed among the most able modern thinkers in France. He commenced his career as an ardent admirer and adherent of St. Simon and Fourier, but he has latterly made himself independent of their views, and started an original theory. Leroux is a determined foe of all Eclecticism, which he has ably combated for years. He maintains that it is absurd to seek for a knowledge of man in the simple Consciousness, or the *Me;* and he affirms that this *Me* or *Ego* is a mere abstraction, and does not exist in reality. Every individual mind only exists as a part of the whole, and we must study the whole of humanity to know man. We must look to the Science of Life for philosophical truth. Leroux is a traditionalist in history; and he is led by induction from the past to infer that in the same way that Christianity is a legitimate deduction from the universal consent of the world, and a natural stage in the progressive development of man, in like manner it also will eventually be superseded by another and a more perfect system of religion and code of morals. His view of the Deity appears to be strongly tinged with Pantheism; but he does not appear, like the German philososphers, to throw doubt upon the absolute reality of our perceptions. His style is eloquent and graceful; his mind is richly stored with the fruits of extensive reading; but his system is exposed to the charge of being hazardous and imperfectly digested.

IV. *Italy, and other Countries.*

437. Since the time of *Giov. Batt. Vico*,[2] and of his compatriot *Antonio Genovese*, the Italians have not shown much

[1] LEROUX has published the following works:
De l'Humanité, de son principe et de son avenir, 2 vols. Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme. Sept Discours sur la situation de la société, et de l'esprit humain, 7 vols. De la mutilation d'un écrit posthume de Thomas Jouffroy, 1 vol.

[2] GIOV. BATT. VICO, Principj d'una Scienza nuova d'intorno alla commune natura delle nazione, 12mo. *Napoli*, 1725; (often reprinted,) also contained in Vico, Opere, ordinate ed illustrate da GIUSEPPE FERRARI, 6 vols. 8vo. *Milano*, 1835-37. Œuvres Choises, trad. par M. MICHELET, 2 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1833.

originality in mental philosophy, having chiefly devoted themselves to the adoption of German metaphysics, or to certain practical questions. In the latter category must be classed *Gaetan Filangieri*[1] and *Cesare Bonesano*,[2] *Marquis Beccaria*, who treated of legislation in a light principally borrowed from foreign systems.[3] The Italians have latterly become more intimately acquainted with the writings of Kant and other German philosophers, but especially with German works on Æsthetics and the philosophy of Art.

The most eminent Italian philosophers in the present day are *Vincenzo Gioberti*[4] and *Count Mamiani*.[5] Gioberti, distinguished alike as a politician and a philosopher, professes himself a zealous adherent of Catholicism, and hostile to the whole tenor of German philosophy. His psychology, which gives full admission to the supernaturalist principle, partakes somewhat largely of mysticism. Mamiani displays great ingenuity and acuteness in his works, which are highly esteemed even in France and Germany. He is more critical and less mystical than Gioberti, and has devoted much attention to the subject of Method.

To the above Italian philosophers we must add *Rosmini*,[6]

[1] Born 1752; died 1787.

FILANGIERI, La Scienza della Legislazione, 8 vols. *Nap.* 1780, 8vo., and other editions. Translated into most European languages.

[2] Born at Milan, 1735; died 1793.

BECCARIA, Dei Delitti e delle Pene, *Nap.* 1784, 8vo., and other editions. Translated into most European languages.

[3] The French Ideology has especially been spread in Italy. There has also appeared there a Collezione di Classici metafisici, *Pavia*, 1819-22. SACCHI translated Kant's works at Pavia; and GEMINIANI translated A. W. von Schlegel's Lectures on Dramatic Art. G. B. TALIA also published a work on Æsthetics: Saggio di Estetica, *Venezia*, 1822.

[4] GIOBERTI, Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia, 4 vols. 1841. Degli Errori filosofici di A. Rosmini, 1841. Del Primato morale e civile degli Italiani, 2 vols. Del Bello e del Buono, 1843.

[5] MAMIANI, Del Riconoscamento della Filosofia antica Italiana, *Par.* 1834. Sei Letteri del Mamiani a Rosmini, *Par.* 1838. Dell' Ontologia e del Metodo, *Par.* 1841. Dialoghi di Scienza prima, 1846. Maria Pagani: ovvero, Dell' Immortalità, 1846.

ROSMINI, Saggio sull' origini delle Idee, 1830, 3 vols. A controversy occurred between Gioberti and Rosmini, in which DR. WISEMAN is supposed to have defended the latter.

a writer of an idealistic tendency; *Romagnosi*,[1] whose views have a considerable affinity with the speculations of Dugald Stewart; *Baron Pasquale Gallupi*,[2] who successfully criticised Condillac and the principles of Hume; and *Paolo Costa*,[3] a clever and ingenious writer, who examined the writings of Reid, Hume, and Kant, in an impartial spirit.

The Danes, the Swedes, and the Dutch have lately displayed more ardour for philosophical researches, though they are generally deficient in the originality of the German mind. An exception must, however, be made in favour of *Hans Christian Oersted*,[4] a Danish philosopher, who has thrown considerable lustre over the Danish name, by his beautiful and ingenious speculations. He may be pronounced a decided antagonist of Idealism, and devoted to a new school of Realistic-Naturalism. Much of his system, and many of his theories will appear mystical and poetical; nevertheless, there is a rich field of thought, and a copious fund of experimental truth in the scientific and literary labours of this ingenious writer. His leading object seems to be, to animate Nature, which causes him to approximate the ancient theory of giving a Soul to the World, and of generating a kind of realistic Pantheism. There is much that is singularly attractive and original in the speculations of this philosopher, which seem especially adapted to secure the admiration of æsthetical minds. The prominent feature of his system, is the attempt to trace an identity between the soul in Man and the soul in Nature. On this point

[1] Born 1761; died 1835.

ROMAGNOSI, Opere, 19 vols. Genesi del Diritto penale, 1791. Introduzione allo Studio del Diritto Publico, *Parma*, 1802; 2nd edit. *Milan*, 1825. Assunto primo della scienza del Diritto Naturale, 1820.

[2] GALLUPI, Saggio Filosofico sulla critica della conoscenza, *Nap.* 1819, 8vo. 6 vols. (containing an examination of the principal doctrines of Ideology, Kantianism, and the Transcendental philosophy. Gallupi has since published, Elementi di Filosofia, 5 vols. *Messina*, 1821–27, 8vo. Lettere filosofiche, *Nap.* 1837. Lezioni di Logica e di Metafisica, 3 vols. *Firenz.* 1841.

[3] COSTA, Del Modo di comparre le Idee, *Firenz.* 1837. Dissertation on Analysis and Synthesis.

[4] Born 1777; died 1851. His principal work is entitled: Der Geist in der Natur, *Munchen*, 1850. The Soul in Nature, translated, in H. Bohn's Standard Library, 1852.

there is some analogy between Oersted and Schelling; but on most points he diverges widely from the Philosophy of Nature.

In Holland critical philosophy obtained considerable credit and numerous adherents. Its progress, however, was checked by political agitations, by the mutual polemics of the German metaphysicians, and by the differences springing up in the Critical school itself. *Van Hemert* pronounced in favour of Fichte. We are especially called upon to notice *D. Wyttenbach*, who displayed great merits as the historian of philosophy, and the ingenious Socratist, *Francis Hemsterhuis*, both of whom approached the ancient philosophers in a remarkable degree, especially in their method.

The Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Greeks; the Poles and the Russians, have made themselves familiar with German philosophy, by sending their youth to attend lectures at the German universities. The most eminent modern Russian philosophers are, *Sidonski*, a man perfectly conversant with the metaphysics of Germany and France; and *Kedrew*, author of a work on the philosophy of Nature.[1] It appears that the philosophy of Kant has been lately superseded by that of Hegel, in the Russian universities. The most remarkable Polish writer on philosophy in modern times, is *Joseph C. Szanianski*,[2] a native of East Galicia, who, after having carefully studied Hegel's system, transplanted it into Poland soon after it was known in Germany.

[1] Einleitung in die Philosophie. Also L. H. DE JACOB'S Essais Philosophiques sur l'Homme, ses principaux Rapports, et sa Destinée, *Halle*, 1818; 2 vols.; new ed. *St. Petersburgh*, 1822.

[2] SZANIANSKI published the following works:

Was ist Philosophie? *Warschau*, 1802. Ueber die vorzüglichsten moralischen systeme des Alterthums, *Warschau*, 1803. Ueberblick der Philosophie seit den Zeiten ihres Verfalls bei den Griechen und Römern, bis zum wiederaufleben der Wissenschaften, *Warschau*, 1804.

We may also mention the Pole, J. E. JANKOWSKY, (Professor at Cracow), who published a Logic in 1822 in Polish, with a Review of the progress of Poland in Philosophy. Also, J. GOLUCHOWSKY'S (a Schellingite) Philosophy in its relation to the life of nations, *Erlangen*, 1822, 8vo.

V. *America.*

438. A faint echo of German philosophy has even reached the distant shores of Brazil;[1] and the Anglo-Saxon race in the United States of North America has become perfectly familiar with European thoughts.

Among the most distinguished of the American writers and thinkers, we must enumerate *R. W. Emerson*,[2] a writer distinguished for his genius, cultivated mind, and elegant diction. He can hardly be ranked as a systematic philosopher, but belongs more correctly to the class of philosophical essayists, such as Montaigne. His metaphysical views, as expressed in his Essay on the *Over soul*, seem strongly coloured with idealistic Pantheism. Among the American writers who have most contributed to diffuse German philosophy and theology in the United States, one of the first is *Theodore Parker*,[3] who is a Rationalist in theology, and a man of immense reading, thoroughly versed in all the German philosophical and theological systems since the time of Kant. America has produced several other men eminent for their intellectual endowments, many of whom have adopted, either *in toto* or in part, the Socialistic philosophy of Fourier and other French writers. The most distinguished ornaments of this Socialistic school in America, are *Albert Brisbane*,[4] *W. E. Channing*, *Henry James* and *George Ripley*. An able expositor of the German Transcendental school has recently appeared in the person of Mr. *Stallo*.[5]

Thus the New World has proved its legitimate relationship with the intellectual progress of the Old; and the modern thinkers across the "great waters" appear to be in no degree unworthy of their sires.

[1] The Critical Philosophy is taught in the College of St. Paul's in Brazil. See ZSCHOKKE'S Wöchentliche Unterhaltung's Blätter, *Aarau*, 1824, pt. III.

[2] Essays, two series. Nature, an Essay. Man Thinking: an Oration. Representative Men. 12mo. Bohn, 1849, &c. The *Dial* (periodical) contains many papers of Emerson, Parker, &c.

[3] THEODORE PARKER, Discourse on Religion.

[4] Social Destiny, by ALBERT BRISBANE.

[5] STALLO'S General Principles of the Philosophy of Nature, *New York*, 1841.

Conclusion.

439. It is natural that the various and contradictory attempts which have lately been hazarded by the philosophic mind should cast some doubt on philosophy itself, and lead men to despair of ever finding the solution of the problem of Reason, which consists in finding a certain system of knowledge founded on principles. And this suspicion seems to be confirmed by the fact, that the Critical method followed by Kant, which endeavoured to fix the measure and limit of knowledge with the view of overthrowing the scepticism of the Sensationalists, so far from checking the daring flight of speculation, has only furnished it with new materials, and given it a more lively and imposing character. Nevertheless these various endeavours should lead us to hope that Reason will at length arrive at the knowledge of itself; that it will determine the sphere assigned to it, and continue to unfold more and more the true philosophic method; and that it will learn from the past how to avoid the shoals on which so many adventurous thinkers have been stranded. A time will probably come when the different modes of philosophizing, which now only seem to be aberrations, will be recognized as the necessary conditions of the true cultivation of Reason and Wisdom.

THE END.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

FOR

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

B.C.	Rome	Olymp.	
640	114	35,1	Thales born, ac. to Apollodorus.
630	116	35,3	Solon born.
629	125	38	Thales born, ac. to Meiners.
611	143	42,2	Anaximander born.
608	146	43,1	Pythagoras born, ac. to Larcher.
598	156	45,3	Solon published his laws. Pherecydes born about the same time.
597	157	45,4	Thales foretold an eclipse.
584	170	49	Pythagoras born, ac. to Meiners.
561	193	55,1	Solon died.
557	197	56	Anaximenes flourished.
548	206	58,1	Thales died.
547	207	58,2	Anaximander died.
543	211	57,2	Thales died, ac. to some. Pherecydes died.
540	214	60	Pythagoras founded a school at Croto.
536	218	61	Xenophanes settled at Elea.
504	250	69	Pythagoras died. Parmenides flourished, ac. to some.
500	254	70,1	Anaxagoras and Philolaus born. Heraclitus and Leucippus flourished. Anaximenes died.
496	258	71,1	Ocellus Lucanus flourished.
494	260	71,3	Democritus born.
490	264	72,3	Battle of Marathon.
489	265	72,4	Pythagoras died, ac. to some.
480	274	75,1	Battle of Salamis.
472	282	77	Diogenes of Apollonia flourished.
470	284	77,3	Democritus born, ac. to Thrasyllus.
469	285	77,4	Socrates born. Parmenides flourished.
460	284	80	Parmenides came from Elea to Athens with Zeno. Democritus born, ac. to Apollodorus. Empedocles flourished, ac. to some.

B.C.	Rome	Olymp.	
456	298	81	Anaxagoras repaired to Athens.
450	304	82,3	Xenophon born.
444	310	84	Melissus.
			Gorgias wrote his treatise Περὶ Φύσεως.
442	312	86	Protagoras and Prodicus flourished.
432	322	87,1	Beginning of the Peloponessian war.
431	323	87,2	Anaxagoras accused.
430	324	87,3	Plato born, ac. to Corsini.
429	325	87,4	Plato born, ac. to Dodwell. Pericles died.
428	326	88,1	Anaxagoras died.
427	327	88,2	Gorgias sent ambassador to Athens. Diagoras fl.
414	340	91,3	Diogenes of Sinope born.
407	347	93,2	Democritus died, ac. to Eusebius.
404	350	94,1	Close of the Peloponnesian war.
400	354	95,1	Socrates died; his disciples retired to Megara.
			Euclid and Archytas flourished.
389	365	97,4	Plato's first voyage to Syracuse.
384	370	99,1	Aristotle born. Pyrrho born.
380	374	100	Antisthenes and Aristippus flourished.
		102	Aristotle repaired to Athens.
			Eudoxus flourished.
364	390	104,1	Plato's second voyage to Syracuse.
361	393	104,4	Plato's third voyage to Syracuse.
360	394	105	Xenophon died.
356	398	106	Alexander born.
348	406	108,1	Plato died; Speusippus succeeded him.
343	411	109,2	Aristotle became preceptor to Alexander.
340	414	110,1	Diogenes and Crates (the Cynics) Pyrrho and Anaxarchus flourished. Zeno of Cittium born.
339	415	110,2	Speusippus died. Xenocrates began to teach.
337	417	110,4	Battle of Cheronæa. Epicurus born.
336	418	111,1	Philip, king of Macedon, died.
335	419	111,2	Aristotle opened his school at the Lyceum.
324	430	114,1	Diogenes the Cynic died.
323	431	114,2	Alexander the Great died. Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, succeeded him in Egypt.
322	432	114,3	Aristotle died; Theophrastus succeeded him.
320	434	115	Demetrius Phalereus, and Dicæarchus of Messana flourished.
316	438	116,1	Arcesilaus born (or later).
314	440	116,3	Xenocrates died; Polemo succeeded him.
313	441	116,4	Theophrastus became celebrated. Crates.
305	449	118,3	Epicurus opened his school at Athens.
300	454	120,1	Stilpo, and Theodorus the Atheist, flourished.
			Zeno founded a school at Athens.
			Diodorus and Philo.

B.C.	Rome	Olymp.	
288	466	123,1	Pyrrho died.
286	468	123,3	Theophrastus died. Pyrrho died about the same time; succeeded by Strato.
285	469	123,4	Ptolemy Philadelphus became king of Egypt.
280	474	125,1	Chrysippus born.
272	482	126,4	Timon flourished.
270	484	127,2	Epicurus died.
269	485	127,3	Strato died; succeeded by Lyco.
264	490	128,3	Zeno, the Stoic, died (or later); succeeded by Cleanthes.
260	494	130	Persæus.—Aristo of Chios.—Herillus flourished.
241	513	134,1	Arcesilaus died (or later).
217	537	141,3	Carneades born.
212	542	143	Zeno of Tarsus flourished.
208	546	144	Chrysippus died, ac. to Menage. Diogenes of Babylon.
185	569	148,4	Panætius born (ac. to some, later).
155	599	156,3	Embassy from the Athenians to Rome. (Critolaus, Carneades the Stoic, and Diogenes of Babylon).
146	608	158,3	Greece and Carthage subjected to Rome. Antipater of Tarsus.
142	612	159,3	Macedon became a Roman province.
135	619	161,2	Posidonius born.
129	625	162,4	Carneades died; succeeded by Clitomachus.
115	639		Panætius accompanied Scipio Africanus to Alexandria.
107 or 106	647	167,2	Cicero born.
		170	Clitomachus died; succeeded by Philo. Posidonius flourished.
84	666	171,1	Sylla took Athens. Philo retired to Rome. Antiochus.
86	667	171,2	Lucretius born (ac. to others, earlier). Posidonius died.
69	685	178	Antiochus died.
63	691	172,2	Judæa became a Roman province.
50		182,2	Posidonius died; succeeded by Jason. Lucretius died.
48		183,1	Cratippus, the Peripatetic, flourished.
44 or 43	711	184,2	Cicero died.
30	724	187,3	Egypt became a Roman province.
27	727	188,2	Augustus became Emperor. Philo the Jew born.

A.C.	Roman Emperors.	
1	Augustus.	Birth of Christ.
3		Seneca the philosopher born.
		Sextus the Pythagorean.
		Nicolaus of Damascus, and Xenarchus flourished.
		Athenodorus the Stoic.
14	Tiberius.	
15		Sotion.
33		Crucifixion of Jesus Christ.
34		Philo the Jew flourished.
37	Caligula.	Flavius Josephus born.
41	Claudius.	
50		Plutarch of Chæronea born.
54	Nero.	
65		Seneca died.
66		Cornutus and Musonius exiled.
69	Galba, Otho, Vitellius.	Apollonius of Tyana flourished.
79	Titus.	
81		Musonius Rufus recalled from exile.
82	Domitian.	Domitian banished the philosophers and mathematicians from Rome.
89		Justin Martyr born.
		Epictetus flourished.
90		Apollonius of Tyana died.
95		
97	Nerva.	Plutarch flourished.
99	Trajan.	Tacitus.
		Gnostics.
118	Adrian.	Secundus of Athens. Plutarch died.
120		
122		Euphrates the Stoic died.
131		Galen born. Favorinus. Basilides the Gnostic.
134		Arrian flourished.
138		Akibha the Rabbin died.
139	Antoninus Pius.	Calv. Taurus. Apollonius the Stoic.
		Basilides the Stoic.
160		Apuleius.
161	M. Aurelius Antoninus.	Alcinous. Numenius.
165		Peregrinus the Cynic, and Justin Martyr died.
		Lucian.
170		Athenagorus and Tatianus. Atticus the Platonist.
		Bardesanes.

A.C.	Roman Emperors.	
180	Commodus.	Maximus of Tyre. Death of Antoninus. Irenæus. Juda the Rabbi. The Talmud.
185		Origen born.
193	Pertinax.	Ammonius Saccas founded a school.
	Julianus.	Clemens of Alexandria. Alexander of
	Sept. Severus.	Aphrodisias.
		Galen died.
200		Plotinus born. Philostratus.
205		
212	Caracalla.	Clemens of Alexandria died.
218	Macrinus.	Tertullian died.
220	Antoninus Heliogabalus.	
222	Alex. Severus.	
232		Plotinus became a disciple of Ammonius.
233		Porphyrius born.
235	Maximinus.	
238	Gordian.	Ulpianus.
239	Gordian the son.	
242		Plotinus travelled into Persia.
243		Plotinus came to Rome.
244	Philip.	
246		Amelius became a disciple of Plotinus.
253	Trajanus Decius.	
252	Trebonianus.	
	Gallus and Vibius.	
	Hostilianus.	
252		Longinus flourished.
253	Æmilius Valerianus.	Origen died.
269	Flavius Claudius.	
270	Aurelian.	Plotinus died.
275		Longinus put to death.
276	Flavius Tacitus.	
277	Aurel. Probus.	The Manichæans.
282	Aurelius Carus.	
284	Diocletian.	Arnobius.
304	Constantine and Maximianus.	Porphyrius died.
306	Constantine the Great.	
321	Constantine converted to Christianity.	Iamblichus flourished.
326		Arnobius died.

A.C.	Roman Emperors.	
330		Lactantius died.
333		Iamblichus died. Themistius.
337	Constantius and Constans.	
340		Eusebius bishop of Cæsarea died.
354		Augustine born.
355		Themistius taught at Constantinople.
360	Julian.	Sallustius.
363	Jovianus.	
364	Valentinianus and Valens.	
379	Theodosius the Great.	Eunapius.
380		Nemesius flourished.
384		St. Jerome flourished.
391		Gregorius of Nazianzus died.
394		Gregorius of Nyssa.
395	Arcadius and Honorius.	The Roman empire divided.
398		St. Ambrosius died.
400		Nemesius died.
401		Plutarch the son of Nestorius flourished.
	Greek Emperors.	
402	Arcadius.	
408	Theodosius II.	
409		Macrobius. Pelagius.
410		Synesius.
412		Proclus born.
415		Death of Hypatia.
418		Pelagius condemned.
430		St. Augustine, and Plutarch the son of Nestorius, died.
434		Syrianus flourished.
450	Marcianus.	Hierocles and Olympiodorus flourished. Syrianus died.
457	Leo I.	
470		Claudianus Mamertinus flourished. Boethius born.
474	Leo II. Zeno Isauricus.	Marcianus Capella flourished.
476	*End of the Western Empire.*	
480		Salvanius. Cassiodorus born.
485		Proclus died. Ammonius the son of Hermias. Hierocles.

A. C.	Greek Emperors.	
487		Æneas of Gaza flourished.
490		Marinus died.
491	Anastasius.	Marinus succeeded by Isidorus.
518	Justin I.	
526		Boethius beheaded.
527	Justinian.	
529		The Schools of philosophy closed at Athens.
533		Philoponus flourished.
539		Cassiodorus retired to a convent.
549		Damascius and Simplicius flourished.
563	Justinian II.	
575	Tiberius II.	Cassiodorus died.
582	Mauritius.	
602	Phocas.	
604		Gregory the Great died.
610	Heraclius.	
622		Flight of Mahomet.
636		Isidorus of Seville died.
641	Constantine III. and IV. Constans II.	
668	Constantine V.	
673		The Venerable Bede born.
685	Justinus II.	
694	Leontius.	
698	Tiberius III.	
711	Philippicus.	
713	Anastasius II.	
716	Theodosius III.	
717	Leo III. Isauricus	
735		Bede died.
736		Alcuin born.
741	Constant. VI.	
753	Almanzour the Khalif.	
754		John of Damascus died.
776		Rhabanus Maurus born.
796	Irene.	
	Emperors of Germany.	
800	Charlemagne.	Haroun al Raschid. Alkendi flourished.
804	Louis the Pious.	Alcuin died.
814	Lothaire.	
840	Louis II.	

A. C.	German Emperors.	
855		
856		Rhabanus died.
875	Charles the Bald.	J. Scot Erigena came to France.
877	Louis III.	
879		Alfred the Great.
880	Charles the Fat.	
886		Erigena died.
887	Arnolphe.	
891		Photius died.
899	Louis IV.	
912	Conrad.	
919	Henry the Fowler	
937	Otho the Great.	
954		Alfarabi died.
974	Otho II.	
980		Avicenna born.
987	Otho III.	
999		Gerbert, Pope Sylvester II.
1002	Henry II.	
1003		Sylvester II died.
1020		Mich. Const. Psellus born.
1025	Conrad II.	
1034		Anselm born.
1036		Avicenna died.
1039	Henry III.	
1042		Lanfranc entered the convent of Bec.
1055		Hildebert of Lavardin born.
1056	Henry IV.	
1060		Anselm became prior of Bec.
1072		P. Damianus died. Algazel born.
1079		Abelard born.
1080		Berengarias of Tours died.
1089		Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury, died.
1091		Bernard of Clairvaux died.
1092		Roscellin found guilty of heresy at Soissons.
1096		Hugues of St. Victor born.
1100		Psellus died (later, ac. to some). Eustrachius of Nicæa.
1107	Henry V.	
1109		Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, died. Alghazali d. at Bagdad (ac. to Hammer).
1114		Alanus of Ryssel born.
1117		Anselm of Laon died.
1118		Abelard taught at Paris.
1120		Abelard became monk of St. Denis. William of Champeaux, bishop of Châlons, died.

A.C.	German Emperors.	
1126	Lothaire.	
1127		Algazel died at Bagdad.
1134		Hildebert died.
1138		
1139	Conrad III.	Moses Maimonides born.
1140		Hugo of St. Victor died.
1141		Gilbertus Porretanus became bishop of Poictiers.
1142		Abelard died.
1146		Assembly of ecclesiastics at Paris and Rheims to oppose Gilbertus Porretanus.
1150		Lombardus wrote his Sentences. Will. of Conches died. Rob. Pulleyn died.
1153		Bernard of Clairvaux died.
1154	Fred. Barbarossa.	Gilbertus Porretanus died.
1164		Peter Lombardus and Hugo of Amiens died.
1173		Richard of St. Victor and Robert of Melun died.
1180		John of Salisbury died. Walter of St. Victor.
1190		Thophail died.
1193	Henry VI.	Albert the Great born, according to some.
1198		
1203	Otho IV.	Alanus of Ryssel died.
1205		Moses Maimonides and Peter of Poictiers died. Albert the Great born, according to others.
1206		Peter of Poictiers and Averroes died.
1209		David of Dinant. Amalric of Chartres died.
1214		Roger Bacon born.
1217		Averroes died, according to some. Michael Scot at Toledo.
1218		
1221	Frederic II.	Bonaventura born.
1224		Thomas Aquinas born.
1234		Raymond Lulli born.
1236		Albert the Great, doctor of theology at Paris.
1245		Alexander of Hales died.
1247		Thomas Aquinas went to Paris. Ægidius Colonna born.
1248		Will. of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, died. Thomas Aquinas began to lecture on Lombardus.
1250		Peter of Abano born.
1251	Conrad IV.	
1252		Foundation of the Sorbonne.
1253		Robert Grosseteste died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1254		Niceph. Blemmydes flourished.
1256		Thom. Aquinas became Doctor of Theology.
1264		Vincent of Beauvais died.
1273	Rodolphus I.	
1274		Thomas Aquinas died. Bonaventura died.
1275		J. Duns Scotus and Walter Burleigh born.
1277		John XXI. (Petr. Hispanus) died.
1280	Adolphus of Nassau.	Albert the Great died.
1292		Roger Bacon died, according to Wood.
1293	Albert I.	Henry of Ghent died.
1294		Roger Bacon died, according to some.
1300		Richard of Middleton died.
1308	Henry VII.	J. Duns Scotus died.
1310		Georgius Pachymeres died about this time.
1314	Louis V.	
1315		Raymond Lulli died.
		Franc. Mayron introduced disputes in the Sorbonne.
1316		Ægidius Colonna died.
		Peter of Abano died.
1322		Occam resisted the Pope.
1323		Hervé (Hervæus Natalis) died.
1325		Franc. Mayron died.
1330		Occam sought the protection of the emperor Louis.
1332		Will. Durand of Saint Pourçain, died.
		Theodorus Metochita died.
1337		Walter Burleigh died.
1343		Occam died.
1346	Charles IV.	
1347		Occam died, according to others.
1349		Thomas of Bradwardine and Robert Holcot died.
1350		Peter d'Ailly born.
1357		Thomas of Strasburg died.
1358		J. Buridan still alive.
		Gregory of Rimini died.
1361		J. Tauler died.
1363		J. Gerson born.
1374		Petrarch died.
1379	Wenceslaus.	
1380		Nic. Oramus, or Oresmius, died.
1382		Thomas à Kempis born.
1395		Bessarion and George of Trebisond born.
1396		Marsilius of Inghen died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1397		Henry of Hesse died.
1400	Robert.	
1401		Nicolas Cusanus born.
1408		Laur. Valla died.
1410	Sigismund.	Matthæus of Cracow died.
1415		Emmanuel Chrysoloras died.
1419		J. Wessel Gansfort born.
1425		Peter D'Ailly died.
1429		J. Gerson died.
1430		Theodorus Gaza arrived in Italy.
1435		Marsilius Ficinus born.
1436		Raymond de Sabunde taught at Toulouse.
1438	Albert II.	George Gemisthus Pletho and Bessarion repaired to Florence.
1440	Frederick III.	Invention of Printing. Foundation of the Platonic Academy at Florence.
		Nicolas de Clemange died.
1443		Rodolphus Agricola born.
1453	Taking of Constantinople.	
1455		Nicolas V. died. Reuchlin born.
1457		Laur. Valla died.
1462		P. Pomponatius born.
1463		John Picus of Mirandula born.
1464		Geo. Scholarius Gennadius and Nicolas Cusanus died.
		Cosmo de' Medici and Pius II. died.
1467		Erasmus born.
1471		Thomas à Kempis died.
1472		Bessarion died.
1473		Persecution of the Nominalists at Paris.
		Augustinus Niphus born.
1478		Theodorus Gaza died.
1480		Thomas More born.
1481		Franc. Philelphus died.
1483		Paulus Jovius born.
1484		Jul. Cæs. Scaliger born.
1485		Rodolphus Agricola died.
1486		J. Argyropulus and George of Trebisond died, ac. to some.
		Agrippa of Nettesheim born.
1489		J. Wessel died.
1492	Maximilian I.	Lorenzo de' Medici died. Louis Vives born.
1493	Discovery of America.	Hermolaus Barbarus died. Theophrastus Paracelsus born.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1494		J. Picus of Mirandula and Angelus Politianus died.
1495		Gabr. Biel died.
1497		Melancthon born.
1499		Marcilius Ficinus died.
1500		Dominicus of Flanders died.
1501		Jerome Cardan born.
1508		Bernardinus Telesius born.
1509		Andr. Cæsalpinus born.
1512		Alex. Achillinus died.
1515		Petrus Ramus born. Macchiavelli flourished.
1517	Beginning of the Reformation.	
1520	Charles V.	Fr. Piccolomini born.
1522		J. Reuchlin died.
1525		P. Pomponatius died. Fr. Zorzi flourished.
1527		Nich. Macchiavelli died.
1529		Fr. Patritius born.
1532		Ant. Zimara died. Jac. Zabarella born.
1533		J. Fr. Picus of Mirandula killed.
		Nic. Leonicus died. Val. Weigel and Montaigne born.
1535		H. Cornelius Agrippa died. Sir T. More beheaded.
1536		Erasmus died. Fr. Zorzi died.
1537		Jac. Faber died.
1540		Marius Nizolius and L. Vives died.
		Institution of the Jesuits.
1541		Theophr. Paracelsus died. Charron born.
1542		Gasp. Contarini died.
1543		Copernicus died.
1546		Augustinus Niphus died.
1547		Jac. Sadoletus died. Nic. Taurellus and Justus Lipsius born.
1552		Paulus Jovius died. Cæs. Cremoninus born.
1553		Sim. Porta died.
1555	Ferdinand I.	
1560		Phil. Melancthon died.
1561		Franc. Bacon born.
1562		Ant. Talæus died. Fr. Sanchez born.
1564	Maximilian II.	
1568		Thomas Campanella born.
1569		
1572		P. Ramus died. Dan. Sennert born.
		J. Sepulveda died.
1574		Robert Fludd born.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1575		Jac. Böhm born.
1576	Rodolph II.	Jer. Cardan died.
1577		J. P. Van Helmont born.
1578		Berigard born. Alex. Piccolomini died.
1580		Giordano Bruno quitted Italy.
1581		Lord Herbert of Cherbury born.
1583		Grotius born.
1586		Jac. Schegk died. Luc. Vanini and Le Vayer born.
1588		Bernardus Telesius born. Th. Hobbes born. Val. Weigel died.
1589		Jac. Zabarella died.
1592		Mich. de Montaigne died. Gassendi and Comenius born.
1596		R. Descartes born. J. Bodin died.
1597		Fr. Patritius died.
1600		Giord. Bruno burnt.
1603		P. Charron and And. Cæsalpinus died.
1604		Fr. Piccolomini died.
1606		Nic. Taurellus and Just. Lipsius died.
1614	Matthias.	Mart. Schoock born. Fr. Suarez died. Fr. Merc. Van Helmont born.
1619	Ferdinand II.	L. Vanini burnt.
1621		J. Barclay died.
1623		Blaise Pascal born.
1624		Jac. Böhm died.
1625		Clauberg, Geulinx, and Wittich born.
1626		Fr. Bacon died.
1628		Rud. Goclenius died.
1630		Huet born. Cæs. Cremoninus died.
1632		Fr. Sanchez died.
		Benedict Spinoza, J. Locke, Silv. Regis, Sam. Puffendorf, and Rich. Cumberland born.
1634		B. Becker born.
1637	Ferdinand III.	Dan. Sennert and Robert Fludd died.
1638		Nic. Malebranche born.
1639		Th. Campanella died.
1642		Galileo died. Newton born.
1644		J. Baptiste Van Helmont died.
1645		Grotius died.
1646		Leibnitz and Poiret born.
1647		Bayle born.
1648		Herbert of Cherbury and Merscnne died.
1649		Scioppius died.
1650		Descartes died.

A.C.	German Emperors.	
1651		William of Tschirnhausen born.
1654		J. Selden died.
1655		Gassendi died. Chr. Thomasius born.
1657	Leopold I.	
1659		Adr. Heerebord died. Wollaston born.
1662		Blaise Pascal died.
1663		Berigard died.
1665		J. Clauberg and Mart. Schoock died.
1666		J. De Silhon died.
1669		Geulinx and J. Coccejus died.
1670		Sorbière died.
1671		Comenius died. Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury b.
1672		Le Vayer died.
1675		Sam. Clarke born.
1676		M. Von Kronland and Voetius died.
1677		Ben. Spinoza died. Th. Gale, Fr. Glisson, and Harrington died.
1679		Chr. Wolf born. Jer. Hirnhaym and Hobbes died.
1680		Jos. Glanville and La Rochefoucauld died.
1684		Berkeley born. Jac. Thomasius died.
1685		Lamb. Velthuysen died.
1687		Henr. More and Wittich died.
1688		Cudworth and Parker died.
1694		Ant. Arnault and Sam. Puffendorf died. Fr. Hutcheson and Voltaire born.
1695		Nicole died.
1698		Balthasar Becker and J. Pordage died.
1699		Fr. Merc. Van Helmont died.
1704		J. Locke and Bossuet died.
1705	Joseph I.	J. Ray died.
1706		Bayle died.
1707		Silv. Regis died.
1708		Tschirnhausen and Jacquelot died.
1711		Hume born.
1712		Crusius and Rousseau born.
1713	Charles VI.	Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury died.
1715		Malebranche died. Condillac and Helvetius born. Gellert born.
1716		Leibnitz died.
1718		M. Aug. Fardella died.
1719		P. Poiret and Rich. Cumberland died.
1720		Bonnet born.
1721		Huet died.
1722		Boulainvilliers died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1723		Adam Smith born.
1724		Wollaston died. Kant born.
1727		Newton died.
1728		Chr. Thomasius and Thümmig died.
1729		Sam. Clarke, Collins, Gundling, and Fr. Buddeus died.
		And. Rüdiger died.
1731		J. Priestley born. Mandeville died.
1733		W. Derham died.
1735		Le Clerc died.
1736	Charles VII.	
1740	Frederic II, King of Prussia.	
1742		Garve born.
1743		Jacobi born.
1744		Baptist Vico and Joachim Lange died. Platner born.
1745	Francis I.	
1747		Fr. Hutcheson died.
1748		De Crouzaz and Burlamaqui died.
1750		Bilfinger died.
1751		La Mettrie died.
1752		Hansch died.
1754		Berkeley and Christ. Wolf died.
1755		Montesquieu died.
1756		
1757		David Hartley died. Gall born.
1758		Ch. Reinhold born.
1759		Maupertuis died.
1762		Alex. Baumgarten died. Fichte born.
1765	Joseph II.	Herm. Sam. Reimarus died.
1766		Thomas Abbt and Gottsched died.
1769		Gellert died.
1770		Winckler, D'Argens, and Formey died.
1771		Helvetius died.
1772		J. Ulr. Cramer died. Swedenborg died.
1774		Quesnay died.
1775		Crusius and Walch died. Schelling born.
1776		Hume died. Spurzheim born.
1777		Meier and Lambert died.
1778		Voltaire and Rousseau died.
1779		Sulzer died.
1780		Condillac and Batteux died.
1781		Ernesti and Lessing died.
1782		Henry Home and Iselin died.
1783		D'Alembert died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1784		Diderot died.
1785		Baumeister and De Mably died.
1786		Mendelssohn died.
1788		Hamann and Filangieri died.
1789	French Revolution.	
1790	Leopold II.	A. Smith, F. Hemsterhuys and Basedow d.
1791		Rich. Price, Daries, and Nettelbladt died.
1792	Francis II.	Victor Cousin born.
1793		Bonnet, Moritz, and Beccaria died.
1796		Th. Reid died. Jouffroy born.
1798		Garve died.
1800		Sol. Maimon died.
1801		Heidenreich and Irving died.
1802		Engel died.
1803		J. Beattie and Herder died.
1804		Kant, Jos. Priestley, and Saint-Martin d.
1806		Tiedemann died.
1808		Bardili died.
1809		J. A. Eberhard, Steinbart, and Thos. Payne, died.
1812		K. Chr. E. Schmid died.
1813		J. A. H. Ulrich died.
1814		Fichte died.
1815		Mesmer died.
1816		Ferguson died.
1817		De Dalberg died.
1818		Platner and Campe died.
1819		Jacobi and Solger died.
1820		Wyttenbach and Klein died. Gall d.
1821		Feder and Buhle died.
1822		Eschenmayer died.
1823		Reinhold and Maass died.
1828		D. Stewart and Bouterwek died.
1829		Frederic Schlegel.
1831		Hegel.
1832		Krause. Schulze. Spurzheim died.
1834		Schleiermacher.
1837	Ferdinand IV.	Fourier.
1838		Schopenhauer died.
1840		Krug.
1841		Herbart.
1842		Degerando.
1843	Francis.	Fries. Fr. Baader.
1850		Jouffroy.
1851	Joseph I.	Oersted.

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